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PREFACE
The Land Tenure Country Profiles presented here are a new edition of a continent-wide set of profiles prepared
and published by the Land Tenure Center a decade ago, in 1986. The brevity of the profiles and their
standardized organization across countries had made them a useful reference for a generation of development
specialists. A few key references were noted at the conclusion of each profile.
The new profiles reflect a decade of intensive work on the continent by LTC, and a very considerable
deepening of LTC’s knowledge and understanding of land tenure issues in Africa. They take account of the events
of the past ten years, which have been substantial in many of the countries covered. Land tenure continues to be a
volatile policy domain. In addition, the standard topics treated have been revised to take into account new
development concerns; those now covered, however briefly, are:
National land policy and legal framework
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure systems
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Economic growth and food security strategies
Agricultural development
Natural resource management and conservation
Democratization and governance
Gender dimensions
Present policy position and reform debates
Implications for policy reform and programming
The 1986 profiles appeared as a single volume, “African Land Tenure Country Profiles,” in the LTC Papers
series, with a single continent-wide synthesis of the state of land tenure. This was revealing in some ways, but
obscured significant regional characteristics of policy debates and trends in law reform. This time, three regional
syntheses have been prepared, for West Africa, the Greater Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa.
The profiles are a project of the Land Tenure Center’s Access II Project with AID’s Global Bureau and
Africa Bureau, and the Center gratefully acknowledges both AID’s support and the substantive contributions of
Dr. Pamela Stanbury, Access II Project Manager.
Six LTC research assistants compiled most of the West Africa tranche of these profiles and contributed to
the synthesis: Rebecca Furth, Mary Hobbs, Anna Knox, Stephen Leisz, Michael Williams, and Kevin Bohrer.
Four LTC research assistants worked on the East African tranche and contributed to the synthesis: Jyoti
Subramanian, Anna Knox, Stephen Leisz, and Kevin Bohrer. Deutsche Gessellschaft für Techniche
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) provided supplementary funding to allow drafts of these Horn of Africa profiles and the
regional synthesis paper to be completed and circulated for comments at a Subregional Workshop on Land
Tenure Issues in Natural Resource Management, Addis Ababa, 11–15 March 1996. The profiles benefited
greatly from the suggestions of participants who commented on the drafts. Finally, five LTC research assistants
compiled most of the Southern Africa tranche of these profiles and contributed to the synthesis: Eva Jensen, Scott
Kloeck-Jenson, Anna Knox, Jyoti Subramanian, and Michael Williams.vi
The work of these LTC research assistants was performed under tight time constraints, their commitment
and efficiency were exemplary, and their insights were valuable. In addition, thanks are due to Jane Dennis for her
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Executive summary
The present report is a regional synthesis completed as a component of the Land Tenure Center’s “Africa Land
Tenure Profiles” project undertaken at the request of USAID. The tenure profiles project divides sub-Saharan
Africa into three regions: the Greater Horn, Southern Africa, and West Africa. West Africa, as defined within the
context of this project, includes a region bordered by the Sahelian states to the north, the West African coast
(though Cape Verde, an island nation off the coast, is included), and the Central African states of Gabon, the
Congo, Zaire, and the Central African Republic, stretching far to the south and east and occupying a space that is
generally not considered to be a part of West Africa. This vast zone features dramatic and countless variations in
climate, environment, ethnicity, cultural expressions, and social institutions. The region includes 22 countries, 15
of which are commonly classified as Francophone, 5 as Anglophone, and 2 as Lusophone. One might note as well
that two tiny countries of West Africa—Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Principe—are not included among
the countries profiled.
Policy and legal framework
Contrary to what one might expect given a group of 22 countries of nearly unimagineable ethnic, linguistic,
geographic, and climatic diversity, one can speak relatively easily of dominant policy trends across vast sections
of this grouping and even, in general terms, of policy trends common throughout the greater region. This is mostly
explained by the fact that all localities within the region have for over a century been subjected to nonlocal legal
regimes that departed fundamentally from the still generally dominant customary systems of tenure and natural
resource management. The legacy of dual tenure systems—statutory and customary—has continued into the era
of independence and to the present day. Although there is a real distinction between the legal and administrative
approach of the French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonizers as compared to the Anglo-Saxons, as well as a
diversity of postindependent legal experimentation regarding land tenure and natural resource management
policies, the fundamental duality that has long characterized tenure and resource management remains a defining
characteristic of current regimes throughout the region.3
TABLE 1.1 Land and population












Benin 11. 1.9 (17%) .44 (4%) 5.3 (48%) 5.2 3. (58%)
Burkina Faso 27. 3.6 (13%) 6. (22%) 4. (15%) 10. 8.4 (84%)
Cameroon 47. 7. (15%) 2. (4%) 1.7 (4%) 12.9 7.4 (57%)
Cape Verde .4 .05 (13%) .025 (6%) .3 (75%) .38 .15 (39%)
Central African Republic 62. 2. (3%) 3. (5%) 10.6 (17%) 3.2 1.9 (59%)
Chad 126. 3.3 (3%) 45. (35%) 45.2 (35%) 6.1 4.4 (72%)
Congo 34. .18 (.5%) 10. (29%) 2.9 (9%) 2.5 1.5 (60%)
Gabon 27. .5 (2%) 4.7 (17%) .7 (3%) 1. .86 (86%)
Gambia 1.1 .2 (18%) .9 (8%) .5 (.5%) 1.3 .82 (63%)
Ghana 23.9 4.3 (18%) 5. (20%) 5.5 (4%) 16.9 8. (47%)
Guinea 24.6 .7 (3%) 5.5 (22%) 3.9 (16%) 6.5 4.6 (70%)
Guinea Bissau 3.6 .34 (9%) 1.1 (31%) .3 (8%) 1.1 .81 (74%)
Ivory Coast 32. 3.7 (12%) 13. (41%) 8. (25%) 13.8 7.1 (51%)
Liberia 9.8 .38 (4%) 5.8 (59%) 1.9 (19%) 2.9 2. (70%)
Mali 124. 2.5 (2%) 30. (24%)  82.6 (67%) 10.5 8.2 (78%)
Mauritania 103. .21 (.2%) 39.2 (38%) 58.7 (57%) 2.2 1.4 (64%)
Niger 127. 3.6 (.3%) 8.9 (7%) 112. (88%) 8.8 7.6 (86%)
Nigeria 91. 32.4 (36%) 40. (44%) 7.4 (8%) 108. 68.7 (63%)
Senegal 19. 2.4 (13%) 3.1 (16%) 3.4 (18%) 8.1 6.3 (78%)
Sierra Leone 7.2 .54 (8%) 2.2 (31%) 2.4 (33%) 4.4 2.6 (59%)
Togo 5.4 2.4 (44%)  .2 (4%) 1.9 (35%) 4. 2.7 (68%)
Zaire 234. 7.9 (3%) 15. (6%) 3. (1%) 42.6 27. (59%)
All statistics are based on FAO data from 1994.4
The Portuguese (since 1856), the Belgians (since 1885/86), and the French (since the turn of the twentieth
century) clearly articulated in legislation that “occupied lands” were to be governed according to local custom and
all other lands were considered to be state property. A reading of the table profiles suggests, however, that during
the colonial period, especially in Francophone West Africa, state property was widely considered by
administrators to include all untitled land (as opposed to excluding all occupied lands), as land registration
through long-term state leasehold and freehold titling systems gained a prominent place within legislated policy.
Widespread practices of itinerant farming and transhumant or nomadic herding common throughout West Africa
resulted in vulnerability of local populations to being confronted with state claims of ownership to lands exploited
on a periodic basis. Economic development goals further increased vulnerability as continuous and monetarily
profitable land and resource use was favored by colonial policies. An early legal development, for example, was
codification by colonial administrations of the new principle of mise en valeur (land use and development) as a
tool intending to achieve economic development goals. This principle required long-term leaseholders to satisfy
specific resource investment and development conditions defined by the state prior to gaining eligibility for
application for private title. Further evidence of the decisive role claimed by the colonial government in redirecting
land tenure is early codification of the principle of eminent domain,
1 which was liberally exercised in some areas.
Application of such principles as mise en valeur and eminent domain, often resulting in the establishment of state-
supported and long-term land claims on the part of nonlocal individuals and the accompanying displacement of
local populations, is especially striking in the resource-rich region today defined by the countries of Zaire, Congo,
and Gabon.
One can generalize in the context of West African legislative policy with remarkable ease, especially across
Francophone West Africa, which includes 15 of the 22 countries classified within the “West Africa Region” for
purposes of these profiles.
2 In the Francophone zone, titling and registration systems were aimed at converting
state land to private freehold, with the expectation that future private property would first complete a period as
state leasehold. The leasehold period was to serve as a kind of land-steward apprenticeship during which the
candidate for eventual land title fulfilled specified conditions regarding land exploitation, improvement, and
development (as upheld by the legal principle of mise en valeur). Indigenous populations made extremely little
use of legal provisions governing state leasehold or freehold land. Later attempts by French colonial
administrators to make land registration more accessible to indigenous populations—such as the introduction of a
less cumbersome method of land registration known as the livret foncier appearing in French West African
legislation in 1925—did little to change the situation.
The British were less consistent than the French in their legal approach to land management during the
colonial period. At the same time that the British colonial administration was attempting to consolidate state
control over land management in northern Nigeria and northern Ghana through the establishment of protectorates,
the policy elsewhere in British West Africa was to vest land ownership and authority in paramount chiefs
considered to have derived their status from precolonial “customary” institutions. The distinction between the
“protected” and “customary” (or “tribal”) regions, however, becomes less clear when one considers that in both
settings actual land administration was accomplished “indirectly” through customary authorities.
A second ambiguity characteristic of the Anglophone zone emerges from the introduction of western-style
freehold ownership of land in particular regions—especially coastal Liberia and Sierra Leone—adjacent to
                                                  
1 The Black’s Law Dictionary begins a definition of the principle of eminent domain as follows: “The power to take
private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise
functions of public character.” The principle is an important tenet in both Francophone and Anglophone legal traditions.
2 One might note, however, that among the 15 countries here referred to as “Francophone,” a piece of Cameroon—
at least in linguistic terms—is Anglophone, and Zaire was colonized by Belgium as opposed to France. The significance
of the unique linguistic characteristics of Cameroon is here considered minimal since the dominant legal tradition of
importance throughout the period since independence is decidedly French.5
regions declared to be under the authority of indigenous chiefs. The juxtaposition of freehold principles and
paramount chief administration of land has been a strong feature in most postindependence Anglophone West
Africa countries; Nigeria, however, chose to revive the “protectorate” legacy in 1978 by proclaiming state
ownership of the entire national territory.
As contrasted to a general emphasis on the privatization and economic development of land resources,
colonial policies framed in the context of the broader category of natural resource management were decidedly
state-centric and protectionist. Forest legislation enacted for French West and Equatorial Africa, for example,
consisted primarily of lists of rules and restrictions to exploitation of trees and soils to be enforced by the quasi-
military institution known as the government forest service. Ownership of trees and forests was, in legal terms,
uniquely an attribute of the state. Nonetheless, commercially valuable trees, as was the case with land, could be
made available for private exploitation through a state concession—an administrative act granting specific use
rights to state-owned resources to particular individuals for specified periods. This centralized, enforcement-
oriented approach to natural resource management remained intact—and in most cases was even reinforced—
throughout the period since independence and has only relatively recently been seriously questioned and, in a few
cases (see Senegal for an example), partially reformed.
The 2–3 decades following independence (around 1960 for the majority of the 22 countries discussed here)
saw considerable experimentation in the realm of land policy on the part of a number of countries of the region.
Such experimentation generally took the form of significant legislative reinforcement of state claims of direct
management authority and ownership over land resources. Nationalization, partial nationalization, or some
variation on this theme was attempted in a large number of countries, including Guinea, Zaire, Congo, Benin,
Senegal, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, and Guinea Bissau. In some cases (Guinea, Benin)
such policies have explicitly and officially been replaced by a push toward land privatization through registration
of freehold rights that echoes the early colonial period. In others (Congo, Burkina Faso) recent reforms toward
economic and political liberalization appear to signal coming legal reforms more supportive of private tenures—
or at least to ignore current legislation running counter to individualized control over land. Finally, Niger has
recently (1993) enacted innovative legislation providing for—and encouraging—conversion of customary land
rights into legally recognized freehold.
The majority of the profiles treating West African countries note the increasing influence favoring
individualized landholdings as economies based on the production of commodities become more developed, as
populations and land pressures increase, and as international donors support widespread legal reform. Where
private holdings are not legally allowed (Zaire, Guinea Bissau), the mechanism of state concessions provides for
limited-term individual tenure security where profitable exploitation of natural resources is feasible, or where
privileged individuals are allowed to engage in natural resource market speculation. Some countries, such as
Cameroon, have put in place policies that appear to encourage land speculation through acquisition of private
holdings—again apparently favoring privileged individuals with specialized access to knowledge, influence, or
financial resources.
The unique example of Senegal draws special attention. Since 1964, legislation has existed that intends to
replace customary systems of land administration in rural areas with locally elected councils (Conseils ruraux).
Subsequent legislation in 1972 defined these councils and initiated the process of putting them into place
throughout the zone designated as terroir (inhabited rural areas covering slightly more than half the national
territory)—a process which took nearly two decades to complete.
The Senegalese initiative promoting decentralized and democratic control over land and resource tenure
should still (in 1996) be regarded as experimental, since the tradition of centralized state control built up
throughout the colonial period clearly remains strong in the attitudes and institutions of policy implementers. State
claims of ultimate ownership of all land (with the exception of a small number of privately registered, mostly
urban, plots executed prior to 1964), government definitions of mise en valeur, and requirements that government
approval be obtained prior to execution of most of the important decisions of the local rural councils conspire to
place limits to true decentralization in the area of land and natural resource management.6
TABLE 1.2 National land tenure patterns
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* Significant does not refer to percentage of land area under private ownership or state leasehold but the impact those tenures have in national tenure policy and practice.8
The commercial exploitation of natural resources such as trees and pasture resources is encouraged through
a recent policy trend toward decentralized access to benefits—especially income—resulting from rational
resource exploitation. The trend toward decentralization (at least of benefits) and the emphasis on increasing local
tenure security is especially evident in the Sahelian countries organized into the Permanent Inter-state Committee
for Drought Control in the Sahel (Comité permanent inter-États de lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel,
CILSS), which for nearly two decades has acted as a forum for policy debate on these topics. Guinea, Senegal,
Niger, and other countries have enacted or will enact forest legislation granting increased rights to populations
living in the vicinity of both classified and unclassified forests. In return for legal recognition of local capture of
benefit streams, local communities are expected to adhere to a forest management plan formulated or approved
by the state.
In summary, the overall trend (more pronounced in Francophone than in Anglophone countries, yet evident
to varying degrees in both zones) toward official encouragement of land and natural resource markets is
reminiscent of the turn-of-the-century colonial policies designed to replace customary tenures with state-
administered land en route to registration as private property. Notable holdouts include Nigeria, Burkina Faso,
Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Zaire, where policies currently stop short of targeting a final stage of legal conversion
to freehold tenure as they concentrate on maintaining a strong—though perhaps decentralized—role for the state
in land ownership and management. The lines between the two approaches are less distinct than might first be
assumed, however, since policies aiming at conversion of customary tenures to private property, such as in
Guinea and Niger, are quite explicit in maintaining a strong role for the state in land management even once the
conversion is complete. For example, a notable tool to be used in maintaining a strong role for the state,
somewhat redesigned since its introduction during the colonial period, is that of mise en valeur. The current
concept of mise en valeur includes monitoring of land and resource exploitation, even on private holdings, by
state agencies, or local councils that include participation of state agents, endowed with powers to enforce
reigning governmental guidelines where they conflict with observed resource-use patterns and practices.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure systems
In all West African countries, whether officially recognized or not, community-based tenure systems
predominantly dictate who has access to land and natural resources. The only significant regions where this is not
the case are in urban areas—where freehold tenure systems supported by land registration systems have been put
into place—development zones such as irrigation schemes or plantations, and the east coasts of Liberia and
Sierra Leone. The latter two areas were settled mainly by freed slaves. In both of these coastal strips, the
colonizers put into place land registration systems based on freehold title which have replaced the community-
based tenure systems that were previously present.
Literature on community land tenure systems in West Africa reflects the current understanding of how the
land tenure systems employed by sedentary agriculturalists have evolved. The literature agrees that in most places
the first person to arrive in an area, clear the terrain, or put the tract into production was considered to have
primary use rights to that land. Today, in most cases that ancestor’s descendants are considered the primary
“owners” of the land and usually the eldest male has rights to allocate land or in other ways dictate who can use
the land.
There are two major subdivisions. The first is lineage based. In these systems the members of the lineage
descended from the ancestor are considered to be the “owners” of the land. Rights in these systems are passed
either patrilineally or matrilineally. In patrilineal societies rights are passed either from father to eldest son or,
more commonly, from eldest male in the lineage to the next eldest male (usually the brother of the eldest male). In
matrilineal societies rights to land are passed on the mother’s side. In these cases males get rights to land from
their mother’s brothers. Also in these cases one can find the eldest male in the lineage responsible for allocating
land among the members of the lineage.9
The second—and less frequently found among community-based land tenure systems—is where land
allocation is carried out by the monarchy. In this case the king distributes rights to land to nobles who then
distribute the rights to their lineage. These systems are also both patrilineally and matrilineally based. Two
examples of this type are found with the Fon in Benin—a patrilineally based society—and the Agni and Baoule in
Côte d’Ivoire, both of which have matrilineal social structures where land is allocated by the king to the various
lineages.
In all of these community-based tenure systems, access to land is primarily through inheritance if one is a
member of the lineage/group; borrowing, sharecropping, or renting if one is an outsider (stranger) to the group; or
purchase if land is bought and sold in the area. All of these possibilities are primarily for men, though women can
have access to land through borrowing. Otherwise, in most cases, women have access to land through the men in
a lineage. This means either through their husband or through their father, brother, uncle, or another male relative.
Exceptions to this are found among the Fulbe in Niger and in The Gambia, where women have been known to
inherit land from their mothers.
Tree tenure is tied to land tenure in almost all community-based tenure systems. In most places only those
who have primary access to land resources—for example, members of the lineage that controls the allocation of
land in an area—have rights to plant trees. This is because tree planting, and the ownership of trees, usually
indicates a strong right of access and control over the land on which the trees are planted. There are exceptions to
this as shown by reports of community-based tenure systems in Sierra Leone, where stranger farmers can plant—
and own—trees on land they are borrowing. In these cases the stranger farmers are compensated for the trees
when they leave the land.
A second case is nomadic herders, on whom there have also been some studies carried out of land and
natural resource tenure systems. Most of these systems revolve around access to water resources. Two examples
of these systems are the Tuaregs and the Wodaabe in Niger. The Tuareg system consists of a regular
transhumant circular movement that corresponds to the cyclical appearance of the rainy season. In the dry season
the herd movement is organized around a number of wells that the group has dug. The Wodaabe, on the other
hand, migrate along an east-west axis that corresponds to the rains. In many areas a complementary relationship
has developed between transhumant herders and settled farmers, which has often expressed itself through manure
“contracts” or established rights of entry to postharvest fields accorded to herders for grazing of crop residues. In
some cases, however, the relationship has been one of conflict sparked by competition for access to natural
resources. Such conflicts have been especially keen since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s.
A third group of resource users who also have unique forms of community-based tenure systems are the
“pygmies” of the central African forested areas. These people have traditionally made their living from hunting
and gathering in the forested areas of central Africa (Zaire, Gabon, and Congo). While their traditional rights to
land rest on a combination similar to the agricultural tenure systems—a combination of defined territories and
group membership (descended from the first person to use the resource)—their corporate rights to land are not
based on cultivation or clearing of land but, rather, to gathering, fishing, and hunting in the forested areas.
Unfortunately, there have been few studies done on the pygmies’ natural resource tenure systems.
In many areas of West Africa Islamic law plays a large part in the community-based tenure systems. This is
especially true in parts of Guinea, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Gambia, and Nigeria, but is present in a number of
other West African countries as well. Islamic law provides for both collective and individual ownership of land. It
dictates that all land belongs to all Islamic people, but leaves an opening for state assertion of stewardship
(basically amounting to legal ownership) of all land as is the case in Mauritania. However, an individual Muslim
can have legal ownership to land. The basic criteria for establishing ownership are occupation and use. According
the Islamic principle of Indirass, private rights are established through ten years of continuous resource
exploitation—such as for agricultural production—and are to be forfeited following ten years of disuse. In some
cases Islamicization has resulted in the undermining of indigenous inheritance rules, such as where Islamic10
formulas of land and wealth distributions among male and female offspring conflict with practices of matrilineal
systems.
Water rights are also critical in Islamic law. The value of a parcel of land is determined by its proximity to
water and, under Islamic law, all people have rights of access to water sources. Use rights, though, depend on the
type of water source. Some are considered public water ways, open to all users including livestock; others are
considered the property of the person or group that constructed them, such as wells.
In all the countries community-based tenure systems have evolved and adapted to historical pressures on
them, and they are continuing to do so. Following are three notable ways in which some of the community-based
tenure systems are evolving and adapting to specific influences in the different countries in West Africa.
In Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and The Congo (Brazzaville), land markets under community-based tenure
systems are noted to be evolving. In Togo, the first private land markets were introduced by the settling of ex-
slaves from Brazil. Today, this influence has spread to some of the community-based tenure systems in the area.
In Ghana, land markets were noted as developing after the introduction of cocoa as a cash crop in the 1870s. In
Côte d’Ivoire, immigrants to the forest area “bought” land from the local population. And in The Congo, since the
1970s, some nuclear families have been buying “personal” land. This land is then inherited father to son, instead
of matrilineally. In all cases, land is being bought because a commercial potential for crops is seen.
Thus land markets, and therefore individualized tenure, have often appeared following introduction of cash
crops. A further example is illustrated by the Senoufou and Minianka in Mali with the introduction of cotton as a
cash crop. In some areas, such as in parts of Ghana, this individualization is putting pressure on traditional
matrilineal societies to allow for transfer of land from father to son, so that improvements to the land can be
passed on to sons rather than transferred to the eldest male in the lineage. In some cases fathers are giving land
“gifts” to their sons before they die, so that when they die the land, with the improvements, will not be lost from
the immediate family.
Another way that tenure systems are evolving is through the increased conflicts between herders and
sedentary farmers which are seen in parts of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. In these areas traditional
systems that saw herders leaving their herds on agricultural land during the dry season and effectively exchanging
manure for crop stubble, or in other cases herders allowing farmers to grow crops on pastureland during the rainy
season, are breaking down. This is happening as some cultivators are expanding into herding activity and some
herders are expanding into sedentary agriculture. In both cases, traditional tenure arrangements are breaking
down and in some cases violence is reported as having broken out between the two competing groups. The overall
tenure transition appears to be a movement from overlapping to exclusive rights.
Thus, while community-based tenure systems are still the most widely followed patterns of rules regulating
land and natural resource use in West Africa, they are not static. And while there are general similarities amongst
the systems, they are not all the same.
Finally, one should consider the treatment of community-based tenure systems in official policy. Is
customary tenure recognized in national tenure legislation? The answer to this question could be expected to
determine whether a particular policy orientation would be categorized as “replacement” or “adaptation” vis-à-vis
community-based tenure systems. In fact, the answer is not always straightforward. In order to formulate a
response to this question one must first consider what legal recognition of customary tenure might consist of.
Such a task is attempted here through a brief examination of the country-by-country legislation.
A very loose and somewhat debatable classification system emerges from an examination of the profiles.
One might suggest four categories regarding the treatment of community-based tenure systems at the hands of
national legislation in West Africa: (1) nonrecognition or abolition; (2) neutral recognition; (3) recognition aimed
at replacement; and (4) geographically-qualified (“zoning”) recognition. Fully 50% (11 of 22) of the countries of
West Africa appear to fit in the first category: “nonrecognition or abolition.” According to the information11
available, a slight majority of these countries features national policies that largely ignore the issue of community-
based tenure; this includes Benin, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Zaire—the latter which declares
its intention of affording some protection of customary rights, but has neglected to enact specific promised
legislation to this effect. However, a number of the countries of this category, especially Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Congo, Mauritania, and Senegal, seem actively hostile to locally based customary systems and may
even go so far as to legally abolish them.
The second category is composed of those countries with national policies that explicitly mention customary
tenure systems without offering any substantial sanction or protection of them. This category includes the Central
African Republic, Chad, and Mali.
The third category promotes customary recognition of rights as a basis for registration of private individual
rights. One might argue that once such rights are registered on an individual basis, they are transformed (as an
example, they generally become transferable at the initiative of the individual rights holder—contrary to the rules
basic to most customary systems) and are therefore no longer community-based. Countries in this category
include Niger, Togo, and Guinea.
Finally, the fourth category includes a group of countries whose policies have most often evolved from their
former grounding in the British colonial legal system (the exception being Guinea Bissau). British colonial
policies are generally considered to be more tolerant of customary systems of authority than those of the
French—as long as the customary systems are geographically and definitionally circumscribed. The countries in
this category vest land management authority and sometimes property rights in customary authorities within
defined zones. A subtle tradition of standardizing definitions of “customary” systems and authorities accompanied
implementation of British colonial policy and appears to have been upheld by most of Britain’s ex-colonies in
West Africa. Other zones are designated state lands. Thus, something resembling the colonial legacy earlier
designated as “tribal authority lands” continues to exist in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, and Guinea
Bissau. Such recognition of customary systems does not preclude the coexistence of strong replacement policies
as evidenced, for example, by the rapid expansion of state grants of concessions in Guinea Bissau which threatens
the integrity of customary systems and zones.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for most countries in West Africa. Between 50% and 70% of
West African populations reside in rural areas while up to 90% are engaged in agriculture either directly or
indirectly. The majority of rural populations rely on subsistence agriculture. At the macroeconomic level,
however, the countries are quite diverse in terms of their reliance on agriculture as a source of national income.
Gabon, rich in petroleum and mineral resources, generates only 4% of its GDP from agriculture while agriculture
accounts for 50% of GDP in resource-poor Guinea Bissau.
The overall performance of agricultural production in the West Africa region has been disappointing,
particularly since it has been the object of substantial investment and policy directives for most countries since
their independence. Much of the sluggish or negative growth in output can be attributed to several factors
stemming from economic, land tenure, and agricultural policies handed down by governments and donors and the
worsening drought situation in the Sahel. Other factors, including political instability and world price fluctuations,
have affected agricultural production in the countries of the region.
Postindependence governments in West Africa sought development and growth through adopting economic
systems which ranged from socialist to free market. Within the past decade or so, however, there has been a
marked shift toward promoting market economies in the region. State farms and cooperatives, once the focus of
agricultural investment in the CAR, Benin, Congo, and Guinea, are giving way to support for individualized
farming. Internationally supported programs of structural adjustment have played a role in this process. The12
process of market liberalization has fueled changing policies and incentives governing land use and agriculture,
paving the way for increased export crop production.
The introduction of cash crops during colonialism has led to a concentration of different commodities
corresponding to various climatic zones. Roughly, these zones correspond to cocoa and coffee production along
the southern border, groundnuts in the far western region, and cotton production in the lower Sahel. Oil palm is
produced in the more tropical southern and western locales. The trend toward agriculture commercialism has
altered many of the rules and much of the administration of land tenure systems, both at the policy level and on
the ground. Where economies have moved away from largely subsistence production to cash-crop production, the
increased value attached to land as a result of its income-generating potential has led to greater individualization
of tenure. For several countries situated along the coast, including the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and
Nigeria, dual tenure patterns have evolved from the promotion and expansion of export crop production in their
more humid southern regions. Here, community-based tenure systems tend to place greater emphasis on
household ownership rights and are less reliant on traditional authorities for land administration than their
northern counterparts, where subsistence agriculture predominates.
Export crop promotion has met with mixed results. In response to both policy and price incentives, farmers
have undertaken higher levels of cash-crop production. However, policies in many cases have not supported
smallholder production of these crops. In Liberia and Guinea Bissau, sharp inequities in land distribution and
wealth have developed as a result of government policies favoring large-scale export crop production. In fact,
large-scale agriculture, often assumed to be more efficient than smallholder production, has frequently been
characterized by poor management, absentee landlordism, and inefficient land use. Another approach taken to
boost agricultural production are resettlement schemes. In Togo and Burkina Faso, schemes sought to abolish
customary tenure and impose strict regulations on land use and agricultural techniques. Because of their
oppressive nature and inability to offer secure tenure, most floundered.
In addition, the emphasis on export crop production has left subsistence farmers vulnerable to food
insecurity. Many countries which initially prospered from healthy price trends from cocoa, coffee, and
groundnuts subsequently saw prices plunge during the late 1980s and 1990s, dragging their economies down as
well. Heavy reliance on export crop earnings has had serious implications for the food security of both rural and
urban populations. Policy and price incentives to produce export commodities have led to an overall decline in
food crop production. As rural populations become more reliant on purchased foodstuffs, they become extremely
vulnerable to price shocks which send producer prices for exports and consumer prices for staples reeling in
opposite directions. In some cases, more recent policies, such as those in the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, have
sought to revive food crop production to achieve higher levels of food self-sufficiency. In groundnut-producing
regions, many farmers have in recent years reverted to staple food-crop production in response to low prices for
groundnuts.
Furthermore, the profiles suggest that individualization through titling and registration has the potential to
incite greater insecurity for the majority of rural populations by providing opportunities for those with greater
wealth or status to acquire rights at the expense of the poor, whether it be wealthy government officials over
smallholder farmers, landowners over land borrowers, or men over women. Where land speculation exists as a
primary motive encouraging those registering rights to resources, as is illustrated in the case of Cameroon,
agricultural production is most likely to suffer.
Finally, one cannot ignore the policy implications of structural changes occurring in the livestock production
section. For many pastoralists, the waning availability of suitable pastureland and grazing routes has inclined
them to adopt more sedentary lifestyles and engage in agropastoralism. This happens particularly during drought
periods when higher herd mortality rates induce selling of herds and undertaking of cultivation to meet subsistence
needs. Fulani and Tuareg have recurrently sold their herds to farmers, hiring themselves out as herders in order to
generate an alternative source of income. Sedentarization of pastoralists is often perceived by governments to be a13
beneficial process by removing constraints to agricultural expansion. Where it has not occurred naturally,
governments with the aid of donors have frequently tried to encourage sedentarization through the establishment
of reserves. However, sedentarization can have a devastating impact on the environment as a result of
overgrazing and overstocking. Few, if any, efforts to settle pastoralists onto reserves have met with success.
Today, it appears that only Niger is envisioning an alternative to what has been a series of failed attempts at
sedentarization. Its Rural Code calls for the participatory redrawing of range and corridor boundaries. While the
sluggish pace of policy application and recent political ruptures have curtailed implementation of this policy, it is
a step apart from most government legislation in the region which has not addressed pastoralists’ tenure rights at
all.
Just as land tenure systems and national policy positions vary greatly across West Africa, so too do national
legislation for the other components of the natural resource base. Water, pasture, forest, and animal resources
may each be treated separately with their own codes, management, and enforcement services. Cutting across these
sectors is a concern for environmental protection against threats of soil erosion, degradation, and deforestation.
Current natural resource management policies across West Africa are informed by the legacy of the French
colonial administration. Contemporary Sahelian forest codes, for example, have roots in the 4 July 1935 decree
which created forest services with the police powers deemed necessary to enforce the prohibitions established by
the decree. The colonial government assumed responsibility for managing the resources of the forests for two
reasons: (1) to conserve forest products (firewood, charcoal, lumber); and (2) to protect and restore ecologies of
the regions being degraded. This policy thus protected resources through the enforced restriction of their use. The
forest reserves created during this era are today divided into similar systems of classified forests, state reserves,
forest domains, protected forests, community forests, and reforestation lands. While the Anglophone colonies did
not inherit this tradition, they have since adopted comparable systems.
Although local communities’ use rights are greatly restricted or suspended by the state forest preserves,
exploitation of these resources continues. State enforcement of rules as an approach to natural resource
management has not been successful in ensuring sustainable exploitation. When populations are denied
management responsibilities over resources, they may perceive little interest in protecting them. Moreover, some
populations have no choice but to continue exploiting these resources. In The Gambia, for example, deforestation
and wildlife exploitation prompted the establishment of forest parks and reserves, to which villagers are now
restricted access. These villagers, however, continue to rely upon forest products such as firewood and the
pastureland found within the reserves, so they encroach upon the protected areas. Chad also enacted a new
forestry code in 1989 that classified all forests as part of the public domain and abolished the local populations’
access to these resources. Exploitation continues, however, because the government does not enforce the code.
Furthermore, because these resources are now perceived as belonging to the state, incentives for local populations
to restrain from overexploitation are likely reduced.
A common feature of natural resource policies throughout West Africa is the difference between legislation
and the possibility of its enforcement. While many countries officially support strict forest-protection legislation,
they do not have the staff or resources to enforce the regulations. When legislation is enforced, it often does not
produce the desired effect. In 1989, for example, Senegal established forest protection committees (CPNs) to
prevent the illicit use of forest resources. One of the effects of the CPNs’ activities, however, has been an increase
in the tensions between farmers and herders. While farmers once permitted herders access to the tree resources on
their land, they are now restricting access to trees in order not to be blamed themselves for an tree damage or
felling. Senegal’s latest forest code (1993) seeks to increase local communities’ control over their tree resources,
but it is unclear whether or not the new law will be effective. Similarly, Mali’s 1995 forest code allows both
private and community registration of some forests in an effort to promote more forestry comanagement.
While forest resources are severely limited and fragile for many of the West African countries, abundant
forests still exist in Gabon, Congo, and Zaire. In these countries, forest legislation is less developed and14
overexploitation poses a significant threat. Zaire’s 1973/80 General Property Law includes forests as a
component of state property. The state grants 25-year logging concessions to vast tracts of forestland. This
system encourages the destruction of Zaire’s tropical forests by both lumber companies and local populations,
who settle on the land once it has been cleared of trees. Logging in Gabon is similarly almost unrestricted as
permits are required only for its coastal forests. A 1982 law broadly defines forest management, but specific
legislation regulating logging is not yet complete.
Some recent innovative attempts at integrated natural resource management strategies include the adoption
of a terroir approach to local-level management. A terroir is the area regularly used by a community for its
subsistence. Neighboring terroirs often overlap and may include areas over which the community has weak or no
tenure or management claims. The idea of a terroir integrates the physical and social environments and implies a
sense of responsibility for the resources in those areas. Since 1986, Burkina Faso has promoted village
management councils through its programme national de gestion des terroirs. These councils were intended to
work with government administrators to curb environmental degradation, establish village boundaries, and settle
conflicts between resource user groups. To date, relatively few councils have actually been established, and those
that do exist represent the interests of the traditional power holders rather than the whole community. Both
Guinea and Niger are now also considering a terroir approach to natural resources management. Niger has
created gestion du terroir committees, but the government has not yet legally recognized them. The successful
incorporation of a terroir approach requires that states recognize the authority of these local-level tenure
authorities and their latitude to interpret national legislation in light of local circumstances. However, it should
also be noted that the terroir approach has been criticized as biased toward settled, homogenous populations and,
therefore, as disadvantageous for transhumant herders because of difficulties in including them in agriculturally
based terroirs.
In recent regional discussions of natural resources management such as those held by CILSS, it is generally
agreed that local—but not necessarily private or individual—control, over access to, and management of, natural
resources must be increased. To achieve this end, it is advised that countries adopt an integrated management
approach to natural resources rather than treat forests, water, and rangeland as resources separate from land, with
different ministries, legislation, and enforcement strategies.
Democratization movements are common throughout West Africa, as they are across the continent. Such
movements generally entail the legalization of multiparty politics via the passage of a new constitution followed
by national presidential and legislative elections. An official declaration of a commitment to democratization,
however, is not necessarily accompanied by the decentralization of authority. Tenure reform processes are not
always envisioned within the framework of democratization efforts. Conversely, political democratization is not
necessarily promoted by the individualization of tenure rights.
Yet one senses that the Jeffersonian ideal of widely distributed private property rights among a solid,
roughly egalitarian class of small- to medium-landholders underlies some of the recent policy trend toward
registration and titling of holdings in some countries. The theorized link between private property and democracy
has been an important element of western political philosophy for centuries and is not without influence in policy
debates and formulation in non-Western parts of the world. The logic is that individual or local ownership, or at
least some element of local control or authority regarding land and natural resources, facilitates participation in
the democratic processes by increasing one’s stake in the process. Democracy, in turn, is thought to facilitate
tenure security through the efforts of its practitioners: landholders. In some cases, where private property has
been esteemed as inappropriate to a given situation and political climate, decentralized management authority
regarding land and natural resources has been substituted for private property as a desirable complement to
democratic—or at least, decentralized—institutions. The theorized link between private holdings or decentralized
authority and democracy does not necessarily translate easily into workable institutions, as seems evident from
the profiles.15
The decentralization of authority and decision-making in relation to tenure issues may, therefore, be
promoted through several different means. Senegal, for example, was an early leader in this respect when, in
1972, it initiated a system of decentralized rural councils for the local administration of national tenure legislation.
More recently in Niger pilot networks of tenure commissions at the arrondissement level hold the potential for
devolving the authority to evaluate mise en valeur, while they may also validate the conversion of state
concessions into private property. Another potential model for the decentralization process is being pursued in
Guinea, where the communautés rurales de développement (CRDs) are locally elected on the subprefectoral
level. The responsibilities and powers of these CRDs, however, are not clear as they vie with the sub-préfet for
control of regional duties. In these three cases, it has also been noted that the members of the local-level tenure
councils are often the traditional power brokers in the community as well as the local-level representatives of the
national government. Similarly in Burkina Faso, locally elected management councils tend to be founded on
customary hierarchical power structures. Devolving tenure and resource management authorities to local-level
institutions, whether “traditional” or newly created, does not ensure that such institutions will be democratic. A
decentralized tenure administrative structure, therefore, may not generate democratic local-level institutions with
equal representation of local interests.
Greater efforts are required to encourage national administrations to recognize existing customary tenure
authority structures and to provide legal legitimization for new local-level user groups created within the scope of
development, resettlement, and modernization projects. Existing structures, such as Senegal’s rural councils,
could be used to promote democratization, but they must not represent exclusively only one aspect or faction of
local interests or privileged user groups. Such councils must also be recognized by both national governments and
local populations as a legitimate authority entity. Mali’s recent efforts to increase local decision-making authority
in natural resources management, for example, may prove to be effective. In 1993, Mali passed administrative
decentralization legislation that created rural and urban communes to be presided over by elected councils. These
councils will oversee local environmental protection, tenure disputes, and questions of responsible land-use
practices. The decentralization process in Mali, while encouraging greater local participation through the
commissions, is still hampered by national legislation that disregards variations in local tenure realities. Thus,
while decentralized tenure administration units can be democratically elected, national tenure regimes may not
incorporate “democratic” (that is, participatory) principles in their underlying legislation and policy directives.
Often accompanying national democratization campaigns are privatization initiatives that promote the
individualization of tenure. Individualization initiatives that encourage land registration and titling programs may
not be democratic in the sense of allowing fair and equal access to the registration process. In Benin, for example,
minority groups such as serfs and ex-slaves may lose tenure access rights as landowners solidify their control
over the natural resource base. If democratization is a national priority, disadvantaged groups and social classes
must not be excluded from or by individualization initiatives. The effects of individualization should also be
monitored in urban and rural areas. The Cameroon experience shows that in urban areas, individualization
weakens the powers of traditional leaders in the presence of mayors and other urban authorities, while in rural
areas it strengthens the traditional leaders’ powers as they become the state-recognized arbitrators in tenure claim
disputes.
As noted above, a common policy doctrine in West Africa aimed at improving agricultural production has
attempted to replace or adapt community-based tenure systems in favor of more individualized forms of tenure,
including registered leaseholds and, in some instances, freehold. It was also noted earlier that women most often
gain access to productive land through male relatives. While much of the intent of the recent policies supporting
land registration has been to strengthen tenure security and thereby enhance agricultural investment and
production, the tenure security of borrowers, including most women, has been undermined. In the general case of
borrowers, the fear of borrowers’ registering the land they occupy has prompted their eviction by the original
landholders. Registration of land has particular implications for women, West Africa’s chief food producers. The16
registration of land in the head of household’s name by and large precludes women from obtaining rights and
further entrenches male control over land.
Women’s access to land for cultivation is becoming increasingly important in areas where the number of
female-headed households is growing. This may be due either to male out-migration, death, or childbirth out of
wedlock. Increasingly, many women are seeking access to land in their own right through borrowing
arrangements or even purchase. Although most land legislation does officially allow women equal rights of
landownership and registration, there is growing concern that local power structures may mitigate against
women’s registration rights apart from male family members. In areas where cash cropping and monetary land
transactions are increasing land values, women risk being forced off lands they have acquired through husbands
or other lenders on a temporary basis. Increasing land values will also make it difficult for women to purchase
land independently.
The evolution of indigenous tenures, referred to above, does not necessarily affect different actors in similar
ways. Some customary tenure regimes do allow women to inherit land from their birth family, though these
situations are relatively rare. More often encountered are matrilineally based inheritance systems where land is
passed down to male heirs through the mother; this tradition is fairly common among some groups in Côte
d’Ivoire, for example.
Finally, in addition to uncertainties regarding women’s access to land and natural resources is the uncertain
control women exercise over their own labor. Judith Carney and Michael Watts (1991), Véronique de la Brosse
(1989), and others have documented situations where project efforts aimed at increasing production relied heavily
on the labor contribution of women. In cases where such additional labor was to be remunerated through
increased commodity production or through enhanced land rights for women, this surplus has often been captured
by male family members. Such examples highlight the constraints working against women entering into cash-crop
production: inferior access to land and labor limit their ability to earn profitable livelihoods while their ability to
increase personal labor is severely limited.
Future of land and resource tenure in West Africa
The dual nature of West African tenure systems—represented by national policy vis-à-vis community-based
systems—was suggested at the outset of this synthesis of 22 West African land-tenure profiles to be a defining
characteristic of the region. This “duality” is no less pronounced today than it was during the colonial period
when it was initially established. Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, the contemporary duality is unique,
since the many interconnections and mutual influences between customary tenure systems and national policy
tend to transform the expression and form of each over time. The profiles leave no doubt that the processes of
policy change and customary system evolution are intimately interlinked.
Also as stated at the outset of this paper, the contrast between customary and statutory systems is perhaps
the most generalizably significant feature of tenure and natural resource management across the region. The
relevance of this fundamental observation is no less striking whether a country explicitly recognizes customary
tenure in a legal sense, ignores it, or even tries to destroy it. Thus Cameroon and Mauritania (whose policies are
hostile or at best neutral regarding customary tenure) experience the duality between customary and statutory
systems to the same degree as Niger and Guinea (whose policies encourage registration of customary rights) or as
Sierra Leone and Ghana (whose policies sanction a continuing role for customary systems—albeit one that is
generally circumscribed by geographical boundaries as well as subordinate to role of the state).
This duality, though well-entrenched, is nonetheless dynamic. Indeed, the balance between the two
components of the dual system appears to be shifting in tandem at disparate localities across the region in a
characterizable manner. Yet the interplay between the poles of the dual system is subtle; changes in national
policy affect community-based systems in unforeseen ways. It is clear that while customary systems of tenure and
natural resource management nevertheless continue to function in rural areas as the true allocators of land and17
other natural resources, the rules employed in allocation are increasingly modified by national policies and
institutions as well as by changing economic conditions, encouraging development of a multiplicity of reference
points where one or few existed previously.
The dynamic elements of the pole of the duality designated “community-based” are much more difficult to
capture and to characterize than is the case with national policy, which in the majority of West African countries
is moving toward official endorsement of private property rights to land and decentralized management and
control of benefits resulting from the exploitation of nonland resources such as forests. The profiles suggest that
national policy as a catalyst of rule modification at local levels has thus far been uneven and unpredictable. One
conclusion is that where policy is not sufficiently informed by existing tenure and management systems at local
levels, coexisting and competing sets of rules are introduced creating opportunities for increasing numbers of
overlapping claims and social conflict. It is not yet clear where the dynamism thus introduced into customary
systems will finally lead; in other words, one cannot yet confidently predict which of the (new or old) reference
systems will eventually dominate, or whether existing systems have been permanently hybridized.
Nonetheless, available information allows one to elaborate somewhat. This second arena of transition,
labeled “customary,” can be characterized as a partial shift from community-based systems operating on the
basis of social identities (rights based on descent, sex, caste, class, or other historically based reference points) to
less community-oriented systems that are also less consistent or coherent since they consist of competing
elements. As noted above, rights claimants are newly able to select from diverse strategies in order to stake
claims. Such strategies range from “traditional” reliance on social identity to exploitation of political connections
to application of privileged access to economic resources or specialized information.
The profiles identify some of the external pressures to which customary systems are reacting and describe
some of the observable reactions. Incentives to privatize land and other resources are certainly present in most of
West Africa. Intensifying pressure on the natural resource base, exacerbated by growing populations and
resource degradation, creates a built-in incentive for rights claimants to press their claims—whatever they might
be based on. Many of the profiles speak of the “individualization” of property rights to land. Such
individualization is taking place in contexts of overlapping and multiple rights to unique resources or sets of
resources. Many claims continue to be bedded on community-based rules following well-established allocation
patterns stemming from social identity. However, increasingly, challenges to claims based on the traditional social
identity categories are issued by individuals attempting to make use of political connections, policy confusion, or
privileged access to information or resources allowing them to capitalize on new policies such as those favoring
private titling and registration of land. This facet of transformation of customary systems in West Africa—that is,
toward a less exclusive reliance on social identity as a basis for staking and legitimizing claims to resource
tenure—is common enough and general enough to qualify as an issue that is already crucial and will be of
growing importance into the next century.
In summary, the current tenure transition in West Africa could be said in very broad terms to be taking place
at each of the two levels designated by the labels of “customary” and “statutory”: (1) official policies (with some
exceptions) are moving toward promotion of individual titling and registration, which is widely viewed as more
compatible than community-based systems with achieving goals of economic development; and (2) a tendency is
developing within customary systems to diversify strategies aimed at staking claims to land and natural resources
or at having claims to land and resources recognized and legitimized. The underlying point gleaned from the
profiles is that the two levels interact with each other in an unplanned and haphazard fashion, since
institutionalized means of communication between them hardly exist. This not only threatens to exacerbate social
inequalities and injustice, but also can result in market inefficiencies and social conflicts.
There is hope that the mutual incomprehension between national policy and community-based systems can
be ameliorated. The CILSS-sponsored policy dialogue of the nine Sahelian states of West Africa is an example of
regional integration and policy coordination in natural resource management issues that is unique in Africa—at18
least in terms of the maturity of the initiative. The CILSS dialogue represents, among other things, an effort to
inform policymakers of the needs and practices of rural populations, and rural populations of the contents and
significance of policy. CILSS is attempting to create communications networks as mechanisms to promote the
participation of all segments of civil populations as well as government authorities. The future of land and
resource tenure in West Africa will to a significant degree be determined by the degree of success achieved by
efforts such as those of CILSS to institutionalize multidirectional communications in order both to inform policy
formulation and to promote local tenure security and stewardship of natural resources.
The CILSS policy dialogue and related research activities represent a new and promising element in the field
of West African tenure and natural resource management. Many of the broad observations recorded in 1986, the
last time LTC engaged in an exercise of producing tenure profiles for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, remain
valid today, albeit in some cases to a greater or lesser degree than was true ten years ago. Thus, for example,
1996 mirrors 1986 in the following fundamental characteristics: customary tenures continue as the dominant
authority in the majority of land and resource allocation systems; existing tenure systems remain diverse, yet are
evolving in sometimes predictable ways as they interact with modern forces; no single arrangement or model
emerges as a global panacea to alleviate problems in agricultural production and environmental management (the
general push toward private individualized and registered holdings has far to go before it can claim even a
modicum of implementation success); a policy stance promoting individualization through registration and titling
still raises questions (though an increasing number of countries has embraced such a policy stance); insufficient
administrative capacity and financial means remain a decisive constraint in adopting land administration reforms;
and where private property is promoted, governments retain a legal interest in privately held land (Niger, for
example, retains some authority over use-right distribution to privately held land).
The essential elements that can be added to the synthesis list of West African tenure developments if one
includes the decade leading up to 1996 include: an increasingly sophisticated understanding of contemporary
indigenous systems and the evolution of those systems; an emphasis on regional integration of policy and
dialogue; and a deepening commitment to democratization of tenure policy formulation and natural resource
management. Furthermore, the willingness to strive for innovative policies, noted in the earlier profiles, is
probably even stronger today. The West African region probably leads the continent in promoting a regional
dialogue based on tenure and natural resource management issues, and it certainly has advanced considerably in
this initiative compared to the situation in 1986.
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Despite government initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s to create agricultural cooperatives based on collective
landholdings, and despite the more recent efforts of the newly elected democratic government to privatize
landholdings and encourage the individualization of land, land tenure in Benin has continued to be dominated by
traditional lineage-based systems. With increased cash cropping in the southern zone and government emphasis
on individual private landholdings, greater individualization of land is on the rise. The increase in
individualization of land is an important issue. Individualization will be felt differently depending on the
customary tenure systems of various groups. The impacts of the 1990 reform on women will also vary depending
on traditional land tenure practices and customs. In addition, land borrowers and descendants of ex-slaves may be
disadvantaged by the reform.
National policy and legal framework
Benin is a small country on the Gulf of Guinea wedged between Togo to the west and Nigeria to the east. It
shares its northern border with Burkina Faso and Niger. The total land area is estimated at 112,620 square
kilometers, of which 12% is arable, 4% is in permanent crops, 4% is pastureland, 35% is forest and woodland,
and 45% is other. Over 60% of the total population of 5,522,677 million inhabitants is employed in the
agricultural sector.
Benin is divided into two principal zones. The southern half of the country is a productive and densely
populated tropical forest zone. The northern region, which lies in the transition zone bordering the Sahel, is
generally less densely populated and less agriculturally productive.
The Government of Benin was set on rural cooperatives as a way of developing the country until the
inception of the newly elected democratic government in 1990. The military government, which ousted the first
independent government in 1963, espoused a strong Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Under this government, the
state established obligatory cooperatives. Cooperative areas, usually for the production of oil palms, were chosen
by the government. Farmers in the selected areas were then obliged to donate their land for a lease period of fifty
years.
Land Law no. 61-27 of 1961 designated land for development. Such areas could be selected based on
individual initiative or by the state. Land was broken up into “A” shares and “B” shares. “A” shares were
contributions of landholdings of 1 hectare; “B” shares were contributions of labor. Often people with no or little
land would give labor. There also existed “AB” shares, which consisted of landowners who contributed land and
labor to the collectivity. The system was organized so that contributors of land would receive up to 3% of the
interest earned by the cooperative but had no rights to govern cooperative activities in any way. Contributors of
labor, “B” shares, would receive a percentage of cooperative profits after six growing seasons. All cooperative
directors were appointed by the nation’s Ministry of Agriculture. A person could resign from the cooperative;
however, if he was a landholder, he could escape his obligation only by selling his land to a farmer who would be
part of the cooperative. Once contributions of land were made to a cooperative, the commitment could not be
annulled.
Land chosen for cooperatives had to be surveyed, consolidated, and titled under the 1961 law. In addition, a
1965 law declared that all land must be registered. There is no reference as to how the government titled20
traditionally communal lands to individuals. Given that customary lineage-based land tenure systems have
prevailed, it is possible that legal titling either was not extensive or was not viewed by the lineage as a contract for
permanent ownership. An important point, which needs further investigation, is how such land titlings have
influenced the individualization of land under both the current regime and indigenous land tenure systems.
In 1976, the military government increased cooperative production by establishing a law which divided the
land into four categories: state land, cooperative land, individual land, and foreigners’ land. All uncultivated land
as well as forests, mining areas, water, and other natural resources were owned by the state. Cooperative land
was selected by, and essentially leased to, the state; however, it was considered property of the cooperative.
Individual farmers retained long-term rights to the land while leasing it to the cooperative for a fixed period.
Individual land was land cultivated by and titled to a farmer. Finally, the government allowed foreigners to own
and cultivate land as long as it was in the interest of the state. This suggests that though foreigners might have
been vital producers, they had little land security.
The new democratic government of Benin, elected in 1990, has changed its emphasis from agricultural
cooperatives to individual landownership. Farmers wishing to gain legal title to land must establish their claim to
the land by either producing legal documentation if they have previously purchased the land or justifying their
inheritance claims. They must then follow the appropriate registration measures. Unfortunately, specific
information regarding formal land registration is absent from the current literature.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
In Benin at present there are four common methods of land transmission that correspond mainly to customary
systems: inheritance, gift, customary attribution, and purchase. Inheritance appears to be entirely patrilineal and
has become more common with the increasing tendency toward the individualization of land. In patrilineal
lineage-based transmission, one lineage elder passes land on laterally to the next lineage elder. According to some
authors, it is now not uncommon for land which is allocated by the lineage head to become the property of the
receiver.
Gift giving is a way of manipulating customary transmission of land in favor of the children of a farmer.
Under the customary system, as long as land is being cultivated by the farmer to whom it is allocated, it cannot
revert to the lineage head. Because cash crops necessitate larger inputs than other crops, farmers seek to pass
their land on to their sons in order to protect their investments, rather than have the land revert to the lineage after
their death. Thus, many farmers will give their land to their sons before they, the fathers, die. Land therefore
remains in the hands of an active farmer and cannot be reclaimed by the lineage.
Purchase of land is also occurring with increasing frequency. Sale of land in some areas is more common
between indigenous landholders, and in other areas land is only exchanged between indigenous holders and
strangers. In the latter case, lands closer to village areas continue to be passed through customary lineage
transmission while lands farther from the village are sold to outsiders. In addition, it is possible for a village or an
individual to hold land under several tenures simultaneously, depending on the land in question.
There are several different types of land borrowers and users. These include: traditional users, women, and
strangers. People who are considered landowners, or who have established rights to land because of their
affiliation with a lineage (in almost all cases men), have extensive use rights. Such users can plant trees and place
permanent structures, such as houses, on the land. Other land users, who are not property owners or who do not
have extensive use rights under the lineage system, are more restricted. Women, strangers, and other borrowers
must continue to work the land in order to maintain their use rights. In addition, they are not permitted to plant
trees on the land or to construct permanent structures. 
The arid northern region of Benin has been largely ignored by the existing literature. Fulani herders in the
north share fertile lands with farmers. Herds often find pasture on fallowed farmlands. Farmers exchange21
agricultural goods with herders as payment for manure. Generally rights to land in the north are granted by the
lineage chief, land priest, chief, or head of household. Gifts of land are not uncommon and much of the productive
land in the north is farmed by “strangers.” Because population density remains relatively low, there have been
few conflicts over land and borrowers rights remain relatively secure.
The peoples and tenure systems of southern Benin are better represented in the literature. These peoples of
the south include the Fon, Yoruba, Aja-Ewe, and Idatcha. The Fon are characterized by a patrilineal lineage-
based land tenure system. Unlike many lineage-based system, in which the first clearers of the land are considered
the lineage head and have rights to allocate land, the Fon have a hierarchical system based on their monarchy. In
the Fon system, the king allocates land to the nobles, who then have the right to divide the land among people of
their lineages. Land ultimately reverts to the royal household.
Among the Yoruba and Aja-Ewe, land belongs to the first clearers. These groups practice patrilineal
lineage-based transmission of land. The first clearers are considered to have established the lineages. Land is
considered communal, though allocation of the land is generally managed by the lineage head. Land is passed
laterally through the men of the family. In other words, instead of passing from father to son, land is transmitted
from the oldest male in the lineage to the next oldest male. Land reverts to the lineage head for reallocation upon
the death of the user. The lineage head then has the authority to allocate land to other members of the lineage.
The Fon, Yoruba, and Aja-Ewe, all separate men’s and women’s agricultural and financial activities. While
there is little mention of the Idatcha customary transmission of land, it is mentioned that men and women among
the Idatcha share farming and financial activities. This difference is important to consider as increasing cash
cropping and individualization of land will affect these groups, and particularly the different genders, differently
(see section 4.5 for more information).
Slavery and serfdom were common to all these groups. Slaves and serfs were responsible for cultivating
their masters’ land as well as their own plots. They were prohibited from owning land under customary law; thus,
all land ultimately belonged to nobles or masters. Despite the abolition of serfdom, social vestiges of this system
remain to the present. Because these groups could not own land under customary land-tenure systems, they can
gain title to land under current policies only through land purchase and registration. The access of ex-captives to
land and the possibilities for land purchase for these groups relative to others need to be more thoroughly
investigated and documented.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
From independence, through the period of Marxist military government, and into the present democratic state, the
Government of Benin has encouraged cash cropping. Many individuals engage in cash-crop production of oil
ct Manager.
Six LTC research assistants compiled most of the West Africa tranche of these profiles and contributed to
the synthesis: Rebecca Furth, Mary Hobbs, Anna Knox, Stephen Leisz, Michael Williams, and Kevin Bohrer.
Four LTC rehin their nuclear families by transmitting the land they occupy to their sons and not allowing it to
revert to the lineage head. Lands under cash-crop production are viewed more commonly as personal property
and not as the property of the lineage.
There is no reference in the available information to government policy with regard to nomadic or sedentary
herders. As was previously noted, herders in the north have an important relationship with farmers. Fulani herders
are often hired to care for farmers’ livestock and fertilize farmlands with manure. Agricultural goods are often
given in exchange for these services. In recent years, however, a decrease in grazing lands, due to population
increases and perennial cash cropping, has created problems. Herds break into productive farmlands more
frequently and destroy or damage crops inciting land disputes. Many Fulani herders have also started farming as
well. Consequently, the traditional land tenure relations are not longer well delineated. The government needs to
address these issues in its land tenure policies.22
Land tenure is a crucial issue for natural resources management. In areas in Benin where land borrowing is
more common and landownership less frequent, according to Heidhues and Neef (1994a), natural resources are
more likely to be overexploited for several reasons. First, because land borrowers are prohibited from planting
trees or any other perennial crop, or constructing permanent structures on the land, they are less likely to practice
sustainable agriculture and more likely to reap as much from the land as possible within a given growing season.
Second, because use rights can be maintained only if the land continues to be under production, land borrowers
are not likely to put their land into fallow for fear of losing their use rights. Thus, in Benin land under production
by borrowers is at risk of overexploitation and, therefore, decreased fertility and productivity.
There are laws addressing forest resources in Benin, though the specifications are not well defined in the
literature. According to available information, state forestlands include all forests which are “vacant” and do not
have a recognized proprietor. It is not at all clear what the government means by vacant or what constitutes a
recognized proprietor. State lands also include classified forests, protected forest domains, and reforestation
lands. Classified forests are forests which were formally classified under the French government and which have
remained state-owned forestlands. Protected domains include all other forestlands that are not classified and do
not have an owner. Reforestation lands are all state-owned lands in need of reforestation, particularly hill slopes
and deforested zones. Yet all these categories are vague and are in need of further investigation.
It is clear that under the current regime, individualization of land is encouraged. Given that in order to title
land one must establish legal purchase or inheritance, it is likely that laborers (including ex-slaves and serfs) will
be formally excluded from landownership unless they are able to purchase land. More needs to be understood
about the income and rights of these laborers in order to assess the impact of land individualization and
government policies on the rights of laborers and borrowers. Successful democratization will necessitate
government recognition of the various groups and social classes in Benin.
At present, Benin’s natural resources and availability of land are sufficiently abundant to sustain the
population and permit further growth. However, the government must maintain a land tenure policy that takes
into consideration indigenous land tenure systems and the rights of women, immigrants, and landless workers.
Benin can avoid problems of land conflict and degradation now being faced by its neighbors, such as the Ivory
Coast, if it establishes a clear and comprehensive land tenure policy which addresses all potential owners and
users as well as traditional systems. Benin’s population growth rate is currently estimated at 3.33% per year, a
figure which must also be considered when land tenure policies are constructed in order to assure continued
productivity and maintenance of land resources under the pressures of a growing population.
There is no mention of matrilineal transmission of land in the literature on indigenous land tenure systems of
Benin. All systems referred to are patrilineal. Nor is there any mention of government policy toward women and
land tenure. According to the information available, women are generally land users and not land owners. Women
do not have inheritance rights. However, they are able to obtain usufructuary rights from their husbands. Among
the Ayizo and the Fon, women commonly maintain financial independence from their husbands and carry
separate economic household responsibilities. They often borrow a parcel of land from their husbands in order to
produce the goods which will contribute to their financial well-being as well as the family’s sustenance. Under
customary law, it is obligatory for the husband to loan land to his wife unless he lacks sufficient land to do so.
Women’s use rights are secure as long as they remain within the conjugal household of their husbands. However,
with the increase in land sales and population, men’s landholdings may become more restricted and it could
become increasingly difficult for women to gain access to land. Among other groups such as the Idatcha,
women’s and men’s budgets and farming practices are mixed. It is imperative that gender dimensions of land use
and tenure not be overgeneralized, because women of different ethnic groups will be affected differently
depending on their customary practices.23
Present policy position and reforms discussed
Although the current government is making strides toward democratization through its encouragement of
individual landownership, it must assure the rights of land users and borrowers if it is to maintain a truly
democratic system. Location and use of lands must also be taken into consideration. Lands closer to urban areas
have a higher percentage of land borrowers than lands in more rural areas. Increased individual ownership and
cash-crop production may limit access and use rights to land for women, immigrants, and other borrowers. It may
be necessary to develop a system of long-term leases to assure these producers equal rights and access to
productive land. In addition, individualization of tenure will be a gradual process with much land remaining under
indigenous land-tenure systems. Those systems, be they lineage or other, must be recognized and integrated into
national policy and law.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Benin’s national land tenure policy is not adequately defined in the current land tenure literature. A much more
comprehensive study of the current national land tenure policies is necessary for effective project planning and
design. With regard to program design, it is important not to overgeneralize. It is clear from the literature that
land tenure varies dramatically even on a village-by-village basis. Program planners must take into consideration
traditional land tenure systems as well as current trends and modifications of traditional systems in the cash-
cropping economy. Women and men, as well as other land users and owners, have different rights with regard to
land. Long-term leases may be necessary to assure continued access to land for all land users. In addition, not all
lands are considered equal, and in some cases lands are likely to remain under customary transmission while
others are more likely to be sold. An in-depth understanding of these systems is necessary for the development of
successful project plans and a just national land tenure policy.
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BURKINA FASO COUNTRY PROFILE
by Rebecca Furth
Executive summary
The Government of Burkina Faso has focused recent efforts on increasing agricultural production and assuring
self-sufficiency. Although the government is encouraging intensive production and individualization of
landholdings through the implementation of resettlement projects and tenure policies, customary land tenure and
traditional extensive agricultural practices are still widely espoused. The drought plaguing the Sahel region since
1968 has influenced land tenure and agricultural policies by creating the need for the resettlement, development,
and management of the river blindness-infested river basins. While the government has made tremendous efforts
to overcome population and environmental constraints, its strategies have not recognized indigenous land tenure
systems. Consequently, there is little tenure security, particularly in regions where the government has promoted
resettlement or intensive agricultural production.
National policy and legal framework
Landlocked in the center of West Africa, Burkina Faso is struggling for economic security in the drought-ridden
Sahel. Bordered by Mali to the west and north, Niger to the east, and Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast to the
south, Burkina Faso has a total land area of 274,200 square kilometers. Only 10% of this land is arable, 37% is
meadows and pastures, 26% is forest and woodland, and 27% is classified as other. Burkina Faso has
approximately 160 square kilometers of irrigated lands. Recent surveys estimate the total population at
10,422,800 with a growth rate of 2.79 annually. About 85% of the population is employed in the agricultural
sector. Severe drought problems since 1968 and endemic onchocerciasis (river blindness) and bovine
trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) have handicapped the country and inhibited agricultural production.
Population pressures are intensifying and must be considered in government planning and land tenure policies.
Under the Sankara government (1983–1987) agricultural and economic self-sufficiency were principal
objectives. The government nationalized all land, increased national spending on agriculture, and raised producer
prices. Increased emphasis was placed on small-scale agricultural projects implemented by village cooperatives.
For the most part, these policies have been maintained by the current government. However, recent shifts in
political ideology from a Marxist-Leninist to a democratic philosophy may result in trends away from
cooperatives.
In 1984, the government issued a decree addressing land tenure. This decree is evidence that though all land
is property of the state, the government intends to create a system of land registration and titling which would
secure individual as well as collective rights to certain lands. These laws include dictates for land occupation.
Occupation rights outlined in the 1984 decree include a permis d’occupation. This permit allocates use rights to
an individual wishing to engage in cash-crop farming or industry. An urban land occupation permit grants
permanent land rights to a person wishing to build a house for himself or his family. Finally, the law outlines a
regulation for a permis d’exploitation which grants permanent rights to rural lands used for cash cropping. Both
the permis d’occupation and the permis d’exploitation can be acquired by collectives as well as individuals. The
decree also prescribes the establishment of allocation committees to supervise the distribution and registration of
lands. Although these laws are technically government policy, there is no indication that they have been
implemented on a large scale. In addition, none of the titling provisions address farmers who do not engage in
intensive cash-crop production. This excludes the majority of the rural population.25
In 1991, the present government created a new land tenure law which further addresses issues of
privatization. This new law permits the government to cede national domain lands to individuals for private land
title. In addition to allowing for legal and inalienable title, the law recognizes various other forms of tenure such
as use rights, long-term lease, and habitation rights, though it is not clear how the law assures these rights.
Contrary to past laws, the 1991 law addresses production and land management as well as ownership; however,
like the ownership laws, the specific conditions for “effective” land management are not clear. In order to
administer its new management policies the state created four administrative bodies: Schéma national
d’aménagement du territoire (SNAT), Schémas régionaux d’aménagement du territoire (SRAT), Schémas
provinciaux d’aménagement du territoire (SPAT), and Schémas directeurs d’aménagement (SDA). Despite the
creation of these offices, the ambiguous management law as well as the state’s neglect to address past land tenure
make the new law difficult to implement. It appears as if previous laws remain largely intact.
Other national policies that include tenure issues have been crucial in Burkina Faso’s land management
plan. Resettlement has been a key element in national land policy. One of the consequences of the prevalence of
onchocerciasis was that some of the most fertile lands in the country became uninhabitable. Traditionally, peoples
indigenous to the waterways would migrate between the fertile shores and more distant arid lands in response to
the severity of the disease. This is an effective way of controlling the disease because when people leave the area
with their domestic animals, the cycle of disease is broken and the area gradually becomes free of onchocerciasis
and inhabitable once again. Although people may not have continually inhabited the fertile valley lands, those
lands were never void of customary land rights. In an effort to control both disease and the vital natural resources
along the waterways, the government took charge of all land in the valleys as well as all underpopulated
territories.
The government-established resettlement projects, under the jurisdiction of the Volta Valley Authority
(AVV), were designed to offset the rapid destruction of forests and random land settlement in the river basins as
well as control onchocerciasis. The project eliminated traditional land tenure practices which it believed promoted
“irrational” and unproductive extensive agricultural practices. A presidential edict declared all regions included in
the river basins as property of the state. Zoning was applied to specific areas in order to protect forests and
wildlife and to designate regions for cash cropping. The AVV also restricted the quantity of land that an
individual household could clear and required settlers to adhere to intensive agricultural regulations.
One of the conditions of a farmer’s acceptance into the settlement areas was that he comply with the
required agricultural techniques. These included monocropping and seasonal crop rotation, utilization of
improved seed varieties, and, in many cases, mechanized or plow agriculture. According to most researchers,
however, while settlers may have initially complied with government regulations and dictates on land tenure and
agriculture, in the longer run these have largely been ignored. Although there has been a documented increase in
the standard of living in some resettlement areas, project regions have also experienced many problems.
Regarding land tenure, there is considerable confusion and conflict between indigenous and immigrant farmers in
resettlement areas. As the population increases, and more farmers return from the Ivory Coast and Ghana,
competition for land is growing. While the AVV projects may have shown some short-term successes regarding
agricultural production, in the long run the problems seem to outweigh the benefits.
In 1989, the AVV was incorporated into the Ministry of Agriculture and no longer exercises extensive
control in project areas. Because the AVV never established contracts for the land on which migrants were
instructed to establish their concessions and farms, residents are now nervous about the security of their holdings
within project areas.
The Front Populaire which took over the government in 1987 has shifted from a Marxist-Leninist ideology
to one endorsing free trade and social democracy. While in the late 1980s the government had expressed26
intentions to encourage agricultural cooperatives and land use, it is not clear how this new political philosophy
will influence national land tenure policies.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Burkina Faso is an ethnically diverse country. Traditional land tenure systems vary depending not only on
ethnicity but also on demographic factors. Only a broad description of indigenous land tenure practices can be
addressed in this document. However, it is important to note that for the development of successful project plans
and policies, more specific research should be undertaken in order to determine the variations in the numerous
traditional land tenure practices characteristic of different areas of the country affected by differing population
and ecological constraints. Traditional tenure systems are also experiencing many changes and are going through
internal modifications in order to adapt to current environmental, political, and economic constraints. 
The Mossi are the dominant ethnic group in Burkina Faso. Not only do they have a greater population than
the other ethnic groups, composing approximately 25% of the total population, but they have a political history of
domination in the region dating back to the beginning of the Mossi empire in the eleventh century. Mossi land
tenure systems are characterized by individual household rights to and control of land. In this system, the nuclear
family is the major unit of production and land rights are held by the head of the family. However, the first clearer
of the land established ownership rights for himself and his descendants within his lineage. The descendants of the
first clearer of the land, not the lineage head, have ultimate use rights. Upon the death of a farmer, land passes to
his sons and does not revert to the lineage. Although lineages did not have rights over the land of individuals, land
title ultimately belonged to the clan of a given family. While individual household rights to land predominate in
most Mossi areas, there are also communal lands which cannot be inherited and are governed by chiefs of clans
or lineages who pass on their control of land through lateral transmission to junior brothers.
The Mossi also have a system of institutionalized borrowing of land in which loans of fields are very
common. Farmers with more lands than their family unit can cultivate often lend land to other members of their
extended families with limited access to land resources. Loans to unrelated farmers are also not unheard of and, in
fact, in some areas the majority of land under cultivation is borrowed land. This suggests inequality in the
distribution and ownership of land within the traditional Mossi land tenure system which is consistent with their
strongly hierarchical political and judiciary systems.
  The Bwa have a system of communal land tenure based on lineage affiliations. In this system, people of the
same family work lands together. The lineage chief exercises control over land allocation and the distribution of
agricultural yields from collective fields. Land cannot be sold or mortgaged but remains under the management of
the lineage chief. The chief distributes land among the different kinship groups or sublineages and technically has
the right to recall and redistribute lands, though such reclamations rarely occur. Access and use of land in this
system tends to be more egalitarian, as opposed to the hierarchically based Mossi system.
A more common tenure pattern is one of mixed communal and individual land rights found in the southern
and western regions of the country among the Gourounsi, Gouin, and Senoufo. Lineage chiefs in these systems
also exercise powers of allocation over communal lands, which are usually those farther from the village and may
often be cultivated only periodically. Land closer to the village is usually held by an individual family head and is
under permanent cultivation by the nuclear family. Use rights to these lands can be both inherited and loaned for
varying periods of time to individuals outside the family or lineage.
Lastly, in the northern part of the country, Fulbe pastoralists share lands with farmers. Fulbe often grant
temporary use rights to dry-season pasturelands to local farmers in exchange for a percentage of their crop. The
drought has resulted in mounting tensions between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers as available arable and
pasturelands become more scarce.27
With the dramatic out-migration of the 1970s and early 1980s, land lending and borrowing between
occupants of fertile lands and immigrants became more common. Paradoxically, out-migration resulted in the
freeing up of some fertile lands and an influx of immigrants from agriculturally poorer regions. Conditions for
such loans dictate that no trees or permanent structures can be placed on the land by the borrower since these are
signs of ownership. This, combined with the lack of land security for borrowers, has created greater problems of
land resource depletion and erosion.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
The production of cash crops, most notably cotton, has increased dramatically in recent years. Consequently, the
production of many food crops has declined. No information is yet available on the effects of the augmentation of
cash cropping on land tenure systems in Burkina Faso. Cash cropping in many other parts of Africa, and the
world, often results in a greater individualization of land tenure. Project planners should investigate land tenure
shifts and their repercussions in potential project areas. As population increases and cash cropping becomes more
common, land available for loan may decrease. This could increase land inequality particularly in Mossi areas
where households often loan out large portions of land but maintain ownership rights.
With increased population pressures, continued drought, and threatened water and forest resources, the
Burkina Faso government must reevaluate its strategies for the management of agricultural resources. Sustainable
agriculture cannot be promoted successfully without tenure security. A sense of tenure security is lacking in
resettlement areas and in much of the rest of the country due to past government policies. In addition, the
government’s installation of irrigation systems covering approximately 10,000 hectares not only has affected
agricultural production in irrigated areas but also has created questions regarding the rights of displaced people to
their old and new lands.
Clashes and tensions between herders and farmers in the northern region of the country have escalated in
recent years. While in the past, land was abundant enough to permit farmers and herders to live in the same
region and share lands, the prevailing drought combined with mounting population pressures has created a
shortage of arable and pasture lands. Recent projects which have encouraged northern farmers to raise animals
have also thrown the traditional relationship between herders and farmers off balance. The government must
work together with both the farmers and herders of this region to develop a defined land tenure policy which will
enable them to continue to utilize the region’s resources without major conflict.
In 1986, the Government of Burkina Faso instigated a natural resource management project which was
based on the establishment of management councils. This program, called the Programme national de gestion
des terroirs, proposed to assure natural resource management on a local level by creating management councils
in each village that would work together with government administrators. The program was intended to curb
environmental degradation as well as provide a body capable of establishing village boundaries and zoning land
according to its use. The government also hoped to quell conflicts among different resources user groups and to
instill the idea that natural resources are not inexhaustible.
The program necessitates widespread representation of the government administration in the form of Sous-
préfets and lesser government officials. The role of these administrators is to supervise and collaborate with
village councils. In addition, village management groups, groupements villageois, composed of a council of local
leaders supported by the village, were to help communities define their needs and wants regarding natural
resources and to work with government administrators to assure effective resource use and management.
One way the government encourages the creation of village councils is through the national agricultural
credit reserve. Credit can be accessed by small farmers only through their village councils. Thus villages that do
not have a village council affiliated with the “Gestion de Terroir” program cannot acquire credit.28
There are several administrative problems with this program. First, because it necessitates government
collaboration on the local level, it is difficult to support. The government simply does not have the manpower to
maintain this program on a grand scale. Consequently, village councils have been set up in relatively few areas
(perhaps as few as 100 villages). Second, the local councils are, for the most part, based on traditional political
structures. The heads of the councils tend to be village chiefs or other customary leaders. These power structures
are often hierarchical and not democratic. Community members are often reluctant to voice their concerns, feeling
that it is not their place to do so. Minority or marginalized groups, such as immigrants and women, are sometimes
excluded from these community organizations. Furthermore, decision-making is frequently based on the will and
desires of the leaders and not the wants or needs of the community as a whole.
Moreover, the program is failing in its attempt to arbitrate disputes over resources and assure environmental
protection. The councils, as previously stated, are not representative of the local populations. While there might
be a representative from each user group on the council, these representatives tend to be members of the elite. The
simple designation and representation of user groups is insufficient because the groups themselves are very
diverse. For example, farmers might be chiefs or landless immigrants. In addition, the councils are more interested
in tapping funding sources for the development of infrastructure than for the protection of the environment.
Environmental protection is not valued in many areas over the construction of roads and schools.
While the program might have been a good idea, in practice, it has been largely unsuccessful. However, in
areas where councils have been established resource users appear to be better informed about the condition of
their local resources. Although little action has been taken, some small changes, mostly increased awareness, are
occurring.
There are two main types of tenure which affect forest resources in Burkina Faso: commons, or community
forests, and government forest reserves. While there is little information on land tenure in community forests,
some documentation does address government policy in officially reserved forestlands. During the colonial era,
the government designated certain forestlands as property of the state, expropriating them from traditional
ownership. After independence, the populations inhabiting the designated forest reserves were able to acquire
limited use rights to the forest which included collecting deadwood, medicinal plants, and sometimes, but rarely,
parcels of land to cultivate. The lands originally reserved by the colonial government have technically remained
state reserves. In practice, however, the combination of population pressures and environmental constraints
combined with unenforced government policies has resulted in the occupation of these lands by farmers and
occasionally whole villages. In some cases, the need for land is so great that the government has actually freed
portions of previously reserved forestlands.
During the CNR (Conseil National de la Révolution) government, many of the forests were opened up to
community use. This was part of the government’s scheme to develop community forestry in order to promote the
development of communities as well as forest management. All families who once had lands in the reserved forest
regions still recognize the boundaries of those lands even if they are no longer actively used. Consequently, during
the government’s campaign for the creation of community forests, communities voiced their desire to reclaim their
agricultural lands trapped within the boundaries of the reserved forests. While the government and FAO projects
have not endorsed cultivation in forest reserves it appears as if enforcement has become lackadaisical in the past
eight years. Under Sankara, the government had strict policies regarding bush-fire control, illegal wood cutting
and uncontrolled grazing of livestock. However, since 1989, enforcement of these policies has been relaxed.
Water and forest resources are greatly threatened in Burkina Faso, largely as a result of the drought. The
AVV was designed to gain control of the vital forest and water resources along the major waterways by resettling
people along the river banks in a manner which would both protect valuable water and forest resources and
promote agricultural production and economic development. While these programs have benefited the standard of29
living of people in project areas, little has been mentioned of the overall effects of these government projects on
the management of water and forest resources.
The gestion des terroirs approach to natural resource management instigated by the government in 1986 is
constructed around the establishment of locally elected democratic management councils. These councils are
intended to collaborate with government officials to create a democratic, decentralized political body in charge of
natural resource management. With regard to democratization, this project has been largely unsuccessful. Local
management councils tend to be founded on customary power structures which are generally hierarchical and
undemocratic. Management problems seem to stem from a lack of understanding of local power structures and
how they function. Future project design needs to undertake a thorough examination of these local political
structures in order to devise effective ways of integrating democratic structures with traditional political systems.
The most recent government has taken some steps toward establishing itself as a democratic authority since
the elections of 1991. However, the government has not yet come to terms with rights asserted under indigenous
tenure systems, and this may undermine its mandate. In addition, the problem of land insecurity due to
resettlement or the lack of appropriate guidelines for titling land must be addressed. Without such measures, land
rights of the majority of the population cannot be guaranteed.
There are several obstacles inhibiting the economic development of Burkina Faso. These include the
overpopulation of the plateau regions versus the virtually abandoned river basins. Severe problems of
onchocerciasis, which escalated with the drought, have forced the population out of the fertile river basins to the
overcrowded lands of the plateau regions. The plateau lands are not viable for the large-scale agricultural
production that is necessary for the maintenance of the growing population and the growth of the national
economy. The government attempted to overcome this problem through planned resettlement programs which
would control disease and simultaneously promote intensive agriculture and protect water and forest resources
along the rivers from overexploitation.
The Government of Burkina Faso has made agricultural production a priority in its strides to improving the
national economy. This is evident in its irrigation and resettlement efforts. In addition, cash-cropping projects,
particularly of cotton, have been encouraged. The government has taken these measures to assure adequate
farming resources to sustain the population and to maintain the national economy. But because past approaches
to land tenure in resettlement and irrigation project regions were not adequately comprehensive and did not
incorporate indigenous land tenure systems, both indigenous and immigrant farmers have little land security.
Without land security, the future stability of agricultural production and the national economy is tenuous.
There is little information in the available literature on women’s rights within tenure systems. Among the
Mossi and other peoples in Burkina Faso, it is common for women to cultivate at least one plot of land separate
from their husband or family. The land a woman farms is borrowed from her husband; however, anything she
earns from her field is her personal property. Income gained from women’s market and farming activities is kept
separately from men’s. The government resettlement projects such as those promoted by the AVV ignored this
aspect of the household economy and agricultural production and addressed only men. Unfortunately, there is no
information indicating the effects of this oversight on the status of women or the household economy. Personal
use of land, economic, and other household resources is not uncommon in West Africa ,and this is no less true of
Burkina Faso. Women’s rights within indigenous tenure systems as well as their role in agricultural production
and the household economy must not be overlooked in project planning or implementation.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
The government’s attempts at maintaining the country’s self sufficiency through the resettlement of populations,
the promotion of cash crops, the eradication of disease, and the provision of irrigation systems have been partially
successful. According to recent statistics, the rate of production has remained above the rate of population growth30
since the early 1980s. The production of cotton has also continued to be a prosperous enterprise. Despite these
successes, the government faces several problems. Its failure to recognize indigenous land tenure systems and
land rights and to incorporate these systems into a national policy has created a severe sense of insecurity among
farmers. As a result, tensions are high between indigenous and immigrant populations. Without tenure security, it
is unlikely that farmers will make the long-term investment necessary for sustainable agricultural systems.
The Government of Burkina Faso cannot expect to resolve its pressing environmental problems without
addressing these land tenure issues. With the current environmental and population pressures, land has become
more scarce. Land tenure policies of the Burkina Faso government need to find a balance in order to protect the
rights and interests of both indigenous and immigrant farmer populations. With land security, both production
and resource management will be more stable. In addition, administrative policies are necessary to assure the
rights of pastoralists to grazing lands while simultaneously protecting farmers’ land rights.
Through the decree established in 1984, the government intended to create a system of written permits and
titles. The purpose of this would be to promote production on agricultural, pastoral, and urban lands. Such titling
would also ensure a written record which would provide land security. While the government’s policies were
clearly stated in this decree, none of the current information indicates that this has actually come to pass. The
1991 law attempted to remedy the ineffectiveness of the 1984 law and provide for land privatization; however, the
information available indicates that it is also largely inoperable. The creation and effective implementation of a
clear and just land tenure policy which recognizes indigenous land tenure systems is necessary for sustainable
production and economic stability in Burkina Faso. However, in order for such a system of titling to be effective,
there must be a justifiable method for determining who has the right to gain title to land which would not usurp
traditional land tenure rights.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Project planners should be aware of the complex tenure issues existing in Burkina Faso between indigenous and
immigrant farmers, farmers and pastoralists, and state and traditional policies. An effort to understand land tenure
issues specific to project areas is necessary. The government’s continued commitment to elevating agricultural
production and its encouragement of the involvement of village cooperatives pose important land tenure questions
that are necessary to consider in project design. In addition, the government’s philosophical shift from a Marxist-
Leninist ideology to a more democratic system must be considered. Future trends in the government’s approach to
development may involve new efforts and raise additional land tenure questions. In the absence of an adequately
comprehensive national land tenure policy, strategies should be developed to assure successful integration of
indigenous and state land tenure systems into project design.
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Cameroon has a complicated land tenure legacy as a result of colonial occupation by three different countries,
each of which contributed distinct characteristics to future land legislation initiatives. Postindependence
Cameroon has been under the formal tenure regime imposed by ordinances passed into law in 1974 and 1976.
While the impact of this legislation has not resulted in widespread conversion of customary tenure rights to titled,
private property, it has facilitated access to and titling of land for nonresidents such as entrepreneurs and
bureaucrats. However, in spite of the 1974 Ordinance, customary definitions of land tenure rights continue to
predominate at the village level. Economic and social changes have had a strong impact on the nature of land
rights at the village level, particularly in areas where production of perennial cash crops such as coffee and cacao
has led to greater individualization of landownership. Many regions of present-day Cameroon suffer from serious
land competition, and twenty years of national land legislation seems to have contributed more to promoting the
interests of absentee landowners than to decreasing competition by providing secure access for rural producers.
National policy and legal framework
Cameroon is a triangle-shaped country possessing a small coastline on the Gulf of Guinea in the south, reaching
up to Lake Chad in the north, and bordering Nigeria to the west and the Central African Republic to the east. Its
population of 12,871,000 inhabits a landmass of some 46,540,000 hectares. A large portion of the landmass,
approximately 75%, is forested, while only about 15% is under cultivation. Two distinct climatic zones can be
found in Cameroon: the northern half of the country is primarily semi-arid tropics with a single rainy season (an
exception to this climate is the plateau region of Adamaoua, which is more humid and cool due to its high
altitude), and the southern part of the country is mostly humid tropics with bi-modal rainy seasons.
Current tenure legislation in Cameroon has been in effect since 1974, and there are presently no initiatives
under way to revise these ordinances. One of the motivations behind the 1974 tenure reform was to reconcile
differences between the British and French traditions of land law in order to solidify the unification of the country.
In effect, what the 1974 Ordinances accomplished was to rescind legal recognition of customary and communal
tenure rights, to impose land titling as the sole means of acquiring private ownership, and to empower the state as
the guardian of all nonregistered lands, which were henceforth to be considered as national domain. These
characteristics of the 1974 land laws actually had a great deal in common with French and German colonial
traditions, and they signified a retrogressive approach to land policy by removing recognition of customary rights
as embodied in previous legislation enacted in 1959.
It is necessary to review the history of colonial land laws in what has become modern-day Cameroon in
order to understand the derivation of the 1974 and 1976 Ordinances. The first colonial legislation affecting land
rights was established in Cameroon by the Germans in 1896. The 1896 Crown Lands Act established all lands
not occupied by chiefs and their communities to be the property of the German Imperial Government. Private
plantation agriculture was promoted and these properties were to be legitimized through procedures of
registration and titling to be recorded in the official land registry (Grundbuch). Germany lost its holdings in
Cameroon as a result of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I in 1919. Portions of
Cameroon were granted to both France and Britain, and each of these nations imposed its own distinctive
traditions of colonial legislation on Cameroonian territory.32
Under the British, all territory was declared “native land,” but with the important stipulation that these lands
were under the control of the prime minister and that no titles of occupation could be granted without the prime
minister’s approval. Additionally, according to official law, no indigenous Cameroonians were allowed to transfer
or alienate land in any way without the prime minister’s consent.
French colonial land legislation closely resembled the German tradition. Under a 1921 law, all land not
under occupation was simply declared the property of the French state. Later this legislation was refined and a
system of registration was introduced which allowed for the recording of collective rights to land by corporate
groups. Another important characteristic introduced under French law included the necessity of exploitation, or
mise en valeur, as the primary means of establishing tenure rights.
As Cameroon prepared for independence, initiatives to reestablish the legitimacy of customary land rights
were undertaken by the Territorial Assembly under Law 59-47 of 17 June 1959. This reversal was an effort to
gain the support of traditional leaders and village residents, but it did not endure. Much of the recognition granted
to customary tenure practices was rescinded by the postindependence government under Law 63-2 of January
1963. Not only did Law 63-2 remove the concept of customary land “ownership” in favor of “occupation,” but
also it repealed the right to collective registration of customary land that was granted under the 1932 French
legislation. The 1963 legislation further paved the way for the 1974 ordinances by reestablishing state ownership
of “vacant” lands as a form of “national patrimony.”
The 1974 ordinances were ostensibly intended to empower the state as guardian of all land, thus ensuring
rational use. Among other things, “rational use” during this period of drought, food shortages, and perceived
environmental decline was defined in terms of maximizing productivity through the promotion of “modernized”
private cooperatives and plantations, which could facilitate economic growth through increased exports. In
support of these macroeconomic objectives, aspects of the new legislation granted rights of landownership
through titling to village outsiders, in opposition to customary traditions, which tend to allocate land to members
of the resident social group (Fisiy 1992, p. 103). This change has enabled land to be allocated through the
marketplace, and the majority of persons who have taken advantage of the registration process are those in a
position to purchase land, primarily government officials and private businessmen (Fisiy 1992, p. 116).
The 1974 land legislation comprises three separate ordinances: Ordinance 74-1 established rules governing
land tenure; Ordinance 74-2 established rules governing state lands; and Ordinance 74-3 spelled out procedures
for expropriation of land for public use. Three additional enabling texts followed in 1976 which specified
procedures for registration and outlined conditions for managing state and national lands. The promotion of these
land tenure revisions was made possible by the passage of a national Constitution through means of popular
referendum in 1972. Under the new Constitution, the president was granted authority to revise Cameroonian land
legislation, a power which was reconfirmed by Law 73-3 of July 1973, which specifically mandated the president
to redraft existing tenure legislation.
In summary, since independence various Cameroonian governments have succeeded in resurrecting colonial
traditions of state ownership of all nonregistered lands. The 1974 legislation officially recognizes private rights
only to those lands which had been previously registered under any one of the previous governments (colonial or
postindependence), thus leaving no opportunities for legally securing more recent ownership claims under
customary practice.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Indigenous tenure systems in Cameroon can be distinguished according to different production systems and
historical and ethnic traditions. Clear distinctions usually exist between tenure rights for historically cultivating
peoples versus rights for pastoral, transitory production systems. Because there are over 200 different ethnic
groups in Cameroon, each possessing some distinctive characteristics in their tenure regimes, it would be33
impossible to adequately address the variety of subtle distinctions. In general, however, one can note that control
over land has traditionally been acquired by various groups through conquest, through first settlement and land
clearing, or through land grants from established chieftaincies.
Among settled, cultivating groups land is usually entrusted to the village chief, who is often the direct
descendant of the first settler. Historically, village chiefs grant use-rights to male heads of household, who then
decide upon questions of land access for their extended families. Inheritance of land is typically divided among
male heirs. While this pattern tends to be the norm, regional and ethnic distinctions certainly exist. Additionally it
is important to note that tenure systems have evolved in response to changes in production strategies, particularly
in those areas that have become dominated by coffee and cacao cultivation. In the areas where cash crops are a
major component of agricultural production (particularly in the south and central regions and mountainous
zones), land tenure is increasingly individualized and access to land is often determined by the market. Such is
also the case in areas of high population density such as peri-urban areas surrounding Yaounde and Douala.
In less populated regions where subsistence production dominates, the customary land allocation role of
village chiefs continues to be the major means of access. A rather extreme form of chieftaincy control exists
among the Bamileke and Bamoun peoples of western Cameroon. Among these groups the village chiefs own all
land, allocating temporary use rights to village members during the cropping season. This is sometimes
problematic; temporary rights do not allow for the cultivation of perennial crops, and thus tree planting is not
encouraged (Tonye, Meke-Me-Ze, and Titi-Nwel 1993).
 In most areas of northwest Cameroon, particularly in the Nso region, the village chief, or Fon, is the titular
proprietor of village lands. But in actuality customary ownership rights belong to the person commonly
recognized as having cultivated the area for an extended period of time. In these cases tree planting can in fact
serve to solidify land rights.
Northern Cameroon is also inhabited by Fulani herders, who first moved to the area from Nigeria in the
early part of the twentieth century. Historically the Fulani were granted access rights to pasture by local chiefs in
exchange for tribute in the form of cows or money. However, shortly after their arrival and increasingly into the
present day, competition for land has heightened among herders and local farmers. In particular, conflicts have
occurred between herders and women, who frequently cultivate on the fringes of settlements in proximity to
pasture areas.
In other areas of northern Cameroon, particularly in the Mandara mountain range, the Fulani acquired land
through conquest, enslaving local populations who cultivated for them. Throughout the past century, however,
many Fulani have settled into agricultural production, becoming the guardians of first claim to some village lands.
Similarly, in the forest zone of southeastern Cameroon many groups acquired dominant land rights through
conquest. This was the case among the Pygmees, who have also become increasingly sedentarised.
In the context of an expanding agricultural export economy, one could interpret the instigation behind the
1974 Land Ordinances as an effort to promote and secure the commercialization of land rights in order to expand
the production of cash crops. For example, the stipulation allowing for alienation of land to nonvillage members
often served to legitimize a process that was already under way. In other areas it facilitated processes of land
acquisition and speculation among absentee owners.
Customary land rights, and particularly communal production systems, do continue to exist in many regions
of Cameroon where land values and export crop production have not escalated. This is particularly the case in
western Cameroon. In this region family-based production systems have been preserved, largely due to practices
of primogeniture, which grant exclusive management rights over collective fields to the eldest son following the
death of the father.34
The last twenty years have been witness to increasing frustrations in those areas of Cameroon where
community lands have been acquired by outsiders. In some areas this has led to situations where villagers work as
day laborers on plantations which have been purchased and titled by outsiders, thus alienating local inhabitants
from what is viewed under customary law as their birthright (Mbome, Ndongo, and Poumie 1995). Pressures for
reforming the 1974 ordinances in order to reestablish communal land rights have begun to enter the policy
dialogue, but as yet no tangible revisions have been made.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
In the Northwest Province of Cameroon interesting dynamics have been occurring during the last century which
characterize the complexity involved in changing tenure rules and the shortcomings of current legislation in
providing any means of reconciling conflicting rights of access. Increased competition over land between Fulani
herders and women cultivators has led to conflicts which have not been adequately addressed through registration
schemes promoted under the 1974 Land Ordinances.
When the Fulani herders first moved into the northwest region in the 1920s they were welcomed by both
traditional leaders and colonial authorities because of the wealth they contributed in the form of fealty to local
chiefs and cattle taxes to the colonial government. Problems began to develop in the 1930s due to the doubling of
cattle numbers in the area and the simultaneous promotion of coffee cultivation. As male cultivators claimed
much of the prime land close to village settlements for their coffee plantations, village women were forced to
cultivate their food crops in closer proximity to what remained of the open range. The problem continued to
exacerbate into the 1940s as cattle numbers exceeded projected carrying capacity levels leading to destruction of
field crops and violent clashes between Fulani and women cultivators (Fisiy 1992, p. 69).
Decree 76-165 of 1976 attempted to resolve this problem by demarcating livestock boundaries and
establishing arbitration councils for crop-damage disputes. However, the boundaries set by local authorities have
not been respected, and promised provision of barbed wire has not been forthcoming. The situation is further
complicated by the absence of any means to register collective property, such as rangeland, under the 1974
ordinances. In fact there is evidence to substantiate that some of the more prosperous Fulani are benefiting due to
their ability to acquire private title to land, thus alienating many women from cultivable lands and changing rules
of access for other herders (Fisiy 1992, p. 116). Many of the Fulani who have acquired private land through
registration have moved into sedentary production in addition to investment in livestock. This trend appears to be
leading to increased frustration among resident cultivators who perceive the continued alienation of their ancestral
lands by “outsiders.”
In the regions of large-scale cacao and coffee cultivation, such as Lékié, the transition from subsistence to
market production has further weakened customary views of land as an inalienable right derived from the
ancestors and to be passed on to future generations. Rather, land is increasingly seen as a commodity, and the
high value to be obtained from cacao production has led to a situation of absentee ownership with local producers
gaining access through rental.
In 1990 the ministries responsible for forest management in Cameroon were reorganized to form the Office
National de Développement des Forêts (ONADEF). The purpose of this new organization is to promote the
protection of forest resources and encourage reforestation initiatives with a view toward the economic gains to be
made from responsible exploitation.
Similar to land legislation, forest policy in Cameroon is characterized by the notion of national domain.
According to the Forest Code of 1981, forests in Cameroon are classified in one of three ways: (1) state forests,
which include national parks and wildlife preserves; (2) collective or private forests, which are planted by
individuals on land they have registered but which have some restrictions on use still applicable; and finally, the
largest category, (3) national domain forests, which consist of all forested land not falling within the other two35
categories. The state has attempted to enforce rules regulating access rights to these forests, including harvesting
of products and timber by local communities. Cutting and hunting rights are allowed only through issuance of
permits, though harvesting of deadwood and most tree products is allowed for local residents. Trees that are
planted by individuals are considered private property as long as they are planted on that individual’s registered
landholding. All other trees are considered state property.
Customary laws differ significantly from national legislation. Under customary tenure rules trees are
considered the property of the person with locally recognized, legitimate claims to the land. This holds true both
for naturally propagated trees and for planted trees. Persons having only temporary use-rights to land under
customary rules do not have ownership rights to trees and are discouraged from planting them on borrowed land.
If trees are planted by a person with temporary rights, ownership of those trees belongs to the recognized
landowner.
Wildlife species are similarly considered national domain, and they are protected through control over
hunting permits. Additionally, a number of national parks exist, particularly in northern Cameroon, and hunting is
strictly forbidden in these areas.
For nearly thirty years following independence, Cameroonian politics was dominated by a single governing
party. This changed in December 1990 with the passage of Law 90-056, which legalized the creation of
competing political parties and ushered in an era of multiparty democracy.
The single-party system in combination with the 1974 land legislation had different impacts in rural areas
than it did in the urban zones. Control of urban areas by state-appointed mayors of the Unity Party meant that
traditional leaders’ powers were diminished and the nationalization and individualization of land rights as dictated
by the 1974 Land Ordinances was realized. Conversely, in the rural areas the unitary political system had the
effect of strengthening traditional leaders’ control over land by naming village chiefs as the local party
representatives. While the process of acquisition of village lands by outsiders did occur, at the same time the role
of the village chiefs as ultimate arbiters in determining land rights was strengthened.
It is too early to determine if the transition to a multiparty political system will have a significant impact on
tenure rights. However, it does seem certain that the control that appointed mayors have possessed over urban
land decisions and village chiefs have possessed over rural land access will be subject to increased competition.
According to many customary traditions in Cameroon, women acquire access to land through their
husbands. The 1974 Land Ordinances officially granted usufruct rights to widows upon the death of their
husbands, but with the stipulation that ownership rights be acquired by sons (or in some cases daughters) once
they reached the age of 21.
Additionally, many different ethnic groups consider the production of food crops and the provision of
firewood to be the woman’s responsibility. It is for this reason that few women have become involved in cash-
crop production, particularly of tree crops such as coffee and cacao. As previously described, it has often been
Cameroonian women who have come into conflict with herders as their fields are pushed farther to the margins to
make way for men’s coffee plantations.
Increasingly over the last few decades, more female-headed households are coming into existence in
Cameroon as a result either of divorce, death, or abandonment on the part of husbands or of women raising
families out of wedlock. Women are also increasingly involved in the market either as professionals and laborers
or through the sale of their production. As a result, increasing numbers of women are independently acquiring or
even registering land—a situation which was virtually unknown a generation ago.
However, while this development may be viewed as positive, a much more common incidence that has been
occurring in recent years is that women who gain access to land through borrowing or other forms of temporary36
usufruct are often forced off the land when the proprietor decides to sell the parcel or to increase his production.
These occurrences are particularly common in peri-urban areas where land markets are prevalent.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
Because over twenty years have elapsed since the passage of the 1974 Land Ordinances, a substantial amount of
research has been conducted to allow for rudimentary conclusions of the impacts of this legislation. According to
various authors (Mbome, Ndongo, and Poumie 1995; Fisiy 1992) some of the principal impacts of the land
legislation have included: increased individualization of landownership;, alienation of previously community-held
lands by outsiders; increase in the number of cooperatively and privately owned commercial plantations;
heightened land speculation in urban and peri-urban areas; greater proletarianization of rural residents who have
lost access to land and now hire out their labor on coffee, cacao ,or palm plantations; and increased state control
over land access and use.
Remarkable distinctions have been noted between the impact of the legislative reform in urban versus in
rural areas. The FAO study (Mbome, Ndongo, and Poumie 1995) in particular speaks of a dual land tenure
system which presently exists: individual or state ownership and a thriving land market in coastal, central and
southern Cameroon (particularly in urban areas); and continued predominance of customary rules of access in
less inhabited, less commercially oriented rural areas. However, even in these rural zones it is argued that market
forces are increasingly important, that outside investors now have access to landownership, and that the land
allocation role of village chiefs has been strengthened in many areas (Mbome, Ndongo, and Poumie 1995, p. 64).
A growing consensus regarding the need to strengthen customary land laws and enhance tenure security for
village residents appears to be emerging. The recent establishment of multiparty democracy may facilitate
bringing these calls for reform into the policy dialogue; however, no substantive efforts to effect such changes
have yet been implemented.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
To summarize, the result of the 1974 Land Ordinances appears to have been to create a dual structure in
Cameroonian land tenure, with widespread registration and titling of landholdings and an active land market and
land speculation in urban areas and some registration and titling of property with outsiders acquiring rights to
community-held lands in rural areas. But the most part rural residents continue to abide by local custom in
gaining access to and managing resources.
Given that the law has been accepted in a very uneven manner, many analysts have recommended revisions
to the legislation that would effectively recognize the traditions which predominate in a given area, whether they
be customary or modern rules. Among the tenure reform policies under discussion in Cameroon are the following:
u Decentralizing land tenure institutions so that land grants are allocated through local (village-level) decision-
making rather than as concessions by national-level bureaucrats. Such a reform could continue the process of
securing individual title in order to facilitate rational economic exploitation while at the same time returning
control and recognition of customary land rights to the local community.
u Proclaimed state ownership over all nonregistered land and self-propagated trees should be discontinued, with
rights to these resources reverting to local, customary definitions. Such definitions typically grant ownership
rights to landowners over all trees located on their holdings. Additionally land rights are secured according to
local definitions rather than through registration at the sate-level. Unless individuals feel that they have a
recognized claim to the resources they exploit, both land and trees, the likelihood that they will make
investments in maintaining these resources is greatly reduced.37
u Further deterioration of communal and family-based landholding could be alleviated by providing the legal
means to register corporate land rights.
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CAPE VERDE COUNTRY PROFILE
by Mike Williams
Executive summary
When Cape Verde was discovered by the Portuguese in 1460, the islands were uninhabited. At first, they were
used as a location to facilitate the slave trade and as a place where Portuguese ships could prepare for their
journeys around the African continent. Most of the land in Cape Verde is not arable. In addition, the islands are
subject to unpredictable and extraordinary droughts. Due to these circumstances, the Portuguese did not attempt
to establish an infrastructure in the archipelago, and for most of its history, the Cape Verde was ruled by its
landowners (morgados) rather than the Portuguese government. The morgados initiated sharecropping in the
islands, and the remnants of this system still exist.th
National policy and legal framework
The Republic of Cape Verde consists of ten islands 600 kilometers off the coast of Senegal. Nine of the ten
islands are inhabited, and the total land area of the archipelago is 4,033 square kilometers. The islands are subject
to long droughts and extreme shortages of water. Most of the islands are barren with only a few strips of arable
land. Specifically, only 10–15% of the total area is suitable for farming, and the population density on
agricultural land is approximately 400 individuals per square kilometer. The islands are volcanic in origin and
represent the tip of a large undersea mountain range. Due to the dire ecological conditions, many Cape Verdeans
have traditionally emigrated to seek employment. As a result, there are more Cape Verdeans abroad than in the
archipelago.
Cape Verde experienced almost undiminished drought from 1968 to 1984. The total cultivable land area is
39,000 hectares, of which 34,000 hectares are actually utilized for agricultural production. The two staple
agricultural products are maize and beans. During the years of drought (1968–1984), the harvest of maize and
beans was nearly wiped out. While agricultural production has improved over the last fifteen years, Cape Verde
is still forced to import most of its produce. Even though 90% of the population are engaged in the production of
agriculture, food production makes up only 20% of the GDP. 
The Portuguese founded Cape Verde in 1460, offering land titles to wealthy families as incentive to
encourage settlement. In fact, the island of Santiago (the largest island) was divided between Diogo Gomes and
Genoese Antonio da Nola—the two “discoverers” of the islands. These initial landowners wielded extreme power
and retained title for almost 130 years. As settlers began to arrive, the Portuguese government continued to cede
large portions of the islands to wealthy landowners. By the end of the sixteenth century, the land was divided
among Portuguese families and the church under two similar land tenure arrangements: the morgadio
(sharecropping) system, and the arrendamento (money-rent) system. These land tenure systems were utilized to
establish large farms that produced sugarcane (an export crop) at the expense of food crops such as maize and
beans. The overproduction of sugarcane under the morgadio system proved to be disastrous for Cape Verde’s
economic and ecological system.
Under the morgadio system, individual families (morgados) were given the right to specific pieces of land in
perpetuity through the male line. While the families had certain duties as landowners, for the most part they were
able to extract what they wanted from the land without reimbursing those who happened to be living and working
there. The sharecroppers were forced to renew their contracts every year, and thus they had no tenure security and
no incentive to make improvements to the land. In addition, because the landowners were not allowed to sell the39
land, when land became unproductive, many families simply abandoned their holdings. This type of land
administration affected the peasants and slaves more than any other individuals. In addition, because land sales
were prohibited and only the eldest son could inherit the land, many of the offspring were left without means of
support except as tenant farmers. Due to the end of the slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century as well as the
terrible drought in 1830, the morgadio land tenure system proved inefficient and was officially abolished by royal
decree in 1864.
While the morgadio land tenure system was formally abolished in the late nineteenth century, it continued to
be the de facto tenure arrangement until the 1930s. In 1865, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (National Overseas
Bank) was established in Cape Verde. This institution lent money to landowners and thus helped them retain their
power. The financial crisis of 1929, however, damaged the landowners to such an extent that the morgadio
system was finally destroyed.
The landowners who prospered under the morgadio land tenure system were replaced by a new middle class
made up of Cape Verdean emigrants who had been working in the United States. For the most part, however, the
land was controlled by a few wealthy landowners and it continued to be tilled by tenants or sharecroppers. Thus,
while the old landowners were replaced by new middle class, the land tenure system (which consisted of tenant
farming and sharecropping) was largely left intact.
In 1975, Cape Verde was granted independence from Portugal. Land tenure did not become an important
political issue until the 1981 Agrarian Reform Act. This legislation was enacted to distribute landholdings of over
5 hectares that were not being farmed directly by the owners to their peasant cultivators. In another effort in the
mid-1980s, the government sought to eliminate sharecropping and to limit tenant farming. Unfortunately, it did
not pass any legislation to this effect. Under the current Movimento Popular Democrático (MPD) government
land tenure reform is not a high priority issue, and it is unlikely to initiate any further land reform.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
As indicated above, most sources suggest that the archipelago was uninhabited when it was found by the
Portuguese. Land was distributed to wealthy families under the morgadio land tenure system. This sharecropping
system has continued, more or less, to the present day. While the government initiated some modest land tenure
reform programs in the 1980s, most peasants do not own the land they till and continue to lease from large
landowners.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Cape Verde suffered almost total drought from 1968 to 1984. It is unlikely that the islands will achieve food self-
sufficiency in the foreseeable future. The success of agricultural development depends on whether the islands can
tap the underground water resources. The complex volcanic geology of the archipelago, however, makes this
endeavor difficult. Until more funds are devoted to the development of irrigation systems, it is unlikely that
agricultural production will increase.
Over the last few years, the government has sought to increase the water resources through a reforestation
program. This program sought to plant enough trees to supply fuel, retain rainwater, and reverse the effects of
centuries of soil erosion. In 1990, the government instituted a program where they planned to plant 2 million
trees. Unfortunately, there have been no studies to assess the success of this program.
Livestock plays an important role in the archipelago. Over the years, however, it has been difficult to sustain
large numbers of livestock due to the droughts. For example, it is estimated that the total number of animals
declined 37% during the 1970s. Even though there has been adequate rainfall over the last ten years, the total
number of livestock is still below the historical average.40
In terms of minerals, the islands possess virtually no natural resources except for pozzolana (a type of
cement base) and orchil (a lichen that produces a specific red dye). There is no current information on specific
natural resource management programs with respect to these minerals. As indicated above, however, the
government has initiated afforestation programs.
In 1991, Cape Verde held its first multiparty legislative and presidential elections. This election resulted in
the defeat of the Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV) and President Aristides Pereira.
This ended the single-party rule that had existed since 1975. The PAICV was replaced by the opposition party,
the MPD, and Carlos Veiga was elected president. Land reform was not an important issue in the elections, and it
is doubtful that the MPD government will initiate land tenure reforms in the future. 
Due to the severe droughts which have inflicted Cape Verde, the islands have been able to produce only
60% of their food needs. The main food crops are beans and maize. These crops are grown on terraced
mountainsides by individual families. The land utilized for these crops, however, is minimal due to the intense
cultivation of sugarcane. In the past, the landlords reserved most arable lands for the production of sugar cane.
This product was either exported as refined sweetener or used as the base for the local liquor, known as grogo.
The excessive cultivation of sugarcane was disastrous for both the economic situation of the Cape Verdeans and
their health as well.
Present policy positions and reforms discussed
There is no information available to indicate that the current government is considering land tenure reform.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The amount of information that is available on Cape Verde is limited. There needs to be additional research
completed.
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC COUNTRY PROFILE
by Rebecca Furth
Executive summary
The Government of the Central African Republic (CAR) has voiced its intention to encourage projects that are
based on individual or small collective leadership groups. The idea is to promote the autonomy and encourage the
motivation of user groups. Although the government created a system of land registration, it lacks the manpower
to administer or promote such a system. While some skeletal land tenure policies may exist within national
legislation, they are not heeded. Indigenous land tenure systems remain the foundation of CAR land tenure.
National policy and legal framework  
Central African Republic is a sparsely populated and geographically diverse country spanning the Sahelian and
forest zones of central Africa. The country is bordered by Cameroon and Congo to the southwest, Zaire to the
south, Chad to the north, and Sudan to the east. Landlocked in the heart of the continent, the Central African
Republic has suffered from poor economic growth, political corruption, and drought. Its population is estimated
at 3.3 million people with a 2.6% annual growth rate. The total land area of the Central African Republic equals
622,984 square kilometers (240,535 square miles). Only about 3% of the total land area is occupied with
agricultural production, 5% by meadows and pastures, and 64% by forest and woodlands; 28% is employed for
other uses.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the government of CAR encouraged agricultural cooperatives based on a
centralized decision-making body and obligatory participation. This approach met substantial resistance and was
almost completely ineffective. More recently, the government has adopted an approach to agricultural
development based on a “self-focused” development model. The government is interested in creating and
implementing programs in a decentralized manner with local individuals or groups as the core of the decision-
making body.
Although the government is voicing a liberal philosophy for production and development, its current doctrine
is not reflected in its land tenure policies. The present land tenure policy of the Central African government is
based on the archaic colonial land tenure policy. The government started a process of reconstructing a national
land tenure policy in 1986; however, no new policies have been established to date.
The Central African government claims all “unused” or “unowned” lands (both rural and urban) as property
of the state. Private ownership can be established and secured through the official entry of lands into the national
land register. The regulations for registering land are detailed in Law No. 60/76 of 1976. According to this law, it
is possible to obtain two different sorts of land permits: habitation permits, and official land title.
Certain lands are zoned for habitation only. The state remains the ultimate legal owner of these lands, but
individuals can obtain permits to occupy and build nonpermanent structures on these properties. Huts or houses
made of traditional organic materials are considered nonpermanent; cement or metal structures are not. In rural
areas, habitation permits are easy to acquire and are usually free. In peri-urban areas, they are more difficult to
acquire and usually necessitate substantial payment and the permission of several government officials.
Permission to build permanent structures on land on which a person has a habitation permit can be obtained with
the acquisition of a construction permit. Furthermore, if a resident can establish that he has put his “habitation”
land into productive use according to the stipulations of mise en valeur, then he can apply for legal ownership of
his residential lands. Such cases, however, are rare.42
Legal registration of land for ownership title is possible in both urban and rural areas. In order to establish
rights to land, an applicant must prove he has put land into viable mise en valeur (usually intensive or permanent
agriculture) or erected a permanent structure on the land, which constitutes the land as legally occupied or in use.
After viable use or occupation is verified, land can be officially registered and the application for legal title can be
processed. It is possible for either an individual or a collective to obtain legal title to land in the Central African
Republic. The procedure for land registration, however, is complicated, time consuming, and expensive.
Consequently, few lands are legally titled.
In urban areas, vacant lands can be temporarily rented to people wishing to acquire use rights. Users can
become owners of these lands by completing the aforementioned registration procedures. There is a zoning plan
for each major town in the Central African Republic. These zones are hierarchically ordered and different tiers
may have different building and use restrictions. These regulations manage the control and use of residential
lands. However, the lack of facilities on urban sites and the inefficient collection of real-estate taxes result in the
inability of the government to ensure the efficient operation of these services.
Despite its legal registration procedures, the state maintains legal right to expropriate lands for the public
good (that is, the construction of roads). In addition, the state can also repossess lands which it feels are not being
put to “proper use.” Because proper use is only broadly defined, the state has a considerable amount of flexibility
in declaring what it considers proper in any given situation. The unclear guidelines in this aspect of the law bring
the issue of land security into question.
Just as the lack of manpower and finances inhibits the government from enforcing zoning and registration
regulations in the urban centers, so there is no enforcement of government land-tenure policies in the rural sector.
While the government recognizes the legitimacy of traditional land tenure systems, its policy does not incorporate
these systems. Despite this neglect of traditional systems by the government, most lands continue to be allocated
and controlled by community-based land tenure systems.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
While customary systems govern land tenure in rural areas, they have been affected by national policy as well as
economic and environmental constraints. Whereas the lineage chiefs or clan elders once managed the land in most
communities, chiefs (who are often government liaisons) are increasingly becoming intermediaries between the
land seekers and users and the lineage or clan elders who are the traditional land managers. In addition to this
administrative shift, traditional systems are being altered by the possibilities offered in the national policy, such as
permanent individual ownership.
Traditional systems are constantly changing and adapting to differing political, economic, and environmental
conditions. Individual communities may have highly divergent ways of adapting to similar situations. Although
traditional systems are characterized in this paper, it is important that these general characterizations not be
viewed as absolute or fixed.
Although an ethnically diverse country, the Banda and Baya groups compose the majority of the population.
These groups typically practice extensive swidden agriculture. In this system, the first clearers of the land
establish use rights. Rights to land are transmitted through patrilineal inheritance. While farmers have individual
use rights to land, all land is collectively owned by the lineage. The lineage head has ultimate control over land
distribution and allocation. Control over land passes laterally from the eldest male in the lineage to the next eldest.
The lineage head also acts as arbitrator in land disputes.
A farmer can borrow land with the permission of the lineage head or an individual farmer. Borrowers can
obtain only temporary use rights and not ownership rights to land. There is no indication of how many farmers
are land borrowers versus land owners or perennial users. Development projects should attempt to gain an
understanding of the relationship between owners, users, and borrowers in given project areas. It is also important43
to examine the ways in which this relationship is changing under economic pressures such as the shift from food
crops to cash crops in CAR. Because CAR is not encountering the same constraints of land shortages, even in the
major cash cropping regions, it is likely that the change in relationships will not resemble that experienced by
neighboring countries, such as Chad and Benin, which are facing major land shortages.
Fulani herders occupy the northwestern region of the country. There is little mention of their land tenure
system, but it is noted that the herders and farmers of this region have a complementary relationship with farmers
with regard to land use. Farmers will allow herders to occupy their fallowed and farmed lands. The herds sustain
themselves on the fertile lands and simultaneously fertilize the fields. In addition, the herders and farmers
exchange agricultural and animal products. This relationship between farmers and herders is common to many
other countries of the region. In many areas this relationship is being thrown off balance by changing
environmental and economic forces. This is an important subject in need of further investigation in the Central
African Republic.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
The Government of CAR has encouraged the intensification of agriculture in recent years. Permanent and
intensive agriculture are two of the main conditions of mise en valeur. In the past, emphasis was placed on
intensive cash cropping, particularly of cotton. Cotton plantations were mostly owned by French farmers and
companies until the early 1980s, when they reverted to smallholder control. There is no information about the
transformation of these large plantations into the hands of smallholders. Nor is there any indication of the rights
these smallholders have to their lands. Recently the government has begun a campaign to encourage food-crop as
well as cash-crop production in order to lower the national importation of foodstuffs.
Although the Central African Republic has undergone the same destructive drought as other countries in the
region, its low population density and abundance of arable land have spared it from the land scarcity and conflict
problems currently being experienced by its northern neighbors. The weak economy and poor prospects for
exportation, due the country’s landlocked status and insufficient infrastructure, have resulted in a decrease in
agricultural production. As a consequence, rural-to-urban out-migration is occurring at an alarming rate.
Agriculture remains extensive and impermanent in most areas. Thus, the majority of lands do not meet the
necessary conditions of mise en valeur and can be legally expropriated by the state. This circumstance results in
little tenure security for the majority of the country’s producers.
As noted earlier, the Fulani herders have traditionally shared lands in the northwestern region with sedentary
farmers. There is not enough information available about the relationship of these two groups in the Central
African Republic. It is noted, however, that because the Fulani are transhumant and migrate between grasslands
and waterways, they rarely occupy a parcel long enough to establish a claim for legal title.
The government developed the National Livestock Project (l’Agence National pour le Développement de
l’Élevage, ANDE) in 1986 to improve livestock production. This project was aimed at protecting pasturelands by
establishing semi-sedentary “pastoral action zones.” Each of these zones was planned to be administered by an
association of herdsmen. This project was to be based in the Ministry of Rural Development and the National
Livestock Federation. Unfortunately there is no indication that it was ever implemented, nor any information
about how it addressed land tenure issues, which were an integral part of the establishment of pastoral action
zones.
The Central African Republic possesses one of the last truly extensive rainforests in Africa. The government
has continually been developing new plans for the exploitation of the forest in order to better the national
economy. The lack of sufficient infrastructure has proved to be an effective constraint to large-scale exploitation;
however, deforestation is still occurring with increasing speed.44
There are several pygmy groups and other peoples who inhabit these forest regions, not to mention the
various groups who use forest resources. Tree tenure and land tenure are most often separate in customary tenure
systems. In forest areas, caterpillar trees, mushroom trees, and certain fruit trees are open to exploitation by
anyone. This is not the case with perennial tree crops, which are customarily accessible only by the tree owner.
Owners of perennial tree crops have use rights to the land on which the trees are situated as long as the trees
remain productive. 
  There are several classified forests that are considered property of the state. In 1990, Law No. 90.003
clearly delineates the various forest zones in the country, organizes the regulations for herding in classified
forests, and defines regulations for controlled burning. It is important that project planners and the CAR
government develop an understanding of the customary land and forest tenures and create programs sensitive to
these peoples’ rights and needs.
The Central African Republic has one of the last substantial wildlife populations in the world. Despite the
government’s creation of three national parks and eight game reserves, hunting and poaching have nearly
decimated many of the animal populations. Most of these reserves were established in the sparsely populated
regions of the country. There is no information regarding the rights of the peoples indigenous to these lands. This
subject is in need of further research, particularly for project planners addressing issues surrounding game
reserves.
Mining lands come under the national domain and are property of the state. However, Article 4 of
Ordinance No. 83/024/1985 authorizes all persons of Central African nationality the right to small-scale
exploitation of gold and diamond resources. Other mining resources are accessible only with permission of state
authorities.
Since 1993, the Central African government has expressed its commitment to democracy. In addition, the
government recently voiced its desire to promote village, group, and individual leadership in development
programs. In order to remain consistent, the government must also develop a national land-tenure policy which
will recognize the legitimacy of community-based land tenure systems. While it seems as if the government is
philosophically dedicated to democracy, it must restructure its policy to reflect its doctrine in practical terms.
The principle of mise en valeur is designed to increase agricultural production in order to boost the national
economy. This same principle is also the basis for legal landownership and rights to land. Despite the
government’s efforts to better the economy by controlling land tenure through mise en valeur, the Central African
Republic has been struggling economically since the early 1970s. The lack of infrastructure, combined with the
country’s landlocked status, has inhibited exportation as well as production for domestic consumption. The CAR
is a net food importer. In order to control this unfavorable situation, the government has promoted the production
of food crops as well as cash crops in recent years. Pronounced rural-to-urban out-migration has resulted in the
decrease of agricultural production despite the government’s campaigns.
In most customary systems, women can acquire use rights to land only through their husbands or fathers.
The national land-tenure policy makes it possible for women to own land independently since it does not
discriminate on the basis of age or sex. Although women can legally own land, there is no indication that any
have, as yet, registered land or gained legal title. The possibility for women to own land could potentially cause
many shifts in community-based systems. Project designers should be sensitive to the relationship between men
and women with the land and conscious of shifts in community-based systems if they are to construct effective
development programs.
Present policy reforms discussed
While it appears that the government has made important changes in its approach to agricultural production and
development, the national land-tenure policies have remained unaltered. If the government is truly dedicated to45
democracy and decentralization, it must adjust its land tenure policies to reflect its philosophy. There is little
tenure security under current policies. New policies need to be developed to assure security for all users. Because
of poor infrastructure and a weak economy, intensive (mechanized and plow) and permanent agriculture is not
realistic. Therefore, the current stipulations for mise en valeur are not viable.
Furthermore, the Government of the CAR needs to formulate a new land tenure policy that recognizes
traditional land-tenure systems and assures tenure security for lands governed under those systems. At the same
time, an overarching national policy needs to be constructed to define national land-tenure policy in situations of
land conflict, sale, rental, and loan as well the interaction between national and traditional systems. A policy of
land registration and titling must be confined to the modest areas for which the government can provide the
finances and staff necessary for effectively maintaining such a system.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Far too little has been documented regarding land tenure in the Central African Republic. As a basis for
successful project design and implementation, both state policy and traditional land-tenure systems must be
investigated further. The Central African government needs to review its land tenure legislation in light of its
current development philosophies. Projects should attempt to integrate state and customary land-tenure systems in
order to empower local populations and ensure greater security of tenure.
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Unenforced national land-tenure policies in Chad have left intact the primacy of traditional land-tenure systems.
The southern region, characterized by sedentary agriculture, has a hierarchical lineage-based land tenure system,
while Islamic law governs land tenure in the northern pastoral region. Severe environmental constraints, due to
the prolonged drought in the region and a weakened economy, have thrown the relationship between farmers and
herders and various other users groups out of balance. Traditional land tenure systems are now challenged by
changing environmental and social relationships. A clear and well-defined national land tenure policy, which
recognizes the legitimacy of traditional tenure systems and yet provides clear and just land tenure laws, is
necessary to ensure effective land tenure conflict resolution as well as continued production and economic
stability.
National policy and legal framework
Chad is a landlocked country spanning the Sahelian zone and the Sahara desert. The fourth largest country in
sub-Saharan Africa, Chad covers an area of 1,284,000 square kilometers (495,800 square miles). Chad is
bordered by Libya to the north, the Central African Republic to the south, Sudan to the east, and Niger and
Cameroon to the west. Recent population censuses estimate the total population of the country at 6,288,000, with
the majority of the inhabitants living in the southern third of the country.
Land tenure in Chad is characterized by the interaction of different tenure systems, many land uses, and
various authorities governing the land. Different tenure systems include state policy, customary tenure, Islamic
law, and the legacy of colonialism. Lands are used for agriculture, social and political activities, migrations of
human and animal populations, and various systems of production. In addition to these myriad systems, there is
an overlapping of state, traditional, and collective authorities.
Colonial land tenure policy claimed all “unowned” or “unused” land as property of the state and required the
registration and titling of all lands. While the postindependence Chadian government did not directly adopt
colonial policies, it did emulate them. According to available information, the most recent land tenure edicts were
established in 1967.
In postindependence legislation, all land not under production and without a proprietor is considered
property of the state. This includes all unregistered and communally owned lands. According to government
policy, land under production which is governed by traditional land tenure systems is recognized as legitimate but
can be expropriated by the state if left to fallow for three years or more. However, although the legislation claims
to recognize indigenous land tenure systems, the policies usurp the power and rights of those same systems by
requiring legal registration and titling and denying collective property rights.
Laws No. 23, 24, and 25 of 1967 define national land tenure policy. Landownership and usufruct rights,
according to Law No. 24, necessitate legal registration and titling. Law No. 25 declares that the government has
the right to expropriate any lands under customary ownership or use if those lands are necessary for public use.
This suggests that there is little land security on lands governed by traditional tenure systems.
The Chadian state holds lands in both public and private domains. Public lands are nontransferable and are
subdivided into natural and “artificial” domains. Natural public lands include rivers, lakes, mineral reserves, and47
classified forests. Artificial public lands are composed of lands where infrastructure and public monuments are
established. Private state lands can be sold, rented, or leased, though there are no guidelines for such transfers.
Private lands encompass “other” lands which are owned and managed by the state. These include both urban and
rural lands which are frequently used in development initiatives. 
Despite the tenure laws of 1967, land tenure policies of the state are largely ignored. Neither private nor
public state property has been developed to any notable extent. For the most part, customary land tenure practices
prevail. Information from as recently as 1994 indicates that scarcely over 2,000 titles in all have been granted
since 1967, and fewer than 15 of those titles were issued to rural land users. Furthermore, the laws do not address
issues of conflict over natural resources, territorial boundaries, human and animal rights, competition between
different user groups, or problems of cohabitation.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Chad is divided into three main ecological zones which also largely delimit ethnic boundaries as well as land
tenure systems. The southern third of the country has the highest rainfall and is most conducive to sedentary
agriculture. This region of the country is mostly populated by animist farmers, most notably the Sara who
compose 25% of the total population. These groups practice a patrilineal lineage-based land tenure system in
which land is collectively owned. Land rights are established by the first clearer of the land and are transmitted
laterally through the eldest male in the lineage (land chief). In other words, instead of passing from father to son,
rights are passed from the oldest male in the lineage to the next oldest. The land chief has the right to distribute
land and acts as arbitrator in land conflicts. Although land is collectively owned by the entire lineage, individuals
have inalienable use rights. Only men in this system can inherit use rights. Women can gain access to land
through their husbands, though such access is not guaranteed as it is with men.
“Stranger” farmers with no affiliation to the lineage system who, nonetheless, wish to obtain use rights to a
parcel of land under this system can do so simply by getting the permission of the lineage chief. A primary
condition for borrowed land is that the user cannot plant trees. Although strangers’ use rights can be inherited, a
strange” will never acquire inalienable use rights or ownership. Some strangers have successfully obtained
permission to plant perennial crops. These cases are rare and are usually granted only to a stranger who has
already inhabited the area where he wishes to plant for several years. Strangers must keep land under production
or it will be reclaimed by the lineage.
The customary system appears to be evolving. Traditionally, sale of land under the customary system is
unknown. Land is viewed as common and not individual property. However, with the growing scarcity of viable
farm and grazing lands, families are clinging more tightly to the lands on which they hold usufruct rights.
Increasingly, families are wanting to assure that their land passes directly to their descendants and does not revert
to the lineage head for redistribution. Consequently, land purchases, loans, and rentals are occurring with
increasing frequency.
Islamic law governs land tenure in the northern and central regions of the country. Islamic law provides for
both collective and individual ownership. It dictates that all land belongs to all Islamic peoples. However, an
individual Muslim can acquire legal ownership to land. Within Islamic law there are privately owned lands and
collective lands. Privately owned lands are under the governance of the owner, whereas collective lands are
governed by the religious leader (imam) and are only managed by the land user. Collective lands are divided into
three main categories: dead lands, live lands, and terre de main morte. Dead lands constitute collectively owned
lands where each individual has private acquisition rights to a parcel of the collective land. Live lands are lands
which belong to the Muslim community and are managed by the community leaders. Individuals can obtain
usufruct rights to live lands by paying tribute to the leader of the Muslim community. Lastly, terre de main morte
comprise lands owned by the Muslim community. 48
Water rights are critical in Muslim law. The value of a parcel of land is determined by its proximity to a
water source. Under Muslim law, all people have rights of access to water sources. However, use rights vary
depending on the type of water source. Lakes and rivers are considered public waterways and are open to all
users including herders and their animals. Wells and other man-made water sources are the property of the person
who constructed them. In general, Islamic law holds that all people have access rights to private water sources as
well; however, they must offer payment or compensation to the owner of the water source (see section 4.2.1 for
more information). 
In general, there is nothing in either customary or Islamic land tenure systems which allows for equal access
to and control of land. Both systems are fundamentally hierarchical. Descendants of chiefs or wealthy members of
the community have access to more land and better quality lands and will rarely have difficulty acquiring land.
Increasing scarcity of land and competition over land resources is liable to create even greater inequality.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Chad’s history of political instability and civil conflict, combined with the prolonged drought and resulting
environmental degradation, has jeopardized traditional tenure relations. Government policies are no longer
sufficient to handle contemporary land tenure issues. New relationships are developing in agricultural and
pastoral domains as well as in the realms of natural resources, economics, and social relations.
While communal land tenure systems were once quite stable, the decrease in the number and quality of
fertile lands had destabilized traditional land tenure systems on agricultural lands. More and more, families are
clinging tightly to their lands and assuring that they be transmitted within their nuclear families instead of
reverting to the lineage. Sales, rentals, and loans of land are also occurring with increasing frequency. However,
traditional communal systems are still paramount. Attention needs to be paid not necessarily to the increase of
individually held lands but to the stabilization of land tenure systems, be they based on communal or private land
tenure. According to Yonoudjoum and Abdelsalam (1994), nothing in Chad’s experience indicates that the
increased individualization of land has had noticeable benefits on agricultural production. However, the lack of
land tenure stability has shown adverse effects on agricultural production and is therefore a crucial issue for the
Chadian nation.
Livestock production plays an important role in the Chadian economy accounting for 13% of the GDP and
engaging approximately 40% of the labor force. In 1988, the Chadian government created the Projet National
d’Élevage (PNE). Although this project was established to improve the development of livestock production, its
efforts are concentrated on veterinary developments. It does not address vital land tenure issues. The World Bank,
in its pilot project Périmètres Pastoraux Pilots, has attempted to address the issue of resource distribution and use,
particularly of water sources on pasturelands. It is not clear how the World Bank has approached land tenure
issues or what the outcome of its efforts have been.
Herding tenure is traditionally based on the idea of inexhaustible land resources and the availability of a
variety of pasturelands. The scarcity of pastureland which has resulted from the prolonged drought in Chad has
had a significant impact on land rights of pastoralists. There are three different categories of pasturelands: rainy
season pasturage, dry season pasturage, and trans-seasonal zones. Traditionally, there were clear arrangements
between herders and sedentary farmers which delimited pasturelands and defined and permitted access to water
sources. The war, drought, and environmental degradation since the late 1960s have thrown the relationship
between farmers and herders drastically out of balance. Because of the limited availability of pasturelands,
herders are continually trying to access new lands where they have no history of collaboration with the indigenous
farming populations. There is no national code to assist contemporary negotiations; in fact, there is nothing in the
national legislation that addresses these issues of land use between farmers and herders.49
Herders frequent both public and private water sources. The tenure issues regarding these different sources
have an important impact on water resource management and the surrounding lands. Public water sources are
created by the state. Because of the lack of government restrictions or guidelines governing these water sources
and the lands around them, the founts tend to be overused, dilapidated, and degraded. Private wells, on the other
hand, are managed by the person or community who created them. Herders are prohibited from parking their
animals at these sources for more than three days; thus these wells tend to be better maintained than public wells.
As the government increases its efforts to develop water sources for pasture maintenance, it must address the
issue of tenure and use rights in order to protect both the water sources and the surrounding lands.
Rights to water sources can be inherited but cannot be loaned, rented, or sold. In general, it is only the
children of the first wife of a spring owner who can inherit ownership rights; children of other wives only inherit
use rights.
The Government of Chad promulgated a new forest law in 1989. The information concerning this law is not
explicit, but it does indicate that the law regulates the protection and exploitation of wild animals and otherwise
reiterates the previous laws enacted in the 1960s. Laws No. 23, 24, and 25, established in 1967, address forest
tenure. Classified forests are part of the public domain of the state. The population technically has no legal rights
to these lands. However, the laws are not strongly enforced and exploitation of deadwood and other forest
products is ignored by the state. More significantly in recent years, farmers and herders have begun to expand
their activities into protected forest areas in an effort to find arable land.
Gum arabic is an important source of revenues for the Chadian herders and farmers. As pressure grows on
increasingly scarce land resources, competition over rights to the exploitation of gum arabic is intensifying.
Landowners often rent out the rights to exploit gum arabic from trees planted on their lands. Disputes have arisen
over whether sedentary farmers with farming rights to lands or herders with grazing rights to the same lands have
the right to harvest gum arabic. Tree tenure is an issue of increasing importance which should not be ignored in
project design and implementation. 
Oases are an important natural resource in the northern region of the country and generally come under
Islamic law. The first clearer and manager of a water source in an oasis has rights to the water source and
surrounding lands. Although gardeners may own rights to lands on which to garden, tree tenure may be
completely separate. There is no specific government policy that defines land tenure in oases.
Substantial oil reserves were recently discovered in Chad. This finding has important implications for the
national economy. According to Chadian law, the lands in which the oil is located are property of the state since
they contribute to the public good. The government has not begun exploiting these resources. It is not clear
whether the state will compensate the traditional landowners; however, nothing in the national land tenure
policies, nor in political history, gives any reason to believe that they will.
Chad recently reclaimed the Azou strip, located in the far north of the country, from Libya. This region is
said to have deposits of uranium and manganese. There is no information on government plans for this region.
Nor is there information on the traditional landowners of this area.
The current Government of Chad has voiced its dedication to creating a democratic, multiparty system. The
political turmoil, warring, and civil conflict of the past thirty years, combined with the prolonged drought, have
wreaked havoc on farming and herding and destabilized the economy. A stable government and a new
comprehensive land tenure policy are necessary for stable production. The newly democratic regime must
understand the importance of land tenure issues and be dedicated to creating a clear and just policy which
recognizes the rights of the many different user groups and the legitimacy of various land tenure systems.
The Government of Chad needs to address pressing land tenure issues if it is to assure economic growth and
stability. Since 1991, the government has had difficulty balancing the country’s fiscal situation. Civil conflict as50
well as drought and other environmental constraints have disrupted the country’s economy. Although the
petroleum reserves discovered in 1993 may ameliorate the national economy, the agricultural and herding sectors
will remain unstable without the resolution of land conflicts. New policies are necessary to assure land security
and provide guidelines for arbitrating disputes. Without clarification of land tenure, agricultural production and
herding will remain unstable and conflicts over land may increase dramatically.
here is little mention of women’s land tenure rights in Chad. In the customary tenure system of the southern
zone, married women can request a parcel of land from the land chief, though there is no guarantee that such a
request will be granted. Young or unmarried women have little chance of obtaining a parcel of land.
Present policy and reforms discussed
Chad is currently lacking a comprehensive land tenure policy capable of addressing its present land tenure
problems. The old laws of 1967 are skeletal at best and do not address important issues of land tenure for herders,
trees, oases and water sources. There is nothing in the present laws that provides a framework for arbitrating
current disputes over land between herders and farmers and other user groups. Although the laws recognize
traditional tenure systems, there is no clearly defined understanding of the relationship between rights of
traditional systems versus rights of the state. In order to resolve the current tensions and disputes over land which
have occurred as result of environmental degradation and political unrest, the government must create a new land
tenure policy.
In the northern region of Chad, where land is suitable only for herding, private tenure has little to offer
people who travel hundreds of miles each season in a continuing search for pasture. Moreover, the possibility of
tenure claims on migratory routes (most likely in mid-Chad) could devastate the fragile balance maintained by
herding populations with their environment. What may appear as vacant land may in reality be an integral part of
a group’s migratory pattern—even if it is used only in alternate years. Hence the failure of the 1967 laws to
realistically account for pastoral patterns of land use becomes a critical tenure issue. If freehold tenure continues
to be the national policy, planners must consider possibilities for integrating pastoral needs and practices into
titling schemes, perhaps along the lines of group ranches. However, concomitant delimitations of herd size and
range size necessary for such schemes make this an extremely difficult task.
For the more sedentary peoples in the south, a system of registration is unrealistic from the standpoint of
both the administrative and the financial capacity of the government. This is manifested in the lack of survey
personnel and the difficulty of demarcating the vast numbers of irregularly shaped farm plots. A system of land
tenure that involves local input and relies on local administration could ease the requirements on national financial
and human resources.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Given the compound problem of civil conflict and drought, land tenure issues have been of secondary importance
in past development strategies. However, with the new hopes of political stability, development projects must turn
their focus to land tenure issues, which are fundamental in the relationship between different producers, and
production as a whole. Solutions to environmental degradation created by drought cannot be developed without
attention to land tenure issues. Project design must incorporate traditional land tenure systems in project areas in
order to create effective and sustainable programs.
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Congo is currently emerging from its long-standing anticolonial socialist ideology. The difficult transition to
multiparty democracy has hampered the implementation of the 1992 Constitution. In 1988/89, the government
began pushing free-market economic reforms, but these reforms have not yet been accompanied by more liberal
tenure legislation. All land is owned by the state. Private landownership, even in urban areas, is not recognized.
Instead, use and habitation rights may be registered to individuals and groups. An opportunity for creative tenure
legislation exists in Congo in relation to the country’s vast forest resources. Significant growth is possible in both
the agricultural and the timber sectors, but further legislative reform is required to initiate and direct such
expansion, particularly if private investment is to increase.
National policy dialogue and legal framework
Congo covers a total of 342,000 square kilometers The population of 2.5 million people (July 1995 estimate) is
unevenly distributed throughout the country. Although the average population density is relatively low for Africa
(7 people/square kilometer), some regions are highly urbanized. About 50% of the population lives in an urban or
peri-urban environment; a full 82% lives in the southern corridor along the railroad between the capital
Brazzaville and the port town of Pointe Noire. While such urban concentrations in the south generate problems of
unemployment and competition for land, northern Congo is one of the most sparsely populated regions in all of
Africa with a population density of only 1–3 persons per square kilometer.
The terrain varies from a coastal plain to a central plateau bounded by southern and northern basins.
Constant high temperatures and humidity are typical throughout both the rainy and dry season. Less than 2% of
the land is currently under cultivation and approximately 62% of the surface area remains wooded. Behind Zaire,
Congo currently holds Africa’s second most extensive forest reserves. While an estimated 75% of the labor force
engages in agriculture, this figure is misleading because it includes urban workers who cultivate small
supplementary gardens.
Congo has a heterogeneous ethnic composition. The numerically dominant Bakongo live in the Brazzaville
area and account for 48% of the population. Other groups include the M’boshi and the Sanga, both in the north,
and the Teke, in the central region. In all, people who speak Bantu languages constitute 97% of the population.
The remaining 3% includes Aka and Bakola pygmies in the northern forests and Babango pygmies in the
southern forests. The present-day close relationships with Angola and Gabon are supported by long-standing
ethnic and cultural ties; however contemporary relations with nearby Zaire have been described as “fractious.”
Despite the economic difficulties of the past decade, Congo maintains one of the highest per capita incomes
in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to timber, the country is well endowed with natural resources, including
petroleum, potash, lead, zinc, uranium, copper, phosphates, and natural gas. Timber was the main source of
foreign revenue until oil was discovered in the 1970s. Petroleum production has increased steadily, providing two-
thirds of government receipts by the 1990s. As Congo has become sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth largest oil
producer, the future of the timber industry is uncertain. Due to local transportation costs, Congolese timber can
no longer compete on the world market with timber from Southeast Asia.
When the price of petroleum declined on the world market in the 1980s, Congo tried to reinvigorate its
economy by initiating a wave of free-market reforms. Since its independence from France in 1960, Congo had53
been staunchly anticolonial and committed to a socialist path to development. The world petroleum crisis
prompted nationwide reforms to reassure Congo’s international donors and creditors. In 1991, opposition parties
were legalized, and by 1992, a new multiparty constitution was adopted by a national referendum. A series of
contested presidential elections followed in 1993, as did much civil unrest in the urban centers. In the wake of the
recent political turmoil, the official status of Congo’s tenure legislation is unclear.
During the colonial period, Brazzaville emerged as the administrative center of French Equatorial Africa,
which included what is today Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, Chad, and the Central African Republic. In 1899,
inspired by King Leopold of Belgium, France adopted a system of monopoly concessions in French Equatorial
Africa similar to the system in the Belgian Congo. Seventy percent of the Congo was divided into areas that were
leased to companies. Each company possessed a monopoly to exploit the products in its concession. When the
concessions lapsed in 1930, they were not renewed. The companies instead were granted ownership of the large
tracts of land.
French colonial land legislation exploited fully the notion that “vacant lands” reverted to state domain. All
land not officially registered under the Torrens Act, or held in accordance with French civil code, was considered
vacant. Local customary tenure was not recognized. The practice of collective land holding by communities and
lineages, the role of land chiefs and elders, and the customary rights of individuals were ignored. In the 1930s, the
colonial government initiated a program of village regroupings whereby many villagers lost access to their
traditional lineage land. As a result of the reassembly program, an existing customary system of interlineage land
borrowing was adapted to provide new arrivals with land access.
With the majority of rural land held by foreign concessions, only a few Africans in Congo were able to
obtain land titles. In 1920, land titles were granted to Africans possessing urban land not held collectively. In
1955, title could be granted only with proof that permanent improvements (that is, buildings) had been erected on
the land.
The 1969 Constitution represented a complete rupture from former French legislation. All land was declared
to be the property of the Congolese people as presented by the state. A series of new constitutions followed in the
1970s and 1980s, but all held to the basic premise of state ownership of all land. The most recent land legislation
available for review (1983) indicates that both land titles and customary tenure rules are invalid, but in reality the
majority of rural land continues to be held and managed according to customary systems. Although the
government once promoted the formation of state farms and government-directed producer cooperatives, the
administration now favors the formation of small, voluntary marketing cooperatives based on existing village
structures and customary land allocation practices.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Recent news reports from Congo indicate that a new constitution was approved by referendum in March 1992.
Neither the actual text nor the general policy direction of this document is available for review. The following
discussion, therefore, does not take into account the 1992 Constitution. Whether or not this constitution permits
private ownership of land or recognizes customary tenure is not know.
Since independence, land legislation has continued to dismiss the validity of customary land tenure.
Following the 1969 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution stated even more clearly that all land titles and customary
land rights were abolished (ARTICLE 31). In the 1979 Constitution, an added clause clarified that land cannot be
held as private property. A specific 1983 Land Code (Law No. 52/83) solidifies even further the authority of the
state over land. Whereas the 1979 Constitution (ART. 30) asserts that the state, in the name of the people,
regulates the use of the means of production (including land), the 1983 law states that the land is the property of
the people represented by the state (ART. 1).54
According to the 1983 Land Code, land is broadly divided into two categories: state and popular domains.
Regardless of legislative category, all land is the property of the state. State domain consists of state public and
private domains. Public domain includes public works such as bridges and roads as well as minerals and water
resources. Private domain is subdivided into state private domain and decentralized collectives. These categories
include forest reserves and state-run farms. 
Unique to the 1983 code is the creation of a new legal category of land, the popular domain. This
designation represents a break from the French land law heritage. Included in the popular domain is all land that
is effectively used by individuals and communities. The code, however, is not intended to formally recognize these
rights but rather to provide a legal means for the state to regulate use patterns. The code was also designed to
control the land speculation that was proliferating in the peri-urban areas, to discourage further increases in rents
for the seasonal use of land, and to prevent the dispersion of fields that may impede growth in agricultural
productivity.
Popular domain is subdivided into popular urban domain and popular rural domain. Popular urban domain
includes a category for residential and commercial land, and a category for agricultural and industrial land.
Individuals may obtain titles of occupation and use rights to popular urban domain, but not titles of ownership.
Renewable residential titles are issued for periods of five years. Similar titles of use rights are also renewable but
are initially issued for periods of twenty years. These titles cannot be sold or bequeathed. All titles must be
registered in a national cadastre.
Two categories exist within the popular rural domain: collective land, and modernization land. Collective
land includes residential, agricultural, pasture, and forest land. Each member of a village is entitled to secure use
rights to a maximum of 30 hectares of collective land. Groups of village members may similarly secure use rights
to a maximum of 100 hectares. Unlike collective land, modernization land is awarded not to individuals but to
village groupings and agricultural cooperatives. Modernization land includes the majority of the land that during
the colonial period was termed “vacante et sans maître.” The government expects this land to be used for staple
crop production, agricultural cooperatives, livestock herding, tree plantations, forests, and mining activities.
Included in the vast tracts of modernization land are the regions that will be crucial for Congo’s long-term food
security.
Although according to the 1979 Constitution all customary tenure was “abolished,” the majority of Congo’s
agricultural land, now under the category of popular rural domain, continues to be administered following
customary tenure.
Among the Bakongo, land is held by the lineage that first cleared the land. Lineage land is managed by the
lineage head who distributes access rights to the land. Land is inherited matrilineally; both men and women have
access to lineage land through their maternal uncles. The control of marriage partners is traditionally an important
means of maintaining or consolidating matrilineage property. Upon marriage, the nephew receives land use rights
in his maternal uncle’s village. Women often lose access to their own lineage land when they move with their
husbands, obligating them to either swap their use rights or rent land.
Much lineage land is today dispersed throughout a region, and even throughout the country, for several
reasons. First, each lineage traditionally holds land in each of the different ecological zones. Most villages include
several lineages whose holdings are scattered among each other. Second, over time, lineages segment to form new
villages as populations grow. Because parcels of lineage land may be dispersed, the lineage chief may delegate his
authority to a family member living nearby. Third, the forced village regroupings of the 1930s separated many
lineages from their ancestral land. These rearrangements precipitated an early form of land sales in Congo.
Displaced lineages were accommodated by established villages through the evolution of a pre-existing form
of land exchange. According to this system of land rotation (kitemo), a lineage head rents lineage land to members
of other lineages who are unable to use their own lineage land due to the alternation of the cultivation-fallow55
system or to constraints of the ecosystem such as water availability and soil fertility. In succeeding years, other
lineages rotate offering their land for rent to neighboring lineages. Rents are determined by size, type, and
potential productivity of the parcel.
Payments from these land rents are deposited in a collective lineage fund. According to the kitemo system,
all lineages are ensured access to land, while at the same time they are able to protect their long fallow periods.
When villages were forcibly regrouped in the 1930s, many lineage chiefs used lineage funds to buy land in new
villages where host lineages offered for sale land in the kitemo rotation system. The land was then allocated
according to customary rules and future access rights continue to follow matrilineal inheritance patterns.
Since the 1970s, individual heads of nuclear families have been using private funds to buy “personal” land.
These land sales have begun to be the source of land disputes as matrilineages fear the loss of their traditional
land. Many land buyers follow a father-to-son inheritance pattern rather than the customary uncle-to-nephew
structure. This emergence of individualized tenure will continue to generate conflicts, particularly because the
state does not recognize private property.
Although the 1979 Constitution does not recognize customary rights, the 1983 Land Code does leave open
some opportunities for the strengthening of customary rights in the framework of the national legislation. By
creating the categories of popular urban and rural domains, the state at least recognizes use rights as distinct from
ownership rights. Furthermore, within the popular rural domains, groups as well as individuals are permitted to
apply for use rights. The village groupings that may be awarded modernization lands could include lineages.
Although this system forces lineages, at the risk of losing their use rights, to apply for their traditional land to be
categorized as modernization land, once such a categorization has been made, the lineage is at liberty to continue
distributing and managing this land according to its customary system.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Agricultural land in Congo is exploited in three categories. Traditional farming practices, which include the
allocation and management of land according to customary systems, account for 70% of all land used for
agriculture. The principal crops are manioc, banana, plantains, and maize. State-operated farms utilize 27% of
the agricultural land and are oriented to large-scale palm oil and sugarcane production. The remaining 3% is
devoted to private industrial farming. Livestock production is curtailed nationwide by a shortage of suitable
pasture and the presence of the tsetse fly.
As of the late 1980s, the government, prompted by involvement from the United Nations, was developing
small agricultural cooperatives. These cooperatives, which often targeted women, were intended to increase food
production for local consumption rather than generate produce for the export market. The promotion of small-
scale farming, and the concurrent scaling back of state-run farms, may signal a change in the government’s
attitude toward the viability of private property in Congo.
There is evidence of the evolution of customary tenure systems as land pressure in the peri-urban areas
raises the value of productive land. Some land has passed out of lineage control as private land sales proliferate.
Inheritance patterns are also changing as men seek to bequeath their land rights directly to their sons. Conflicts
involving land rights are likely to escalate, particularly since use rights titles cannot be inherited according to the
1983 Land Code.
The central natural resource management issue in Congo involves forests. Both the coastal swamp forests
and the dry lowland forests are threatened by agriculture and timber exploitation. Deforestation is a concern, as is
the impact of forest destruction upon the indigenous minority pygmy population. Yet Congo presents several
possibilities for forest conservation. Since the 1970s, there has been an active program for establishing tree
plantations. The country remains heavily forested with 65% of the territory still wooded.56
According to a 1992 assessment of Congo’s forest codes, all Congolese citizens are guaranteed the right to
use forestland. The Forest Administration may not curtail these rights, even in areas managed by timber
companies. Villagers are permitted to continue their practices of burning the forests to clear land for cultivation.
Although the 1979 Constitution does not recognize customary ownership rights, use rights are protected. It is not
clear how disputes between agriculturalists and timber companies are resolved.
To date, only one national park has been established in which no exploitation is permitted. Other tracts of
forest have been designated as forest management units (Unités Forestières d’Aménagement, UFA). Each UFA is
large enough to support a separate timber industry. The country may be roughly divided into two regions with
regards to agriculture and the future of the timber industry. In the south, with higher population densities, the
UFAs are often invaded by agriculturalists. Under such conditions, commercial logging cannot be sustained
because neither the timber firms nor the local farmers have management responsibility or authority for the forests
categorized as state private domain. One conservation organization suggests that if logging is to continue, a
portion of the forest should be recategorized as popular rural domain which could be more intensely managed as a
commercial plantation. Whether or not local farmers would then be denied access to the forest is unclear. In
contrast, the forests in the north regenerate naturally after logging because they are relatively undisturbed by
agriculturalists. In this situation, the forests can sustain a logging industry while still classified as state private
domain.
The future of the Congolese timber industry is currently in question. Four of eight logging companies in the
north have suspended activities since 1991. Disruption of transportation networks due to strikes, rail accidents,
low river water levels, pressure from foreign environmentalist campaigns, and domestic political unrest have all
made Congolese timber less competitive on the world market.
After decades of commitment to a socialist ideology, Congo is slowly making a transition to a more
democratic state structure. Multiparty national elections were held in 1992 and 1993, but policy liberalization
reforms have not yet permeated tenure legislation. The assignment of use rights to local communities in the 1983
Land Code opens the possibility for a more decentralized structure of natural resource management, but there is
currently no recognition of local-level institutions. 
Congo has considerable agricultural potential, but it relies heavily on imported food to feed the large urban
population. In addition to the labor shift from rural to urban areas, agriculture also suffers from poor distribution
and transport networks. Food production has fallen as total land cultivated has declined. Furthermore, the state
farms that were established during the Marxist regime were often inefficient and depended on subsidies. The
government has stated a desire to achieve food self-sufficiency by the year 2000, but there are no plans for
achieving this goal. Unemployed city dwellers have been encouraged to take up farming, as is evident in the
creation of the agricultural category of the popular urban domain, but overall the country imports over 90% of its
food needs.
Although some project initiatives such as small producer farming cooperatives have been aimed specifically
at women, there have been few legislative or policy efforts intended to secure women’s tenure rights. Women
often lose access to their lineage lands when they get married and move to a new village. The customary kitemo
system of land rotations historically assured women of access to land, but as land passes into more exclusive
family holdings, women may find it more difficult to borrow or swap land use rights. As land rents increase,
women may be excluded from the productive land. Women’s use rights are not specifically addressed in the 1983
Land Code.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
In the 1970s, the Congolese government attempted to regroup farmers into producer co-ops administered by the
government. Farmers, however, were noncooperative and the government now tries instead to incorporate57
customary institutions in its cooperative program. In the 1980s, the rapid rise of world oil prices permitted Congo
to launch many large-scale development projects which have since stalled. Government economic reform
programs in 1990/91 also encountered problems when they coincided with the transition to a more democratic
national political regime. Although the government no longer discourages smallholder farming on land distributed
according to customary management practices, customary ownership is officially still abolished. Unless the 1992
Constitution states differently, there are no plans to revise tenure legislation or progress toward a more liberal
stance regarding private property.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Before any policy dialogue is initiated, the content of the 1992 Constitution must be understood as it relates to
tenure, private property, and the recognition of customary rights. Clarification is also required regarding the
national cadastre mentioned in the 1983 Land Code. How habitation and use rights are registered in this cadastre
is not evident.
Of global interest, the fate of Congo’s forests rests in the future collaboration between the government,
villagers, and the forest industries. Use and management rights and responsibilities must be more clearly
delineated to ensure a sustainable logging industry.
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Gabon’s legal framework promotes the registry of individual private property to the exclusion of customary
rights. The majority of land, however, continues to be held and managed through communally based tenure
systems in the rural areas. Since Gabon is sparsely populated and heavily urbanized, land legislation has not been
a national priority. Only in the urban areas have land disputes emerged, and even these disputes have not been
severe. The most pressing tenure issue facing the country today is the ownership and management of Gabon’s
extensive rainforests. More explicit and detailed legislation is required to clarify the rights and responsibilities of
individuals, groups, and the state before these forests are exploited or destroyed.
National policy dialogue and legal framework
Gabon, covering a total of 267,670 square kilometers, is situated along the west coast of Africa. The tropical
climate is hot and humid throughout the year. A hilly interior lies between a narrow coastal plain to the west and a
savanna zone to the east and south. Gabon is endowed with valuable mineral resources, notably petroleum,
manganese, uranium, gold, and iron ore, as well as extensive timber reserves. Approximately 78% of the country
is still wooded, including dense tropical forests. Only about 1% of the land is currently arable, while 18% is
suitable for grazing. A July 1995 estimate placed the population at 1,155,749 people. Most Gabonese people
have Bantu origins, including the Fang in the north of the country who comprise 30–40% of the total population.
Other local Bantu groups include the Eshira (25% of the population), the Bapounou, and the Bateke. A relatively
large number of foreigners, about 100,000 people including Europeans and other Africans, reside in Gabon. The
population is heavily urbanized with 46% of the total population living in one of Gabon’s three major cities
according to 1990 estimates. With the capital Libreville alone home to 352,000 people, population densities in the
countryside are low.
Gabon has experienced a level of economic prosperity unusual in postcolonial Africa. Given its abundance
of natural wealth and a manageable population growth rate of 1.46%, Gabon is not experiencing land shortages
or even appreciable land pressure outside of the urban centers. Despite ongoing economic difficulties, Gabon has
one of the highest per capita incomes in sub-Saharan Africa. The petroleum sector alone accounts for 50% of
GDP, and Gabon is the third largest producer of petroleum in sub-Saharan Africa.
Iron and rubber were the main Gabonese exports when France divided the territory into massive 30-year
concessions in 1898. The French settlers, and later companies, on these concessions were obligated to remit 15%
of their profits to the colonial government. When the concessions lapsed in 1930, the companies were able to
obtain freehold ownership by registering titles under the Torrens system. By that time, the territory of Gabon was
already incorporated into French Equatorial Africa along with Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic. In
1931, Gabon was divided into three zones of exploitation. Zones I and III were more easily accessed via the
railroad system, and thus they were more exploited during the colonial phase.
When Gabon gained its independence on 17 August 1960, it modeled its legal system on French civil law.
The most recent constitution was adopted on 14 March 1991. Little has changed in Gabonese politics during the
past three decades as President Bongo has been successively elected in 1974, 1980, 1986, and 1993. According
to the current legal framework, communally based tenure is rendered invalid. The national codes do not recognize
village, lineage, clan, or tribal property claims. The procedures for land registration are prescribed in Land Law59
15/63 of 8 May 1963, which was amended by Ordinance 50/70/PR/MFB/DE of 30 September 1970.
Accordingly, local land commissions, courts, the Direction of Lands, the Council of Ministers, and the Chief of
State may all become involved in the administration of land.
Officially, land commissions have been created in every administrative district. Anyone occupying land can
initiate the registration process by contacting these commissions. Rural commissions may be composed of local
administrators such as prefects, the head of the Office of the Cadastre, and the local land agent, among others.
Despite this formal administrative structure for registering land, however, most rural land is not registered and
remains under customary tenure, administered by local land chiefs, family heads, and other village notables.
Although Gabon is heavily urbanized, an estimated 65% of the population is involved in agriculture to some
degree.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
The Gabonese government has adopted a policy of encouraging individual private tenure, but only through a
formal registry system. The Gabonese domainial code recognizes only state property and individual private
property. Legally, customary tenure rights are not recognized, and there are no provisions for the evolution or
accommodation of customary tenure. Occupants of state land can opt to register their customary land claims, but
the registering entity must be an individual. Communal landownership is not permitted under the law.
State land consists of public and private domains. State public domain includes the nation’s rivers and lakes,
as well as roads, bridges, ports, and rail lines. State private domain includes all land without title that has not been
registered as individual private property. This includes all land held under customary systems. Most rural land is
officially state owned. Once definitive title is granted to an individual, however, the land is no longer state domain.
Private individual titles to state land are ceded by the state for a provisional period of two years in urban
areas and five years in rural areas. Once the land has been shown to be developed and in productive use, a
definitive title to land may be acquired. Persons who occupy land to which they have customary rights can secure
a title only by going through the land registration process. The state can also agree to a long-term lease of land
from the state private domain for a limit of fifty years. The lease may be renewed for a maximum of forty-nine
years.
The promotion of individual tenure may be seen as a threat to local group landholding rights and social
cohesion. Yet, since Gabon is relatively underpopulated and only a small fraction of the land is cultivated, the
abundance of land may forestall severe land conflicts.
As of the 1970s, the government had an ongoing policy of regrouping and relocating villages to ease their
access to services, agricultural extension works, and marketing of crops. State farms were formed with the
expectation that they would serve as poles of rural development for the surrounding villages and region. The
processes of resettlement may have generated conflicts between landholding groups, but little has been written
about the consequences of the regrouping schemes or the success of the state farms.
Despite the state’s policy of disregarding customary tenure, the majority of rural land continues to be held
and managed under communally based systems. There is much variety in customary tenure systems among the
over forty different ethnic groups, but documentation of such systems is limited mostly to the Fang and the Bateke
people. In general, Gabonese villages are traditionally located in clearings in the equatorial forests, though as of
the 1950s, some villages have been relocated so that all villages are now situated on either roads or navigable
rivers. The major staple food crops are plantain and manioc. Lineage, clan, and village groups communally hold
customary tenure rights. Individuals and families have rights to land contingent upon the broader lineage, clan, or
village claims to natural resources.60
In the north, the Fang are generally grouped together in larger villages and settled around cocoa and coffee
plantations. Individual and family rights to land are relatively fixed. While male family members may have once
contributed labor to family plantations, today each farmer is likely to develop his own plantation.
The literature is disappointingly sparse regarding the trade, rent, or sale of land. Similarly, land management
practices are not detailed, especially the possibilities of returning to the same field after a fallow period or planting
trees. The relations between customary tenure practices and relative land security are also not explored.
In the Libreville area, the land of the Mpongwe ethnic group has been completely subsumed by
urbanization. The Mpongwe have claimed urban land through their customary rights, but these rights have been
ignored by both the colonial and the postcolonial administrations. The case of the urban Mpongwe is the only
documented example of friction between customary landholding groups and the legislative framework, but similar
disputes are likely to exist elsewhere, particularly around the settlement villages.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Agriculture is one of the weakest sectors of the Gabonese economy. In 1991, agriculture contributed only 4% of
GDP. The lack of an intense agricultural tradition in a mineral-rich country, coupled with the rural exodus of the
recent decades, leaves Gabon heavily dependent on imported food. Meat is also imported since few of Gabon’s
ethnic groups have a pastoral tradition, and therefore they do not maintain animal herds. The national plan of
1976–1981 was the first national statement seriously to address agriculture, but with only 54% of population
living in rural areas and revenues anticipated to continue from petroleum and timber, agriculture is still not a
national priority. Fallow periods remain long, and soil fertility is not severely threatened.
The most pressing natural resource management issue in Gabon is deforestation. At the moment, however,
the annual loss of tropical forest is low due to a limited infrastructure of roads and railways crossing the
country’s swamps and rivers. After Zaire, Gabon still possesses one of the largest remaining tropical forests in
Africa, and, with such a relatively small population, Gabon has the highest figure of hectares of forest area per
person in Africa. As of 1992, approximately 50 timber companies were practicing selective logging of Okoumé in
Gabon’s forests. While selective logging generally does not result in deforestation, many forests are now being
relogged as timber companies target other tree species to diversify their exports. It is far from certain that the
increased logging activities are sustainable. While reforestation projects have been started at six sites, the current
annual reforestation rate is able to replace only the amount of timber selectively logged each day in Gabon.
Selective logging is permitted even in Gabon’s five protected areas.
The situation in Gabon presents a unique opportunity for innovative conservation and comanagement
initiatives. Three divisions of the Ministry of Water and Forests are concerned with forest management, but
exploitation licenses are required for only the coastal forests. All inland forests are open for unlicensed logging.
Further legislation is needed to ensure that Gabon’s forests will be protected and that their future exploitation will
be rational and sustainable. According to the 1982 Loi d’Orientation (No. 1/82/PR), 40% of the national territory
is classified as forests or animal reserves, but these are not protected areas. Reportedly, management rights for a
portion of this land have been allotted to local families. Further research needs to clarify this division of forest
management rights between individuals, logging companies, and the state, and to outline how these three entities
interact. Despite the 1982 law, which broadly defines forest management practices, specific legislation relating to
selective logging is not yet complete. Similarly, the mechanisms for dispute resolution must be detailed.
The country currently permits multiparty elections, but the Gabonese Democratic Party continues to
dominate as it has since independence. The formation of “rural land commissions” intimates that a trend toward
decentralized politics exists in Gabon. The actual workings of these commissions, however, is not described in the
literature.61
Heavily dependent on revenues from the petroleum and timber sectors, the state invests little money in
agriculture. The few state-run plantations and large industrial farms for oil palms, sugar, rubber, and bananas
have been able to meet domestic demand for these products, but staple foods still must be imported. Most state
investment is directed toward the petroleum industry and the development of infrastructure such as roads and
bridges. Food security has not been a priority of the Gabonese government, and though the country is potentially
self-sufficient in terms of land and water resources, the population is presently ever-more oriented to urban rather
than rural life.
The literature does not directly address gender issues in either customary or formal legal frameworks.
National land registration laws do not specifically include or exclude women. Presumably, anyone occupying land
can contact a land commission to initiate the registration process. It is not clear, however, if women are legally
permitted to do so, and, if they are, if any women have actually registered land individually. The effects of formal
land privatization upon women’s customary rights cannot be estimated since such customary rights are not
delineated.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
The Gabonese government does not seem to have an agenda for reforms relating to tenure legislation or the
agricultural sector generally. Some agricultural project proposals have been put forth to offset the nationwide
economic losses from a floundering international petroleum industry, but with such little land pressure, there are
few incentives to effect real policy change. The ongoing trend toward urbanization continues to focus attention
away from rural land issues. As the urban areas expand, future conflicts may arise as individuals try to register
land held communally under customary tenure systems. The mechanisms for such conflict resolution are not
explicitly detailed, and further legislation in this domain may be appropriate. More detailed forest management
legislation is anticipated, but no advancements toward such legislation are detected.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Before specific policy recommendations can be made for Gabon, further research is required to clarify several
issues. Questions include: Under the various customary tenure systems, what possibilities exist for land sales,
rents, and trades? What level of tenure security do farmers hold under customary tenure? Are farmers assured of
returning to the same fields after a fallow period? May farmers plant trees or make any other improvements on
land that may be held through a communally based tenure system? What rights do women have under these
customary systems? Are women’s rights secure or insecure? How do women’s rights under customary tenure
compare to women’s rights according to national tenure legislation? Are women permitted to register land as
individuals? If legally they can, do they? In general, do the national land laws create greater security or insecurity
compared to the customary systems, and are farmers more or less inclined to make improvements on the land?
Regarding the national agricultural policies directed at growth in the agricultural sector, clarification is
needed regarding the village regroupings and state farms. Are such regroupings still initiated, and if so, what are
the effects upon the existing surrounding villages? What are the tenure rights and responsibilities of the newly
installed villages? Similarly, clarification is needed regarding the long-term lease of state private domain. Do
individuals, collectives, or companies rent this land? Can the lease be sold or bequeathed?
Possible policy recommendations might include the development of more explicitly decentralized registration
systems and conflict resolution mechanisms, especially in peri-urban areas. As urbanization trends continue in
Gabon, land pressure is likely to surface in the neighboring rural areas. A more flexible registration system could
be promoted to allow for the evolution of communally based customary systems into more individually held
private property. Further forestry legislation is also needed to avoid large-scale devastation by private logging on
state domain. Comanagement may be possible once the tenure of such areas is better defined.62
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Unlike most other West African countries, land tenure policies in The Gambia have upheld customary
mechanisms and institutions in the rural areas. Although quite diverse, these community-based systems have
proved themselves highly flexible and responsive to local conditions. However, the State Lands Act 1990, while
as yet applied only in urban Banjul and Kombo St. Mary, empowers the government to designate other areas to
be covered by the law. This law would abolish customary tenure systems and replace them with long-term leases
granted by the state, a change which would have serious socioeconomic implications for the country if
implemented on a broad scale.
National policy and legal framework
The Gambia’s population is around 1,081,000, of which approximately 80% are engaged in agriculture (1994).
Of its total land area, less than 20% is arable with an average of 0.22 hectare for each person engaged in
agriculture. Land pressures are most serious in peri-urban and rural areas bordering Banjul, Serekunda,
Farafenni, and other growing urban and semi-urban locales. Droughts and the declining groundnut industry have
stimulated male out-migration from rural areas in search of wage employment in the cities or their environs.
While customary practices continue to dominate, efforts on the part of the Government of The Gambia
(GOTG) to centralize control over land and natural resources threaten to overhaul community based land
administration and management. In 1946, under British colonialism, the Land (Provinces) Act vested land in the
seyfos (chiefs), also known as district authorities, who are ultimately responsible for land administration decisions
such as establishment of villages in the district. They further preside over district tribunals, bodies of locally
selected individuals, which are the initial layer of formal authority over land disputes. Within each village, the
village leader known as the alkalo administers land and mediates land disputes at the local level. He is usually a
descendant of the original village founders and, together with other founding families, holds the highest status and
power in the village along with the greatest tenure security.
At the national level, the Ministry of Local Government and Lands is responsible for land administration.
The ministry has the authority to expropriate any land it deems necessary for public use. Ecological preservation
efforts as well as tourist industry promotion have prompted the government to establish numerous forest and
wildlife parks, mainly in the western half of the country. There are tensions between villages near the reserves and
officials over restrictions on use of reserves for such activities as gathering firewood, fishing, hunting, grazing,
and controlling crop-destructive pests such as the bush pig.
The State Lands Act 1990 was made into law in April 1991. Its provisions hold that land in the urban
Banjul and Kombo St. Mary areas is vested exclusively in the state with the exception of lands held under
freehold. The Ministry of Local Government and Lands in turn grants 99-year leases to residents occupying land
regardless of whether they are the original holder or acquired the land as a borrower. The act further empowers
the government to designate other areas of the country to fall under the provisions of the law as it sees fit. The
intention of the law is to provide greater and more equitable tenure security to landholders as well as opportunities
for acquiring formal credit in order to stimulate investment in residential, commercial, and agricultural land.
However, studies conducted in rural areas around Banjul conclude that application of the State Lands Act outside64
of the urban realm could have several detrimental effects including exacerbating social inequities and destroying a
highly flexible tenure system which effectively responds to local conditions (Freudenberger 1994).
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Community-based tenure systems in The Gambia are rooted in the original settlement patterns of villages. The
initial founders of a village cleared the land, establishing public areas and residential compounds; small inner
fields of vegetables, maize, potatoes, and early millet; larger outer family fields of sorghum, late millet, and
groundnuts; and lowland swamp areas for rice cultivation. Extended families maintain exclusive rights over the
compounds they occupy and the fields they cultivate, even when fallow. Families are generally governed by a
male head of household and may house one or more brothers and their families within the same compound. The
head of household is responsible for allocating land within his holdings to his family members as well as for the
initial mediation of disputes. The majority of land disputes are resolved at the household level.
Women are the primary cultivators of vegetable gardens close to the compounds as well as rice plots.
Traditionally they borrow the land they cultivate from their husband, husband’s family, or other members of the
village. On a more limited scale, women in some ethnic groups may also inherit land from their mothers, which
may be passed on to their daughters. In this case, they are considered owners of such land rather than borrowers.
While the initial founding families are considered the “owners” of land in a village, they are not strictly so in
the western definition, since in most cases custom and religion prohibit selling land. Land is rather vested in the
community; the district seyfo acts as a trustee over it and guarantees the owners permanent rights to their land.
The founding families have extensive usufruct rights over their landholdings and may transfer land via
inheritance, gift, exchange, or loan.
Lending land is commonplace in rural Gambia. Founding families regularly were host to other ethnic groups
who would settle in the village after its establishment. In some cases, alkalolu would grant them unused land for
extensive periods, but more often they would borrow land from the founding families on a seasonal basis, though
many families have borrowed land for decades. These provisions have traditionally not been accompanied by
payment other than a possible tribute of kola nuts. More recently, in land scarce areas, “kola-money” has
replaced the traditional symbolic gesture and a cash tribute is paid to the lender seasonally.
Yet another class of farmers exists though their numbers have waned considerably; these are immigrant or
“stranger” farmers who migrate to Gambian villages on a seasonal basis, often from neighboring countries,
typically to cultivate groundnuts. In exchange for being allotted land to grow crops as well as tools and inputs
from the lender, the stranger farmer works for the owner a few days a week and pays him a share of the crop or
income from its sale. The declining profitability of groundnut production as well as recent drought conditions
have resulted in a shrinking number of immigrant farmers.
Women and land borrowers have less secure and equitable rights to land than male founding family
members. Even though they may occupy a piece of land over a long period of time, it is on a perpetually
temporary basis. Women and borrowers in many villages are prohibited from planting trees on the land they
cultivate and, even when not forbidden, must receive approval from the landowner before doing so. This is
because tree planting is typically associated with permanent rights to land since trees are regarded as the property
of those who plant them. In areas suffering from increasing land shortages, such as urban and peri-urban
locations, long-term borrowers are seeing some of their land being reclaimed to accommodate the inheritance
rights of the children of founding families and other village newcomers. The less secure land rights of borrowers
and the land-use limitations imposed on them have implications for the investments and improvements such
farmers are willing to make in the land. Borrowed land is more likely to be subject to soil and water degradation
and lack sustainable production technologies such as tree intercropping.65
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Growing competition for land, particularly in more populated regions and urban areas, has spawned the
emergence of land markets. Cash is replacing kola nuts in securing land borrowing arrangements. In peri-urban
villages, alkalos have taken part in selling land parcels to outsiders for personal gain. More often, individuals are
selling land as a means to satisfy immediate cash needs. Buyers are typically affluent urbanites who seek land for
speculation and/or residential purposes. Substantial growth of such a trend would inevitably exacerbate economic
disparities among Gambians.
Natural resource preservation has been a growing concern. Open access regimes or weak common-property
tenure regimes in areas surrounding villages have paved the way for environmental degradation. Heavy losses of
dense forest areas and wildlife have prompted the establishment of forest parks and reserves often to the detriment
of surrounding villages, whose members have restricted access to these areas. In the Kiang West District for
example, the village of Dumbutu, flanked on three sides by forest parks, finds itself constrained for firewood
collection, the sale of which is an important income source for women. Livestock owners find their animals are
undernourished for lack of sufficient grazing areas. The village is further troubled by crop damage caused by the
bush pig, whose numbers cannot be controlled since villagers may not hunt in the forest and are forbidden to set
bush fires traditionally used for killing the pests. These problems and others such as restrictions on hunting and
fishing in reserve areas plague villages in proximity to reserves and are an underlying source of tension. Many
reserves promised surrounding villages employment opportunities, but these have turned out much more limited
than anticipated and many villages feel they have suffered a net loss as a result of the reserves. In some cases,
villager resentment has led to deliberate harm to the reserves such as setting fires and poaching.
Livestock raising is a major source of livelihood for many in The Gambia. While cattle owning is highly
skewed, with around 20% of the cattle owners commanding 80% of the herds, women are also prominent
livestock owners. Nearly half of Gambian women own cattle while the vast majority have small ruminants such
as goats and sheep. Owned on a small scale, livestock are an asset and form of savings for families. Cattle are
generally tethered during the cropping seasons to prevent damage to the fields. During the dry season, livestock
feed in postharvest fields and are grazed in the common areas surrounding villages. Land shortages and
degradation of the commons have led to a diminishing supply of fodder in many areas and thus forced herders to
graze their animals at greater distances from their village. Although a commons may “belong” to a village, it is
rare that outsiders are restricted from utilizing the resources of these areas. Tensions and disputes between
livestock owners and farmers are commonly rooted in the crop damage done by cattle trampling through
cultivated fields. Women cultivating lowland rice fields in the dry season may find their crops harmed by cattle
herded to boreholes on the outskirts of the village.
Livestock owners are also increasingly facing a shortage of fodder and adequate grazing lands for their
animals as drought, bush fires, and resource degradation take their toll on the commons. More and more livestock
are undernourished and suffer high mortality rates.
In July 1994, military leader Lieutenant Yayeh Jammeh toppled the long-benign dictator-turned-democratic-
president, Dawda Jawara, who had held office since The Gambia’s independence in 1965. The succession of
military rule in The Gambia has been a step backward in its path toward democratization and potentially poses a
threat to the decentralized administration of land tenure. The Jammeh government’s dissolution of parliament,
suspension of the constitution, bans on political parties, and detention of former ministers and other government
officials point to an intolerance for political pluralism and decentralized governance. However, land tenure issues
do not appear to be a priority for Jammeh, so that the status quo may remain in effect until restoration of civilian
rule, currently slated for July 1996.
As commodity prices for groundnuts fall, farmers are once again cultivating more subsistence crops.
However, lack of opportunities to rise above a meager subsistence is driving more young males into the urban66
areas and increasing the burden borne by women to manage farms and provide for the families. As agricultural
production falls due to agricultural labor shortages, declining soil fertility, and drought conditions, The Gambia
finds itself importing larger quantities of basic foodstuffs, such as rice, to meet its food security needs and facing
a ballooning external debt. Whereas the agricultural sector accounted for 32% of GDP in 1982, it was only 23%
in 1991. Within the past decade, the country has placed increasing emphasis on expanding its tourist trade and the
service sector, which in 1990/91 was 63.2% of GDP. Urban and peri-urban agriculture is directed toward
horticulture and vegetable growth, much of which goes to supply tourist hotels and restaurants. As migration
from rural areas in search of limited wage-earning opportunities continues, leading to a shrinking of the domestic
food supply, The Gambia will find itself increasingly pressed to meet its food security needs.
While women maintain unequal status as land borrowers under customary tenure regimes, their position
would likely be weakened by implementation of the State Lands Act in the provinces, since this would confer
greater rights on male registration holders. This may weaken men’s obligation to allocate land to their wives as
well as women’s traditional control over crop production and the income earned from it. The envisaged use of
leases to serve as mortgages for bank loans would in fact disadvantage women.
The well-known Jahaly-Pacharr irrigation project demonstrates how outside intervention with the intent to
fortify women’s position actually resulted in the erosion of their rights and loss of income. The project envisaged
increasing the production of women’s rice plots through provision of irrigation facilities. However, the use of
upland fields rather than the lowland swamp areas where women traditionally cultivated rice overlapped with
family lands controlled by the head of household and other men. While rice production grew and women found
themselves needing to devote their time to cultivating the new fields, men’s authority over the fields gave them
control of the production and income produced from it. In some cases women demanded compensation for their
time, but overall the project further marginalized and disempowered women.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
The State Lands Act 1990 seeks to create more centralized authority over land tenure and impose more equitable
and secure land tenure as a means to stimulate investment in land improvements, agricultural production, and
conservation practices, particularly in areas characterized by severe land shortages and numerous disputes. While
the act’s application to the Banjul and Kombo St. Mary regions may be appropriate given the severe land scarcity
problems and the emergence of land markets in the urban context, the rural areas might better be served by
continued state recognition of customary systems and institutions which have proved themselves highly flexible
and responsive to local realities. Indeed, a more decentralized structure may be appropriate for enhancing natural
resource management and maintaining reserve lands. Some of the foreseen consequences of implementing the
State Lands Act in rural areas include:
u Landowners may abruptly reclaim their lands prior to the implementation of the act in order to retain control
over them , for the act grants 99-year leases to those occupying the land, whether owner or borrower. As a
result many borrowers would be left with insufficient land to meet their subsistence needs or rendered
landless.
u Registering leaseholders in the name of the household head would likely undermine women’s status as
landholders. Whereas customary tenure rules obligate men to provide land to their wives and recognize
women’s right to cultivate their own land, modern land law does not.
u The act’s provision for the establishing of ministry-appointed land administration boards to replace district
tribunals for hearing and making judgments on land disputes would gravely weaken the effectiveness of
conflict resolution. Unlike the seyfo and members of the district tribunal, who originate from the district
communities, the new decision-makers would not possess sufficient knowledge and experience with local
circumstances nor would have engendered the confidence and trust of community members.67
u Registration efforts undertaken in other African countries have proved enormously expensive and difficult to
maintain. Even once lands are registered, title transfers are infrequently recorded and the system quickly
deteriorates.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
While the issuing of long-term leases in urban areas may prove effective in reducing land speculation, replacing
customary tenure with state control over land administration in the provinces is anticipated to be highly disruptive
and ultimately much less effective than the status quo. The inequities present in community-based tenure as it
stands might better be addressed through adaptation models specific to local circumstances and based on
community decision-making. The insecure tenure situation of borrowers, for instance, might be improved by
agreements for long-term (rather than seasonal) borrowing periods witnessed by the village chief. Such
agreements could make provisions for the planting of trees such that the borrower would also plant and tend trees
for the owner with all trees reverting to the owner at the end of the borrowing period. Agreements could further be
formalized and made binding by the district seyfo to alleviate fears of land reclamation by the owners.
In cases where the State Lands Act has been applied, a land tax could be levied on landholdings exceeding
an amount a family is capable of cultivating themselves. In this way, lending land to others may relieve one of
such a tax burden.
With respect to preservation of natural resources, the current customary tenure structures and decentralized
institutions provide an opportunity for comanagement of forest reserves and grazing commons by the state and
the local communities, offering a more sustainable alternative to both government-controlled parks and open-
access regions. Successful natural resource management would need to ensure that all community interest groups
are represented, their needs acknowledged, and the rules for resource management as well as roles and
responsibilities clearly spelled out. Preservation of forests and wildlife will depend on users’ perceiving long-term
benefits and continued access to the such resources.
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Although community-based systems remain the dominant form of land tenure in Ghana, the economic growth
surge of the past decade has fueled the emergence of land markets and more privatized forms of landholdings.
This is particularly evident in the southern cocoa-growing regions, characterized by agricultural commercialism
and mounting pressures on land. While competition for land and the complexity of Ghana’s various forms of
customary tenure incite widespread land disputes and litigation, the government has attempted to tackle the
problem by enacting legislation requiring all long-term claims to land to be formerly registered while continuing to
extend legal recognition to local community-based tenure systems.
National policy and legal framework
Ghana’s population in 1989 was estimated at 14.5 million, 62% of whom live in rural areas and make their living
from agriculture. The country’s area spans 239,400 square kilometers. Despite an average population density of
60.5 per square kilometer (including urban areas), rural densities in the south measured as high as 200 persons
per square kilometer in 1986. At that time, population growth was almost 3% per annum, indicating rural
crowding has likely worsened considerably since the mid-1980s.
There are three main climatic zones: the coastal scrubland characterized by low rainfall and generally poor
soils; the humid tropical rainforest of the southern interior zone where Ghana’s primary export, cocoa, is grown;
and the arid savannas of the north which stretch over half of the country.
Many of Ghana’s development patterns and agricultural policies have both shaped and been affected by
historic land legislation. Under British indirect rule, the colonial authorities delegated administrative power over
land to paramount and divisional chiefs, thereby weakening the potency of the village chiefs and Tendanas over
land allocation. This strategically minimized governing costs incurred by the Crown while bolstering the power of
those authorities the British were allied with and could easily control. Northern Ghana was set up as a
protectorate, with the prosperous cocoa trade in the south engendering the deliberate neglect of this region in order
to foster a supply of cheap migrant labor to the south. This policy continued in the postindependence period. In
1927, the Land and Native Rights Ordinance declared all land in northern Ghana public lands, vested in the
colonial governor for the benefit of natives, though chiefs were accorded substantial authority over land matters.
By contrast, land in southern Ghana was vested in the stool. This differentiated status was carried through to
Ghana’s independence, after which the State Property and Contract Act of 1960 vested all land in northern Ghana
in the president of the republic.
By 1951, power structures were again revised. Ghana was accorded self-governance under the leadership of
Kwame Nkrumah. The country’s first constitution was drafted, which provided for the establishment of local and
district councils, comprised of elected officials. In accordance with Nkrumah’s socialist doctrine of not allowing
resources to be dominated by elite factions, this measure served to weaken the power of traditional authorities
over stool lands. All transactions in stool land now required approval of local councils while revenue derived from
such transactions had to be collected by the local councils and deposited into a collective fund.
When Kwame Nkrumah became the first president of the independent Republic of Ghana, he officially
nationalized landownership under the Administration of Lands Act, 1962, and turned a blind eye to customary
tenure systems. Not only were all stool lands subject to government acquisition without compensation, but all69
revenues generated from stool lands were considered government property. By stripping chiefs of their authority
over land and forcing them to depend on the government for their positions, Nkrumah blocked their exit from the
political arena while he made opposition to his regime unattractive, particularly since one risked political
detention and expulsion.
In the rural areas, government ownership of land essentially enabled Nkrumah’s socialist government to
appropriate land for the establishment of state-owned enterprise farms and sale to private commercial farming
interests. Despite high hopes that large-scale, capital-intensive farming would serve as an engine for agricultural
growth, particularly in the north, persistent faith in mechanization and economies of scale has resulted in
widespread soil degradation, vast tracts of unproductive land, marginalization of smallholders, and, in some
cases, violent outbreaks over access to land.
Today, a significant body of legislation exists concerning land tenure in Ghana, though much of it is quite
ambiguous and contradicts what is taking place in practice. The revised 1979 Constitution revested land
administration in local authorities, though much uncertainty has prevailed with regard to the government’s policy
on land and with whom authority over land administration rests.
The 1992 Constitution upholds the authority of chiefs and divides land into both public and customary
tenures. Public land is vested in the president and is managed by a central lands commission under the provisions
provided in the State Lands Act and the Administration of Lands Act of 1962. Customary land is divided into
stool or skin lands and family lands. Most land in Ghana is administered under the former structure whereby
lands are vested in customary “governments,” termed “stools” in southern Ghana and “skins” in the north.
Paramount chiefs and councils of elders hold the offices of the stool or skin and function as custodians over land
in their respective jurisdictions. Essentially, communities own the land while the traditional authorities hold it in
trust for their benefit via an allodial title. Family lands, common in certain regions of Ghana, are vested in
landholding families and are administered by family heads and senior family members. The emergence of family
lands is indicative of much of the individualization of tenure which has taken place in Ghana. In recent years,
confusion has arisen over the rules governing the administration of family lands and whether it is subject to the
same regulations as stool/skin land.
More recently, the central government has sought to check some of the powers of local chiefs through
legislation. The PNDC Proclamation, 1982, stipulates all land transactions involving cash or in-kind transfers
must be approved by the Lands Commission, which has the authority to regulate the size and duration of transfers
as well as judge their fairness. This is a grossly unrealistic measure given the implicit transactions costs of
seeking approval from a centralized institution and the fact that land markets are highly developed, particularly in
southern Ghana where land purchases have taken place since the turn of the century. ARTICLE 267 of the 1992
Constitution further attempts to regulate land transactions to ensure their consistency with local development
objectives by mandating the consent of regional land commissions. However, these bodies have yet to be installed.
Another legislative restraint on the latitude of traditional authority is the Office of the Administrator of Stools
Land Act, 1994, which requires paramount chiefs to establish stool land accounts for the deposit of all payments
collected by the stool, including rents. It also fixes percentages for the allocation of such payments, with 55%
being owed to the local district assemblies.
The Land Title Registration Law, 1986, was drafted in response to mounting litigation over entitlement to
land, especially in the cash-crop regions. The law requires that all persons with claim to land must formerly
register that land at local registry units in their state. Thus far, the measure has been applied only to the Greater
Accra Region, while efforts to expand its coverage have not been forthcoming.70
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Ghana has a tradition of community-based land tenure which is upheld to the present day. Nevertheless, this form
of tenure has undergone significant changes in certain regions of Ghana corresponding to economic, political, and
demographic conditions. Customary land tenure systems are based on land ascribed to a community of common
lineage. Land belongs not only to the community but also to their ancestors, who are believed to exert power over
the land and the welfare of the community. Land is held in trust by community leaders, who assume
responsibilities for distributing unallocated land. Once community members are assigned land, they have a
guaranteed right to it unless they permanently abandon the land. Eviction of community members from their land
is virtually nonexistent.
Prior to colonialism, many villages, particularly in northern Ghana, had an “earth god,” known as Tendana,
who administered land transactions and performed ceremonial land rights. Upon British indirect rule, the colonial
powers designated area chiefs to administer land and awarded them title to it. This mandate manifested itself into
a multitude of different hierarchical structures and decision-making levels involved in the administration of land.
In some cases, such as the Ashanti in the south and the Dagomba and Gonja in the north, paramount chiefs have
the final authority over who receives land, though decisions are made in consultation with local leaders. Other
lineages recognize the head of the clan or extended family as the primary authority. Family land, in which land
administration is controlled by the immediate extended family rather than the community, has assumed increasing
prevalence in the more developed regions of Ghana, particularly among cocoa farmers. While past attempts were
made to centralize land administration at the national level, today the government bows to local authority for most
land transactions.
The introduction of cocoa to Ghana in 1879 invoked radical tenure changes as the profitability of the crop
lured farmers to migrate to the Akyem Abuakwa region. Since their purpose in inhabiting the land was to earn
profits rather than subsistence, the local leaders rationalized that the land ought to be sold to them rather than
granted as had been the traditional means of allocating land to outsiders. Two main forms of tenure took root. In
one, groups of unrelated individuals organized to purchase land and received parcel strips in accordance with
their contribution to the purchase. These farmers largely originated from patrilineal groups, such as the Krobo.
By contrast, the matrilineal Akan purchased land as individuals or, among extended families, often in tracts larger
than what they were capable of cultivating themselves as land became looked upon as an investment.
The underdeveloped regions of the north have experienced different circumstances in the evolution of land
tenure. Poor infrastructure combined with lack of public services and markets have stimulated high levels of
migration to urban areas and the cocoa belt. Land thus remains relatively plentiful and more traditional
community-based tenure systems continue to thrive. Among the Dagomba in the northern region, absolute title is
vested in the paramount chief who acts as custodian over the land and exercises the final say over land
allocations. Other northern lineages continue to recognize the Tendana or joint authority between the chief or
subchiefs and the Tendana. Within the community, land is distributed to sons who do not obtain land through
inheritance. Women are highly restricted from owning land; their rights being subjective to those of their husband.
They are usually relegated their own plots on their husband’s land where they are chiefly responsible for growing
food crops.
Once land is secured by an individual, the land remains in his family so long as they continue to cultivate it.
Even when land is temporarily abandoned, the original possessor can still reclaim it. Tributes in the form of crop
production are typically paid to the chief, but are considered a gesture of appreciation rather than rent. Usually
they are quite small (for example, a basket of corn or millet) and not obligatory. Essentially, the farmer has full
right to the returns of his own labor. In the case of allocations to outsiders who are not members of the
community, land is usually made available to them provided they are judged by the community elders and chief to71
be of good character. Regular tributes from them may be more obligatory and increasingly may involve some
cash up-front, though not in the sense of a purchase. Practices are highly differentiated.
In the south, rising population pressures combined with agricultural commercialization have caused land to
become a scarce resource. As a result, the role of local authorities in allocating lands has waned with the
disappearance of unallocated land. Land is still transferred in large part through inheritance, though the incidence
of sales, leasehold, sharecropping, gifts, and pledging are increasingly more common where land is scarce. With
regard to inheritance, land held by patrilineal groups, who distribute land among all of the deceased’s sons, has
succumbed to increasing fragmentation to a size which is often too small to generate a reasonable return. The
matrilineal Akan, who traditionally have passed land down to the eldest son of their sister, now prefer to bestow
land as gifts to their own children before their death. This in effect protects the interests of their own children,
since the community can no longer guarantee them land.
Land scarcity also precludes the migrant farmer from obtaining unallocated lands on which to farm. Instead,
one witnesses the expansion of leasing and sharecropping arrangements plus the use of hired agricultural labor,
often under exploitative and insecure terms. The incidence of landlessness is also on the rise in a country that once
regarded land as a birthright of every citizen. As traditional values about the land are replaced by market values
and commercial opportunism, the south has experienced two effects. One is the tendency for communities to
protect their land and restrict it only to their own members. The other is increased commoditization of land under
which land rights are no longer inalienable.
Land tenure patterns in the north, though relatively stable as compared with the south, have not been isolated
from the drive toward economic modernization. In the 1960s, the entry of commercial rice farmers and modern
technology kindled the development of dualistic land tenures. This was particularly felt in the Tono and Vea areas
in the upper east region, where a large irrigation project was set up to raise the productivity of commercial rice
farmers. In the process, neither local farmers nor chiefs were consulted about the project either before or during
its implementation. Chiefs lost title to land and farmers were displaced, receiving delayed and inadequate
compensation in return. As anger and resentment mounted, indigenous farmers took to burning commercial
farmers’ crops in protest.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Tenure security is commonly framed in terms of rights: the right to cultivate the land without imposition or
disruption, the right to reap the benefits of one’s labor and investment in the land, and the right to transfer one’s
claims to the land. Under customary tenure, the former two rights are largely uniform among different groups and
resemble freehold ownership. Land is held on an individualized basis in which the farmer possesses the permanent
right to the land and has ownership of its production and improvements he makes to the land. Transference rights,
however, are more restrictive. Land under indigenous tenure has traditionally been acquired through inheritance,
whereas males who were not entitled to inherit or there was not sufficient land to do so, received unallocated land
bestowed by the local authority. Sale of land was not prohibited and could be regarded as an offense to one’s
ancestors. This is still by and large the practice in northern Ghana. As explained earlier, transference rights have
been adopted significantly in the south to include land sales as well as the increased prevalence of bestowing land
as gifts, leasing parcels, and pledging land as collateral.
The issue of tenure security under indigenous systems and its impact on investment has been a constant area
of debate and misunderstanding among western development economists evaluating agricultural production in
Africa. The term communal to describe community-based systems has often been mistaken for cooperative and
assumed that individuals did not have rights and could be subject to removal from the land. Another mistake was
the belief that community members were merely tenants or sharecroppers under the chief and did not have rights
over their production or investment. Although these rights are better understood today, restrictions on transfer72
rights are still argued to be a source of tenure insecurity. The claim is made that small-scale farmers are often
precluded from access to formal credit since their inability to sell land restricts its use as collateral. However
access to credit encompasses a much broader range of considerations. Small-scale farmers typically require loans
which are too small for financial institutions to consider worthwhile. This in combination with their distance from
urban areas where banks are located makes transactions costs too high for both the lender and the farmer.
Agricultural credit is further viewed as very high risk with only a small part of a bank’s portfolio being devoted to
this sector. Thus, transfer rights play a relatively insignificant part in constraining farmers’ access to formal
credit.
Recent studies conducted in three separate regions of the south characterized by different tenure patterns
suggested that no link could be made between the right of a farmer to dispose of his land freely and his level of
investment and subsequent output yields (see Migot-Adholla et al.). In fact, tenure security may even be
weakened when market economies induce societies to move away from community-based land tenure, which acts
as a type of insurance to community members in times of economic uncertainty. When markets fail, guaranteed
access to land and community support offer a means of subsistence and security. One might partly attribute the
relative stability of indigenous land tenure systems in the economically disadvantaged north to this phenomenon.
The population pressures being experienced in Ghana combined with export orientation have given rise to
land degradation and destruction of natural resources. Timber is a primary export of Ghana and is recklessly
exploited. Despite government efforts to curtail the destruction, the capacity to enforce such laws has been
limited. The widespread planting of the economic trees (cocoa trees in the south and shea and dawadawa trees in
the north) has also replaced other tree growth, upsetting the ecosystem and creating shortages of fuelwood and
fodder. Likewise, in the north, the expansion of commercial farming since the 1960s has led to widespread abuse
of fragile soils in a drought-prone climate. With land being relatively cheap and easy to acquire, many
commercial farmers have exploited land for a few years until its fertility is exhausted, after which they abandon
their farms in search of new land.
The Ghanaian political system under the current president, Jerry Rawlings, has essentially evolved from
benign dictatorship to a fairly open multiparty democracy. The first session of a multiparty parliament convened
in 1993. Economic deregulation has accompanied political pluralism with major public enterprises undergoing
privatization in the past few years. Debate over issues has not been constrained and land tenure is likely to be no
exception. However, the many interests at stake will make it a very complex issue to grapple with. Chiefs and
other local leaders will want to ensure their power and positions remain in tact and advocate local autonomy.
Likely, they will receive the support of many of their community members, who often identify more with local
politics than national. Migrant sharecroppers, leaseholders, and the landless will favor reforms which give them
access to their own land. Women may advocate for stricter reforms on inheritance rights than currently exist.
Even if reforms are conducted democratically, however, their effectiveness will largely depend on the
government’s capacity to supply an infrastructure capable of supporting and enforcing the measures.
Ghana’s widespread shift to export-oriented commercial agriculture, particularly in the south, has meant
that food crops are grown to a much lesser extent and people rely increasingly on imported staples. The negative
implications for food security are exacerbated by swelling urban populations as well as rural population pressures
which necessitate increased intensification of agriculture with shorter or no fallow periods to rejuvenate the soil,
resulting in lower yields. In the south, one finds cassava replacing yam as a staple food. Although it is less
nutritious, cassava has a shorter growing period and requires less fertile soil than yam to grow.
Women have experienced a mixed fate in the face of evolving tenure systems. Traditionally, many ethnic
groups awarded them no rights to land except under their families or husbands. This remains largely unchanged
in the north. Once married, women are typically allocated plots by their husbands in which they grow vegetables
and other food crops close to the home. They also perform duties such as weeding their husband’s crops in73
addition to firewood and water collection and other domestic duties. Among the Akan, women have gained access
to land in their own right as a result of their fathers (and increasingly their mothers) bestowing land to them as
gifts. Likewise, husbands in both matrilineal and patrilineal groups have a greater tendency to allocate land to
their wives either before or after their death. National law now requires that a portion of property of persons
dying intestate must be provided to their spouses. However, community traditions still continue to override this,
leaving women without land. As lineage and extended family structures give way to smaller family units ,as they
have in the south, this may leave women particularly vulnerable since their security is no longer safeguarded by
the community. Likewise, the expansion of agricultural commercialism has crowded out the food crops of
women, forcing them into petty trade in order to provide for their families.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
In assessing strategies to improve tenure security and encourage sustainable, equitable development, one will
want to explore the causes behind the limited implementation of a land title registry. Do the costs of building the
infrastructure to maintain the system outweigh the potential savings from a reduction in land disputes? To what
extent are there political pressures which do not favor implementation? Also, what are the costs and benefits to
the individual of registering land? Are the benefits sufficient to ensure widespread participation? Finally, one will
want to look at the impact of land registration on women and how such a measure may only further entrench male
dominance over property rights if land is documented legally in the man’s name.
Often, the principal argument behind private property rights and land registration is its use as collateral to
obtain credit. However, for small-scale farmers, the link has been demonstrated to be quite weak as compared
with other constraints they face. Rather than converting customary tenure systems, a more successful strategy
may be reviewing the limitations and disincentives for financial institutions for lending to small-scale rural
farmers. Rural credit schemes will not work until institutions can find ways to decentralize their structures to
make rural lending more cost-effective; dealing with this bottleneck needs to be a first priority. In the end, changes
made to financial systems may prove more effective in increasing agricultural productivity than changes to laws
governing property rights.
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GUINEA BISSAU COUNTRY PROFILE
by Mike Williams
Executive summary
Land tenure is of central concern in Guinea Bissau. Over the last twenty years, there has been a steady increase in
land tenure conflicts throughout the country. Government officials are faced with the dilemma of promoting
agricultural production and land tenure security while also protecting the traditional land rights of the tabanca
(village) farmers. The policy decisions made by government officials will undoubtedly affect all aspects of the
Guinean way of life.
National policy and legal framework
There are approximately 1.1 million people in Guinea Bissau with a population density of 26 persons per square
kilometer. Guinea Bissau is recognized as one of the poorest countries in the world. The mining and
manufacturing industries are underdeveloped and the only export crop that has provided income over the last
decade has been cashew nuts. Agriculture is at the heart of the Guinean economy, and the current debates over
land tenure reform directly affect the interests of most of the population.
The current land policy in Guinea Bissau can be traced back to the policies of the colonial government. The
land laws set forth by the colonial government are characterized by a dualism between “governmental” land law
(the law of concessions/long-term state leaseholds) and tabanca (village) farmers. Under Portuguese rule, the
government allocated land to persons for a fee, but those persons who received such concessions did not receive
full ownership of the land. Instead, the individuals were entitled to occupy and use the land for a designated period
of time that was subject to renewal. Even though the colonial state desired to maintain control over the land (and
thus production of agriculture for export), the reality of the situation was that tabanca farmers were important
agricultural producers. Thus, as early as 1856, in order to protect the land used by small farmers, the Portuguese
government established that land occupied by the natives would not be subject to concessions. In a 1919 law, it
was established that concessions would be granted only after the local people agreed. The most important law
concerning land tenure, however, was the 1961 Overseas Property Decree. This legislation was the most thorough
land law in the history of Guinea Bissau, and it explicitly embodied this policy of a dual land tenure system.
Under this law, the government ensured that the local communities had a right to land that was traditionally
recognized as theirs. All “unoccupied” land, however, was subject to state regulations and concessions. While
traditional rights to land were recognized, this did not grant the local communities rights of ownership. All land
was still owned by the Portuguese state.
In 1974, when Guinea Bissau achieved independence from Portugal, the new government did not introduce a
new conception of land policy. Instead, the government adopted the 1961 colonial legislation. In 1984, however, a
new constitution was adopted that employed a socialist orientation of land policy. Under the constitution, all land
was declared to be state owned. Currently, the 1984 Constitution is still in effect. As under the 1961 law, while
tabanca farmers are in theory granted protection from their land being taken without notice or compensation, in
reality, many investors and buyers are not receiving the necessary tabanca approval before purchasing land.
Thus, while local communities have de facto rights to land use and occupancy, the law does not recognize rights
of ownership.
Ever since Guinea Bissau gained independence, the government has stated that land policy is an important
factor. In spite of such rhetoric, however, little has been done to address the serious issues that are becoming75
increasingly conflictual. The Ministry of Rural Development and Agriculture is in charge of land tenure policies,
but over the years, this ministry has not proved effective at initiating land tenure reform programs.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Just as there is a dualism in the legal framework, there is a dualism in the agricultural structure as well. There are
two distinct types of agricultural farms in Guinea Bissau: the tabanca and the ponta. Tabancas are village family
farms, which account for a large portion of the national subsistence and export production and also provide
employment for 85% of the population. In the past, many believed that tabancas were ill suited for commercial
production and that their primary purpose was subsistence agriculture. Recent research, however, demonstrates
that tabancas are more efficient than ponta farms. In addition, it has been shown that many community-based
tenure systems embody the notions of “ownership,” even though they may not explicitly grant “private property”
rights to individuals (Bruce and Tanner 1993). The capability of the customary law to be flexible and to evolve in
response to changing internal and external circumstances makes it both an adaptable and efficient tenure
arrangement.
It would be misleading to suggest that the customary laws of each tabanca are the same. Within the tabanca
farms, there is much diversity with respect to the customary land laws that designate land grants, land sales, or
land inheritance. The nature and specific rules of the customary law depend very much on ethnicity. Generally,
however, land is regulated by village “chiefs” who have different roles depending on the ethnic group to which
they belong. For example, the Fula regalo (tribal chief) closely controls land allocations, the Balanta dunu di
tchon (founder of an area) monitors land transactions less stringently, and, finally, the Papel/Mancanha/Manjaco
regalo regulates the land only in the area directly controlled by him. Despite such variety, research has indicated
that the most common land disputes for all villages and all ethnic groups involve the rules regulating land grants,
land loans, and land inheritance. Such disputes occur both between villages and between tabancas and pontas.
Contrary to tabancas, pontas are large-scale farms and plantations which are dedicated primarily to
commercial use. These farms resulted from the concession policies of the colonial government and the
postindependence government. The granting of concessions has often been a controversial matter due to the fact
that in many circumstances the government will allocate land that is being used by tabanca farmers. This
situation often causes conflicts between tabanca farmers and ponta farmers as they dispute the allocations. Since
1984, due in large part to the government’s liberalization policies, there has been a marked increase in land
concessions. Even with a rise in concessions, however, it is estimated that only 3% of such land is being
cultivated. Because concessions can be attained inexpensively, and because the land is not taxed, many
individuals who acquire land concessions are more interested in speculation than food production.
The government has yet to implement a new land law, but it appears from recent policy statements that it
would prefer to replace the tabanca community-based tenure system with a tenure structure based on private
property principles. Many government officials believe that private property principles are not present in the
tabanca land system. Recent research has shown, however, that the tabancas are a dynamic land tenure system
that now encompasses a mixture of private property and community-based property tenets. It would be a mistake
to assume that tabanca land tenure system is antithetical to notions of private property.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Agriculture represents the most important factor for future national development. It accounts for more than 50%
of the GDP and approximately 90% of the employment. The principal food crops are rice, groundnuts, cereals,
and root crops. The main export crop is cashew nuts. Since 1984, the Government of Guinea Bissau has been
implementing liberal economic reforms. One of the major effects of these policies is that there has been a
substantial increase in the number of ponta farms. While there has been an increase in agricultural output over the
last decade, this success has come at the expense of tabanca farms. Ponta farmers are being granted concessions76
to land that is occupied and used by tabanca farmers. The result is that there are numerous land disputes between
the ponteiros and the tabancas. Despite the fact that there has been an increase in ponta farm production, tabanca
farms still account for approximately 90% of the agricultural output. As ponteiros continue to gain access to
tabanca land, it is possible that this production will decrease. Such a decrease would be devastating in terms of
both domestic subsistence and export capabilities.
Most of the research in Guinea Bissau is focused on agricultural issues, and there has been little information
gathered on common property issues. What is known, however, is that most of the forests, woodlands, and
marshlands in Guinea Bissau which appear to be “unused,” idle, or uncultivated are in fact vital to local
communities and farmers. In most instances, such areas are governed by customary common property regimes
that are known to the local communities. Such rules have proved effective at utilizing and conserving valuable
natural resources. As more land is granted through concessions, however, such customary rules are likely to be
strained. Thus, it is imperative that the government recognize the existing, and potential, tenure conflicts that are
linked to natural resources and attempt to mediate such disputes in a manner that is fair to both the ponteiros and
the tabancas. Research has also indicated that in some cases there will be disputes between ethnic groups over
which group has exclusive rights to common areas. There need to be more surveys compiled, however, before we
can determine the extent and severity of such conflicts.
Since independence in 1974, the government has stated that land tenure policy is an important national issue.
Even though land policy has been stressed, land law policy has not been fundamentally altered. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the Government of Guinea Bissau began to liberalize both the economy and the political system.
In 1991, the government legalized opposition parties and, in 1994, Guinea Bissau held its first democratic
election. The election results, however, were contested on the speculation of widespread fraud. While land law
reform was an important issue during the election, no candidate offered specific proposals and the newly elected
government has not seriously addressed land reform.
As noted above, the past decade has seen an increase in ponta agricultural production even though tabanca
farms still account for a majority of the food crops. The land pressure that tabanca farms are currently
experiencing could have a dramatic effect on food security.
The research shows that women are responsible for much of the labor on tabanca farms. Thus, under the
current community-based tenure system in the tabancas, women are entitled to use the land on the same basis as
any other individual. In some cases, though women are allocated plots by their husbands, they have no claims of
ownership over the land. Yet, despite the fact that the women do not “own” the plots, they are allowed to sell any
surplus crops that are grown on the land. Thus, it appears that while women do not claim any ownership rights
over land, they do maintain the right to treat surplus crops as their own. Finally, if land disputes concerning
women occur, they are more likely to go to the family elder rather than the local authority for resolution.
Present policy positions and reforms discussed
The Government of Guinea Bissau has yet to adopt any changes to the current land law as articulated in the 1984
Constitution. The dualist legal framework that has existed for over 100 years is proving to be ineffective at
protecting the interests of the ponteiros and the tabanca farmers. While the government is naturally concerned
with economic development and increased agricultural production, economic liberalization that harms tabanca
farms—that are producing most of the agriculture—is self-defeating. The government’s attitude toward the
ponteiros and tabancas is based on a misconception that tabanca farms are less productive than pontas, and that
tabanca land law is devoid of any notion of private ownership. Research has shown that both of these
assumptions is misplaced. Customary law is flexible and is able to adapt to changing circumstances. It would
seem that the government has much more room to negotiate between the interests of the ponteiros and the tabanca
farmers than it currently deems possible.77
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
As was noted above, the customary land laws are highly diverse and are not necessarily alien to private property
concepts. Due to increased land pressure and an increasing land market, principles of private ownership have
been evolving over time. The government should not attempt to replace the community-based tenure systems with
a private property regime. Instead, the government should adopt a law that would recognize the customary
definition of property rights, including agricultural land and common areas. In addition, it should set up a process
whereby the tabancas could have their land boundaries demarcated and registered. Such a law would respect the
community-based tenure system which has existed for hundreds of years and which has proved effective in
promoting agricultural production, social cohesion, and conflict resolution. In addition, boundary demarcation
may help forestall conflicts between villages and between tabancas and pontas. More importantly, such a legal
framework would allow the tabancas to evolve into a private property regime if such a system proves to be
beneficial to the individuals.
The government needs to adopt a national land law that establishes internally coherent and consistent legal
rules while, at the same time, allowing for local variations among the villages. Because there is no one customary
law “system,” any attempt to promulgate a national land law on this presumption will fail. Instead of one system
existing, there are in fact many subsystems that operate at once. A national land law should try to adopt general
principles that crosscut these subsystems. Most importantly, the government needs to demarcate and regulate
village boundaries. A comprehensive framework that can establish general principles and respect the different
customary land laws will allow the space needed for customary laws to adapt in the future.
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IVORY COAST COUNTRY PROFILE
by Rebecca Furth
Executive summary
The land tenure system of Ivory Coast is characterized by continuing reliance on traditional, predominantly
lineage-based tenure practices, which have come under increasing stress with the influx of immigrant labor and
intensive monetarization of land values. Although claiming ultimate ownership of land, the government has
neglected to enforce its statutory tenure system in favor of an ad hoc consideration of problems and issues on a
piecemeal basis. This policy worked surprisingly well up through much of the 1980s due to an economic
prosperity which allowed the government to maintain acceptable producer prices and provide reasonably easy
credit to farmers. However, the decline of the cocoa and coffee markets in the 1980s, the devaluation of the CFA,
increasing resentment of immigrants, and recent shifts in political structures have resulted in recent years in
considerable unrest, which is putting strain on the once stable system.
National policy and legal framework:
Ivory Coast has a total land area of 124,503 square miles bordered on the north by Mali and Burkina Faso, the
east by Ghana, the west by Liberia and Guinea, and the south by the Gulf of Guinea. The southern half of the
country is a fertile forest region which is notable as a successful cash-crop production zone of coffee, cocoa, palm
oil, and many other crops. The northern region, an arid Sahelian zone, poses more constraints to agriculture but is
known for its considerable cotton production. Land use is divided as follows: 11.6% cropland, 40.9% permanent
pasture, 23.2% forest and woodland, and 24.3% other. About 12% of the total land area can be classified as
arable land. Recent population estimates from 1994 average 13,895,000 inhabitants and record an annual
population growth rate of 3.7% per year. The estimated population density is 112 inhabitants per square mile
with approximately 59.6% living in rural areas.
During the colonial period the French administration created many laws that were applicable to all its
colonies. These laws included land tenure edicts. At the turn of the century, the French authorities claimed all
“unused” (not under production at the time) land as property of the colonial state under the decree of 20 July
1900. This decree overruled all traditional ownership for lands not under cultivation at that time. Later acts
imposed by the French colonial government defined a legal procedure for obtaining freehold title to land (25 July
1932 and 15 November 1935). Furthermore, the November 1935 degree declared the right of the colonial
government to expropriate any lands in use under community-based land tenure systems if such an action was
economically justified and necessary. A 1955 law renounced many of the previous policies by acknowledging
community-based land tenure systems and revoking public claim to unoccupied land or land “not in use.” This
reversal of previously established policy was part of the overall trend of the colonial government toward
liberalization in its last years of rule.
After independence the Ivorian government reestablished earlier colonial policies stating that all unoccupied
land belonged to the state. A 1962 law vests all land in the state, which in turn has the right to grant concessions
for varying lengths of time. A 1963 law, passed unanimously by the National Assembly but never promulgated,
would have: (1) abrogated all customary rights in land; (2) given the government power to allocate vacant lands;
and (3) made individual rights to land revocable and uninheritable until the land was registered for full ownership.
However, fearing that ensuing resentments might retard economic development, not to mention potentially cause
unrest, the president refused to promulgate the law (see Rassam 1990).79
Subsequent land tenure legislation of 1964, 1971, and 1984 sought to clarify land tenure policy. The laws of
April and October 1964 declared all private land sales as null and void and outlawed polygamy and all matrilineal
succession of land. This latter law disregards all indigenous forms of inheritance with the exception of patrilineal
(father-to-son) systems. The 1971 law reasserts the April 1964 law stating that private land sales are not legally
recognized by the state. Lastly, a 1984 law established the government procedure for land grants and leases.
In order to legally register and gain title to land or leasehold of land in the Ivory Coast it is necessary to have
a given parcel of land inscribed in the land register. In order to do so, an applicant must first put in a request to
the Sous-préfet. The Sous-préfet must then consult the village council and, if the land is of 50 hectares or less,
then has the right to grant a use permit. Any request for registration of land surpassing 50 hectares must be
passed through the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Abidjan. After the land is registered and in
use, the proprietor can begin the process of attaining actual ownership. This entails a formal survey which is used
to create a dossier technique. If the request for ownership is granted, the government allows only 12 hectares to
come under individual ownership. The remaining land can only be leased from the state. Leases are granted for
twenty-five years with an option for renewal and can be sold, mortgaged, and inherited.
Needless to say, the process of registration for obtaining private property and lease titles is very lengthy and
expensive. For this reason, few people bother to use the system. Consequently, most land remains in use through
the community-based land tenure systems, where usufruct rights are granted by the lineage which is the guardian
of the land. Whether legally titled or not, the government maintains control over the majority of cultivable land. If
farmers do not title their lands, then the state is considered the legal holder. On the other hand, if farmers title their
lands, the government reserves control over a major portion by permitting private ownership of only 12 hectares. 
Although the 1962 law claims state ownership of all land, it nonetheless has allowed continued use of all
lands put into production, even land that has not been legally registered or titled. Consequently, many farmers
have tried to put more land into use to forestall government claims. In the process, there has been accelerated
destruction of valuable resources including forests. In an attempt to curb expansion and assert state claims, the
Ivorian government established laws in 1964, 1965, and 1974 which delineated potential mining, forest, and
tourist lands. Despite this effort, however, it seems that these laws have been more or less impotent, for the
indigenous population has refused to relinquish its claims to these lands.
The government’s confusing and contradictory land tenure policies, and particularly its assertion of state
ownership and simultaneous tolerance of community-based land tenure systems, have created a truly muddled ad
hoc system. The creation of a better integrated and “rationalized” land tenure system is one of the greatest
challenges facing the Ivorian government at present. In order to address this problem the government launched a
pilot land tenure project in 1989 with the assistance of the World Bank and the French government. This project
studied customary-based tenure practices with the aim of creating a unified system based on customary practices
and government initiatives. Although a follow-up study was programmed to take place in 1993, no information is
available regarding the results and implications of this project with regard to national policy.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
The Ivorian government, as was previously noted, does not recognize community-based tenure as legal. However,
a lineage or village group can legally obtain land title by formally registering as a village cooperative or
association. Such cases have arisen in the past. In confrontations over access to land the courts have upheld
indigenous rights in circumstances where lands are legally registered.
The introduction of coffee and cocoa farming has also brought some degree of inequality of land
distribution. Whereas in the past land was controlled by heads of lineages and divided among the group, the
profits to be made from perennial tree crops have encouraged young men to clear forest areas on their own and
have attracted investors (in addition to migrants) from outside the area. As yet, the inequalities in land distribution80
are not severe, but there is an increasing tendency for large areas of land to be held by a small number of
individuals.
The Ivory Coast is a culturally diverse country harboring over twenty different ethnic groups. Consequently,
there are also a variety of community-based land tenure systems. When these myriad systems are outlined,
however, it is important to keep in mind that traditional systems are undergoing modifications in response to
changing national and local environmental, demographic, political, and economic conditions. Descriptions of
these systems should not be considered as universal or static.
Although a comprehensive summary of each of these systems is not possible, several useful generalizations
can be made. The Agni and Baoule ethnic groups predominate in the center and eastern portions of Ivory Coast.
The tenure systems of both groups exhibit a hierarchical matrilineal social structure in which land is allocated by
the king to the various lineages. However, the extended family remains the basic economic unit working the land
and is not required to make payments in exchange for use rights. Whereas the Agni redistribute land annually, the
Baoule tend to maintain the same parcels from year to year. “Slaves” existed within the Agni system, working not
only their own plots but also those of “free” rural families. One finds a cluster of small ethnic groups, most of
which also follow matrilineal descent, in the southeast corner of Ivory Coast. In contrast to the Agni to the north,
these groups have few formal intervillage political structures. The chief of each lineage/village allocates the land.
Age groups sometimes provide a communal agricultural labor pool.
The Senoufo, Lobi, and Koulango, in the north and northeast, are characterized by village-level hierarchical
social structures. The oldest male in the lineage that first settled in the village allocates land to the extended
family. These rights are partially matrilineally inherited. As with the peoples of the southeast, age groups provide
communal farming labor.
Although the Krou and the Mande-tan speaking groups of the southwest are in different language classes,
they are both patrilineal societies. Each lineage normally corresponds to a village. The lineage head allocates land
to the extended family. Although slaves were utilized, their exact obligations and position are not clearly defined
in the literature. Age-group labor is also common.
Finally, the Malinke and other Mande-tan speakers of the northwest have strongly hierarchical social
structures based on patrilineal descent. Historically empire-builders, both groups had fairly rigid social castes and
slaves. The oldest male in the longest-established lineages allocates land to the nuclear family.
The migrant/immigrant population, though not of a single ethnicity, makes up one of the more significant
groups in the Ivory Coast. In the 1940s and 1950s, the French began importing laborers, mostly Baoule from
central Ivory Coast, into the coffee- and cocoa-producing forest regions to work on the plantations. In the late
1950s, when the colonial land tenure polices were liberalized, many other Ivorian groups moved into the fertile
forest area and began putting lands to use with the permission of the indigenous farmers. Finally, in the early
1960s, shortly after independence, the government encouraged people from Burkina Faso and Mali to move into
the forest zone in order to fuel cash-crop production (and thus the national economy).
Technically, according to the government’s decree that all land belongs to the person who puts it into use,
many of these immigrants could stake claims to land. However, because the community-based land tenure
systems prevailed, the majority of immigrants either purchased land directly from the indigenous proprietors or
contracted out their labor for a number of years in exchange for a parcel of land upon completion of their service.
Thus, the population of the productive forested zone today is composed largely of immigrants (who sometimes
outnumber the indigenous peoples). A 1993 World Bank report found that in parts of the forested production
zone, migrants accounted for over 70% of the total population. This is an astounding figure and one that must be
considered when planning for the future of land tenure policies for Ivory Coast.81
Creating a land tenure policy for the Ivory Coast will be a complicated endeavor. Not only does the
government need to consider indigenous interests, it also must take into account the large population of
immigrants who have been farming the land for over thirty years and are largely responsible for the success of the
Ivorian economy. With a growing population, increasing land pressure, and the decline of opportunities in urban
areas, it is likely that there will be increased tension over access to land between the indigenous and the immigrant
populations.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
The government’s land tenure policies were specifically designed to encourage the production of cash crops. This
emphasis has put significant strain on the production of food crops. Although largely successful in the cash-crop
economy, Ivory Coast has become a net food importer. In recent years the government has made strides to rectify
the low status of food crops by mounting campaigns to encourage more farmers to plant food over cash crops.
The nomadic Fulani herders of the northern Sahelian zones have begun to drift into the Ivory Coast in recent
years. This is largely due to environmental and land constraints in the north, better pasture in the south, markets
in the Ivory Coast, and veterinary care subsidies provided by the Ivorian government. The Fulani migration into
the Ivory Coast has been the source of much conflict with Senoufou farmers, who are upset over the destruction
of their crops by the wandering herds. In 1986, clashes over access to lands and crop destruction resulted in the
murder of several Fulani herders at the hands of Senoufou farmers. The government is in the process of trying to
quell the problems by encouraging collaboration between herders and farmers based on cropped lands and
manured corrals. No mention has been made of the development of land tenure policies to address these issues.
The government’s policy of land “belonging to the person who puts it into use” has resulted in the
overexploitation of natural resources. Under state policy, the “use” law has no constraints, meaning that the user
has equal access to all resources, including forest and land resources, on their parcels of land. However, a conflict
has arisen with regard to community-based systems and cocoa and coffee crops. Although a farmer may lose use
rights to land in the community-based system, any trees he has planted on that land technically belong to him.
Because cocoa and coffee are tree crops, this issue has resulted in considerable confusion as indigenous farmers
try to reclaim use rights from immigrants. In addition, because of the low population density, there was adequate
access to land and little agricultural intensification in the past. With increasing population pressures in the forest
zone, easy access to land and swidden agriculture have put stress on the resources of the forest area. Although
conflict has been minimal so far, it is likely that tension will mount with increasing competition for land.
The Ivory Coast has recently undergone political transformation with a greater trend toward
democratization. However, it is not clear how this may affect land tenure policies. In order to create a truly
democratic system the government will have to give voice to the indigenous population and take community-
based land tenure systems into consideration when designing national land tenure policies. However, the
government also has a large immigrant population to consider as well. Creating a policy that acknowledges and
protects the rights of both indigenous and immigrant farmers is one of the most difficult challenges facing the new
Ivorian government.
The Ivory Coast has designed all its land tenure policies to encourage economic growth. The prevailing
philosophies of the government under Houphouet-Boigny deemed traditional land tenure practices as obstacles to
cash-crop production, judging that individualization of land was the only way to achieve the economic growth
that would lead the country to prosperity. Given that the state has chosen not to enforce its land tenure policies
and has allowed customary practices to prevail, it is clear that the economic prosperity of the country was, until
recently, significant enough for the government to pay little regard to land tenure. With the failing coffee and
cocoa markets in the 1980s and the increasing economic instability in Ivory Coast, the government needs to
rethink its policies in order to assure a stable economy.82
There is little information regarding women’s roles in land tenure in the Ivory Coast. Women have use rights
to land through their husbands, but it appears as if they have no ownership rights. Under customary matrilineal
systems, land stayed in the woman’s family and was inherited by her sons through her brother. However, the
government’s 1964 decree outlaws all land succession except patrilineal inheritance. There are two main
implications of this policy. First, it eliminates matrilineal community-based land tenure systems. Second, it
formally denies women the right to inherit or pass on land. Thus, the essential aim of the government’s policies is
to vest all land rights in men and their male offspring and prevent women from owning land.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
Although the government has taken strides in recent years to redefine its land tenure policies, there is little
indication as to where these efforts will actually lead. The government’s land tenure pilot project is an important
step toward recognizing the importance of community-based land tenure practices. 
It is essential that the government also develop a system for assisting indigenous villagers and immigrant
farmers to resolve land disputes. If steps are not made in this direction, considerable conflict could arise over
rights to land and production. Particular attention must be paid to land succession and the relationship in this
regard between immigrant and indigenous farmers. The majority of recent conflicts have been over inheritance
rights between these two groups, with the indigenous farmers reclaiming land and denying inheritance to the sons
of immigrants.
Implications for policy reform
It is imperative that the Ivorian government develop a coherent land tenure policy in order to assure the continued
growth and development of the country without conflict. Mounting population pressures and unstable markets
have resulted in considerable competition over land resources. Traditional land tenure systems are continually
changing and adapting and appear to be highly flexible. In-depth research of customary land tenure practices and
local incorporation of national policy is important for successful development planning. Of particular concern is
the relationship between immigrant and indigenous farmers. Project planners must consider these issues when
designing development programs.
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Since December 1989, Liberia has been in the throes of civil conflict and virtual anarchy. Rural areas in
particular have been besieged by brutal violence, causing over 700,000 refugees to flee the country and at least as
many to take sanctuary in and around Monrovia. As a result of this mass exodus, communities and families have
been broken apart. Little is known from the literature about what currently characterizes the land tenure situation
in Liberia. It can only be surmised that much of the formal structure has crumbled in the face of fear, instability,
and out-migration. Much of the description below of Liberia’s land tenure reflects the situation prior to the war
and may not be a valid portrayal of present conditions; one can only speculate on the impact the war has had on
land rights. As Liberia stands poised on the brink of a tenuous peace, serious consideration needs to be given to
the role of land tenure as part of an effort to rebuild the nation.
National policy and legal framework
Arable land is scarce in Liberia. According to FAO estimates, only around 3.8% of its total land area is
considered arable. Liberia’s agricultural population densities are extremely high at 5.2 persons per arable hectare
as of 1993. The severity of arable land shortages is underscored by inequitable land distribution whereby 75% of
agricultural land is held by 7% of landholders.
Liberia was founded in 1822 by the American Colonization Society for the purposes of creating an African
nation of repatriated black ex-slaves, mainly from the United States. These settlers, known as Americo-Liberians,
initially occupied five counties along Liberia’s Atlantic Coast, which were purchased by the society from the
African chiefs presiding over that region. In turn, settlers could purchase plots of land from the society in the
name of the male head of household, thus launching a freehold tenure system. What started out as a
“philanthropic” effort soon emerged as Black Imperialism, as the Americo-Liberians sought to expand their land
acquisitions along the coast and further into the hinterlands. Their objectives were to extract resources and
expand trade as well as to “civilize” and “christianize” the indigenous population. By 1900, Americo-Liberians
controlled 600 miles along Liberia’s Atlantic Coast and between 150 and 250 miles inland.
Liberia’s land tenure system continues to provide for freehold tenure, which is secured by title. All other
land is vested in the government and is classified as tribal trust (reserves) and state land. The former principally
accommodates the various customary land tenure systems practiced by the sixteen indigenous ethnic groups of
Liberia, which constitute 93% of the population. Freehold tenure, on the other hand, has been dominated by the
former black slave settlers (Americo-Liberians) who principally occupy the coastal plain region where the capital,
Monrovia, is located as well as large farming estates along the main arteries cutting through the rural areas.
According to the Liberian constitution, only blacks may be citizens of Liberia and only Liberians may own land.
Land may, however, be leased on a long-term basis to foreign concessionaires, and indeed much of it is. Foreign-
owned mining operations and rubber plantations dominated Liberia’s export trade prior to the war’s outbreak.
Liberian law recognizes both individual and community tenure and guarantees the right of all rural natives to
occupy land. Communities have the first right of possession against all outsiders. Nevertheless, the declaration of
land held under customary tenure as property of the state initially sparked violent rebellions among indigenous
populations, who viewed this as an assault on the authority of local leaders over land matters. Tenure insecurity
resulted from the risk of lands not under cultivation or protected by deeds being appropriated by the state.84
The recent history of land legislation in the country appears sparse. In 1974, the government instituted the
Registered Land Law in an effort to formalize the land registration system through requiring landholders to
register parcels. It empowers the Ministry of Lands and Mines to designate particular areas for adjudication and
registration of land. The law itself assigns positions, specifies their roles and responsibilities, and outlines
procedures for adjudication and registration once notice has been given by the minister of a designated area. It is
unclear from the literature whether this law was implemented and, if so, to what extent. Given that descriptions of
land tenure in more recent literature fail to mention the law, one supposes its impact was minimal.
By law, all land sales must be sanctioned by the government. The process of obtaining approval involves
lengthy bureaucratic procedures, culminating with the signature of the president himself. Initial sales are made by
the state, which sells land at a fixed price. The purchaser may subsequently sell this land to another individual at
market price.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Under customary tenure in Liberia land is allocated to community members by chiefs or elders. Rights to the land
constitute use rights rather than full ownership and are initially established through clearing the land. Among
some groups, gifts of salt and tobacco are given to the chief in appreciation for the land bestowed and may be
followed by a sample of the first year’s crop. Gifts are not required, though not offering them could impose high
social costs on the community member. Several communities regularly donate labor to the local chief’s land and
crops.
Inheritance practices in Liberia are overwhelmingly patrilineal. Among the Kpelle, Kru, Gio, and Mano,
upon a man’s death, his eldest brother take possession of the land. Other tribes, such as the Bassa and Loma,
bequeath land to their oldest son. Women are not permitted to inherit their husband’s property.
Persons from outside the lineage of a community are generally welcomed since higher populations lend
villages political clout. However, their tenure rights remain secondary to lineage males. In order to obtain land,
they must receive permission from a member of the community to clear a portion of their family land, usually for
rice cultivation. After one year, the borrower will give his host a bag of rice as tribute. After the initial year, he is
accepted into the family and is no longer obliged to pay tribute. However, he retains his status as a borrower and
is not permitted to plant trees on the land. In densely populated areas, more temporary borrowing arrangements
have unfolded.
The arrival of the Americo-Liberians proved highly disruptive to the traditional administrative mechanisms
of the African populations, including land tenure systems. A series of expeditions took place in the late nineteenth
century followed by a scramble to protect existing territory and acquire new land to prevent it from falling into the
hands of British and French colonial forces. Settlements were established in the interior to accommodate new
immigrants, and the government granted concessions to Americo-Liberians wishing to acquire land for farming.
By 1904, the Americo-Liberians imposed a system of indirect rule over the interior, dividing it into four districts
administered by Americo-Liberian district commissioners and establishing military garrisons to protect the ruling
interests and later to enforce the collection of hut taxes. The system proved to be highly repressive and brutal
toward the Africans, who were frequently subject to forced labor on Americo-Liberian farms and plantations.
Although concession-granting and freehold tenure exercised by Americo-Liberians fueled resentment and tenure
insecurity among native Liberians, their oppressors did not attempt to alter customary tenure systems directly and
so the mechanics of the systems remained largely intact.
It was not until President William Tubman assumed office that some of the political, social, and economic
barriers between Americo-Liberians and African Liberians were removed. The Unification Policy of 1945
extended citizenship status to Africans, who had previously been unable to vote or occupy office. November 1960
marked the end of indirect rule in the interior provinces and locally elected officials replaced government85
appointees, though no attempt was made to establish a single nationwide land tenure system and customary
tenure among indigenous populations continued. However, it was not until the election of Samuel Doe in the early
1980s that concession granting in the provinces was suspended in the interest of strengthening the tenure security
of Liberia’s native occupants.
Today, most communities continue to discourage land sales despite the fact that they are historically familiar
transactions and the practice has taken place within customary tenure systems in Liberia for some time. Among
the communities where land sales are permitted, the person wanting to buy land must receive permission from
village elders, the quarter chief, and the community chief. He then must pay for a surveyor and have the land
registered. Members of the community purchasing land must compensate the village with a goat or sheep.
Outsiders usually have to pay money and/or liquor in addition to goat/sheep to tribal authorities, including the
village, clan, and paramount chiefs, to facilitate the transaction. This is in addition to the price charged by the
government for the land.
The creation of these land markets has had implications for fallowing land since land left inactive is more
vulnerable to being sold. The risk of appropriation by the state if the land is not being cropped has provided
incentive for the cultivation of tree crops, namely, coffee and cocoa, which are sold as cash crops. Thus the need
to ensure intensive use of the land and the resulting expansion of cash cropping has invited greater
individualization of land.
Despite an increase in land purchases in Liberia’s interior, disruptions in customary tenure are more
attributable to concessions to corporate interests, including state, foreign, and wealthy Liberians, than to
privatized tenure. Rubber and timber operations run mainly by foreigners have undertaken vast acreages while
large-scale Liberian-owned commercial farms produce rubber, livestock, coffee, cocoa, and oil palm. Absentee
landlordism is common as is the practice of leaving significant areas of land idle. Wealthy Liberians, in
particular, government officials, have frequently purchased land in rural areas for purely speculative purposes,
hiring local residents to maintain it.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
About 70% of Liberia’s population live in rural areas. Among them, around 75% are engaged primarily in
agriculture which accounts for over 30% of national GDP. Most farmers (95%) grow rice, the staple food of
Liberians, which accounted for 92% of agriculture production in 1978. Both upland and swamp rice cultivation
are practiced, though the former continues to dominate.
Cash crops, including coffee, cocoa, rubber, and oil palm, have taken on increased prominence in the past
few decades with rubber, oil palm, and sugar produced chiefly by commercial plantations. While smallholders
mainly cultivate rice and other food crops, increasingly they are supplementing subsistence production with
monetary income from small cash-crop cultivation. Coffee and cocoa are preferred among smallholders, who are
the principal producers of these crops. They are also compatible with subsistence production, and the trees are
frequently intercropped with cassava. Also, labor requirements are not excessive, with coffee in particular
demanding little labor. On the whole, tree crops have been coveted by men whereas rice and food crops remain
women’s responsibility.
In the past, community groups were formed to assist in rice cultivation on a rotation basis during peak
periods. Known as Kuu, this system of cooperative farming was practiced by male and female groups who
worked on the farms of each member. Males undertook brushing and burning activities while women performed
planting, weeding and harvesting, thus enabling individuals to manage larger farms than they would be able to
themselves. Gradually, individualization of tenure has rendered Kuu groups obsolete and replaced them with
hired seasonal labor.86
The interior of Liberia, especially the north, has undergone fundamental changes in peasant agriculture since
the 1950s as a result of the widespread expansion of commercial agriculture, markets, and wage labor
opportunities. The Firestone Rubber plantation in the north served as a major source of rural employment along
with other agricultural plantations, providing financing for smallholder cash cropping. Men also brought back
new plantings from migratory work for planting their own crops. The expansion of road and market facilities in
the north funded by foreign corporate farms has further contributed to enhanced cash-crop production by the
region. This contrasts with the relatively underdeveloped rural areas in the east, where coffee and cocoa are not
cultivated by smallholders nearly to the extent of their northern counterparts.
Despite increases in cash cropping by smallholders, most continue to operate at the subsistence level. In
response to poor production, declining yields, and low technology adoption by the sector, the government
instituted a series of agriculture development plans in the 1970s, including the Four Year Development Plan,
launched in 1976, which stressed diversification of agricultural production as well as improvement of agricultural
marketing and rural infrastructure. Like many others of its kind, little was invested in the plan to meet its
purposes.
In the interest of enhancing production, several donor schemes in Liberia have been aimed at shifting
farmers from upland to swamp rice cultivation on the principle that swamp rice, unlike upland rice, allows for
continuous cultivation and provides higher returns to labor in the long run. Most projects ran into resistance,
though, due to the risk of adopting new cropping techniques, problems of access to swamp plots and water
resources, and the initial heavy labor requirement before swamp crops are profitable. Also, many farmers do not
like swamp farming and associate it with disease. It creates conflicting labor demands due to the necessary timing
of inputs. Projects also failed to integrate communities into their design, a major component in their failure.
Studies have shown that increased swamp rice cultivation is more likely to be accelerated by increased population
pressures and land shortages.
There is limited livestock production in Liberia due to problems with disease. Although most households
keep goat, pigs, and chickens in small numbers, cattle and sheep are far less common.
There appears to have been little study of natural resource management in Liberia. With timber as a primary
export, significant deforestation has taken place. Beginning in 1971, the government has undertaken reforestation
efforts and manages five major reforestation areas. However, forest depletion continues at alarming rates with
timber exports serving as a major revenue source for the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the rebel
forces led by Charles Taylor.
Under certain customary tenure systems, secret societies, centered around boys’ and girls’ bush schools,
hold their activities in local forests, which they regard as sacred. Farming activities are strictly prohibited in or
near these forests and the exploitation of resources from these forests is tightly managed by the community
through an intricate set of rules and beliefs.
The Liberian war is not populist in nature, but is rather carried out by numerous enclaves of persons seeking
power with no substantial agenda or constituency. As a war of personalities as opposed to ideologies, it is fueled
more by a lust for power and the pursuit of vendettas than commitment to a cause. Given this scenario, the
prospects for building a democratic government and political participation following the war seem particularly
bleak. Repeatedly, cease-fires and disarmament attempts have failed, multifactioned transitional governments
have been systematically rotated and torn down, and elections have been postponed. Given the intensity of the
struggle to attain power, it is doubtful that most of the probable candidates would be interested in turning some of
it over to local authorities, such as allocating authority over administration of land. Certainly land issues will need
to come at the forefront of the political agenda once the conflict is put to rest in order to accommodate the influx
of returning refugees and resettle the internally displaced. It remains to be seen what type of tenure system will be
established and the degree of centralized control which will govern it.87
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, much emphasis was laid on achieving food self-sufficiency in an
effort to halt increasing dependency on imported rice. Policies aimed at export promotion and import substitution
combined with increased spending on agricultural development and price subsidies for locally produced rice
aimed at strengthening food security. Although these efforts produced few results, they did manage to lend
increased recognition of the agricultural sector and its contribution to Liberia’s economy and welfare.
Little mention is made in the literature of women’s roles in land tenure and agriculture in Liberia other than
to specify their major role in rice production and their limited rights to land except through their husbands.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
In the current state of upheaval and violent power struggle it is unlikely that any significant policies have emerged
on land tenure. However, it appears the country is reaching a stage where it is exhausted by war and at least a
tenuous peace is possible. As a country in which three-quarters of the population rely mainly on agriculture and
land for survival, rebuilding the country will demand an effective land tenure policy which provides a secure
livelihood for farmers. While customary tenure systems may have once offered that security, their foundation,
communities, have in many cases collapsed, sending forth a diaspora of refugees. The question remains as to how
the displaced will be settled after the war. Is a return to community-based systems with land vested in the state
appropriate, or even possible, if people have no longer been living among their lineage communities? Or is private
tenure a more viable option? Finally, how can the Liberian public be engaged in policy dialogue and decision-
making over land tenure to determine what makes sense on the ground?
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
In order to better anticipate the postwar situation and assess popular sentiment, it may be worthwhile to engage in
dialogue with the Liberian refugees to ascertain their intentions of returning after the war and, if so, what sort of
land tenure systems they perceive to be most appropriate to their circumstances. One would also want to know
their expectations of the new government on land policy issues and their ideas for rebuilding rural communities.
Such an assessment could be carried out by local agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and United
Nations refugee committee (UNHCR) officials assisting the refugees. The results of the study could serve as a
launching point for future formulation of land tenure policy.
A particularly challenging objective for Liberia will be to incorporate widespread political participation and
democracy around land and other issues confronting the nation. In a postwar climate of fear and suspicion,
however, more authoritarian structures are poised to emerge, breeding further political unrest. The Organization
of African Unity (OAU) is perhaps in the best position to encourage democratization in Liberia given its capacity
to provide peer nurturing rather than paternal prescriptions.
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Mali has been undergoing reform processes in the areas of administrative decentralization; forest, water, and
fishing legislation; and tenure and land rights since the overthrow of long-established dictator, Moussa Traoré, in
March 1991. Indeed, revisions to the Forest Code had been set in motion prior to the 1991 coup. The
overwhelming unpopularity of Mali’s repressive tenure and resource management legislation ensured that efforts
to increase local control were a high priority for the current democratically elected regime. A revised Forest Code
and laws governing fisheries and wildlife protection were passed by the National Assembly in early 1995, but
have been widely criticized for maintaining excessive control in the hands of state officials. This revised resource
legislation did take into account the devolution of authority to more local administrative structures as described in
the decentralization Code 93-8, which was passed in February 1993. However, critics have argued that it might
have been more effective to tackle the statist-oriented tenure regime supported by the 1986 Code Domanial et
Foncier (CDF) prior to attempting other natural resource reform efforts (Barrière 1995). The 1986 Code is seen
as a carry-over from colonial legacies of state control over land rights, and revisions to this text are considered a
high priority.
National policy and legal framework
Mali is a large, arid, landlocked country located in the heart of West Africa. Northern Mali is dominated by the
Sahara Desert and borders Algeria and Mauritania. As one moves south the climate shifts to a wetter Sudano-
Sahelian zone and becomes increasingly humid as one approaches the border with Côte d’Ivoire to the south.
Mali’s population of 10,462,000 is concentrated primarily in the southern third of the country. While Mali’s
landmass consists of approximately 1,220,019 square kilometers, only about 2% is considered arable, while an
additional 25% is classified as permanent pasture and about 6% is forested.
New Malian land legislation as embodied in the Code Domanial et Foncier was drafted in 1986. However,
even up to the present date, tenure and resource legislation has maintained many fundamental characteristics
inherited from French colonial law. Such characteristics include continued state ownership over all lands not
registered as private property, the role of the central state as the sole legitimate authority governing natural
resources, and the concept of exploitation (mise en valeur) as the principal means for establishing land rights.
The concept of mise en valeur as well as the state’s restrictive role in managing forests and other resources were
first established during the French colonial government and have been preserved to a large degree in the 1986
Forestry Code. (Brinkerhoff and Gage 1993)
Efforts to foster European traditions of private property were first attempted in the colonial era and have
been continued to the present day. However, despite the assumed evolution toward private, freehold property
rights, methods for registering and titling land are complicated and expensive. Different administrative steps are
required to register property rights under the 1986 law: land must be declared and registered as state property
before being designated a “rural concession” or leasehold, and the land must first be granted a lease before being
registered as freehold under the producer’s name. Each of these steps requires considerable financial investment.
The combination of high cost, complicated procedures, and an apparent lack of necessity for registration given
local recognition of land rights may provide an explanation for the small number of officially registered fields
found in Mali. It is estimated that only 2–3% of cultivated land is registered as either leasehold or freehold. In89
other words, de facto land rights in Mali continue to rely on legitimacy as established through customary
definitions at the village level.
Prior to the 1993 administrative decentralization legislation (Law 93-12), the 1986 CDF outlined official
procedures for clearing and/or registering land as follows: requests were first submitted to the village chief, who
then passed the request on to the arrondissement chief (an administrative authority) and other technical agents.
After payment was made for securing these rights, clearing or preliminary registration could be undertaken. The
1993 decentralization law changed these procedures surprisingly little. The primary impact of this legislation was
to create new administrative units, the rural and urban communes, which would be presided over by an elected
council. The communes are to replace the arrondissement as the level of administration just beyond the village
unit. Under the leadership of an elected mayor, the communal councils are to have responsibility for
environmental protection, conciliating tenure disputes, and questions of responsible land use practices. Similar
elected councils are to preside at the next highest levels: the cercle, and the region. These councils also possess de
jure authority over land use, tenure rights, and environmental protection. At the village level, the decentralization
legislation preserves the office of village chief, but chiefs are to be seen as state officials and must be approved by
the administrative authority at the level of the cercle.
To summarize, the decentralization law of 29 January 1993 was primarily a redrawing of administrative
lines with the presumption of greater local participation in resource and land management through the election of
local councils. However, the decentralization of resource and land management as currently drafted is a top-down
approach rather than a participatory initiative. Restrictive state regulations over forest use and tenure rights have
not been drastically changed. It remains to be seen whether the proposed re-drafting of the 1986 Code Domanial
et Foncier will give greater recognition to customary resource tenure rights.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Indigenous tenure systems vary throughout Mali according to both ethnic traditions and land use practices. The
variety of tenure practices can be categorized into three broad areas reflecting various production zones: the
southern and central agricultural regions inhabited primarily by Bambara, Senoufou, and Sarakole peoples; the
north-central floodplains of the Niger Delta where herding, farming, and fishing are practiced by Fulani and Bozo
groups; and the northern desert and arid plains where Tuareg and some Fulani practice nomadic pastoralism.
South-central Mali is the main cultivation region where staple crops such as millet, maize and rice are grown
in addition to cash crops like cotton and peanuts. The Bambara are the predominant ethnic group in this area.
Tenure rights among the Bambara are granted by the village chief (dugutigi), who possesses rights of distribution
as the titular head of the first family to settle the region. Land is historically granted to male heads of household
who rely on family labor to cultivate common fields. Increasingly, young male members of families cultivate
fields independently of their fathers, though they continue to contribute labor toward family production. Bambara
women work in the fields of their husbands and fathers and will frequently cultivate garden plots or fields
independently. While Bambara women rarely inherit fields, they do acquire independent fields through other
means such as borrowing.
Among the Senoufou and Minianka of south-eastern Mali, the office of land chief retains a strong authority
and quasi-religious role over cultivation and land rights. The land chief is seen as the spiritual liaison for the
community, and his advice relating to land use and cultivation practices must be adhered to in order to avoid
bringing misfortune to the village. The land chief possesses eminent rights over all lands within the village
domain, but grants permanent and temporary use-rights to groups and individuals. Additional responsibilities held
by Senoufou land chiefs include setting dates for harvesting and cultivation, determining location and selection of
crops to be planted on collective fields, and scheduling the work days for collective fields (Sanogo, in Crowley
1991). Similar to Bambara communities, land tenure is becoming increasingly individualized among the90
Senoufou and Minianka with the increase in production of cash crops (notably cotton). Competition for land
access has also heightened in the face of declining availability and increased agro-pastoral production.
Among the Fulani herders of the Niger Delta in north-central Mali, tenure rights have evolved since the well-
regulated pastoral code, or dina, established under the reign of Cheikou Ahmadou in the nineteenth century.
Because of the ecology of the Niger Delta region and the seasonal nature of resource use, a variety of different
groups—Fulani pastoralists, Bozo fisherpeople, and Bambara rice farmers—may compete for the same resources
during different periods of the year. Similarly, the changing availability of forage grasses, water sources, and
minerals for livestock necessitated the development of a system of rules for determining access to the same
resources over time. The Dina Code as originally established by Cheikh Ahmadou during the last century was
essentially a set of regulations aimed at controlling livestock movements, ensuring resource access to different
users and extracting taxes on livestock. Under this system water and pasture rights were granted to heads of clans
or transhumance groups. Access could be provided to outsiders in return for payment of a user’s fee to the clan
chief. Annual livestock movements were coordinated by an eighty-member council under the leadership of Cheikh
Ahmadou.
While some aspects of the Dina Code remain, its effectiveness has declined significantly in recent years due
to a variety of factors. Increased population growth and declining resource availability due to drought have
heightened competition. Additionally, state policy reforms and development interventions have been disruptive to
rule enforcement and tenure rights (Crowley 1991).
Among transhumant Fulani and Tuareg in northern Mali, tenure rights revolve around access to key
resources such as water points, salt licks, and pastures. Priority use over such resources is acquired through either
investments of labor or materials, first arrival, long-term residence, or donation from an outsider (as in the case of
access rights to boreholes).
The 1986 revision of the Code Domanial et Foncier served to reinforce the state’s legal ownership over all
land not independently registered. For the first time this legislation did provide official recognition to customary
tenure rights, but did not define them and gave them priority only in cases where the state did not exercise a need
for these lands (ARTICLE 127). The state’s priority right to land is evidenced by the precedence which
administrative authorities’ (arrondissement chiefs and commandants de cercle) decisions relating to dispute
resolution or arrival of new settlers have over that of traditional leaders’ decisions.
The rationale for retaining eminent state ownership of land and resources has been interpreted as a means of
achieving two ends: (1) the legal basis for enforcement of restrictive environmental regulations and state
expropriation of land without compensation; and (2) an effort to accelerate the process of privatizing land rights
through registration (Barrière 1995).
Revisions to the 1986 CDF have been established as a high priority since the overthrow of Traoré in 1991
and the passage of the 1992 Constitution. Several initiatives taken since the political transition have provided
some hope for those favoring greater local control over natural resources and increased participation in drafting
legislation which would accommodate local realities. Most notably a series of public forums dealing with
increasing local decision-making authority in natural resource use were held in 1991, including a number of
public hearings which informed revisions to the bush fire code. Additionally, a national conference was held in
1993 to discuss means of accommodating local realities in future tenure legislation.
However, in spite of such optimistic signs, the revised Forest Code, which was passed in 1995, did not bode
well for true reform. This legislation largely retained the power of decentralized administrative authorities to
determine and enforce regulations controlling forest use.91
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Expansion of agricultural production in Mali has been dramatic over the last twenty years. For example, the
fertile inland delta has experienced an increasing proportion of land (on the order of 51%) devoted to rice and
cereal production (Barrière 1995, p. 37). The result of such expansion has been increased competition for land,
decreasing fallowing periods, and the replacement of rangeland with cropland.
Livestock production strategies have also changed as a result of decreasing livestock numbers following the
droughts of the mid-1970s and 1980s. Large numbers of livestock were sold by desperate Fulani and Tuareg
herders; much of the cattle was purchased by absentee merchants or traditional cultivators. Thus increasingly
pastoral herd owners have become herd guardians, often resulting in a decline in incentives for responsibly
managing rangeland. Additionally the integration of livestock into farming systems for manuring and traction
purposes has led to a greater concentration of livestock in proximity to fields, resulting in greater demands for
rangeland near villages. Much has also been written about the transfer of nutrients from pastures to farmland as
organic fertilizers are increasingly valued as a substitute for fallowing and expensive chemical inputs. 
The 1986 Code Domanial et Foncier did not explicitly address the issue of rights to rangelands. However,
given the prevailing centrist approach of this legislation, it is assumed that these resources fall into the category of
“non-registered” land and are hence defined as state property.
Among sedentary agricultural populations in Mali there has been an increasing individualization of
production strategies over the last few decades, which has led to greater fragmentation of family fields and
increased competition for access to land. This trend is particularly noteworthy in those areas where cash crops are
an important component of production, such as in the cotton and peanut zones of southeastern Mali. A
countervailing force to this trend has been the difficulty of accessing sufficient labor resources to support
individualized production. This is especially problematic given the prevalence of out-migration of young males in
search of off-farm work opportunities, particularly during periods of crisis.
The Malian state has long had a protectionist strategy toward the use of natural resources, particularly trees.
Since the 1935 Forest Code, the state has claimed ownership over all forest resources, including trees on
individual fields. Complete or partial cutting of trees as well as harvesting of forest products have been strictly
controlled. Significant yet limited reforms have taken place in the area of natural resource management since
1992. The former Service des Eaux et Forêts (Water and Forest Service) has been transformed to the Direction
Nationale des Forêts, de la Chasse et de la Pêche, which oversees policies relating to forests, wildlife, and
fisheries. The approach of this service as outlined in the 1995 legislation is to apply and enforce legislation
relating to protected forests and reserves and to ensure responsible exploitation of natural resources (Barrière
1995, p. 169).
The 1995 Forest Code (Law 95-003) allows for private and community registration of some forests, thus
increasing local control over the exploitation of these categories of resources. The legislation emphasizes the
economic potential of forests and supports this through the organization of local wood-marketing cooperatives,
which are granted annual harvest quotas and exclusive sale rights. The previous forest classification system is
preserved under the new law, with restrictions varying depending upon the level of classification. The three
different types of forest domains are: (1) classified forests; (2) protected forests; and (3) individual or community
forests. Classified forests are subject to the strictest controls, but do allow for some exploitation according to the
nature of the specific ordinance and through the issuance of a permit; community and individual forests are
planted by local populations and registered in their names. These forests are subject to many of the same
restrictions as those imposed on classified forests, but there is greater leniency with respect to harvesting
products.92
Revised wildlife management legislation was passed in March 1995 (Law 95-031) and spelled out
restrictions governing the management of protected areas and the protection of wildlife resources. The various
levels of protected zones were maintained as written in the 1986 Code Domanial et Foncier. Classified reserves
include: international biospheres, integral natural reserves (where all types of exploitation are prohibited), national
parks, sanctuaries, and wildlife reserves. Wildlife is considered a national resource, and permission to hunt on
restricted areas is granted only through the issuance of a license. An underlying premise of the revised legislation
is the protection of wildlife for tourist purposes.
Much of the instigation for current legislative reform in the areas of natural resources and administrative
decentralization in Mali stems from the popular overthrow of twenty-eight years of dictatorial rule and the
subsequent multiparty elections held in 1992. To date, the decentralization process has resulted in the creation of
new administrative levels presided over by elected officials. In spite of this initiative, however, regulations relating
to land and natural resources have not devolved significant authority to the village level, but rather have
maintained state control through elected councils responsible for enforcing national legislation.
In rural areas the repressive nature of forest and other resource regulations were partially responsible for
opposition to the previous regime. Popular pressure continues to play a role in influencing changes to forest and
land tenure policies. These initiatives are also supported through the influence of external donor agencies, which
have promoted greater local control and decision-making power over natural resources during the last decade.
National tenure legislation as embodied in the 1986 Code Domanial et Foncier granted broader tenure rights
to women than is often the case under customary law. Women are allowed to register land independently under
the 1986 law, but they are seldom granted exclusive land rights in the village context. Rather, temporary
arrangements such as borrowing agreements are the primary means by which women gain access to land.
Distinctions do exist between various ethnic groups with respect to women’s tenure rights. For example,
among the Dogon and Rimaibe, women often farm small parcels independently of male relatives and are allowed
exclusive rights to harvested products. These occurrences are much more rare among the Fulani, Bambara, and
Malinke (McLain 1992).
Socioeconomic changes such as male labor migration are leading to increasing instances of woman farm
managers. In spite of this reality, however, few women are granted local recognition as landowners independently
of male relatives.
With respect to tree tenure, women often have the right to harvest wood and fruit from trees, particularly on
family land. However, they are not granted ownership rights to trees independently of land, even in cases where
they plant the trees themselves. While men are often able to acquire land rights through tree planting (mise en
valeur), this is seldom the case for women.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
While progress has been made in Malian natural resource legislative reform through the passage of a new Forest
Code, wildlife and fisheries legislation, and an administrative decentralization code, fundamental issues relating to
land tenure have yet to be addressed. This is particularly problematic given that the above-outlined legislation will
be affected by any changes made to tenure regimes. As things currently stand, the 1986 Code Domanial et
Foncier is still followed, despite the fact that it was officially abolished with the passage of the 1992 Constitution.
The redrafting of land tenure legislation is frequently cited as a high priority in Mali. Evidence of progress
on this front includes the 1993 national convention on land tenure reform. Furthermore, the tenure reforms in
neighboring countries such as Guinea and Niger as well as the international policy climate embodied in the 1994
Praia Conference on Decentralization of Natural Resource Management in the Sahel, and the activities
supporting community-based natural resource management promoted by donors should have some influence on93
the reform process. It remains to be seen whether future revisions will accommodate customary tenure practices
and how issues of tenure security will be addressed. Among the issues that have not been confronted in previous
policies are questions of pastoral tenure rights and women’s access to and ownership of land.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Current Malian land legislation does not provide the necessary juridical framework for guaranteeing security of
tenure to many producers because: (a) it does not recognize de facto (that is, customary) land rights at the village
level, and (b) it does not give local populations the degree of ownership over resources necessary to foster rational
exploitation and conservation.
It has been recommended that a suitable interim method for providing the security necessary to facilitate
land transactions and provide incentives for both short- and long-term investments would be the promotion of
user contracts between owners and renters of land or between the state and a local collectivity. Such contracts
could be tailored to the specific needs of the two parties, and conditions relating to longevity of use and
permissible investments (such as tree planting, fencing, and land reclamation efforts) could be spelled out in terms
suitable to both parties (Hesseling and Coulibaly 1991).
Since revisions to land legislation have not yet begun, it is recommended that popular participation play an
integral role in deciding upon the nature of the revised law. Such a process was implemented in drafting revisions
to the bush fire code in 1991. While the results of this process were positive, it did require considerable
investments in time and money. A more streamlined approach could be followed in revising the Code Domanial et
Foncier. One method might consist of using a multidisciplinary survey team to determine public opinion, followed
by conferences at the regional and national levels in order to allow for public dissent (McLain 1992).
Once draft legislation is written, an extensive public education process would need to be undertaken to
ensure that Malians are aware of changes made to their rights and obligations in natural resource management.
While involving local populations in policy planning process, it will be necessary to guard against biases in
favor of sedentarized groups. This is particularly crucial in regard to common property resources (pastures,
forests, and water points) that are used by a variety of groups at different times of the year. Some means will need
to be considered to allow for the participation of transient groups (such as pastoralists) in order to protect their
security of access to these resources.
While the promotion of greater local responsibility and control over resource use is viewed as a positive
initiative, a vital role for the state remains. In order to prevent the monopolization of prime resources by local
elites, the state must have some means of ensuring equitable access. Additionally, the state has a role to play in
cases of conflict over resource tenure, particularly when these conflicts involve different villages or ethnic groups.
Finally, in addition to serving as an outside mediator and protector of marginalized groups, the state should act as
a technical advisor in promoting sustainable production practices.
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Land tenure is an extremely sensitive issue in Mauritania. Although pastoralists’ rights to natural resources once
took precedence over those of cultivators in this country, the 1983/84 land tenure legislation reversed this
situation by promoting agriculture and emphasizing the role of irrigation. Following a series of severe droughts,
the value of irrigable land became the basis of ethnic conflicts that escalated to international proportions. The
control of flood-recession land, the most reliable land asset in the Senegal River Basin, has long been a source of
competition and tension within and across communities and ethnic groups in the region. Mauritania’s adoption of
a private-property framework for landownership proved to be an instance where tenure legislative reform was
justified by the national government as part of their “Islamization” program, and welcomed by international donor
organizations as a positive step toward individualization, but proved to be a vehicle for land grabbing by a
dominant ethnic group.
National policy dialogue and legal framework
With a land area of 1,030,700 square kilometers and only 2.3 million people (1994 estimate), Mauritania is
sparsely populated. Yet since approximately 80% of the territory is desert, all but 20% of the population live in
the southern third of the country in or near the Senegal River Valley. Most of the country is hot, dry, and dusty
throughout the year. Only the narrow band of land along the river can regularly support agriculture. The
country’s primary natural resources are iron ore, gypsum, and the well-know fishing waters off Mauritania’s
coast. Although approximately 47% of the population is engaged in either agriculture, herding, or fishing, these
sectors account for only 25% of the GDP. The rest of the people work in services, industry, commerce, and
government. Despite the decline in the world price of iron ore, mining continues to be Mauritania’s main source
of revenue. The country was severely affected by the series of droughts (1967–1985) that plagued Sahelian West
Africa. While an estimated 75% of the population were nomadic herders in 1965, this figure was reduced to 12%
by 1988.
The ethnic groups of the Senegal River Basin have long interacted and even intermarried. All but the Bidan
are dark-skinned. The Haratine are both culturally and linguistically aligned with the Hassaniya Arabic-speaking
Bidan. Although “Haratine” is often glossed as “slave” in English, many of the Haratine were freed long before
the official abolishment of slavery by the Mauritanian government in 1980. Nonetheless, many Haratine maintain
a dependent relationship with Bidan families. Together the Bidan and Haratine, the white and black Maures,
dominate the country numerically and politically, followed by the Halpulaar-en, the Soninke, and the Wolof.
Before the droughts, pastoralism was the primary activity of the Bidan, the Haratine, and the Peul faction of the
Halpulaar-en.
The local patterns of resource tenure had woven into them complex compromises among different user
groups. Each of Mauritania’s ethnic groups can make legitimate historical tenure claims to fertile flood-recession
land in the Senegal River Valley. The Soninke cultivate land on both sides of the river in the eastern portion of the
country, but at the time of independence the Halpulaar-en cultivated the great majority of the land throughout the
middle river valley. Their dominant landholding position makes them an obstacle to the expansion of Bidan-
sponsored development schemes in the region. By conquest, the Bidan claimed a portion of the right bank of the
river, where they established emirates in the nineteenth century. Most of the Halpulaar-en initially fled from this
region, but, encouraged by the French regime, many of the Halpulaar-en returned and arranged tenure rights96
through marriage ties or the payment of tithes to the Bidan. The Bidan also put a portion of the river valley land
under cultivation using Haratine labor, and since 1984 they have established large irrigation enterprise which
similarly employ Haratine labor.
The effects of the 1983/84 tenure reforms, which were in part designed to address the rising values of river
basin land as irrigation was promoted, were compounded by severe environmental changes. This combination of
factors gravely upset the existing tenure compromises among the local communities and led to conflict of
international proportions. What started as a border skirmish between Mauritanian herders and Senegalese farmers
along the river escalated into ethnic riots in Nouakchott and Dakar. Tens of thousands of people were shuttled
between the two capitals as black Africans were routed out of Mauritania and Maures were repatriated from
Senegal. These events continue to shape issues of land tenure and use in Mauritania, for the dominant Bidan have
seized the opportunity to expand their landholdings in the Senegal River Valley.
The Maure influence can be traced in the tenure legislation passed by the French colonial government that
recognized the Islamic principal of indirass. The French began conquering the Senegal River Valley in 1858, and
by 1900 they controlled the entire southern portion of the country. The 1905 arrêté established the right bank of
the river as the boundary between the Mauritanian and Senegalese territories. It also established the right of
farmers residing on either side of the river to cultivate land on the opposite side. While the décret of 1906
provided for the conversion of traditional tenure claims into private legal property through a registration process
(immatriculation), later colonial legislation confirmed customary tenure practices that favored current over past
Muslim communities or user groups. According to indirass, property rights must be continually exercised in
order to be renewed. Assessment of “use” is usually based upon signs of occupancy or cultivation such as
constructions or irrigation works. The time period after which rights lapse is usually deemed to be ten years,
whether or not signs of use remain. In the harsh and often barren landscape of Mauritania, however, indirass can
sometimes be applied within just two years since the signs of rain-fed agriculture may leave few traces. In
general, the French colonial administration furthered the interests of elites in the area, complicated claims to land
rights and relations between groups, and did little to advance the status of former slave groups.
Just before Mauritania gained its independence in 1960, the French passed Décret 60.139 of 1960 which
both recognized traditional claims to land and nationalized all land not claimed or under recognized use.
Reference was again made to indirass and a ten-year time limit for the demonstration of land use. The legislation
also provided for the registration of land, but only urban plots were ever registered.
In 1983, Mauritania initiated its own tenure reform with Ordinance No. 83.127, followed by the Décret No.
84.009 of 19 January 1984. Broadly, the law states that all Mauritanians have an equal right to be landowners.
Individual private property, established through a registration procedure, is recognized as the standard form of
landholding. Customary tenure systems in the flood-recession land of the river valley are abolished, but the
pastoral collectives within Bidan customary tenure continue to be validated.
Although traditional tenure is officially abolished according to ARTICLE 3, individual registration does not
replace the standard Islamic law (shari’ah) procedures that are declared valid when they do not conflict with the
new law. All land that is not state domain, or is not registered as private property by an individual or legal
cooperative, remains under the jurisdiction of the shari’ah Traditional collective landholdings can be preserved in
a community-based system only if the lineage or clan forms a legal cooperative that meets the criteria for
cooperatives, including the equal rights and duties of all members which echoes the Bidan’s pastoral tradition.
While promoting private property, the law is more bluntly intended to make clear the state’s right to declare
any land as state domain, leaving no recourse to traditional tenure claims. The state again bases this right on the
Islamic principle of indirass, which asserts that land not used for ten years reverts from private ownership and
becomes available to the Islamic community for private or public acquisition. The bulk of the ordinance and the97
décret are devoted to establishing procedures for registering individual tenure, for acquiring domain land, and for
making concessions to individuals from state domain.
A series of controversial ministerial directives followed the 1983/84 legislation. Essentially, these circulaires
facilitated the granting of concessions without going through full legislative processes. This focus on large
irrigated perimeters accorded with Mauritania’s commitment to the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du
fleuve Sénegal (OMVS), which Mauritania had formed with Senegal and Mali. The OMVS planned to provide
the means for expanded irrigated agriculture throughout the Senegal River Basin. Droughts throughout the 1970s
made the river valley one of the only viable investments in Mauritania. In the shadow of the OMVS, the 1983/84
legislation was designed to promote irrigated agriculture in the hands of Bidan entrepreneurs.
The initial international responses to Mauritania’s new land law were optimistic. They were seen as positive
steps by a national government to address agricultural productivity and growth through land tenure legislation.
Observers also cautioned, however, that there was a great potential for the misuse of the law, especially the
indirass stipulations. It was acknowledged that, due to changing ecological conditions, the residents of the
northern two-thirds of the country would have an interest in securing access to some of the productive land in the
southern one-third of the country, though there was no immediate evidence that the legislation was being used
systematically to gain access to the productive river valley land. The actual drastic consequences of the law were
not apparent until the border conflict with Senegal erupted in 1989.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
To understand the events of 1989 and their consequences, it is important to review the local tenure regimes that
have been increasingly disrupted. In a country dominated by Maure pastoralists, before the droughts the most
important traditional tenure rights were the rights to seasonal pasturage, the rights to tree crops such as dates, and
the rights to water sources. The Maure’s customary tenure regime, which advantages pastoralism over
cultivation, dominated the northern two-thirds of the country. Most Maure agricultural endeavors were
undertaken by Haratine families associated with Bidan landholders. Even if they were freed over a century ago,
Haratine are usually considered to be cultivating Bidan land. Only in areas where the Haratine have themselves
cleared forested land are they considered landowners according to standard Islamic practice.
Land tenure cultivation rights were much more explicit and varied, however, in the Senegal River Valley,
which contains almost all of Mauritania’s irrigable land. This southern region has been cultivated for many
centuries, mostly by the Halpulaar-en and Soninke. Their customary tenure systems recognize superior and
inferior claims to land that approximate ownership and occupancy rights. Most of the fertile river valley land is
held in common property at levels ranging from the extended family to the lineage. Individual tenure of
smallholdings would be generally impractical and inefficient in the flood-recession context.
The balance of primary and secondary use rights dictates who may cultivate a given piece of land depending
upon the availability of arable land in relation to seasonal rainfall. Land that is inundated for more or less than
optimal amounts of time becomes less productive. As a result, the local agricultural systems, which are
complemented by fishing and pastoral activities, have incorporated risk management strategies such as common
property (to increase the size of the portfolio of land accessible to each cultivator) and annual reallocation of land
after the flood recedes (to ensure that individual cultivators each have access to a viable holding). Approximately
80% or more of the cultivators have adequate primary or secondary rights in years of good rainfall. The
remainder of the population is obligated to negotiate access at disadvantageous terms, particularly in poor years.
The payment of tithes secures tenure rights ranging from near freehold to temporary usufruct.
The traditional agricultural systems in this region utilize both flood-recession land (waalo) and rain-fed land
(jeeri). Jeeri land is never flooded. Since it is more plentiful and requires more clearing and preparation before
cultivation than waalo land, jeeri land is characterized by more flexible tenure claims. In many cases, farmers98
without ownership claims can cultivate the land without paying anything to the nominal owners. The most
desirable jeeri fields, however, tend to be grouped and located near settlements because there is a high risk of
damage from cattle and birds when the fields are isolated. Such jeeri land can command a higher tithe, though
some Islamic judges consider that of agricultural land, only waalo, not jeeri, qualifies as traditional private
property.
Waalo land is the most valuable land asset and it is regularly in short supply. Flood recession is intrinsically
unpredictable in terms of how much land is annually inundated and, equally important, which land is best suited
to agriculture in a given year. Such unpredictability is a major concern in the arid Sahel. Even when inundated,
the flood-recession land varies in quality. Within the waalo, cultivators recognize fonde and halalde soils
according to their proximity to the water level and their clay content. Fonde soils are more elevated, less regularly
inundated, receive fewer clay deposits, and therefore are lighter and have better drainage than halalde soils.
Irrigation projects have rendered fonde land more valuable than before because, while this land has always been
near the river and usually flooded in years of good rainfall, it now is ensured of water access every year.
Many of Mauritania’s current tenure clashes especially the problems along the Senegal River, can be traced
to a number of factors. First, the droughts accentuated land pressure demands in the river valley, which contains
not only the most productive agricultural land but also the most dependable pasture resources. Second, irrigation
development, especially that resulting from the OMVS, increased tensions in the river valley with the promise of
investment opportunities in the new irrigated perimeters. Third, the 1983/84 tenure legislation favors state
intervention in the river valley and promotes the arrival of new landholders. In 1989, these three factors reached a
violent peak in the border dispute with Senegal. The resulting repatriation of Maures placed even further demands
on the limited natural resources. The new arrivals wanted access to agricultural land at the same time that
Mauritanian herders were increasingly pressuring the local pasture and water resources since their herds were
barred from traversing the river into Senegal.
A background to all of these events is the delineation of an international boundary in a resource use zone
that spans two countries. Halpulaar-en and Soninke customary land territories (leydi) may include land on both
sides of the river. Thus under customary law, many villagers hold land use rights in both Mauritania and Senegal.
While the Mauritanian government refers to the 1905 décret, which situates the division of the colonial
Mauritanian and Senegalese territories in the middle of the river, the Senegalese government refers to a 1933
décret, which places the boundary at the right bank of the river—the Mauritanian side—indicating that the entire
river belongs to Senegal. One land use study noted that 21% of the people who cultivate on the right
(Mauritanian) side of the river actually reside in Senegal. While recently expelled Mauritanians have noted: “Si
nos terres sont en Mauritanie alors nous sommes Mauritaniens” (Leservoisier 1995, p. 357), tenure legislation
does not respect the cross-border tenure legacies and linkages that continue to shape interaction in the region.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Mauritania presents a unique situation where the rights of herders once took precedence over the rights of
cultivators, but where, due to a series of events precipitated by climatic change, agriculture is now promoted by
the national government in the interests of the former herders. Herders and cultivators have always come into
conflict with each other, but the promotion of irrigation especially has generated or escalated several types of
conflict. In some instances, the state has distributed to new landholders irrigated land that is simultaneously
claimed by others making reference to precolonial and colonial-era land concessions. The increased value of
irrigated land has prompted some cultivators to organize their farming activities more individually, thereby
undermining traditional community and lineage-based land-holding practices. Guaranteed water access through
irrigation has drastically altered the value of some land along the river. As the value of the land increases, tenure
practices that were once flexible now become more rigid as landholders solidify their claims over the land.
Irrigated perimeters along the banks of the river severely limit pastoralists’ access to the water. Herders are also99
barred from allowing their animals to graze within the perimeter after a harvest for fear that the animals will
damage the permanent infrastructure such as the canals, dams, and embankments.
These effects of the promotion of irrigation have been compounded by the application of the new tenure
legislation. The indirass principle in particular presents a problem because villagers might not be able to use their
land for over ten years due to unfavorable climatic conditions or labor constraints. The legislation also makes it
easy for many irrigation administrators to abuse their power and privilege in distributing land, claiming a large
portion of the land for themselves. The administration is mostly Maure, and distributions to new private
landowners have favored Maures. The intentions behind the abolition of common property and the insistence that
only privately registered land has real legal value have become evident now that the various circulaires provide
an easy means for Bidan absentee landlords to develop land in the flood plain.
A concern for natural resource management was brought to the forefront by the droughts. Desertification in
the fragile Sahelian zone, which was already aggravated by overgrazing and deforestation, was accelerated by the
lack of rain. The state is currently focused on the promotion of expanded irrigated agriculture. Although
Mauritania is a member of the Sahelian drought-control organization CILSS (Comité permanent inter-états de
lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel), anti-desertification measures have been limited. A 1987 Forest Code
promotes reforestation programs, particularly dune stabilization, but more innovative forest and water protection
measures have not yet been put forth.
Fishing rights are another of Mauritania’s natural resources that could be more favorably legislated and
administered in order to ensure sustainability. Mauritania’s coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in
the world. With limited investment resources and infrastructure, most industrial fishing in Mauritania is
conducted by foreign-owned and -operated vessels which include on-board processing facilities. The government
instituted a broad fisheries policy in 1979 in order to control the rate of exploitation and to augment Mauritania’s
revenues through more careful stock management and rights allocations. To date, however, Mauritania cannot
secure value-added revenues from the fishing industry because it lacks the appropriate processing and storage
facilities. The future of the fishing industry, and the important proceeds it brings the country, is severely
threatened by recent overexploitation by foreigners. Even with more rigid legislation, however, the government
will not be able to manage more effectively the fishing industry unless it also obtains the means, such as a navy,
of enforcing fishing regulations.
Mauritania’s current leader, Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, came to power by military coup in
1984. With the adoption of the latest Constitution in 1991, however, the democratic process was opened since
organized opposition parties were officially permitted. Colonel Taya was elected as the first president in 1992,
and, though opposition parties are legal, membership in Mauritania’s umbrella resistance organization (FLAM,
Forces de Libération Africaine de Mauritanie) is still considered grounds for arrest .
The organization and division of domain land into concessions is not a process that incorporates local-level
input. According to the 1984 Décret, regional land commissions are created to divide and distribute collectively
held land among newly formed cooperative members. These land commissions are not directly responsive to the
local community because they are presided over by the préfet and include a magistrate of the tribunal of the
département, the commandant of the local militia, the head of the regional agricultural service, and a
representative of the extension service.
In accordance with provisions in the 1983 Land Law and the 1992 Constitution, local land offices have also
recently been opened in a few towns in the river valley. Unlike the land commissions associated with cooperatives,
the local land offices inform the national cadastre and oversee the institution of individual private property rights.
As of 1995, however, it was still unclear if these regional offices would be sufficiently empowered to settle land
claim disputes, especially those generated by the arrival from Senegal of thousands of repatriated Mauritanians,
who have been granted land that was previously occupied.100
The series of droughts which began in 1968/69 has been a principal impetus for change in Mauritanian land
tenure legislation aimed at changing land use practices and promoting increased agricultural production through
irrigation. In the Senegal River Basin, much of the agricultural development has been financed by upper-class,
Bidan entrepreneurs, but the schemes are based on Haratine labor. Moreover, a significant part of the land
granted by the state to Bidan is claimed by Halpulaar-en, who insist that their tenure claims over seemingly
unused land continue despite their inability to cultivate in years of drought. The effects of the droughts have also
attracted Bidan to agriculture since they have lost the majority of their livestock herds and can no longer practice
transhumant pastoralism. Most recently, Bidan business losses in Senegal (and expulsion from that country) have
made the irrigation schemes all the more appealing as investment targets. Donors’ insistence on privatization of
the schemes and on individualization of tenure have facilitated Bidan dominance and use of hired labor.
Expanded irrigation and increased rice cultivation along the Senegal River have resulted in a net loss in
tenure rights for women. The productivity of the “small irrigated perimeters” depends in part upon women’s labor
contributions. Women, however, have resisted participating in some of the perimeters because, to devote time to
the new perimeters, they must neglect their traditional upland rice and peanut fields as well as their dry-season
gardening activities. Women also resist working in the perimeters because this irrigated land falls into the
category of land controlled strictly by men, whereas the customary tenure regime applicable to their traditional
fields was more flexible. In some cases, men have agreed to permit women to form their own cooperatives within
the irrigated perimeters, and thus to exercise their own management rights over the parcels, but only in exchange
for offering one-half of their harvests to the men’s cooperative. The irrigated perimeters, therefore, both divert
women’s labor away from their traditional fields and limit the extent of their land tenure management rights.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
The ecological unity of the Senegal River Valley requires that proposed solutions to the tenure, and associated
ethnic, problems go beyond national considerations. The Senegal River Basin and its user populations span two
countries, Mauritania and Senegal. Significant revisions in both development policy and land tenure legislation
are necessary to begin to rectify some of the inequities and injustices of the recent years. The government needs to
recognize the virtues (risk management) as well as the failings (inequality) of the customary tenure systems in the
region. A more democratic administrative and development structure involving small-scale producers is needed to
ensure that the groups dominating the national government do not displace local farmers in the river valley only to
establish large-scale absentee-landlord agricultural projects.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
In light of the violent events of 1989 and the subsequent ongoing tensions involving land issues, the Mauritanian
government may choose to reevaluate the tenure legislation changes it made in 1983/84. Specific considerations
could include: revise Ordinance 81.234 and Décret 84.009 to recognize the local collective tenure systems, which
incorporate risk management advantages in the fragile Sahelian environment; recognize the shari’ah principle of
the legal validity and priority of oral testimony in the revised land tenure legislation in order to protect the
customary tenure rights of populations living on or near land incorporated into the state domain; recognize the
customary access and use rights of Senegalese citizens to land on the right bank of the Senegal River; decentralize
the procedures of the 1983/84 legislation so that land allocation and dispute settlement decisions do not have to be
approved at the ministerial level while leaving room for appeal to higher authority and scope for national policy
implementation as well as for regional differences; restructure the membership of the regional land commissions
so that they include local-level representation beyond state appointees; and establish the right of indigenous
cultivators to have first choice for any newly irrigated land made available through state expropriation.101
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Niger has been in the process of revising land tenure and natural resource legislation since 1986. This new
legislation, identified collectively as the Rural Code, is motivated by the perceived need to rationalize resource
tenure in the face of increased competition. A history of contradictory land policies, population growth, and
environmental degradation has led to escalating tensions over resource access. Some of the more innovative
underlying principles of the legislative reform process include: (1) recognition of customary definitions of tenure
rights; (2) efforts to promote tenure security through registration and titling; (3) legal sanction of customary
dispute-resolution mechanisms; and (4) establishment and legitimization of community-based resource
management institutions. However, in light of political preoccupations accompanying the institution of Niger’s
first democratically-elected President in 1992 and his subsequent overthrow in early 1996, the Rural Code
process has not been a central focus of the government in recent years. Considerable technical and financial
assistance has been provided by various donors (including USAID), but with continued international support in
jeopardy as a result of the military coup, the Nigerien Rural Code faces an uncertain future.
National policy and legal framework
Niger is a land-locked country whose northern regions are encompassed by the Sahara Desert. The majority of its
8,846,000 inhabitants live in a narrow band of semifertile land located in the Sudano-Sahelian ecological zone
along Niger’s southern border with Nigeria, Benin, and Burkina Faso. The northern desert area is sparsely
populated, primarily by nomadic and settled Tuareg and Fulani peoples. While the total landmass consists of
126,700,000 hectares, only about 3% is considered arable and an additional 7% is classified as viable rangeland.
Nigerien land tenure systems are best understood as amalgams of customarys law and practices which have
been influenced by colonial and postindependence legislative initiatives. Under the French occupation, three
policies in particular have had ramifications on tenure rights to the present day: (1) the (theoretical)
implementation of private freehold tenure validated by the system of registration spelled out in the decree of 26
July 1932; 2) the strengthening of village and canton chiefs’ control over land allocation, particularly through the
legal obligation of tithe payment (1953 decree); and (3) the state’s right of eminent domain over all land not under
private leasehold (Decree 2745 A.P. of 29 September 1928).
The first of these initiatives, registration of freehold tenure, has been largely nonexistent except in some
urban and peri-urban areas. However, as a result of current efforts to improve rural tenure security, the institution
of arrondissement-level tenure commissions responsible for surveying and titling rural land is being promoted,
albeit on a voluntary basis. Initial legislation defining the role of the tenure commissions and delineating
procedures for land registration was drafted in August 1995 but has not yet been approved. However, the
financial and institutional feasibility of widespread land titling has been brought into question; it seems fairly
certain that the Nigerien government does not have the resources to undertake this initiative independently.
Additionally, the preponderance of contradictory land claims as well as overlapping resource use-rights ensures
that many individual efforts to register claims will be disputed.
The second land policy legacy involves the evolutionary nature of chiefs’ rights over land allocation. Under
the French, the typically ceremonial role of traditional chiefs as land managers was reinterpreted as a near-feudal
right to resources within their domains. In the case of canton chiefs, many such authorities were in fact103
established by the French and given full allocative authority over land within their jurisdictions, including
resources controlled by village chiefs.
Following independence, efforts were made to diminish the power of traditional authorities under both the
Diori and Kountché presidential regimes. Law 60-29 of 25 May 1960 officially abolished the payment of rental
tithe to chiefs, and Law 61-30 of 19 July 1961 recognized use-rights of 10-years’ duration as full ownership
rights. The Diori regime went even further in limiting the feudal power acquired by chiefs with the passage of
Law 62-7 suppressing chiefs’ allocative power over land. Such trends were further reinforced under the Kountché
regime with the 18 December 1974 Presidential declaration of “land to the tiller”.
While these legislative acts did have some influence on local land rights, it is important to note that such
impacts were highly variable. Assertion of individual land rights depended on a number of factors including
knowledge of legislation and a willingness or ability to defy local power structures. The strength of land-to-the-
tiller claims was further hampered by the ambiguous authority of local chiefs to conciliate resource conflicts.
Under President Kountché, village and canton chiefs were first granted dispute conciliation authority, then later
removed from this role. However, despite such policy reversals, customary practices continued to recognize the
chiefs’ role in determining land rights, thus ensuring that many claims which opposed the chiefs’ interests would
not be decided to the plaintiffs’ advantage.
The Rural Code does little to clarify the confusion over chiefs’ land authority. The Principes d’Orientation
du Code Rural of 1993 effectively repeals all previous contradictory legislation, including populist efforts such as
the land-to-the-tiller decree. However, methods of determining property and use-rights under the Rural Code are
quite vague. Such rights are to be determined through means of “collective memory” and occupation since “time
immemorial”. This failure of the Rural Code to clearly define the nature of legitimate property rights ensures that
the legacy of confusion will continue. 
With regard to decision-making over resource disputes, the 1993 legislation strengthens the role of
traditional authorities by sanctioning their primary position in land dispute resolution. However, methods for
appealing decisions beyond traditional authorities do remain under the Rural Code. The state’s intervention can
be sought through the regional-level Ministry of Justice; the arrondissement-level tenure commissions can also be
called upon to arbitrate land disputes.
Finally, the nature of the state’s authority over national resources and its ability to expropriate land for
public use have undergone some degree of transformation under the Rural Code. The postindependence
administrations continued the colonial legacy of state ownership over all “non-appropriated” land with the
passage of Ordinance 76-35 of November 1976. Along with similar previous legislation, this ordinance allowed
the state to expropriate land at will with no compensation and provided the means for enforcing severe restrictions
and fines for “irresponsible” land uses. The Principes d’Orientation du Code Rural modifies this tradition through
the subtle redefinition of Nigerien resources from “state-property” to a “national common property” (patrimoine
commune). This redefinition is meant to strengthen individual and community property rights while maintaining
an obligation of responsible use. Furthermore, the 1993 Rural Code requires just compensation for resources
expropriated for public use.
Regarding the state’s regulatory role over resource management, both the Principes d’Orientation and the
1994 draft text on “land use” (mise en valeur) give authority to arrondissement-level tenure commissions to
temporarily remove land from owners in cases of irresponsible management, neglect, or abuse. Therefore the
state’s power to intervene in questions of land management is preserved.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Indigenous tenure systems in Niger share the commonality of the influence of Islamic law (shari’ah); however,
there remains a great deal of diversity between ethnic groups regarding such practices as inheritance, individual104
versus family tenure, and women’s rights of access and ownership. Furthermore significant differences exist
between tenure practices of historically cultivating and pastoral peoples. Where resource uses overlap, as in
access to common pool resources like pastures, forests and ponds, tenure rights are generally shared according to
locally established, but continually evolving rules.
Among settled, cultivator communities in Niger, the right of first occupant is the principal means of
legitimizing tenure rights. Thus if a settlement is established in a previously un-inhabited location, the chief of the
village has the power to grant permission to newcomers to settle within the village territory. Among the
agricultural Songhai and Zarma of the western Niger river basin, the allocative authority of chiefs over land
within their jurisdiction remains strong. Theoretically village and canton chiefs can call back land for
redistribution, but this is extremely rare. Additionally, few Zarma and Songhai women cultivate land
independently of their family units, and women’s inheritance of land is extremely rare despite its sanctioning
under Islamic law.
Among the Hausa and settled Fulbe (Peul or Fulani) speakers of central and eastern Niger, land ultimately
belongs to the community and is unalienable; acceptance into the community gives one use rights. While
community acceptance and access to land are still granted by village, canton, or provincial chiefs, the concept of
“chieftaincy lands” is not as proprietary as is practiced among the Zarma and Songhay. Women in Hausa society
frequently cultivate individual fields, whether acquired as a gift from their husbands, through inheritance, or
through purchase. Women’s inheritance of land is fairly common among the Hausa.
A variety of land transactions and tenure arrangements exists and continues to evolve in Nigerien
agricultural communities. Borrowing fields is a common means of access for both newcomers and junior family
members; these loans are often compensated through annual rental payments or symbolic tithes of harvested
produce. Another common form of customary transaction is pledging, whereby a monetary loan is given to a
landowner in return for cultivation rights. Once the landowner repays the loan, he reclaims field ownership. More
recently, and particularly in the relatively prosperous agricultural zone of south-central Niger, land sales are
becoming quite common. All of these various forms of customary land transactions tend to be validated through
the use of witnesses rather than written contracts or formal registration.
Land tenure arrangements among pastoralists can be divided into two major types. One type is found among
the Tuareg (and other Tamachec speakers), where there is a regular transhumant circular movement that
corresponds to the cyclical appearance of the rainy season. In the dry season, herd movement is organized around
a series of wells that have been put in by the group. The other land tenure/range management system is best
represented by the Fulbe-speaking Wodaabe, nomadic cattle keepers who were able to move into areas under
Tuareg control after the French established their rule. In general, they migrate along an east-west axis, thus
crossing the traditional Tuareg routes. In both pastoral groups it is the control of water that gives control over
land.
Increasingly the pastoralist/cultivator dichotomy is weakening in Niger as various ethnic groups are engaged
in both cultivation and livestock production simultaneously (agro-pastoralism). This shift in production strategies
has had significant impacts on the management of and access to both range and field resources.
The current legislative reform process is moving in the direction of recognizing customary tenure practices.
However, the emphasis on individualizing and formalizing tenure rights through titling tends to undercut the
strength of this recognition. The 1993 Principes d’Orientation did allow for group registration (including
registration of range by pastoral groups) as well as registration of a variety of different levels of tenure rights.
Yet, the proposed 1995 draft text on the role of the tenure commissions contradicts this original definition by not
recognizing group registration.
The need to maintain flexibility in the recognition of tenure rights is an issue of central concern and ongoing
debate in the Rural Code process. The 1993 Principes d’Orientation provided de jure recognition of community-105
based tenure regimes; nonetheless, it remains to be seen if the future complementary texts will respect or
contradict this initiative. The important issue of seasonal and overlapping tenure rights to common resources has
been addressed to some degree by the draft legislative text on terroirs d’attache (pastoral lands); however, there
continues to be a need for further clarification.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Population pressures have increased in the southern agricultural zone of Niger following devastating droughts in
the mid-1970s and 1980s. As livestock herds were decimated or sold, marginalized Fulani and Tuareg
pastoralists settled in the south where they have increasingly relied on agricultural production. These recent
settlers often have very tenuous land rights.
Over the last few decades, Niger’s traditionally dual agricultural economy of pastoralism and cultivation has
gradually evolved into mixed agropastoral production systems. As cultivable land is coming under increasing
population pressure, competition for organic fertilizers has intensified in an effort to maintain production levels in
the absence of fallowing. Some negative consequences of this trend include the permanence of large numbers of
livestock in proximity to agricultural settlements, leading to increased crop damage.
In an effort to defuse these increasing tensions, the Rural Code legislation calls for the participatory
redrawing of range and livestock corridor boundaries. However, this undertaking has the potential of being highly
contentious as increased cultivation within the boundaries of pastoral resources has led to wide divergences of
opinion regarding legitimate land use claims. Ironically, in many cases it is the sedentarized herders who are
cultivating in pastoral areas due to their limited means of acquiring access to cultivable land.
Manuring of fields has become a critical strategy in maintaining soil fertility in Niger. The temporary nature
of this and similar short-term investments such as zy-hole digging (a method of planting crops in recessed,
manmade holes where fertilizer and organic debris are concentrated) has led some critics to question the validity
of arguments relating tenure security to enhanced resource management. Furthermore, while field manuring may
be a beneficial innovation for crop productivity, it is resulting in the transfer of valuable nutrients from rangeland
to cropland, resulting in serious degradation of many range resources.
Niger’s natural resources have suffered from the devastating consequences of drought and population
pressure over the last several years. The resulting environmental degradation has resulted in some rather
innovative policy directives, particularly in the area of forest management.
Through the instigation and financial support of a variety of donor organizations, Niger began
experimenting with community-based forest management strategies in the 1980s. The perceived success of some
of these early initiatives has led to efforts to organize local wood cooperatives and gestion du terroir committees.
Gestion du terroir is an approach which has been promoted in various Sahelian and West African countries over
the last decade. Broadly stated, it consists of establishing locally appointed or elected councils charged with
decision-making and enforcement of rules of access governing natural resources at the level of the community and
its surrounding resource base (the terroir).
Both the Principes d’Orientation and the draft 1995 administrative decentralization legislation contain
enabling laws for the establishment and recognition of local natural resource management structures. Many
gestion du terroir committees have already been established within the context of development projects, but they
await legal recognition in order to play a greater role in environmental management.
An element of the Rural Code will consist of new legislation to replace the outdated Forest Code; however,
this text has yet to be drafted. The Principes d’Orientation does contain several articles which address the issue of
use-rights in protected areas. Protected areas may be established either to reverse severe degradation or to
preserve ecologically significant resources. Because of the difficulty in confiscating land in a situation of scarcity,106
few protected areas exist in Niger and it seems unlikely that additional ones will be created in the near future.
Some of the most noteworthy reserves include the Aïr/Ténéré Nature Reserve found in northern Niger and the
National Park “W” located in southwestern Niger and bordering similar reserves in Benin and Burkina Faso.
Park W was established under the colonial government and has provided an important habitat for endangered
wildlife. However, illegal poaching and livestock grazing do occur as a result of enforcement problems.
In 1991, Niger held a national conference to draft a new constitution which legalized political parties,
allowed for freedom of the press, and established a free and open presidential and congressional election process.
The process of land tenure reform as embodied in the Rural Code has not been directly linked to the
democratization process. In fact, the instigation for the Rural Code preceded the national conference by four
years.
The first democratically elected Nigerien president, Mahamane Ousmane, came to power in 1992.
Ousmane’s administration was hampered by divisive party politics and the control of congress by opposition
parties. Since the national conference, nine major political parties and several minor ones have been established in
Niger.
In January 1996, President Ousmane was removed from power through a military coup led by General
Ibrahim Mainassara. The coup leaders’ stated rationale was to end the political deadlock which they felt
threatened the country’s stability. The military leaders appointed a civilian prime minister within a month after the
coup, began the process of drafting a new constitution, and set a timetable for the organization of national,
regional, and local elections.
At the time of this writing, USAID and several other international donors have suspended aid to Niger as a
result of the coup. Because the Rural Code legislation is heavily dependent on external financing, it is currently
unclear whether the process will be continued should external donors cut off aid.
It is difficult to determine if land tenure reform will be a priority for the future regime. However, given the
current preoccupation with rescheduling elections and drafting a constitution, it is doubtful that any further action
will be taken on the Rural Code until at least 1997.
Underlying efforts to promote tenure security is the need to enhance productivity in the Nigerien agricultural
sector. Even in good harvest years, Niger has not been able to satisfy the food needs of its population without
significant imports and aid. This situation is further complicated by climatic variability which has caused both
drought and excessive rainfall and can dramatically affect annual harvests. 
Following the devastating drought of the mid-1970s, President Kountché made food security a major
priority. He attempted to accomplish this by exhorting populations, rural and urban alike, to “return to the land”
in an effort to enhance food production. This national campaign included the development of large-scale rice
irrigation projects in some areas of southern Niger. Additionally, Kountché provided land grants to numerous
bureaucrats, particularly in fertile areas south of the capital. These grants were allocated at the expense of
previous land users, causing serious disgruntlement among expropriated populations.
Although difficult to substantiate, there are reported increases in land degradation on some of the absentee-
owned fields in arrondissements such as Say. This degradation has been attributed to poor management and the
inappropriate use of capital inputs such as machinery and fertilizers. The Rural Code does not seek to address
problems of absentee ownership, perhaps due to the influential positions of many of these landowners within the
government structures.
As previously discussed, women’s tenure rights differ among the various ethnic groups in Niger. Among the
strongly Islamicized Hausa and Fulani speakers of southern Niger, women have historically been allowed to
acquire land through inheritance; yet these occurrences were relatively rare due to the custom of females marrying
outside the birth village. However, as increasing numbers of men migrate away from villages in search of work,107
female acquisition of land through both inheritance and purchase appears to be on the rise, particularly among the
Hausa of central Niger. Thus, the trend toward increasing numbers of female-headed households in the face of
male out-migration makes the need to solidify women’s tenure security of paramount importance.
In spite of these trends, the issue of women’s tenure rights has not been specifically addressed by the Rural
Code legislation to date. Serious concerns exist among women regarding their ability to register fields
independently of husbands and other male family members. This is particularly true for land acquired through gift
or inheritance within the family. Such land acquisition is seen as insecure in the event of divorce or death of the
husband. While this insecurity exists even in the absence of registration, there is little within the current policy
reform debate which promises to rectify the situation.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
At the time of this draft, a national convention is under way in Niger to draft a new constitution and schedule
future elections to replace the democratically elected government that was overthrown in a coup earlier this year.
The priority given to these initiatives along with the uncertainty surrounding the future elected government have
combined to place the Rural Code and other legislative activities on hold.
In 1993, the framework of the new land and resource legislation, the Principes d’Orientation du Code Rural,
and an additional text on water resources were completed and approved by the National Assembly. Additionally,
some of the accompanying legislative texts to the Rural Code have been drafted, including texts on “Mise en
Valeur” (land use), “Terroirs d’Attache” (rangelands), and the “Role of the Land Commissions” (Commissions
Foncières), in addition to a text on decentralization of administrative institutions. None of these texts has yet been
approved by the National Assembly (now temporarily dissolved), nor have the texts been studied in depth in order
to identify inconsistencies and impracticalities contained therein. Several additional texts addressing specific
issues in resource management await drafting before the Rural Code is complete. Most notably these texts include
the Forest Code and codes on wildlife, fisheries, and property rights.
Progress on the Rural Code legislation has been greatly facilitated over the last five years through the
support of a number of international donor agencies and governments. Because of the current political situation in
Niger, financial assistance from outside donors has been temporarily, and in some cases perhaps permanently,
suspended. It is also unclear whether the Rural Code reform process will occupy a priority position in the policy
objectives of the new government to be elected into office in late 1996.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Should progress continue on the Rural Code, a number of issues remain which will need to be addressed if the
Code is to become a viable tool for rationalizing land and resource tenure in Niger. These issues can be broadly
classified under the following headings: feasibility, participation, and equity.
Many of the initiatives proposed in the Principes d’Orientation du Code Rural and other draft texts rely
upon financial and institutional capabilities that do not currently exist in Niger. Most particularly this is the case
with the proposed establishment of arrondissement-level land commissions and their role in registering land rights.
No one has yet seriously addressed the financial and human resource capacity that will be needed if the proposed
surveying, titling, and registration activities discussed in the Rural Code are to be implemented.
Other areas of difficulty are the determination of mise en valeur (defined in the draft text as responsible
resource management) and the implementation of participatory land-use planning. Current arrondissement agents
do not have the time or resources to adequately monitor resource management on all local properties as described
by the draft text. The additional complication relating to the potential for abuse of this power has also not been
addressed.108
Finally, the human and capital resources needed to implement a truly participatory effort at land use
planning do not currently exist at the arrondissement level. Training in participatory approaches and conflict
resolution would be critical to the success of such an initiative. Furthermore, the transportation and financial
resources needed to demarcate pastures and livestock corridors will be considerable.
Although a public information campaign has been undertaken to announce changes made under the new
Rural Code, no widespread participation has been involved in drafting the Principes d’Orientation or the other
legislative texts. Assuming that a goal of the process is to make national legislation more relevant to local
conditions and to bridge the gap between customary and written law, it is argued that such goals would be more
attainable through the involvement of customary authorities and rural Nigeriens, at least in a consultative
capacity, in the legislative process.
Also, as previously alluded to, the implementation of a truly participatory land-use planning process will
need to involve all users of a particular resource base, including pastoralists, women, and temporary or recent
inhabitants. Facilitation of such a process would necessitate the involvement of persons skilled in participatory
approaches and arbitration techniques.
In order to avoid the accumulation of land and resource rights by those in positions of economic, political, or
social authority, efforts will need to be made to ensure that access is maintained for those with less secure rights.
Examples of tenuous access include the use of rangelands by transhumant pastoralists and the use of farmland by
recent settlers, women, and borrowers. Security of access or use rights might be accomplished through such
means as promotion of user contracts between lenders and borrowers and registration of group rights to common
property resources such as rangelands. The Rural Code legislation as currently drafted does not clearly address
these issues, though some texts do allow for group registration.
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In 1978, the military government of Nigeria promulgated the Land Use Decree in an effort to impose a land
tenure reform that would replace the authority of customary leaders over land tenure with state control and
thereby impose a uniform, nationwide land tenure system. The legislation has been fraught with problems, not the
least of which has been heightened tenure insecurity emanating from the government’s liberal use of its
compulsory acquisition right and general public confusion over the law’s provisions. Nevertheless, the law’s
unique entrenchment into the country’s constitution constrains its modification. Applicable to urban dwellers and
rural farmers, the decree failed to address the significant population of Fulani pastoralists who reside in the
northern region of Nigeria. Rather, targeted efforts have been made to settle the Fulani onto grazing reserves as a
measure to assert greater economic and political control.
National policy and legal framework
In 1900, northern Nigeria was established as a British colony while southern Nigeria remained a protectorate.
Land was classified as either crown land in the colony or public land in the protectorate, the former held in trust
by the colonial governor for the Queen of England, and the latter, for the Nigerian people. Separate land laws
were applied to northern and southern Nigeria. The Native Land Acquisition Proclamation sought to ensure that
land in southern Nigeria remained in the hands of Nigerians. It sanctioned customary tenure systems and forbade
foreigners to acquire land in this region. By contrast, the Land and Native Rights Proclamation of 1908,
applicable in northern Nigeria, vested ownership of land in the government. However, on public lands, there was
little disturbance of indigenous land tenure practices. By 1916, the Land and Native Rights Ordinance imposed
stricter government control over crown land such that certificates of land occupation required the consent of the
relevant state governor. Outsiders, including southern Nigerians, were required to obtain certificates in order to
reside in the north. All certificates were revocable at the will of the governor.
The foremost piece of land legislation following independence, the Land Use Decree of 1978 (LUD), was
modeled in large part after the Land and Native Rights Ordinance. Established by the military government in
power, the law, which is still in force today, guarantees all Nigerians the right to land. Land in each state,
excluding federal land, is vested in the individual governors who are empowered to acquire land deemed to be in
the overriding public interest. The governor, with the assistance of a land use and allocation committee, is also
authorized to issue certificates of occupancy, which essentially are 99-year leases (except in Lagos State where
terms may be shorter). Rent is fixed at the governor’s discretion. Certificates apply to urban or rural land and
must be approved by the governor. Customary certificates of occupancy are administered by local government
councils and apply solely to rural land. Limits on land size are applied depending on use: 0.5 hectare for
residential purposes, 500 hectares for agricultural purposes, and 5,000 hectares for grazing. Any certificate may
be revoked by the governor under compulsory acquisition. By holding a certificate, one is entitled to
compensation for existing improvements on the land acquired. The law stipulates that land sales, mortgages, and
subleases can be transacted only with the approval of the governor.
The Land Use Decree has revealed several problems in its application. A leading cause of land disputes,
some of which have been violent, arises from the law’s lack of clarity as to whom land belongs in the case of
landlord-tenant arrangements. As a result, many tenants have chosen to stop paying rent or tribute to landowners,
arguing that the state now owns the land. Despite the fact that one of the reasons behind the creation of the LUD111
was to promote egalitarian rights to land, most courts have ruled in favor of landlords, fining tenants and
requiring them to make back payments, though tenant use rights have not been revoked. Other cases have been
decided in favor of the tenant, revealing conflicting interpretations of the law.
Another contradiction arises from the law’s approving customary inheritance practices while at the same
time forbidding land fragmentation, which typically occurs when land is bequeathed to multiple sons.
Promulgated in 1991, the NALDA Decree seeks to address land fragmentation through the development of
30,000–50,000 hectares in each state, which would be divided into 4-hectare contiguous farming lots on which to
settle smallholders. The program also intends to provide the settlements with technical and marketing assistance
as well as access to credit, inputs, and agroindustry outlets.
Rather than curtail land speculation, as was intended, the Land Use Decree opened the door for land to be
acquired by government officials and used for political patronage. This is reinforced by the fact that members of
the land use and allocation committee are appointed by the governor and the fact that the governor has discretion
over rent charges. Indeed, the role of state governors as supreme authorities over land allocations has made it
difficult for the federal government to acquire land from states, particularly when the offices are occupied by
members of different parties, and political standoffs afford governors the opportunity to show their teeth.
The LUD has resulted in significant amounts of land being turned over to government and commercial
interests at the expense of smallholder farmers and pastoralists who have been dispossessed of their land. Even
though evicting landholders in favor of private commercial enterprises is not permitted, the law itself forbids the
courts to judge matters pertaining to the state governors’ or local governments’ rights to grant certificates of
occupancy as well as matters concerning compensation paid as a result of government acquisition. This immunity
has permitted inadequate and untimely payment of compensation; it is often several years before displaced
farmers are reimbursed.
Because certificates are issued in the name of the household head, women are effectively precluded from
holding rights to land by virtue of the fact that men assume the role of head of household. In the event of
dispossession, all compensation is made payable to the male head of household.
Despite all of the LUD’s problems, steps taken by the military government before leaving power to integrate
it into the constitution and even render its authority above that of other constitutional mandates makes its repeal
or modification very difficult. In addition, the intent of the LUD to sever the authority of customary tenure
institutions has not been realized. Rural communities continue to rely on community-based systems, and not the
state system, to govern tenure practice. By alienating the support of traditional authorities through undercutting
their power, the government simultaneously eliminated its most effective means of extending its rule to the
grassroots.
Replacement and adaptation strategies
A unique array of customary land tenure practices has evolved in Nigeria which to some extent can be defined
according to region and historical influences. The experience of Nigerians living in the arid savannah terrain of
the north contrasts sharply with their southern counterparts residing in a humid, subtropical climate. The spread
of Islam in the Sahel reinforced individual land rights, altering more communal patterns of land tenure in the
northern region. Colonialism’s stronghold in the north and the evolution of the market economy further
contributed to more individualized customary tenure regimes. Meanwhile, the presence of Fulani pastoralists has
cultivated a system of overlapping rights between farmers and herders.
The south witnessed colonialism in a different light. Even though colonial authorities sought to protect native
rights to land, land sales and leases to foreigners were widespread, creating a myriad of different tenure
arrangements under the categories of freehold, leasehold, and customary tenure. The introduction of cocoa to the
south spurred the development of land markets. Greater values attached to land as a result of cash-cropping112
opportunities in addition to a more long-term interest in this perennial crop and the land led to increased
individualization of tenure. This trend has continued to the present, strengthened by growing land scarcity arising
from tremendous population growth and a decline in arable land. When the LUD was promulgated, its intent was
to alter customary tenure practices in order to create a unified land tenure policy for the nation which would
facilitate government acquisition of land for national development purposes. The emergence of rampant
speculation and rising land prices had led to demands for regulation to establish more egalitarian land distribution
and greater agricultural productivity. Finally, the Land Use Decree was seen to be the remedy to the perceived ills
of customary tenure, which was blamed for fostering tenure insecurity, land fragmentation, constrained land
markets and inequitable access to land, inefficiency and poor productivity of agriculture, as well as exploitative
and unproductive tenancy arrangements. As discussed earlier, many of these objectives have not been realized.
Characterized by rich, fertile soils and a high population density, the south is home to the dominant tribes of
the Yoruba to the west and the Ibo to the east. Customary land tenure among the Yoruba emphasizes household
rights to land. Once land is allocated by the village leader to a member of the lineage, the land remains
permanently within the family and is passed down to its heirs so long as it is not alienated. The Ibo observe more
communal rights to land whereby cropland beyond the household compound is subject to periodic rotation among
community members following fallow periods. Before 1978, communal land in the south was vested in the stool,
an office presided over by the Oba or paramount chief. It appears that communal tenure is easing over on the
continuum toward greater individualization as the rights of the community are increasingly giving way to those of
the household. More often, one encounters a mixture of communal and individual tenure, depending on the
different types of land and crops. Even in communal systems, lowland swamp regions suitable for rice cultivation
are subject to individual tenure rules.
Tenant farming is widely practiced within customary tenure systems. This occurs when families seek to
farm land in a community dominated by another lineage. In communal systems, arrangements are usually made
with the village chief, who assigns the tenant land in exchange for periodic tribute. Where family land
predominates, access to land is by arrangement with the household head whereby tribute is paid to him, usually
on a yearly basis, in cash or in kind, the latter often being an agreed share of the tenant’s harvest. The assertion of
individual rights to land combined with the expansion of the market economy has meant the tenancies are
assigned shorter terms, frequently on an annual renewable basis, and tributes more often take the form of cash.
Overall, outsiders tend to have greater access to lands held under communal tenure than those dominated by
household tenure.
Nearly all ethnic groups in Nigeria practice patrilineal inheritance. Upon a man’s death, land may be divided
among his male heirs or passed down solely to the eldest son, depending on community practice. If a man has
multiple wives, his land is divided equally among the wives and passed down to their sons. While divided
inheritance provides more security to family members, it has been cited as a leading cause of land fragmentation
and declining productivity. Women rarely inherit land, usually doing so only if there are no male heirs. Inheritance
is by far the most common mode of land acquisition among rural Nigerians, followed by leasing and pledging.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Community-based tenure regimes in Nigeria traditionally discouraged land alienation and land sales were not
practiced. European colonialism, however, made land sales and leasehold more familiar transactions. Today,
most communities permit land sales, but only if all principal members of the family agree to the sale. If not, the
transaction can be rendered void.
The Land Use Decree has been ineffective in curtailing land alienation. Instead, increasing land values have
given rise to revocation of tenancy agreements, heightened state acquisition of land, and land sales. Substantial
speculation continues to occur and is particularly rife in the Middle Belt region, which is the target for future113
agriculture expansion. In the majority of cases, those who purchase land from chiefs and obtain leaseholds from
the government do not occupy the land and smallholders continue to farm the land under high levels of tenure
insecurity arising from the threat of eviction. Studies in the Middle Belt region have showed these farmers
practice less sustainable agricultural techniques, incur low levels of investment, and have poorer agriculture
productivity than their counterparts living on community held land. (Ariyo and Ogbonna 1992). The situation is
fueled by currency devaluation, smallholder fear of government acquisition without compensation, and traditional
authorities who have established themselves as brokers for wealthy individuals and commercial interests seeking
land. Once a sale is complete, the purchaser presents the receipt for endorsement by the local government
chairman. Application to the state land allocation committee is then made. If approved, the state governor will
issue the buyer a statutory certificate of occupancy, constituting a 99-year lease. It is uncertain whether prior
approval for making the sale is typically obtained. Oddly, the LUD makes it illegal to sell land, but not to buy it.
The pastoral Fulani of the northern states comprise around 8% of Nigeria’s total population and contribute
to almost 5% of Nigeria’s GDP through livestock production (data dated from 1981). Within the past few
decades they have confronted immense challenges to their survival and the survival of their herds, including
drought, land degradation, and increased competition for land stemming from agriculture. Once predominantly
transhumant, the Fulani are becoming increasingly sedentarized. Government and donor agency emphasis on
expanding agriculture in the north in conjunction with population pressures has meant that herders are confined to
drier and more marginal lands which do not offer the necessary fodder to feed their herds. The practice among
farmers of sharing overlapping rights to their fields with herders in search of crop residues is increasingly
restricted and potentially a source of conflict as tenure individualization along with shorter fallow periods
becomes more common. Drought has forced the Fulani to migrate further south where they face greater
competition for land with farmers.
Loss of herds, the corresponding need to expand food cultivation, and growing demands for cash income
arising from the market economy have acted together to induce the Fulani to adopt agropastoralism or hire
themselves out as herders to more wealthy pastoralists or farmers who possess livestock. In other cases, destitute
herders migrate to urban areas where they tend to be among the most impoverished.
Since the 1960s, the government in conjunction with agencies such as the World Bank, the Food and
Agriculture Organization, and the U.S. Agency for International Development has attempted to settle the Fulani
onto grazing reserves in order to guarantee a supply of meat and dairy products to urban centers and to establish
firmer political control over them. Despite donor agency claims for being better able to provide inputs to
pastoralists if they are settled, projects have floundered. The fact that Fulani recognize the importance of mobility
in responding to opportunities and uncertainty and to maintaining their livelihood has prevented them from
choosing to settle on the reserves. Most who have settled on the reserves have already adopted agropastoralism in
the vicinity and move to the reserves to take advantage of the services. Due to high concentration levels on the
reserves, overstocking and overgrazing are problematic, leading to erosion. Mechanized boreholes and other
modern technologies on the reserves have broken down, and Fulani lack the spare parts and know-how to repair
them. Of the 2.3 million hectares earmarked for development of grazing reserves, only 0.5 million hectares have
actually been granted (dated reported 1991).
In the south, the threat of trypanosomiasis limits farmers to small ruminants such as goats and sheep. Most
of these livestock are owned by women and remain confined year round.
Customary tenure regimes in Nigeria involve a complex set of rules surrounding natural resource
management. Tree tenure is most favorable to male lineage members who are free to plant and harvest trees on
their holdings. By being accorded a nonlandowning status, women and tenant farmers are typically restricted
from planting trees, since doing so provides grounds for staking one’s claim to land. In the case of tenants, tree
rights like other resource rights will depend on the tenant’s relationship with the landowner. They may be able to114
negotiate with the farmer to plant trees so long as they agree not to challenge the owner’s rights to the land; this
may be reinforced by having the tenant pay additional tribute. Usually those trees will remain the property of the
tenant, however, even after he vacates the land. While such rules certainly pertain to economic trees, it is not clear
to what extent they apply to trees which do not produce a marketable commodity, such as alley trees whose
prunings provide soil-enriching nutrients. Studies have been undertaken which focus on the role of tree and land
tenure in adopting alley cropping technology (Lawry).
Nigeria has experienced severe forest depletion, particularly in the north where competition for scarce
fuelwood is high. The establishment of forest reserves have offered little remedy to the problem. Traditional
community forestry management practices, which divided forests into regulated zones such that the community
held different rights to each, may offer some insight on developing effective forestry management practices.
The design and implementation of the Land Use Decree, 1978, reveals much about the approach taken by
Nigeria’s military government toward legal reform. Part of the intent of the legislation was to wrest control from
local authorities and communities and enlarge the power of the government. The majority report of seven
members of an eight-member Land Use Panel in 1977, established to provide recommendations on developing
Nigeria’s land tenure policy, favored increased privatization of tenure with minimal state intervention, but the
government accepted the minority recommendations of one man favoring continued state ownership. Community
leaders and farmers were left out of the debate over land tenure and formulation of the decree, instigating
widespread resentment. Probably the most audacious moves made by the military government, however, were the
legal immunity afforded the state in carrying out the law and the supreme legal status the government bestowed
before handing over the reins to a civilian administration. Recent political history does not bode well for initiating
participative policy reform dialogue over land tenure issues in Nigeria.
Ninety percent of Nigeria’s agricultural output is produced by smallholders. However, factors such as
fragile tenure security, low producer prices, and declining soil fertility threaten agricultural production. With
agricultural policy focused on cash-crop production since independence, food-crop production has lagged far
behind, often experiencing negative growth rates. Thus, Nigeria has had to import a growing share of its domestic
food supply. As well, the expansion of the market economy into rural areas and cash rents for land have forced
farmers to sell an increasing share of their crops to the market to meet cash demands. Having to contend with a
decline in subsistence production, a growing number of cash demands, and inflation, farmers’ food security is
jeopardized.
Under customary tenure, women rarely inherit land and primarily obtain use rights to land through their
husbands. In some cases, unmarried women are allocated land by their families which they subsequently keep
upon marriage. Nevertheless, the tenure security of women is much weaker than that of men, particularly when a
man has multiple wives who he may assign different fields each cropping season. Studies have revealed how this
uncertainty impedes on women’s willingness to invest in crop-improving technologies or plant tree crops (Lawry).
Given that women uphold the dominant role in food production, this has implications for the nation’s food
security.
Rather than enhancing tenure security for women, the Land Use Decree has the potential to lead to further
regression in their rights to land, requiring only the head of household to apply for registration. Lack of
widespread compliance with the law in rural areas may in fact prove a blessing to women in view of the fact that
customary tenure at least obligates men to allocate land to their wives. The decree also marginalizes women from
obtaining land by linking land acquisition to financial capacity and bureaucratic familiarity.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
While it is uncertain how open the present Nigerian government will be to land tenure policy discussion, several
issues are at hand to address.115
Land speculation, corrupt compulsory acquisition practices, and the ambiguous nature of the Land Use
Decree have contributed to weakening tenure security among farmers. Particularly vulnerable are tenants,
women, and to a certain degree those living under communal tenure systems. Clear policy and legal precedent
needs to be established on the issue of ground rents paid by tenants. This, in addition to more formal contracts
spelling out their rights and obligations, may reduce the number and severity of the disputes which have arisen
between landholders and tenants. In the case of women, certificates of occupancy could include women as joint
leaseholders while land transfer approvals might require the wife’s (or wives’) consent. By enhancing the tenure
security of tenants and women, greater strides could be made toward adopting more sustainable and productive
agricultural techniques.
The high cost of registration and its bureaucratic complexity in addition to lack of information on the law
preclude most rural residents from applying for certificates of occupancy. Local government councils in charge of
providing customary rights of occupancy often were never established. Alternatively, the de facto role of chiefs in
land administration could be capitalized on so as to involve them in issuing certificates. Not only could this prove
an administratively simpler and more cost-effective solution, but also it would enhance the effectiveness of local
authorities in reconciling land disputes. Regional supervisory bodies may need to be established to ensure that
village leaders do not manipulate their power for personal gain.
In the same vein, the immunity afforded state governors under the Land Use Decree demands repeal;
otherwise, gross abuses of power and political patronage will continue at the expense of the less enfranchised.
Legal reform needs to be undertaken to reinstall the court’s power to rule over claims concerning compensation
and the issuance of certificates of occupancy.
After years of investing vast sums in unsuccessful attempts to settle pastoralists onto grazing reserves, it is
time to reassess these methodologies and engage in a better understanding of the strategies and adaptation
techniques of the pastoralists themselves. The fragile ecosystem of the northern region along with high levels of
climatic variation and uncertainty necessitate mobility and opportunistic grazing. In order to protect pastoralist
land rights and simultaneously preserve sustainable natural resource management, large land areas corresponding
to regular grazing routes need to be allocated to them. This could be facilitated by the removal of inefficient large-
scale agriculture and irrigation projects. Stationary services could be replaced with mobile units while durable
manual technologies could substitute for mechanized versions.
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Land tenure in Senegal is managed under the National Domain Law of 1964 and the subsequent Rural Council
Law of 1972. These laws define the national land tenure policy and establish a locally based administration to
manage land tenure and enforce state policy on a local level. In this way, the government has attempted to create a
policy that addresses national and community concerns. In addition, the state has tried to set up a democratic
decentralized body to administer national and customary laws. However, despite the government’s efforts to
create a functioning administrative body through the communautés rurales (rural councils), problems persist. The
rural councils function erratically and often act on the basis of nepotism or social status. Furthermore, as a result
of gaps, conflicts, and contradictions between national and customary land tenure laws, land tenure legislation has
neglected to address, or has confounded, tenure issues for women, herders, and poor and landless farmers.
National policy and legal framework
Senegal is situated at the western-most point of continental Africa. It shares borders in the north with Mauritania,
the south with Guinea Bissau and Guinea, the east with Mali, and the west with the Atlantic Ocean. The Gambia
forms a 200-mile intrusion into the southern region of the country. Senegal hosts a variety of climatic and
ecological zones. The northern region of the country is an arid Sahelian zone, while the Casamance region in the
south is tropical. The central region of the country ranges from dryer to wetter savanna moving from north to
south. Senegal’s total land area is estimated at 75, 955 square miles. Twelve percent of the land area is classified
as cropland, 16% as permanent pasture, 55% as forests and woodlands, and 17% as other. Approximately 27%
of the total land area is considered arable land.
Population estimates from 1995 assess the total number of inhabitants at approximately 8,165,000. Based
on this figure, total population density is 108 persons per square mile. The population growth rate is estimated at
2.7% annually. Over 60% of the population is based in rural areas.
The current land tenure policy of the Senegalese government was enacted in 1964. This law, referred to as
the National Domain Law, expropriated all previously unregistered lands, or lands not registered within a two-
year grace period established by government, as property of the state. Hence, 97–98% of Senegalese land is
incorporated into the national domain. There were several motivating factors behind this law. First, the
government wanted to curb what it perceived as a mass accumulation of land by the rural elite and religious
leaders and the resulting landlessness of the poorer population. Second, the government wanted to encourage
production by establishing conditions for efficient land allocation and use while acknowledging the viability of
customary tenure systems.
The 1964 law divides land into four categories: urban zones, classified zones, territory zones, and pioneer
zones. Urban zones include all lands situated in urban centers or community settlements. Classified zones contain
all government-classified forest areas and national parks. Territory zones are all lands which, at the time of the
enactment of the law, were unregistered and exploited for agricultural purposes, pasture, or rural housing; these
lands are under the direct control of the rural councils, though the decisions of the councils are subject to approval
by local administrative officials. Lastly, pioneer zones encompass all other lands.
In 1972, the government enacted the Rural Council Law (Loi Relative aux Communautés Rurales) which
provided for administrative councils in each community. The councils are composed of elected community117
members who work under the supervision of the Sous-préfet and other government administrators. These councils
are given the right under law to allocate land according to customary practice as long as the land is exploited in
the “most productive” manner.
In 1976, Law No. 76-66 was enacted to define and secure land rights. The law established four new
methods for securing rights to land: occupation authorization, ordinary lease, long-term lease, and land
concession. Of these, only leases can be mortgaged.
In 1986, a new law and decree were debated by the government. This legislation proposed authorization for
the sale of national domain lands zoned for housing in urban areas. The government’s philosophy behind the law
was that people would want a piece of land which they could own and which their children could inherit. This
acknowledges the government’s responsiveness to the population in urban areas. More importantly, however, the
government is not willing to relinquish ownership of national domain lands in rural areas, because this might also
entail the loss of supervisory control over agriculture, herding, and natural resource management.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Like all countries in West Africa, Senegal is ethnically diverse. Incorporated within the many groups are myriad
customary land tenure systems. These systems are not static. They are changing and adapting to current political,
environmental, and economic conditions. Therefore, for project design, it is necessary that these systems be
considered on a case-by-case basis, for there are many different ways of adapting to changing conditions.
While it is important not to overgeneralize, it is possible to highlight several predominant systems. Among
the hierarchical societies in the arid zone north of The Gambia, access to resources is held and governed by
certain social classes. The Wolof, Toucouleur, Soninke, and the Serer are among the most notable of these
groups.
The Wolof, who are for the most part farmers, inhabit the northwestern region between St. Louis and
Dakar. Among the Wolof, customary rights are vested in the descendants of the first clearer of the land, who
generally claimed large expanses of land by burning. The right to allocate and govern land is held by the eldest
male in the lineage. This right is passed laterally from the eldest male to the next eldest and not from father to son.
It is important to stress that members of the lineage acquire use rights, not ownership rights, from the lineage
head. Use rights of a given parcel of land are often inherited from father to son without the reclamation and
redistribution by the lineage head. Families of the same lineage, who arrived after the first clearers, obtained use
rights from the descendants of the original clearers and were not required to pay tribute. Strangers, or members
unrelated to the original settlers, were required to pay tribute in exchange for use rights. Families who arrived
after the fertile farming lands were allocated obtained farming rights to less productive lands but were denied
many other rights. Members of the lineage can lend land but cannot alienate it permanently.
The Serer compose one of the few groups that have a tradition of both herding and agriculture. They occupy
the region of the peanut belt between Dakar and The Gambia and have a customary land tenure system not unlike
that of the Wolof. Allocation of land is governed by the lineage head. However, unlike the Wolof, the Serer inherit
rights to land through their affiliation with their mother’s, not their father’s, lineage. Strangers can acquire use
rights to land by paying tribute to the lineage head. Although strangers do not have inalienable use rights, as do
members of the lineage of the first clearers, evictions are rare.
The Toucouleur, of the northern region along the Senegal River, also have a hierarchically structured society
in which the nobles or religious leaders hold ultimate rights over land. Rights to land are transmitted through
patrilineal inheritance. Loans, rentals, and leases of land are not uncommon. Land tenure among the Toucouleur
is made complex by the nature of their environment. Along the river, fertile flood lands are scarce and are
unequally distributed among households. The more abundant uplands, however, are less constrained and are thus
more equally distributed.118
Unlike their northern neighbors, the Dioula of the southern Casamance region do not have a hierarchically
ordered social structure. Land is communally owned. Use rights to land are held by the lineage members who are
the descendants of the first clearers. Within the household, land is inherited through patrilineal transmission.
Farmers with insufficient holdings can expand their plots by borrowing land, usually from their mother’s brother,
or clearing new land. Borrowed land can be inherited and requires no tribute. Government policy is likely to carry
little weight in the Casamance region, where the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC)
has been staging a fight for independence from the Senegalese government.
The issue of land tenure in the Casamance is complicated. In particular, the subject of indigenous rights to
land and the establishment of rural councils in this region is in need of further investigation. It appears as if Wolof
farmers have migrated from the peanut basin in the Kaolack region into the Casamance in search of more fertile
lands. As a result of the Wolof’s ethnic ties with many government administrators in the region, they have gained
positions and influence on the local rural councils. Consequently, many Dioula have been denied control of or
access to their traditional lands. If this is indeed the case, then there are serious issues regarding tenure security
and land rights in the Casamance region which are being abused under the current national land tenure system.
Within all the customary systems, land loans, rentals, leases, and sharecropping are possible. However, rules
vary according to the customary laws and, in many cases, the scarcity or abundance of resources.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Unfavorable environmental conditions coupled with population pressures have pushed agriculture onto new lands.
As a result, many conflicts have arisen between farmers and other user groups (particularly herders). Agriculture
has diversified in the past twenty years in response to environmental and economic constraints. Farmers are
reducing their dependence on peanut crops by entering into the production of such produce as watermelon,
pumpkin, hibiscus, and a variety of cereals. Agriculture is relatively secure under the national domain laws
because it is considered viable use of land. Herding, on the other hand, is more problematic.
Almost every ethnic group in Senegal practices herding to some degree. Historically, the Peul (Fulani) were
the most specialized herders and are still revered for their herding skills. As agriculture has become less stable in
recent years, more farmers have tried to diversify their activities by increasing livestock production. Herding in
Senegal ranges from large-scale migration to sedentary livestock raising. However, the increase of year-round
cultivation and the expansion of farmlands in northeastern region of Senegal is reducing grazing lands. This is
causing problems for all herders and is threatening livestock production in the entire country.
Under the National Domain Law, pastoralism is not considered viable use of land. Consequently, herders’
rights to land are limited under the law and are considered profoundly inferior to farming rights. Nonetheless, in
1980, Decree 80-268 attempted to protect valuable pasturelands by prohibiting the clearing and cultivation of
“natural pastures.” The decree also called for the creation of pasture conservation committees in each district.
There were two major problems with this decree. First, there was no clear definition of natural pasturelands.
Second, the committees which where established to monitor pasture were made up largely of powerful members
of the farming communities who often failed to represent herders’ interests.
Conflict over land is a major issue among herders and other user groups. For the most part, disputes
between herders and sedentary farmers are over access to resources. However, the expansion of urban settlements
onto pastoral lands is also a source of tension. The construction of dams along the Senegal River at Manantali
(Mali) and Diama (Senegal) has increased irrigated farming opportunities but has reduced access to pasturelands
and water sources for herders. In the Ferlo region in Eastern Senegal, sedentary farmers who have moved in and
settled around boreholes, dug by the French in the 1950s to cultivate peanuts and other crops, are competing for
use rights to land with the herders. The expansion of cotton production in Eastern Senegal has further impinged
upon grazing lands and caused tension between farmers and herders. Traditional migratory routes are being119
reduced by encroaching farms. Access to water sources along the Gambia and Senegal rivers is reduced by
farmers who fence off land along the waterways for gardening.
In addition to land disputes, conflicts have arisen over the right of herders to cut forage for their animals
from protected tree species. Customary practice dictates that herders can exploit tree resources if they have
permission from the owner of the land on which the trees are situated. The Forest Protection Code has confused
this issue. In 1989, the Forest Service reestablished forest protection committees (CPNs) in some areas. The role
of these committees is to prevent illicit use of forest resources and report offenders. In order to encourage the
committees to act, the Forest Service gives the committee 10% of fines received. Recently several herders have
found themselves subject to these fines. In many cases farmers do not object to herders exploiting tree resources
on their property as long as they do not damage their crops. However, with the re-establishment of CPNs, farmers
are increasingly rejecting herders’ requests to access tree resources for fear that they themselves will be fined by
the Forest Service for allowing the herders to cut their trees. The Forest Service’s formal stance on the issue is
that tree resources can be exploited as long as no branches are cut.
Unlike customary land tenure, traditional resource-use rules are not considered legitimate by Senegalese law.
Exploitation of natural resources is subject to the government forest and water codes. In reality, the rules that
predominate depend on whether the government chooses or is able to enforce its control. In most areas the
government is still largely inactive and thus customary systems of resource use prevail.
Natural resources are under stress in some areas by population growth and liberated in others by out-
migration. Thus not all regions have similar constraints on natural resources. The Senegal River area is one
region where a combination of environmental constraints and population pressures has created land shortages.
Drought has caused widespread desertification in the northern half of the country. In addition, soil degradation
has caused not only the decline of agricultural yields but also the disappearance of valuable grasslands necessary
for pasture. Although the country’s latest Forest Code, enacted in February 1993, aims at empowering local
communities to manage their forest and other natural resources, it is yet to be seen if this will be effective.
Senegal’s current Forest Code is based on the French forest code established by the colonial government in
1935. The code affecting forest resources declared specified forest areas as property of the state and prohibited
any exploitation of these forests without proper authorization. Subsequent codes declared all trees and forests as
property of the state and mandated permits for commercial use. In addition, based on the 1935 code, the French
administration clearly delineated the classified forest regions which, for the most part, remain classified under the
present government.
After independence, this forest code was appropriated by the government with only minor alterations.
Changes included an extension of the list of protected tree species and an elaboration of the regulations on
charcoal production. In 1974, the law addressing the forest code was changed while the decree establishing the
system for implementing the law remained in place. Under the new law, a permit is required for the commercial
exploitation of national domain and forestlands. In addition, a second permit is necessary for the transportation
and circulation of products extracted from these lands. If an individual wishes to exploit protected areas for
building materials or firewood for personal use, s/he must obtain a permit to do so. No permit is necessary for
individuals who want to exploit resins, deadwood, honey, medicines, or straw for personal use from protected
forests. As previously stated, cutting branches for animal forage is not acceptable under any conditions. Farmers
are permitted to clear lands if they have obtained legal use rights from the rural council. However, the Forest
Code stipulates that a certain number of trees must be left standing (20 fully grown and established trees or 60
young trees per hectare). Many tree species are further protected by the Forest Code.
A new Forest Code was enacted in 1993. The new code is significant because it allows planted trees to be
owned as private property (see Art. 9 and 88). Art. 78 of the law allows local collectives and communities the
right to own planted or natural forests. Furthermore, Art. 81 allocates free use rights of trees and tree products to120
communities and allows all revenues from the exploitation of forest products to go to the community, though a
small amount (not specified) must be returned to the forest fund. Lastly, Art. 83 empowers local communities to
manage the use, enrichment, and restoration of their forest resources. While the law seems to allow a great deal of
liberty for individuals and collectives wishing to exploit forest resources, it also states in Art. 53 that an
authorization permit must be obtained by any person wishing to exploit tree resources even on his own lands.
Furthermore, although the law addresses ownership for planted trees, it does not address the question of
ownership for naturally regenerating trees.
Irrigated lands have become an important issue with the recent construction of dams along the Senegal
River. Villages wishing to set up an irrigation system either acquire collective rights to appropriate lands or pool
their lands together into a collectivity. After the establishment of an irrigation system, the rural council is
responsible for redistributing the land equitably among members of the collective. Because irrigation makes year-
round cultivation possible, many conflicts have arisen between farmers and herders over irrigated lands. Herders
are often denied access to lands and water sources on which they traditionally camped during the dry season. The
government has yet to address this issue fully.
Senegal has one of the longest histories of stable government and democracy in Francophone West Africa.
The national land tenure policy is evidence of the government’s dedication to democracy. Through its policy, the
Government of Senegal has attempted to create a just land tenure system which acknowledges customary rights
under the umbrella of a unified government policy. The establishment of an administrative body capable of
implementing both government and customary tenure is significant. However, the guidelines for the use of either
method of approach are not clear and the rural councils’ actions are, as yet, minimal. In addition, when
administrative decisions are made by the rural council they frequently favor one or the other system for political
reasons. Often wealthy farmers or those who are relatives of council members are favored over poor or unrelated
farmers. National policy needs to address the needs of all user groups such as herders, the landless, or land-poor
farmers who may be marginalized or openly discriminated against.
The Senegalese economy has been challenged in recent years by the devaluation of the CFA. Although
agriculture, livestock, fishing, and forestry account for over one-fifth of GDP, production has not kept up with
population growth. While agricultural production is expanding and diversifying, it is still restricted in the north by
unfavorable rainfall and poor soils. The southern region of the country is highly productive; however, the ongoing
political struggle in the Casamance threatens the dispersal of products from this region.
As noted above, the expansion of the agricultural sector has been the source of many land conflicts between
various user groups. Although agricultural production does not appear to be restricted as a result of land tenure
issues, livestock production is limited. Many herders have found it difficult to expand their enterprises as a result
of restricted access to and use of land and degraded environmental conditions. Increased production of livestock
cannot be assured until the government secures land tenure rights for herders and acknowledges pasturelands as
productive.
Under the National Domain Law, women can acquire and own land. This runs contrary to many customary
systems which allocate use rights to women only through their husbands. While women once gained access to
parcels for an indefinite period of time, their access is often more restricted in recent years. This is largely a result
of the National Domain Law, which states that land cultivated by the same user for three years or more can be
claimed by that farmer. In order to assure that loaned lands do not transfer to women or other users, farmers now
reclaim them before the three-year limit. Although women may receive another piece of land from their husbands,
the lack of stability discourages investments in the resource and consequently may cause greater environmental
degradation.
In customary practice, women make decisions as to what and how to plant on their own parcels, but their
husbands maintain ultimate rights to the land. In addition, women play an important role in natural resource121
management not only in the decisions they make on their own plots but also as controllers of manure. Women are
the principal owners of small domesticated animals (though this is beginning to change) and thus make many
important decisions regarding the use and distribution of manure.
Despite the fact that women can technically acquire inalienable rights to land through the National Domain
Law, few have attempted to do so. There is little information regarding the implication of this policy for women’s
production and land security.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
Although Senegal’s National Domain Law and administrative structure, as represented by the rural councils,
make an important step toward ensuring continued agricultural production and economic growth while respecting
both customary land tenure practices and national policy, they still suffer from many problems. First, the rural
councils are often ineffective. Many farmers prefer to handle their land disputes and transactions within the
village and pay no attention to the council. Second, the law provides no guidelines for whether national policy or
customary land tenure should be employed in specific instances. Consequently, councils often choose to use
national policy in some cases and customary land tenure in others in order to benefit wealthy or well-connected
members of the community over poorer or less-respected members. While the laws do provide a framework, they
are easily manipulated and can be used for unjust purposes.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Senegal has one of the most innovative and effective national land tenure policies in West Africa. However, its
implementation is erratic and sometimes discriminatory. Policy programmers should consider the degree to which
rural councils are active and effective in project areas. In addition, attention should be paid to the various user
groups and their rights under both national and customary laws. Although the land tenure policy of Senegal is
relatively comprehensive, it still has many inconsistencies. Consequently, various user groups’ rights are
unaccounted for or are not secure within the national policy. Consideration of these issues will greatly inform
project planning and design.
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SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY PROFILE
by Anna Knox
Executive summary
Community-based tenure prevails in three of the four provinces of Sierra Leone and continues to be affirmed by
laws established during the colonial period. In the western province, which includes the coastal regions and the
capital, Freetown, these laws vested land in the state, which granted freehold titles to individuals. Today, this area
remains largely private property holdings. While much debate arose during the 1970s on the implications of
converting the entirety of the country to freehold, customary tenure regimes remain intact in the rural provinces.
Within the past five years, Sierra Leone has been plagued by civil war and issues of land tenure have taken a
back seat in the face of more immediate political concerns.
National policy and legal framework
In the north, south, and eastern provinces of the country, land is primarily held by extended families. According to
the Protectorate Ordinance of 1927 and the Tribal Authorities Ordinance of 1938, land is vested in the paramount
chiefs who govern the villages within their particular chiefdom and act as custodians over the land. Nevertheless,
land is actually considered to belong to the families of the original settlers or hosts of a village who enjoy the
greatest degree of tenure security.
By contrast, in the western province comprising Sierra Leone’s capital and coastline, the British coveted the
lands and administered them as private property, a system which continues to the present. Land which is not held
privately is owned by the state. The government also controls national forests and reserves. As a mining-based
economy, it has frequently exercised its eminent domain privileges, negotiating compensation agreements with the
relevant paramount chiefs.
On a national level, little has changed on the land tenure front since colonial rule. During the 1970s, debate
sprung up around the impact of customary tenure on agricultural production and whether more individualized
tenure might better serve the country’s interests. Studies affirmed rural people’s interest in maintaining
community-based systems and attested to their flexibility in adapting to dynamic environments. Since then,
limited study has been devoted to the issue of land tenure in Sierra Leone.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Less than 10% of Sierra Leone’s total area of 7,174,000 square hectares consists of arable land and permanent
crops. Agricultural population per arable hectare was around 5.3 in 1993. Most of Sierra Leone is forested with
the exception of the coastal and northeastern regions, the latter of which is savannah. Around 65% of its citizens
are engaged in agriculture and cultivate food crops (principally rice, millet, cassava, and cocoyam) as well as
commercial crops (cocoa, coffee, oil palm ,and some groundnuts) for export, all of which contribute to about
45% of GDP. The dominant Mende and Temne ethnic groups occupy much of the land in the provinces while
nonnative Creoles reside throughout the western area.
Descendants of the original settlers, credited for the establishment of a particular village, hold the most
elevated tenure status. Chiefs, including village chiefs, section chiefs, and paramount chiefs, are usually
prominent members of these founding families. Since their ancestors cultivated the village land, these lineages and
their children are seen as having permanent and inalienable rights to it. Families from other lineages who arrive
later must gain access to land via their hosts. In some cases, the chief may allocate them new land to cultivate.123
More commonly, one of the founding families grants them a parcel of their own land in exchange for a tribute of
goodwill, such as kola nuts. Gradually, if the new family establishes themselves on a permanent basis and
develop a good standing in the community, their rights may evolve to a more permanent basis. Essentially, the
longer one cultivates a piece of land, the greater one’s use rights to it. A farmer may, for instance, gain permission
from his patron to plant trees on the land, bury his dead there, or pass the land onto his children, all of which
confer more profound rights to the land. Unlike members of founding families, however, if nonlineage families
abandon the land, the rights to it revert to the host family. In the case of migrant farmers, land may be borrowed
on a seasonal basis, resembling a sharecropping arrangement.
Tenure rights governing trees are separate but integrally linked to land tenure. The planting of “economic”
trees often solidifies a farmer’s right to a parcel while it connotes dedication to that land through investment. A
farmer may award others certain use rights to his trees while a community may do the same for the forest
resources it manages. For instance, a farmer may permit community members to tap his palm trees for palm wine
or remove palm leaves for roof thatching, but forbid them to remove the fruit or kill the tree since the palm oil is
highly valuable. Farmers may also pledge their trees in exchange for loans whereby their creditor is entitled to
collect the tree product as interest payment. Among the Mende, if a borrower leaves his patron’s land, he is
usually entitled to compensation for any trees he has planted. Because of this separability of land and trees, such
that the latter have become marketable commodities, borrowers are usually not prevented from planting trees on
their patron’s land, though they are generally not granted land specifically for tree crops. Trees of the community
forests, especially those of religious sacred forests, are managed by the strict rules set forth by powerful village
organizations, known as secret societies.
A family’s land is administered by its head of household, who allocates it to other family members. When
this person dies, the responsibility is typically passed to the eldest male, either brother or son of the deceased, who
inherits the land and the position as head of household. Customary inheritance law as practiced in the rural
provinces is determined largely according to ethnic origin; in the western area, inheritance practices conform to
English law.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
While land markets have been present in the commercially vibrant western province since the early 1900s, they
are gradually emerging in other areas where populations have multiplied and competition for land has set in. The
increased pressure on land has resulted in reduced fallow periods and some incidences of borrowers losing land to
patron reclamation. For the most part, though, severe land shortages exist only in limited areas and, though
commoditization of land is no longer an alien concept, customary values of universal access to land still prevail.
Nevertheless, the commoditization of land is not an alien concept. In the eastern province, villages, realizing they
could demand compensation for the destruction of sacred forests by mining companies, began to designate
increasing amounts of land as sacred forest.
While most land is agriculturally based, animal husbandry is practiced by the Fulani people who settled in
the northern savannah regions. Little information seems to be available concerning their land tenure practices
specific to this area.
Among cultivators, natural resource management at the village level is largely the domain of powerful
village-level organizations. Consisting of village elders and other respected individuals of the community, they
protect the interests of the community through ensuring that the resources it depends on for survival are not
exploited for personal gain. Through the use of an emblem symbolizing the society, they may mark trees to
preclude picking fruit or cutting or they may mark a pond to prevent fishing and allow the stock to regenerate.
During colonial times, these organizations were forces against timber depletion by the British since native
workers refused to fell trees which were marked by the emblem of the secret societies for fear of spiritual124
repercussions. Although their role is often not well understood, these traditional village organizations essentially
define and administer the moral code to which a village adheres; they are in fact the backbone of rural society and
oversee religious, educational, political, economic, and social spheres. Various organizations exist which govern
different arenas of behavior, such as women’s affairs, sexual conduct, or religious matters. Decisions made by the
chief are usually sanctioned by relevant society members, and a chief often must be among the ranks of the men’s
Poro society. Breaches of rules set forth by the societies carry penalties ranging from fines to ousting from the
community.
Many rural communities in Sierra Leone have “sacred forests” which serve both religious and practical
purposes. Protected by the tenets established by traditional village organizations, these wooded reserves function
as social gathering places where rituals are performed and village youth are educated. Their preservation is
assured by a thorough set of common property rules, which include regulations governing the cutting of trees,
removal of firewood, hunting of game, gathering of wild fruit or medicinal plants, and so on. In a country which
has suffered from rampant deforestation for commercial purposes, means of supporting effective common
property regimes, such as those which sustain sacred forest areas, should be explored.
Sierra Leone’s political future remains highly uncertain at present. War broke out in 1991 with the mounting
of attacks by the rebel group, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Corporeal Foday Sankoh, who
condemned the one-party state under President Momoh. The military soon after staged a coup toppling the
civilian president and placing the country under the military rule of the National Provisional Ruling Council
(NPRC) and Captain Valentine Strasser. Unappeased by the NPRC’s promise to turn over power to democratic
civilian rule, the RUF held their arms in what has unfolded into a five-year-long civil war. Multiparty elections
are currently pegged for February 1996, though the RUF will not agree to a cease-fire or participate in the
elections unless foreign troops from South Africa, Guinea, and Nigeria supporting the government are removed.
Although not directly stated in the literature, it appears that the new government has not sought to impose
change on the existing land tenure systems. Rather, it would seem that other pressing concerns have permitted
rural and tenure systems to remain essentially autonomous. However, once the war ends, land tenure will likely
take a forward seat in the formulation of strategies to revitalize the economy. Participation in this dialogue and
ultimately the distribution of power over land issues will depend to a great extent on the philosophies of those who
succeed to power and the scope of outside intervention.
War has plunged Sierra Leone into economic disaster. The country is highly dependent on bauxite, rutile,
and diamond mining to support the country’s economy, and now such extractive activities have come to a
grinding halt with mining companies abandoning their operations. Economic development projects have been
frustrated, agricultural production hampered, and the tourist industry shut down. Crop burning and roadway
obstruction by rebel factions and government troops not only undermine food security for urban populations as a
result of infrastructure breakdown, but also threaten the subsistence agriculture of the besieged rural
communities. On the one hand, one may anticipate that these occurrences might heighten community
interdependence and foster greater communal rights. On the other hand, the impact of migration from war-
affected areas may have resulted in communities’ disbanding. There appear to be no studies revealing how tenure
has adapted to the effects of the war.
Substitution of cash crops, namely, cocoa and coffee, in place of rice cultivation has also led to an increased
reliance on rice imports to meet the country’s food security needs. Fluctuating cocoa and coffee prices translate to
unstable income flows and nutrition levels. Men’s participation in rice cultivation for a given year is often linked
to the profitability of cash crops versus rice production.
Under customary tenure practices, women typically gain access to land through their husbands, though in
some cases they may inherit and own land independently. Often the first wife of a man is allotted a certain portion
of land which she later doles out to subsequent wives at her discretion. Their position being subordinate to that of125
men, women are generally excluded from decision-making roles and the most influential village organizations,
relegated to those concerning purely women’s affairs. Women mainly cultivate vegetable and root gardens close
to the family compounds or as upland intercrops and plant rice in the lowland swamps or upland dry areas.
Women have assumed the dominant role in rice planting and harvesting, once an activity shared by both men and
women, leaving men obligated solely to the initial clearing of the bush. The shift from upland rice crops to swamp
cultivation as well as the expansion of men’s commercial tree crops in upland regions has contributed to a loss of
women’s rights to upland areas for intercropping vegetables and roots, the latter of which are an important source
of nutrition during lean periods. Essentially, the decreased share of women’s production in upland areas combined
with the expansion of men’s tree crops in these same areas has resulted in men’s assuming greater rights to these
fields.
Present policy position and reforms discussed
Given the lack of attention to land tenure issues in Sierra Leone in the past decade coupled with the country’s
current state of political affairs, it is difficult to ascertain the policy position surrounding land tenure, if one exists.
In the aftermath of war, tenure issues could well surface in the process of reclamation and rebuilding. In the
meantime, it is doubtful that any coherent policies concerning land tenure will emerge; peace will have to be
negotiated with the RUF before any headway on tenure issues is possible.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Whereas it may appear administratively complicated to uphold two systems of land tenure in one country, one
based on customary norms and the other on western freehold, it is important to appreciate the cultural division
which separates the residents of the provinces and the natives to Sierra Leone versus the residents of the western
area and their non-African origin. For the Mende, Temne, Sherbro, and other ethnic groups occupying the rural
provinces, community-based tenure provides the individual with permanent social security as well as contributes
to one’s identity and role in society.
Appreciation for the value of this social safety net will be critical once the war has ended and the
government sets out to rebuild the nation. An urgent need to revive the mining sector so as to jump-start the
economy could result in substantial eviction from landholdings, the severity of the consequences underscored by a
lack of resources to adequately compensate and relocate residents. Similarly, the remaining rainforest reserves
may come under threat in the interest of securing foreign exchange from timber exports. Encouraging community
forestry practices may be one alternative for averting further rainforest destruction. The government might
consider exploring collaborative measures with village organizations and paramount chiefs to enhance their
effectiveness, perhaps establishing comanagement arrangements for national forests with local groups including
those representing women’s interests.
References
Leach, Melissa. 1994. Rainforest Relations: Gender and Resource Use among the Mende of Gola, Sierra Leone, pp. 68–
129. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Lebbie, Aiah R., and Mark Freudenberger. 1995. “Sacred Groves in Africa: A Case Study of Forest Patches in Transition
in Sierra Leone.” N.p.: n.p.
Turay, Harry. 1980. “Land Tenure Systems in Sierra Leone: Perceptions of Land Owners of Problems Related to Land





Land shortages resulting from population pressures in Togo have brought about many conflicts in recent years.
The Togolese government has attempted to alleviate the problem of overpopulation through resettlement projects;
however, these have been largely unsuccessful. There was an extensive land tenure policy enacted in 1974, but
unfortunately, despite its policies, the government has neglected to implement this legislation. As a result, land
tenure issues in Togo remain unresolved. Increasing population pressures combined with environmental
degradation will continue to challenge traditional land tenure relationships and systems. The Togolese government
needs to clarify and put into operation a state land tenure policy that is sensitive to indigenous systems but also
addresses pressing national issues.
National policy and legal framework
Togo is situated on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. It is bordered to the east by Benin, to the west by Ghana, and
to the north by Burkina Faso. Although a small country covering only 21,925 square miles, Togo spans several
ecological zones from the tropical forest of the southern coastal region to the grasslands of the northern savanna.
Over a quarter of the total land area (26.24%) is cropland, 3.68% permanent pasture, 28.50% forests and
woodland, and 41.58% is classified as other. The population is estimated at 3,296,000 inhabitants with an annual
growth rate of 3.06%. The population in Togo is unevenly distributed with the southern plateau region suffering
from pronounced overpopulation and other scattered areas more moderately populated.
Togo was first a German colony which was ceded to the French in 1914. In 1906, the Germans decreed that
all lands must be formally registered. This law was reestablished by the French in 1922 with the addition of the
Livre Foncier. Despite these declarations, almost no rural lands were registered and only a few urban lands were
legally inscribed. Freehold and modern leasehold (as opposed to sharecropping) have existed along the coastal
region since early in the twentieth century. The Germans declared Togo a Musterkolonie (model colony), which
was to provide a pattern for economic expansion elsewhere. Plantations were established throughout the southern
portion of the country and were registered according to German legal practices (referred to in Togo as Romano-
Germanic law). The northern populations resisted any incursion and very few colonial enterprises were
established beyond 100 miles inland. By the time the French took over in 1914, there were 13,000 hectares of
German-owned plantations and even larger areas of African-owned estates.
Another source of individual private tenure appeared in the latter part of the nineteenth century when
commercial families, whose ancestors had been repatriated slaves (many from Brazil and hence the designation
“Brazilians” in many Togo histories) settled on the coast, especially around the port at Aneho. They purchased
and sold land along the coastal plain from the outset; they, rather than the Germans, are the originators of Togo’s
small land market.
The postindependence Togolese government campaigned to increase agricultural production. In 1967, the
government delivered an ordinance which would have instituted agricultural cooperatives; however, the plan was
too complicated and was, therefore, never enacted. Not until 1974 did the postindependence government
successfully promulgate a national land tenure policy. This policy was developed to help improve agricultural
production. Although the law is comprehensive, it has not been enforced. Consequently, land tenure issues
continue to be confusing and contradictory.127
The 1974 law divides land into three categories: lands privately held by individuals or collectives, public and
private lands of the state domain, and national domain lands. Individuals and collectives are assured rights to land
if they can establish ownership. Article 2 of this law states that owners are all persons or collectives holding
legally registered land and an official land title. Indigenous persons or groups can be allocated legal ownership if
they can prove their customary rights to the land. The article does not specify what is considered adequate proof
of customary ownership.
State public lands fall into two categories, natural and artificial. Natural state lands include rivers and the
land bordering the ocean up to 100 meters inland. Artificial public lands include national monuments, roads, and
other man-made constructions. State private lands are lands on which the state reserves private ownership and
access, such as reserves. Lastly, the Government of Togo has established a third, rather unique, category which it
calls national lands. National lands are lands which are neither the property of the state nor owned by an
individual or collective. While the state reserves the right to manage these lands, farmers can acquire access by
obtaining permission from the state and adhering to state restrictions.
Ordinance No. 12 of the 1974 law declared all “unused” or “abandoned” land as property of the state. A
1976 law attempted to further clarify the government’s definitions of unused and productive lands. Unused land is
defined as nonproductive land not situated adjacent to productive lands which were not under production for ten
or more years prior to the creation of the law. Lands that lie adjacent to active farmlands are not subject to
expropriation by the state. In order for a piece of land to be considered under production it must be actively
employed for agricultural cultivation. Lands used for the collection of firewood and other products are not
considered by the state as “in use.” Furthermore, lands left unproductive for more than five years (after 1974) can
be expropriated by the state and transformed into national lands. This prohibits lands from being fallowed for
more than five years, thus contributing to degradation of the soil.
In 1978, the state passed another ordinance which established production zones known as Zones
d’Aménagement Agricole Planifié (or ZAAP). These zones included private and collective lands as well as
national lands. An indemnity was provided to private and collective landholders whose lands fell within ZAAP
boundaries. Cooperative exploitation was obligatory on ZAAP lands. According to the government, ZAAP lands
were created to both increase and manage agricultural production in diverse areas for the improvement of the
people and the economy. Construction of new land tenure systems was authorized in ZAAP areas, and ZAAP
lands were subject to inventory and evaluation by the government.
In addition to the ZAAP land project, the government attempted to assuage the problem of overpopulation
by creating a resettlement program. However, the populations indigenous to resettlement lands often resisted by
either rejecting the resettled populations or denying the government access to lands. Although all the present laws
indicate that the government is philosophically dedicated to playing an active role in the nation’s land tenure
systems, its failure to implement its policies reveals that it lacks practical initiative or ability. It is necessary that
the government develop a realistic and effective land tenure policy which it is capable of not only enacting but
also implementing.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous systems
Togo, like most West African countries, is ethnically diverse; but there are a few dominant groups which have
tenure systems indicative of most of the region. The Ewe predominate in the southern region of the country while
the Paragourma, the Anufom, Peul, and many others inhabit the northern savanna zone. Generally, land is held by
patrilineal descent groups which are hierarchically ordered. The largest group is the clan whose members are
associated through a common ancestor or ancestors. Clans are broken down into lineages. Each lineage is divided
into sublineages or lineage segments which most often make up residential quarters and are usually composed of
a large household or several closely related households. Land in Togo is controlled through lineages. The head of128
the lineage has ultimate control over the allocation of land and is responsible for the arbitration of conflicts and
the management of other land issues. Household rights to land, acquired through lineage affiliation, are inherited
through father-to-son transmission. Lineage control over land passes laterally from the eldest male in the lineage
to the next eldest.
It is important to note that in these customary land tenure systems, people hold only use rights to land and
not ownership rights. There are generally three categories of land in customary systems: lineage lands, individual
household lands, and village lands. Lineage lands fall under the direct control of the lineage head. Household
lands are also ultimately the property of the lineage, but once rights are granted to the household head from the
lineage chief, the household head manages the use and production of the land. Village lands are lands that are held
by neither the lineage nor the household; they are managed by the village head and other respected members of the
community.
A farmer can obtain land through different means in the traditional lineage-based system, including:
inheritance, gift, loan, rental, share tenancy, and purchase. The most lands are inherited or borrowed. Inheritance
involves the transmission of use rights and not ownership rights. Sons are the preferred heirs over daughters or
other relatives. Heirs cannot allocate or pledge land as security for a loan without permission from the lineage
head.
A gift of land indicates an offer of more or less inalienable use rights to land. Land gifts account for up to
5% of the total land acquired in some areas. As previously stated, individuals are permitted to give land only with
permission of the lineage chief. In the case of community lands, only the community leader has the right to give
land; in order to do so he must obtain the accord of other community leaders. Gifts of land can be revoked only by
the giver. A 1983 decision made by the Lomé Traditional Court of Appeals declared that a donor’s heirs do not
have the right to revoke a gift of land made by the donor himself. This raises the question of whether gifts become
permanent after the death of a donor and suggests that gift transfers are relatively secure.
Renting land is widespread in Togo. Renting allocates inalienable use rights to land for a fixed period of
time and is determined by the transfer of cash payments. Share tenancy is much like rental with the exception of
the transactions of payment in kind instead of in cash.
Loans are commonly made to strangers who have no connection to the lineage or community of a given
region. Rights to lands taken on loan can be inherited. However, because borrowed or loaned lands are some of
the least secure, there are no guidelines protecting the rights of the borrower. Given the current population
pressures, it is likely the relationship between land loaners and borrowers will become more tenuous in densely
populated regions.
Lastly, though unknown in the traditional system, land sales and purchases have become more common.
This is largely a result of the intensification of cash cropping (particularly of cotton, coffee, and cocoa). For the
most part, sales are regulated by an oral contract. Formalities included in purchase and sale transactions
necessitate the consent of the council of the family who owns the land. Without this consent, the transaction is
null and void. A second requirement is that witnesses be present at the time of the transaction; however, should
this requirement not be fulfilled, the transaction is still valid. Once land is formally purchased, it ceases to be
regulated by customary law. Most sales transactions in Togo combine legal transfer through the government,
which includes a signed written document and a land survey, and customary transfer practices. As is common in
many other region of West Africa, cash cropping has resulted in the greater individualization of land and
therefore the increase in individual sales and purchases.
Although useful, generalizing glosses over the tremendous variation that is found among the many ethnic
groups in Togo. Many of the land transactions common among the Ewe and other groups in the south are also
shared by people in the central and northern parts of the country. However, information addressing these groups129
and land tenure is seriously lacking. Project planners should seek out more specific information about customary
land tenure practices in project areas.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Severe overpopulation as well as government land tenure policies aimed at increasing production are posing
serious threats to agricultural production. Lands are overexploited and soils are rapidly becoming nutrient-poor.
The lack of tenure security may be decreasing the incentives for farmers to practice sustainable agriculture. The
absence of rights for planting bushes and other perennial crops for green manure, as well as other sustainable
agricultural practices on borrowed or rented lands, is destabilizing agricultural production. In order for land to
continue to be fertile, it must lie fallow until it regenerates (certainly more than five years) or significant
investments must be made. Current state land tenure policies and population pressures will not permit land to lie
unused for such an extended period of time, and rural farmers do not have the resources to invest in organic or
chemical fertilizers. At present, most lands are neither lying fallow nor being refertilized by organic or other
means. The end result is that agricultural lands are quickly degenerating.
Land scarcity in the northern region of the country has resulted in recent conflicts between Peul (Fulani)
herders and local farmers. Traditionally, Peul herders used farmers’ fallowed lands for pasture. Farmers
exchanged grains with herders whose animals fertilized their lands when grazing. Two problems have arisen in
recent years which have thrown this relationship off balance. First, perennial cotton crops have reduced the
number of fallow lands and therefore decreased the availability of pasturelands. Second, herders have started
farming in order to supplement their income and now prefer to retain the animal manure for their own fields. With
the exception of the increased involvement of herders in the agriculture sector, farming and herding are not
integrated. Government land tenure laws do not address herding issues.
Natural resources, particularly agricultural, are seriously threatened in Togo due to overpopulation. In
addition, a shortage of firewood in the northern savanna region of the country has reached serious proportions. As
already noted, soil resources are threatened. There is nothing in the national tenure laws which addresses access to
and use of natural resources (the available literature does not address the country’s forest code). Because lands
reserved for firewood or the collection of other forest products are not considered as “in use” according to
government law, there is little incentive to protect forestlands. The extent to which forest and water resources are
affected by customary and national policies is not adequately addressed in the literature.
Despite political shifts, the Togolese government’s land tenure policies have not changed. The present
regime has declared its dedication to establishing itself as a democratic government. If this is truly its aim, it must
assure access to land and land security for all producers. This will entail formulating a new policy which
integrates both indigenous and state tenure and addresses issues of women’s, pastoralists’, and other users’ land
tenure rights.
Like Ghana and other neighboring countries, Togo has shown little economic growth since the early 1970s.
The land tenure policies enacted in the mid- and late-1970s were clearly efforts to rectify this problem. Despite
these efforts, Togo has continued to struggle economically. Food security is largely dependent upon women’s
continued access to land. In many other regions of West Africa ,the decrease in the availability of land has
negatively affected women’s access to land and land resources. Although the literature makes no mention of the
effect of land scarcity on women’s agricultural production in Togo, this is an important issue which should be
investigated further. Land shortages and environmental degradation pose serious threats to the country’s food
security.
There is no reference to women’s tenure rights in any of the government’s land tenure laws or ordinances. In
many of the traditional systems in Togo, women are given a plot of land when they marry. Women are often130
required or encouraged to take on additional farming plots in order to produce more and contribute to household
expenditures. If women need additional land, they must rent or borrow it from male members of the lineage.
Women’s role in land rentals and loans must not be ignored. Government policies are in need of revision to
address the issue of women’s rights to land. Project planners should consider the important role that women play
in production, land use, and tenure systems. Better information is needed to reflect women’s role in land rentals
and borrowed lands more accurately since it appears that they play a significant part.
Present policy and reforms discussed
While the government’s policy of 1974 attempts to address many of the land tenure issues crucial to the county’s
development, its failure to implement these policies has resulted in a muddled and ad hoc system. The 1974 policy
acknowledges indigenous land rights but does not indicate how national policy and indigenous systems might be
integrated. Furthermore, the national policy has had little impact due to the complications and costs of
implementation. If the government is to assure land security, it must construct a comprehensive and feasible land
tenure policy which integrates indigenous systems. The current national policy addresses only issues of
agricultural production and does not provide guidelines for various land uses such as the collection of firewood
and other forest products. Women’s role in land tenure is also neglected in the national policy. In order for Togo
to successfully resolve its problems of land scarcity, agricultural production, and environmental degradation, it
must create and implement a more comprehensive land tenure policy.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Issues of land insecurity are central to problems of development and must be taken into consideration by policy
planners. Policymakers should keep in mind that land shortages, population pressures, and environmental
constraints will have profound effects on tenure systems. It is important that programmers not overgeneralize.
Areas suffering extreme land shortages in Togo have a higher rate of land rental and pledging and tend to
represent a greater variety of land tenure systems. This may be one strategy used by local populations to
redistribute land and cash resources. These intricacies should be carefully studied and closely noted so that
policies and programs can be developed to respond to specific as well as general situations and needs.
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Zaire’s General Property Law, passed in 1973 and modified in 1980, declares that all land and natural resources
belong to the state. Thereby, the state does not recognize any of the rules relating to access and control of land
and natural resources that emanate from community-based land tenure systems. Yet, the literature suggests that
access to nearly 97% of the land and natural resources is de facto through the community-based land tenure
systems. This situation encourages land and natural resource tenure insecurity, and the literature suggests that in
certain regions of the country land tenure insecurity is high. Further complicating this situation is the political
situation in present-day Zaire. The impasse between President Mobutu and the parliament leaves little hope that
current governmental paralysis will resolve itself anytime soon.
National policy and legal framework
Zaire straddles the equator and is Africa’s third largest country with an area of 2,344,000 square kilometers. It is
blessed with a plethora of natural resources and relatively low overall population. According to a World Bank
estimate, its mid-1991 population was 38.6 million and, while its population growth rate from 1980 to 1990 was
estimated at 3.2%, its current population growth rate is estimated at 3.0%. There are over 200 different ethnic
groups. Mirroring this ethnic diversity is the fact that while French is the official business language, there are four
others—Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, and Kiluba—that are generally recognized as “lingua francas” in the various
regions of the country.
Since independence in 1960 urban populations have grown. At independence 26% of the population was
estimated to live in the urban areas, while World Bank estimates in 1991 put the percentage at around 40%.
Urban growth has resulted from decreasing returns from agriculture and some of it has been blamed on
decreasing land tenure security in certain parts of the country. However, the urban growth does not mean that the
urban manufacturing economy is booming. Rather, out of a total potential working population of 16 million, it is
estimated that only 1.34 million are working, and it appears that the total number of those working in the formal
sector of the economy has changed little since independence. Thus, most Zairians, in one way or another, still
depend on subsistence agriculture.
While Zaire has enormous agricultural potential with soil and a climate that is suitable for growing a wide
variety of crops, such as cotton, rubber, coffee, oil palm, sugar, and others, for export, and also a wide variety of
food crops, agricultural production per person has actually decreased. Consequently, Zaire’s export of
agricultural products has decreased and it is no longer self-sufficient in food production.
With 1.78 million square kilometers of tropical forest area, Zaire contains 12.5 percent of the world’s
remaining tropical rainforest, less only than Brazil and Indonesia. While most of this area has not been exploited
due to poor infrastructure, deforestation is on the rise. Between 1980 and 1985, the annual rate of deforestation
was 3,700 square kilometers. Since then it is feared that deforestation may be rising as logging companies
exhaust the easier-to-reach tropical forests of West Africa.
Since independence, Zaire’s tenure systems have gone through a number of changes. Today, officially, all
land belongs to the state, as noted in the 1973 Land Law, modified in 1980. However, the reality is that perhaps
as much as 97% of land continues to be administered under community-based tenure systems. In this document
the term community-based tenure systems is used to refer to systems where rules that gain their legitimacy from132
community recognition are at the base of the land tenure system. In other publications these systems are often
referred to as customary, traditional, or informal tenure systems.
During colonial times there was a dual system of land laws. Under the decree of 1 July 1885, ARTICLE 2,
King Leopold of Belgium declared that in the Congo Free State “vacant lands must be considered as belonging to
the state” and, in the decree of 17 September 1886, that “lands occupied by the native population, under the
authority of their chiefs, shall continue to be governed by local customs and usages.” These two decrees
established a system under law that sanctioned land rights under customary tenure systems, but also expropriated
over 27,000,000 hectares from the original inhabitants of Zaire. This area became the base of the state’s domain,
which could later be distributed as grants and concessions to Europeans. Also during this period a system of
vacancy inquiry was instituted to determine whether land really was unused and unclaimed under customary law
before it was declared state land. This inquiry provided some limited protection to customary rights.
During colonial times, the Belgians forcibly regrouped villages, local inhabitants were used as forced labor,
and there was obligatory cultivation of food crops for cities and export crops. Because some of these practices
had negative effects on the traditional farming systems and consequently negative effects on soil quality and crop
production, the Belgians set up the paysannat
3 system as a way to ensure that fallow periods were respected,
good crop rotations retained, agricultural production maintained and increased, and surpluses marketed. Some
paysannats allocated individual plots to farmers, often on land to which they had no customary title, while others
attempted to respect customary tenure and allowed land chiefs to distribute the land to group members.
Land that was distributed to Europeans was administered under written law. Land titles were registered
under a Torrens registry system. Under the Torrens system land units had to be surveyed and then registered in a
land book by a registrar of real property. All title transfers had to be recorded in the land book. Only Europeans
could hold title to land. Urban land was also registered under the Torrens system. Consequently, Africans could
not hold title to urban land; they were granted only a temporary right of occupation to restricted urban areas.
A number of changes took place in the official land tenure situation after independence in 1960. First,
immediately following independence all restrictions on African ownership of land were removed and Africans
could acquire land under the Torrens Act. In 1966, the government enacted the Bakajika law to force holders of
colonial titles to renew registration and prove that the land was being put to good, and productive, use. If the latter
conditions were not being met, the government could repossess the land. In 1971, the Constitution of Zaire was
amended and a law passed stipulating that the Republic of Zaire retook the “full and free disposition of all the
rights in the land, the subsoil, and natural resources granted or signed before January 1, 1972.” The effect of this
amendment and law was to make all land and resources state property.
The General Property Law (Loi portant régime général des biens, régime foncier et immoblier, et régime
des sûretés), which is the current law governing land, was passed in 1973 and amended in 1980. This law
stipulates that all land and natural resources are the property of the state. Further, the category of “native” lands
is abolished by the amendment and these laws, thus abrogating the dual system of land laws inherited from
colonial times. Under the 1973/80 laws, individuals can obtain rights to land and natural resources through the
granting of either “perpetual concession” or “ordinary concession.” Customary rights held by the indigenous
population are transformed into “rights of use” that are to be regulated by an ordinance of the President of the
Republic. To date, this ordinance has not been enacted.
                                                  
3 Paysannats were located on land considered by the colonial government as “state” land. They were set up to
provide agricultural produce for city areas and also to encourage what were considered “good” agricultural practices by the
colonial administration. People who worked land under the paysannat system had to agree to farm the land in a certain
manner, and utilize the extension services that were made available to them.133
The 1973/80 laws also cover Zaire’s forested lands. Thus, the tropical forests are considered state property
and areas of forest are allocated as logging concessions on a 25-year lease basis. In theory this time period allows
the logger to harvest the area once, replant, and return for a second harvest. In reality, as the area is opened up,
immigrants often enter and clear land after the first cut; or the logging company’s loggers clear the land for their
own agricultural purposes after the first cut is taken.
According to ART. 182 of the 1980 Land Law, “Lands are managed either by the public administration, or
by public organizations created for this purpose, or by mixed societies of real property development and
promotion.”
The Department of Land Affairs oversees state policy with respect to land and is under the direction of the
Commissaire d’État. The commissaire appoints a conservateur des titres, or registrar of real property titles, for
each land district, which corresponds to an administrative district. The Department of Land Affairs is divided into
(1) a service of real property titles, which handles land registration; (2) a survey service; (3) a state lands service,
which manages state lands and grants concessions; and (4) a land dispute service. Regional branches of these
services are headed by the regional conservateur who reports to the Conservateur en Chef and the Commissaire
d’État.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure systems
Community-based tenure rules vary from one culture to another, being adapted to ecological, demographic, and
socioeconomic variables. Throughout Zaire, individuals customarily gain access to land through membership in
some local corporate group. The rights of the group to the land are inalienable, and individual members of groups
also have inalienable rights of access to some land. The local landholding group may be matrilineal—such as the
clans and families of the Kongo—or patrilineal—as with the Zande Vungara. The local corporate groups cannot
sell land; yet parcels of land may be ceded at times to neighboring groups, and land may be rented to strangers.
Within the larger corporate group with collective title to the land there may exist smaller groups such as
families with direct control over use and inheritance of family land. Within families individuals may have rights to
specific plots of land under cultivation or in fallow after having been cleared. Individuals also often own trees of
economic importance.
The customary right of individuals to their harvest is generally protected, though payments to chiefs of land
may be required. Security of tenure over particular plots of land varies. Rights to fallow land reinforce security
where such rights exist. Women are often considered to have access to land only through their relationship with a
man—husband, father, brother, uncle, and the like—though women may own their harvest. Strangers who do not
become members of the local landholding group generally have short-term, insecure use of land or may be denied
access to land altogether. Religious ideology plays a role in maintaining preeminent rights to local corporate
groups.
Various forms of shifting cultivation are common on lands held under customary, community-based tenure.
Population density is low and tenure systems are flexible over most of Zaire. Where population density is greater
or where for other reasons arable land is scarce, tenure rules and boundaries are stricter, and disputes, more
likely. Scarce land near markets acquires commercial value, and forms of customary rent or one-time payment
appear when landholders allow strangers to use scarce land. Land is particularly scarce in areas of Kivu and Bas-
Zaire and in areas near urban markets. Where land is scarce and valuable, the landholding group with direct
control over land tends to be small and tightly knit.
One exception to the above-noted generalities is the case of the land and natural resource tenure systems
followed by the ethnicity often referred to as the “pygmies.” These people have traditionally made their living
from hunting and gathering in the forested areas of the Zaire basin and Gabon. While their traditional rights to
land rest on a similar combination of defined territories and group membership, as do those of the neighboring,134
farming-based ethnicities, their corporate rights to land are not related to cultivation but rather to gathering,
fishing, and hunting in the forested areas. Another difference is that they see themselves as dependent on the
goodwill of the forest rather than the goodwill of their ancestors.
As noted above, state laws since colonial times have contradicted or officially overturned the community-
based tenure rules. Currently, community-based tenure systems are subverted by the General Property Law of
1973/80. The most enthusiastic enforcement of this principle was actually tried before the law was passed. In
1971, Mobutu denounced the customary tenure in the densely populated Kivu region as “feudal” and exploitative.
Land reform was attempted which stripped local chiefs of their power to allocate land. Agreements between
individuals under a form of freehold were substituted for customary tenure. This tenure reform was met with
widespread resistance and increased general land insecurity. Consequently, the reforms were abandoned. Under
the 1973/80 laws the president is supposed to issue an ordinance clarifying the role that community-based tenure
systems are to play under the General Property Law. The ordinance has never been issued and many
commentators suggest that it has not been (and most likely will not be) issued because of the sensitive nature of
land reform, as witnessed by the Kivu experience.
More recently Salacuse (1985) has noted that in Bandundu a programme fermier has started which small
farmers can apply to for a “concession.” In this program local authorities compel chiefs to turn over a few
hectares to the administrators and/or the small farmers. These small farmers are issued “titles” and they then
consider themselves concessionaires. However, the titles are never registered, though the administrators insist
that someday in the future they will be registered. This new program appears to be another example of the
government’s clashing with the community-based tenure systems.
Since all land is officially owned by the state, there are no official land markets. Still, literature suggests that
under some of the community-based tenure systems land is bought and sold. Also, under the state laws, the
concessionaire has rights to the improvements made upon the land and it appears that the rights to these
improvements may be sold. In some cases in both rural and urban areas these transfers of rights may constitute a
land market.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Agricultural production in Zaire is in crisis. Since independence both food and export crop production has fallen,
and prices farmers are paid for their goods have also fallen. There are multiple reasons for this. One impetus is
definitely tied to the land tenure insecurity that has resulted from government land policies. The land policies
ignore customary rights to land, provide no role for the traditional land chiefs, and do not provide secure title to
land in the place of customary rights. In the early 1990s, another element entered into the fray. The political
upheaval engendered by President Mobutu’s conflict with the reform elements of the transitional parliament have
guaranteed that no laws are passed that will put the country on a path to resolving its agricultural problems.
Huge increases in logging are currently planned according to the Tropical Forestry Action Plan for Zaire. As
current laws are written, these increases will not occur in an environmentally sensitive way. Rather, 25-year
concessions will be given to logging companies, which will then enter an area and take out an average of 8.7
cubic meters (less than one tree) per hectare. However, the removal of this wood is done in such a way to cause
large amounts of destruction to the rest of the forest and also open the forest to people looking to expand
agriculture into these areas. As with agriculture, there is no chance of reforming Zaire’s forest and natural
resource management laws given the current standoff between President Mobutu and the parliament.
Consequently, the current tenure situation encourages the destruction of Zaire’s tropical forests.
The General Property Law is a top-down edict from the government, effectively taking control of land
decisions away from the local, traditional authorities. This limits the participation of the local population in
decision-making and runs counter to the idea of democratization. In order to foster democratization in Zaire, the135
government should look to the local institutions and the rules made under them to better understand how local
participation in decision-making works in the countryside. One way of doing this would be to attempt to adapt
these institutions and rules into the national land tenure system. By adapting community-based tenure systems
into the larger system, local participation in decision-making would be encouraged and the process of
democratization in the country could be fostered.
Food security has deteriorated in Zaire since independence. Not only has food crop production decreased,
but rural diets are protein-deficient. There are food shortages, predictable by season in the rural areas, and
malnutrition in both rural and urban settings. These problems are exacerbated by government policies, carried
over from the colonial era, that demand obligatory cultivation of certain crops by the rural population. As urban
food problems have mounted, there has been an emphasis on obligatory cultivation of food crops suited for the
urban market. This mandatory policy has backfired in that the rural population often uses poor land for this
cultivation, which leads to land degradation and, further, to poorer harvests. Other causes of food insecurity and
decreasing prospects for economic growth are the deterioration of the road network, land tenure insecurity caused
by the nationalization of land under the General Property Law (which has worked to discourage investments in
the land by both small and large land holders), and the political instability caused by the standoff between
President Mobutu and the parliament.
Generally, women are responsible for most of the work on food crops among most of the ethnicities in Zaire.
However, though many of the ethnicities recognize matrilineal lines of inheritance, it is the men who control the
land. Indeed, men inherit land from their mother’s brothers and women gain access to land through men—either
their husband, father, sons, or brothers. Under the customary tenure rules, women have little or no right to land as
“owners.” It appears that this situation has remained, de facto, the case under the General Property Law. In
general men have the right to make decisions regarding land use and access, and women must go along with these
decisions if they wish to access land.
Present policy position and reforms
The Government of Zaire’s present policy is that all land belongs to the state. Land can be acquired as a
concession, either for the short-to-medium term under an ordinary concession or for the long term under a
perpetual concession. The current forestry and natural resource laws are such that they encourage the exploitation
of the natural resource base in a manner that leads to the degradation of the resource over the long term. In both
cases reforms are not on the horizon given the situation between President Mobutu and the national parliament.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The major area where dialogue is needed is in the realm of the General Property Law. Given that there are levels
of land tenure insecurity in many areas of Zaire, the law should be modified to recognize that community-based
tenure systems still exist and influence how the major part of the land and resource base is accessed and used.
Recognition of the validity of community-based tenure systems could also influence the rate at which
deforestation is spreading in the country by decreasing the accessibility of logging companies to logging
concessions.
However, before any policy dialogues can be opened, the current political instability in the country needs to
be addressed. For this to happen the tense situation between President Mobutu and the parliament needs to be
resolved. Unless this takes place all reform of the land tenure situation will have to wait.
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This paper attempts to identify important trends and issues of land and natural resource tenure confronting
policymakers and analysts in East Africa. The diversity of the national experience is almost overwhelming. The
challenge, and the primary enterprise of this paper, is to find commonalties in trends and issues upon which it is
potentially productive to focus attention at the regional level.
State of land and natural resource tenure policy
The countries in the region reflect very different land endowments relative to population, as indicated in table 2.1.
There are also vast differences in the landforms and ecologies of the countries within the region. The same is
true of the tenure “topography” of the region: this is the part of Africa where in the years following independence
countries adopted the most dramatic tenure reform strategies, strategies which differed dramatically from one
nation to the next. What is remarkable is the extent to which tenure reform was undertaken by countries of all
ideological stripes. However different the national scenarios for inducing greater productivity through tenure
reform, a common thread runs through these efforts: the attempt by new national elites to wrest control of land
from traditional elites and create a uniform national tenure system.
Only Kenya has aggressively pursued a policy of tenure individualization and privatization. Burundi,
Rwanda, Comoros, Djibouti, and Sudan have conserved private ownership which existed at independence, but of
these only Burundi and Comoros has show any interest in expanding land in private ownership by conversions of
land in the indigenous tenure sector. Somalia abolished private ownership and was embarking on major
conversions to leasehold from the state, but the current position in that country is unclear. Uganda, which once
abolished private ownership and sought to replace both it and indigenous land tenure with leaseholds from the
state, has in its 1995 Constitution restored recognition of private ownership and protection to the rights of those
who hold land under indigenous tenure.
Most of the countries in the region have provided some legal recognition to indigenous, customary land
tenure, but some, notably Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, have abolished private ownership and sought to
replace indigenous tenure systems with alternative, community-based tenure forms. Two of Africa’s most serious
attempts at collectivist solutions took place in this region, in Tanzania and Ethiopia, the former in the context of
programs of ujamaa and villagization, the latter as the follow-on to a huge land-to-the-tiller reform.
Today, the basic assumptions of governments remain remarkably similar to those of a decade ago despite
major economic liberalization in other sectors of their economies. If many governments in the region have
conserved limited amounts of privately owned land, they have been reluctant to expand it into areas currently
governed by indigenous tenure systems. There is still a clear concern on the part of most governments about the
development of large concentrations of land in private hands, and this has retarded the spread of private
ownership and the development of land markets. In those countries which have continued to affirm state
ownership of land and administrative allocation of the land resource, land administration bureaucracies have been
reluctant to let go of the power and opportunities for corruption provided by administrative allocation of land.
Tanzania and Ethiopia (and now Eritrea) remain committed to broad state ownership of land, and pursue non-
market land policies. They have moved toward tenure policies which seek to support household farming through
decentralization of land administration.139
TABLE 2.1
Land and population
(millions of hectares and millions of persons)














Kenya 56.91 4.52 21.30 16.80 14.29 26.39 19.97 4.42
Burundi 2.55 1.36 0.90 0.09 0.21 6.03 5.47 4.02
Rwanda 2.47 1.17 0.45 0.55 0.30 7.55 6.85 5.85
Comoros 0.23 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.61 0.47 4.70
Sudan 237.60 12.98 110.00 44.24 70.38 26.60 15.09 1.16
Uganda 19.96 6.77 1.80 5.50 5.89 19.94 15.77 2.33
Djibouti 2.32 – 0.20 0.01 2.11 0.56 ? ?
Eritrea 10.10 1.28 4.80 2.00 2.02 3.35 ? ?
Ethiopia 100.00 12.65 40.00 25.00 22.35 51.86 39.37* 3.10
Tanzania 88.40 3.50 35.00 33.50 16.40 28.02 21.74 6.21
Somalia 62.73 1.02 43.00 16.00 2.71 8.95 6.17 6.05
Note: With the exception of Kenya, all breakdowns of land area area based on FAO estimate.
* 1992 figure.140
Only Uganda has undergone a major shift toward private ownership, and there the focus has been on the
restoration of ownership in areas where it previously existed rather than contemplating any major expansion at
the expense of customary tenure. Kenya remains firmly committed to gradual realization of the economic
potential of its conversion to individual ownership, which is now largely complete, and Comoros is pursuing a
similar direction, although much more gradually.
The present national policy situations are summarized in table 2.2.
Comparing the present with the situation thirty years ago, when most of these countries attained
independence, what are the constants and what has changed?
1) Smallholder production continues to be the major form of production throughout the region. Tenure security
for these cultivators remains a critical need throughout the region. With the exception of Kenya (and to a
lesser extent Ethiopia and Tanzania), customary tenure systems still govern most smallholder land use.
Policymakers across the region have abandoned attempts to move to other forms of agricultural production
organization.
2) Many policymakers in the region express the same concern over potential impacts of liberalizing land
markets as they did in the immediate post-independence period. There is still a fear of their potential for
creating large private concentrations of land ownership. There is in fact little beyond anecdotal evidence to
this effect, though this is the single most important objection to recognizing growing informal markets in land
rights.
3) Debates in the region over tenure policy have remained heavily focused on agricultural land, perhaps because
of the complexities of the situations created there by half-effective tenure reforms. Policy work has only
begun to focus on the broader issues of tenure in natural resource management which have for the last decade
preoccupied policymakers in West Africa.
4) There is a new appreciation by governments of the limits of the state’s administrative capacity and their
ability to rapidly replace customary land tenure systems with imported tenure forms. As a result, several
countries have embarked on a re-examination of the potential of decentralization of land administration and
adaptation of customary tenure systems.
5) While reforms of thirty years ago were enacted on a relatively clear stage, any new land policies must
contend with considerable confusion of patterns of landholding by previous reforms. The failure to fully
implement many of these reforms has created substantial normative confusion, as well as an increasingly
cynical view of reforms on the part of the purported beneficiaries.
Tenure issues
In all the countries in the region, the profiles suggest a close connection between tenure arrangements, food
security, and agricultural development. The connections to food security are pronounced and exist on two fronts:
1) security of tenure is an important factor in allowing land to function as a social security mechanism, a safety 
net; and 2) security of tenure is necessary to provide the incentive necessary to invest in the holding and thereby
increase agricultural productivity.
There seems to be broad acceptance across East Africa that agricultural producers throughout the region
have need of greater security of tenure. Different countries in the region are, however, pursuing this objective in
very different fashions. Uganda is restoring individual private property in land while Tanzania is tending toward
greater reliance on community-based tenure systems. In the former case the marketability of land is seen as a
critical element of security of tenure, while in the latter it is seen as a threat to security of tenure. The difference in
approaches reflects different emphases in agricultural policy, with an emphasis on production for export in the
first case and an emphasis on protection of subsistence opportunities in the other.141
TABLE 2.2
National land tenure patterns
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There has probably been more progress made in sorting through issues of security of tenure in the last two
decades than on any other tenure issue. The area has been a major target of research funded by the World Bank
and USAID. While both institutions remain committed to private land ownership of farmland in market
economies, studies conducted in the region (Uganda, Somalia, Kenya, and Rwanda) have provided a better sense
of priorities. It has become clear that compulsory and systematic tenure conversion to individual ownership offers
little benefit in most rural smallholding situations, largely because the benefits anticipated involve interactions of
land markets with other factor markets, and those other factor markets are not developed.
There is a growing understanding that tenure change is not a silver bullet, but must move along with other
reforms in the rural economy. This has suggested greater emphasis on the incremental adaptation of customary
tenure systems to meet new needs of farmers, and the need to provide a legal and institutional environment which
is conducive to that process. A national land policy may pursue a tenure replacement strategy in one part of the
country and an adaptation strategy in another, depending on the objectives of agricultural policy. Not all the
lessons learned to date have been absorbed by policymakers, but there is increasing sophistication of analysis by
national land tenure experts.
Policy discourse in the region is also changing with regard to tenure issues in natural resource management.
The political turmoil in this region has been accompanied by loss of control of scarce natural resources. In
Uganda, the war years saw dramatic deforestation, and the conflicts in Rwanda and in Burundi have threatened
unique habitats and animal populations. Throughout the region, renewed attempts to protect natural resources are
resulting in the barring of local communities from access to resources on which they had previously depended,
and has given rise to a new land tenure literature on the “buffer zone” areas on the edge of parks and reserves, in
which specialized tenure strategies may be adopted and in an attempt to decrease pressure on protected areas
After decades of thinking in terms of a “tragedy of the commons,” policymakers are beginning to absorb
some of the lessons of the common property literature, which emphasizes that under certain circumstances local
communities can manage natural resources sustainably. Resources such as water, fisheries, pastures, wetlands,
and forests are at stake. There is, however, a lack of rigorous studies of these situations in the region, which may
be necessary to convince policymakers of their viability. The legislative framework for management of non-farm
natural resources is commonly a poorly thought-through jumble. In some countries in the region, notably Uganda,
there has been considerable research in this area in recent years, and this will in the near future lead to a clearer
enunciation of policies and an improved legal framework.
A pervasive theme in the profiles is growing conflict over land. This is not a new factor, but it seems clearly
to be intensifying as population pressure on land increases. It is often most acute between expanding farmers and
pastoralist populations, and agricultural intensification is making more difficult the maintenance of overlapping
land uses which once co-existed comfortably in many areas. In some cases this conflict has grown through
natural processes of expansion of farming, but in others it has been pushed by government policies pressing for
(and often subsidizing) the growth of large-scale mechanized cereal production, as in Tanzania and Sudan.
While farmer/pastoralist conflicts have been a standard of African land tenure for decades, it is remarkable
how little progress has been made in grappling with them. It seems clear from the profiles that this is due in part
to the political weakness of pastoralists in most polities in the region. Somalia and Djibouti are exceptions, but in
these countries one finds growing disputes between groups of sedentary and transhumant pastoralists. But
disputes in this context also seem to be due to a failure to identify viable tenure systems for pastoralist land use.
The failure of group ranching in Kenya and Tanzania has redirected attention back toward preservation of viable
extensive land-use patterns for pastoralists, which brings them directly in conflict with farmers.
The profiles suggest a frequent connection between communal and ethnic conflict and competition over
natural resources. In Rwanda and Burundi, with high population densities and acute competition for land,
competition between groups for resources has fueled devastating conflict. In Somalia, one factor leading to the143
collapse of national coherence was anger over unfairness in resource distribution, with pastoralists marginalized
and the valuable urban and irrigated land moving into the hands of clans associated with the government. In
Uganda, policy reform discussions have seen persistent questions of which ethnic groups are winners under
different reform scenarios. In Tanzania and Sudan, expansion of mechanized cereal cultivation is undermining the
viability of pastoralist peoples and has become an international human rights issue. In Kenya, there has been
violence in rural areas against members of ethnic groups who have acquired land through the land market, the
most active in Africa, raising important concerns about the ability of land markets to act as mechanisms for
national integration. Ethiopia has decentralized tenure policy to ethnically based regions, raising fears of
discrimination against those coming from other regions.
Given the alarming growth of ethnic conflict in the region, the links between competition for land and other
natural resources seem to demand urgent attention by policymakers. Neglect of needs for security of tenure and
equitable access to resources may lie at the heart of much of the conflict, and finding remedies for these problems
may offer the best chance of arresting the alarming trends. It appears from the profiles that what is called for in
some cases is not more rules, but finding more effective means of dispute resolution and conflict management.
While formal, judicial approaches to dispute resolution remain critical, it appears there is a need to think through
how these can best be supplemented and properly integrated with more informal approaches to the resolution of
disputes, approaches with strong roots in African culture.
Gender issues in tenure rights stand out as among the most intractable faced in the region. However, they are
also the least seriously appreciated by policymakers and perhaps the least adequately addressed by tenure
analysts. Most women in the region have access to farmland only through their husbands or fathers. Any knotty
policy problems have not been adequately considered, for example, the problems in tenure individualization
through titling to men and the accompanying loss of customary rights of wives, on the one hand, versus making it
possible for women to get land in their own right through inheritance and the land market, on the other.
Discourse on these issues in the region is well behind southern Africa and, for the most part, has yet to move
beyond demands for legal reforms to thinking through effective strategies to realize change. There is ample
evidence that traditional values toward women’s access to land persist in national government, as when
customary limits of women’s rights to land are reproduced in non-traditional contexts such as settlement schemes.
There are, however, interesting experiments in the region which deserve to be examined more closely. Legal
reforms in Burundi appear to be facilitating inheritance of land by women, and recent anecdotal evidence suggests
that Ethiopia and Eritrea are allocating separate parcels to husbands and wives to create household holdings.
Democratization and associated initiatives seem to interact in important ways with tenure policies. Secure
tenure rights facilitate effective participation in political processes, and conditional tenure can create vulnerability
which discourages free expression of political preferences. Where land access is threatened, more democratic
structures may provide greater opportunities to press the case for equitable treatment, though this is no guarantee
of success, at least in the case of minorities. Decentralization of decisions about land policy and land
administration can empower and give vitality to levels of local government which have previously seemed largely
irrelevant to local people. Similarly, the conferring control of land and other resources on local communities can
stimulate popular participation and create new commitment to democratic processes.
Policy reform context
The various countries in the region are at very different points in thinking about tenure reform. Some remain
inflexibly committed to insufficient or faulty policies which have been in place for thirty years. In other cases the
first tentative steps are being taken to move away from failed policies. The abandonment of old tenure policies
often presents delicate political problems and can threaten powerful vested interests.144
Uganda and Tanzania have perhaps been through the most extensive processes of research and consultations
to redefine land policy. In Uganda, the broad framework of reform has already been enacted in the constitution.
The work of the Presidential Commission on Land Matters in Tanzania stands out as a well-conceived process of
policy development, but Tanzania appears to be having more difficulty coming to grips with policy choices.
Eritrea has recently enacted a new land law, after a process involving some local consultation. Ethiopia has
reaffirmed state ownership of all land, but has shifted the responsibility for development of new tenure
arrangements to the governments of the new ethnically defined regions.
In Kenya, Djibouti, and Comoros, no major tenure reforms seem to be contemplated. There is a clear need
for attention to land policy in the strife-torn countries of Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and Sudan, where
competition for land and other natural resources may lie at the root of these civil conflicts. It is not yet clear,
however, whether these volatile situations now present serious opportunities for thoughtful consideration of tenure
options.
There are some commonalities across the regions in terms of the context for reform of land tenure policy:
1) The last two decades have not been good years for tenure research in the region, especially investigation by
national researchers. Governments with strong commitments to particular reform paths have not promoted
critical thinking about policy options or empirical research into the consequences of their policies.
2) Nonetheless, a thin but significant cadre of national land tenure experts has developed in the region over the
last two decades. The extent and quality of this cadre varies considerably from one country to another, but
overall it compares well with other African regions; in some countries, considerable competence was built up,
then dissipated.
3) In spite of the high levels of tenure reform activity within the region, there has been a notable lack of
interaction on these issues at the regional level. Tenure policy debates remain highly compartmentalized
nationally, and, beyond the very broadest generalization, national debates tend to be ill-informed about the
relevant experiences of other countries within the region.
Lessons from larger African experience
To think about the future of land policy on the Horn of Africa, it is necessary to have reference to the larger
experience of the continent. In the post-independence decades, the vast majority of African countries attempted to
reform the indigenous land tenure systems.
The new elites who came to power at independence believed that these tenure systems were outmoded and
had to be replaced. The reform enterprise has not fared well. In 1960, over 90% of Africa’s land was held under
indigenous land tenure systems, and the figure is certainly not lower than 80% today. Attempts to reform those
systems altered and influenced them, often in ways unanticipated by the reformers, but the systems retained their
customary nature and roots in local society.
The reform models adopted varied according to the ideological predilections of the new governments. But in
spite of this diversity, these reforms had some common fundamental assumptions: indigenous systems of tenure
needed to be replaced; the nation-state had to replace the local community as the guarantor of access to land and
security of tenure; and a uniform national system of tenure should replace the diversity of indigenous systems.
The collectivizing reforms are gone, with most of the countries concerned having shifted to some form of
state leasehold or a more decentralized approach to management of state land. Those countries which initially
opted for state leasehold in many cases continue on that track, but this tenure has in most cases been implemented
only on a very limited scale; the governments concerned lacked the personnel and other resources to take over the
vast work of land administration from traditional authorities. Leaseholds were used in development projects and
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with leasehold tenure had been marred by its association with “free land” policies, such as the “land without
value” concept in Zambia, and the corruption of the allocation process engendered by those policies. A system in
which a scarce and valuable good is administratively allocated virtually free provides great opportunities for
corruption. Development conditions, which had been one of the justifications for use of leasehold rather than full
ownership, were often badly conceived and rigid, and in any case they were rarely effectively monitored. They
were sometimes utilized as a pretense for government to take land to punish political dissidents, or simply to take
valuable land for officials and their associates.
The individual ownership reform model has been judged largely by the Kenyan reform, which was
remarkable for its scope, converting the tenure of virtually all agricultural land to private, individual ownership.
The conversion was accomplished through a project of compulsory and systematic demarcation and survey of
holdings, adjudication of rights, and registration of titles. Begun in the late colonial period, it was carried forward
by the government of independent Kenya. In the years after the reform began, Kenyan smallholder agriculture
showed great vitality, but it has been difficult to establish what role the tenure reform had in the rapid
commercialization of smallholder production because several other important changes took place at the time, such
as removal of restrictions upon black farmers’ growing coffee. Where the phenomena that are thought to link
tenure change to investment and productivity (such as credit access) have been examined, linkages have been
difficult to establish.
Side effects of the Kenyan reform have been widely criticized. Individualization had been conceived as an
extinction of community controls over land, but by concentrating all rights in a single proprietor, it also cut off the
customary rights and protections of family members and others. While there is no evidence that sales have
resulted in significant concentration of land ownership, they have played a role in the growing landlessness and
increased urban migration, and left many families without a safety net. While disputes over land declined in the
period immediately after the reform, after a decade the number of disputes mushroomed as members of families
which had not fully accepted the individualist ethos quarreled with the registered owners. The system relies upon
participants to register successions and transactions, but they have very often not done so, undermining a system
established at great cost.
The disappointing results of these reforms were becoming clear by the mid-1980s, and research has tried to
understand better why they failed. In evaluating the reform experiences, it is often difficult to discriminate
between flawed conceptualization and poor implementation as the root of failure, but consistent failure in many
places over time tends to point toward poor conceptualization as the problem. The experience with
collectivization models in Africa was consistent with poor performance under those models around the world, and
they have disappeared from reform agenda. In the case of the individualization reforms, both those which offer
full ownership and those which offered only a leasehold from the state, it seems that tenure had been miscast as
the bottleneck, with tenure reform as the “silver bullet.” Tenure reform proved ineffective when rushed ahead of
the development of access to commodity markets and to formal credit, and it is clear that future programs must
treat tenure reform as an integrated part of rural development.
While the state may need to offer individual titles (private ownership or state leasehold) for urban and peri-
urban situations, or in other circumstances where land is valuable and subject to intense competition, there is a
need for a supplementary set of land tenure policies for most of rural Africa. In contrast to replacement strategies,
there have been attempts to research and think through a set of “adaptation” strategies.
“Adaptation” reform models, while not idealizing indigenous tenure systems, attempt to build upon them.
They recognize the considerable capacity of those systems to evolve to meet new social and economic challenges,
and seek to create a supportive legal and institutional environment  for that evolution. That environment is
generally thought to include explicit recognition of the applicability of indigenous tenure rules, strengthening of
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anticipates the need to reform specific elements in those systems, both particular rules and institutional
arrangements, but emphasizes the need to create democratic processes within local communities to facilitate self-
reform rather than imposition of reforms through national law.
This emphasis on adaptation has directed attention to two early tenure reforms in Africa, those of Senegal
and Botswana. While less well known than the reforms in Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, they offer valuable
experience to those designing adaptation reform strategies.
At Senegal’s independence in 1960, most rural land was owned by the state. It had been de facto
administered by traditional authorities, but the colonial state had withheld recognition from customary tenure
systems and had taken land at will for projects. That intrusiveness created considerable tenure insecurity and
undermined indigenous tenure systems. There were only very small amounts of privately owned land, heavily
concentrated in a few major urban areas. After independence, the government affirmed state ownership of land in
1964, and suspended creation of new private ownership, citing growing land concentration. It legislated for a new
institution to administer rural land, the communauté rurale. This new institution was created under regulations
promulgated in 1971 and implemented on a region-by-region basis over a period of fifteen years. Communauté
rurales were created at a level encompassing several local communities and often different ethnic groups. They
were managed by popularly elected executive committees. Traditional village leaders were sometimes elected, but
other members came from a variety of walks of life. The law affirmed existing rights under custom, but set out
some basic principles to guide committee members in future allocation decisions, including the principle that the
actual tiller of land should have priority over those with historic land claims.
The government may initially have intended the executive committees to take over land administration
directly, but in practice, the communauté rurale has usually acted as a direct allocator of land only in areas newly
opened for farming or new irrigation schemes. It has functioned primarily as a appellate institution, hearing
complaints from those who contend that traditional authorities and other local authorities have violated the
principles set out in the 1964 law. It has also helped manage competition for resources and cooperation between
communities, and served as a forum for interaction with government on proposals for land development. For day-
to-day land administration, the executive committees still rely heavily on traditional and other local leaders,
making the system relatively economical.
The land tenure position in Botswana at independence bore some resemblance to Senegal: there were only
very limited amounts of privately owned land, a little in the capital, Gaborone, and some blocks of rural farmland.
Most rural and town land was technically owned by the state, but, in contrast to the position in Senegal, the
colonial state had long recognized its administration by customary authorities under indigenous law. The
independence government in 1968 enacted the Tribal Land Act, which created a system of district land boards,
each district being based on one of the major Tswana sub-tribes. These took over from the chiefs the role of
trustee to tribal lands, but were also charged with executing the orders of the Ministry of Local Government and
Lands. There is an obvious tension between these two roles, and it has been felt in the implementation of
government’s much-criticized Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP), which required the land boards to participate
in an exercise which pulled large amounts of land in western Botswana out of communal grazing and placed them
under long-term leases for commercial ranching purposes.
Each board was provided with a vehicle, office facilities, and an executive secretary who is a ministry
employee, and members were provided with training. They were usually located in the district capital, and sub-
district land boards were later created in other towns in the district. Election to the boards was originally indirect,
through the district council, and there were many ex-officio members, including chiefs and district officials.
Reforms have recently provided for direct election of members from sub-areas within the districts, reducing the
dominance of the boards by the middle class in the towns. While senior chiefs were initially ex-officio members of147
the boards, their inability to control events proved awkward for them, and they have for the most part ceased to
serve on them. The government has provided them with more satisfactory judicial roles.
The boards manage land directly in the towns, including the planning of town expansion and plotting of land
for that purpose. While most of this land remains administered under the rules of customary land tenure, a board
can on application confer long-term leaseholds which are acceptable to banks as loan security. These are
available for industrial, commercial, and even residential purposes, in the case of an expensive residence. The
boards also directly administer the TGLP leases. They do not, however, play so direct a role with respect to
communal grazing land or farmland; in this case, day-to-day land administration remains in the hands of the
lowest level of the traditional hierarchy, the ward heads.
The Senegalese and Botswana systems have common elements. Both have approached tenure reform
through the creation of new public institutions which have introduced democratic processes into local land
administration. Both have not sought any general replacement of customary law, but have sought to change
customary rules in specific priority areas. Both have retained—to a greater extent than originally anticipated—a
role for traditional authorities in day-to-day land administration, and they have as a result not incurred the cost of
a large land administration bureaucracy. The Botswana program has been better financed than that of Senegal, as
might be expected given the relative resources of the two countries. But both countries have treated land tenure
reform as national priority and committed major national (non-donor) funding to the reforms.
These two instances represent one category of adaptation reform, those which seek to create new public
institutions. There is a second category: adaptation of customary tenure through new private law institutions. One
example is provided by the group ranches created in Kenya and Tanzania in the late 1960s and 1970s. These
attempted to break up pastoralist territories into smaller units, each vested exclusively in a collective management
which was to pursue investment and intensification of production. They have tended to break up more recently,
the land being subdivided into individual holdings, as a result of market pressures for land from without and
diverging interests from within their membership. It is possible that the major value of the group ranches to the
pastoralists was transitional, as a way of allowing them to obtain titles to their land and thus limit incursions by
neighboring sedentary farming peoples. These needs may have provided a stronger motivation for the pastoralists
to work with the group ranch model than any desire to realize the rotational grazing scenarios designed by
development planners.
Another variety of reform seeks to formalize extended family ownership of land through introduction of the
Western institution of trusteeship. An example is the “family land” concept developed by the common law courts
in Anglophone Africa, and recognized as a registrable interest in Nigeria and Malawi, among others. The trustees
are often wealthier and better educated members of the family. One of the key motivations for such reform has
been to facilitate the entry of customary tenure land into the land and credit markets, and so the trustees have the
power to mortgage and sell the land. That power has often been abused. Transfers have commonly been made
without consultation with and contrary to the interests of the family, and trustees have diverted the benefits from
transactions to themselves.
The models involving private institutions have not been as well researched as the Botswana and Senegalese
reforms, and represent a pressing need for further research.
Future of land tenure on horn of Africa
What are the implications of this experience for land policy in the countries of the Horn of Africa? Probably no
lesson is more central—from experience within the region and from that of Africa as a whole—than that
governments cannot realistically expect to suddenly change their tenure systems, replacing them with another
model. Indigenous land tenure remains extensive in most countries in the region, often the dominant tenure
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behave toward land. Where indigenous tenure has been to some extent replaced by alternative community-based
systems, as in Tanzania and Ethiopia, it is often unclear in particular communities how “alternative” and how
“indigenous” the tenure arrangements are.
It seems clear that the future shape of land policy in the region must seek more modest objectives. It may be
feasible and necessary to replace existing tenure in urban and peri-urban areas, or other areas where competition
for land is intense and indigenous land administration is not evolving fast enough to meet the new needs. It is more
questionable whether this is needed in most rural areas, at least whether there is any prospect that the benefits will
be commensurate with the costs. As a result, most countries in the region are likely to find themselves pursuing a
two-track tenure policy in coming years, one track emphasizing the need to formalize tenure arrangements for
high-value land, the other seeking to facilitate a more evolutionary path of tenure change. The latter path will need
to find some way to accommodate innovating individuals whose needs for tenure are different than those of most
smallholders in those communities.
In those same areas where change in agricultural land tenure is likely to be gradual, there is land whose
value is as common-pool resources or for preservation. In those areas, there will be a need for more effective
integration of land tenure policy for agricultural land and tenure policy for common property management or
preservation of natural resources. In addition to tenure policy, there is a need for a new focus on dispute
resolution in these areas, which tend to be the locus for conflicting claims to land for different uses.
This is not, it is emphasized, to suggest that a uniform national tenure system is not a reasonable long-term
objective. It may or may not be, depending upon the diversity of land use systems and other factors of diversity in
the country. What is essential is that there be a unified and coherent land tenure policy, which rationalizes
different tenure forms in the national tenure system in a fashion that effectively mobilizes the potential of the land




Scarcity of land is the most pressing issue with regard to agriculture and development in Burundi. Under
community-based land tenure systems land is held by individual heads of households and passed, for the most
part, from father to son. Also, current agricultural practices and housing patterns follow a dispersed settlement
pattern. These systems appear to provide reasonable security of tenure to existing holders. Over the past few
years there are indications that inheritance patterns could change to allow women to inherit some land, in certain
situations. The most recent land and forest codes indicate that the government is attempting to address land and
forest problems through the replacement of community-based systems rather than by adapting the systems into a
national system. But as in Rwanda, competition for resources is an important stimulant to the communal strife
which is undermining any rational policy reform process.
National policy and legal framework
Burundi, a landlocked country in Central Africa with an area of 27,834 square kilometers, has one of the highest
population densities in Africa (208 inhabitants per square kilometer). Its population was estimated at 5.78 million
by the United Nations in 1992, and its demographic growth rate was 2.9% between 1980 and 1991. During this
same period its urban population increased by 5.7% annually, but today only 6% of the population is found in the
urban area. The three main population groups in the country are the Hutu, 83% of the population, the Tutsi, 17%
of the population, and the Twa, who account for less than 1% of the population.
With 94% of the population rural based and living in dispersed family units on their holdings, there are few
villages or towns outside of the main cities. Most people rely on agriculture for their survival and, consequently,
most of the country’s surface area is used for some form of agriculture. Land use is estimated as follows: 25% of
the countryside is used for cultivated crops, of which 90% is devoted to subsistence agriculture and 10% is
devoted to export crops; 60% is devoted to pasture area, this includes areas of fallow land; and less than 2% of
the land is forest or woodland. The annual deforestation rate is 2.7%. Over 80% of farm families have less than
1.5 hectares of land, and, as of 1982, the average field size was .39 hectares, although indications are that in
recent years field sizes have decreased.
Since independence, changes in Burundi’s land tenure patterns have come about more from demographic
pressures than from government or market forces. Today the tenure systems present in the country are a mixture
of state laws and community-based rules. Officially, all land that is not occupied belongs to the state, and all land
that is occupied should be registered under the terms of the 1986 Land Tenure Code. However, the reality is that
the 1986 land law is not understood by all of the population and as a result community-based tenure systems
4 that
locally regulate access to and use of land and the natural resource base are still being followed.
A 1961 land law stated that land held under customary tenure is part of the state’s domain, with the state
exercising rights of reversion if the land should fall unoccupied or otherwise be abandoned. Individual farmers
                                                  
4 Note that in this document community-based tenure systems are systems where rules that gain their
legitimacy from community recognition are at the base of the land tenure system. In other places these systems are
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only possess rights to occupy and use the land. Land that was registered and held by European companies and
church missions under the colonial system were not similarly encumbered, but, rather, were held as freehold.
Laws passed in 1976 and 1977 furthered state control of land. The 1976 law returned to the state all land
that had been illegally distributed by the local administrative personnel (the bourgmestres) since independence.
The 1977 law officially ended the institution of ubugererwa. This was a system whereby access to land could be
gained via a form of renting. In order to gain access to the land, the potential renter would approach a person who
controlled large areas of land. Traditionally, the potential renter would solicit access to the land with a gift of
beer, and then negotiate the conditions for use of the land. The use rights were often insecure. The 1977 law also
officially supported the idea of villagization, moving families from living in their fields to villages.
The Land Tenure Code of 1986 was the first law, since independence, totally devoted to land tenure reform.
The goal of the code is to encourage the development of the country and increase agricultural production. The law
recognizes all previous granted titles and registration of land as being evidence that the land is appropriated. It
also recognizes customary rights to land, (rights granted under community based tenure systems), in that land
claimed under customary tenure systems is recognized as being “owned,” and specifically protects rights to land
that is currently in fallow. However, the law specifies that land customarily claimed is now supposed to be
registered, and, as the law is very complex, it has not been widely followed. Thus, in reality, after the adoption of
the 1986 law, community-based tenure systems are no longer valid. All land that is appropriated under the
various community-based systems in the country should now be registered and all future transfers of land and/or
acquisitions of land should follow the procedures outlined in the 1986 text.
Urban areas are also covered under the 1986 law. During colonial times, Africans were only allowed
usufructuary rights to urban lands. With independence Africans were able to acquire permanent title to plots of
land in urban areas. The 1986 law further enforces this, noting that urban land needs to be registered and the
registration must be passed on when it is sold, inherited, or in some other way passes from one owner to another.
Current policy discourse tends to focus on what are perceived as the two main problems of agricultural land
fragmentation and increasing degradation of the natural resource base. Indications from the literature are that
these two areas, and how state land and forestry codes affect them, are of the most concern to the Government of
Burundi. From the 1985 Forestry Code and the 1986 Land Code it appears that these two areas are being dealt
with via policies that reflect a national replacement strategy rather than adapting local rules and rule-making
processes into the national structure.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure systems
The myth that most Westerners hold of Burundi (as of neighboring Rwanda) is of a country whose populations
consist of cattle-owning Tutsi, who control the country and live off their herds, and agricultural Hutus, the
dominated group who are forced to yield up tribute and produce to their Tutsi overlords. The reality is, and has
always been, more complex, and the point that needs to be stressed is that there is no dividing line, neither ethnic,
economic, nor social, between pastoralists and agriculturists. Most individuals, whether Hutu or Tutsi, farm, and
the better-off among them also own a few head of cattle. There is no neat division of land and land use between
ethnic groups or castes or between geographical areas.
Land in Burundi is held by an individual rather than a lineage. A man acquires rights to land through
clearing, planting, and continuing to work the land, or via inheritance or purchasing of land. In the past, by
clearing and settling on land, the individual put himself under the authority of the chief in whose district the land
was located. In exchange for the chief’s patronage and protection, and as an acknowledgment of the chief’s
authority, the man would be obligated to supply some of his produce and labor to the chief. Thus, the chief gave
out unallocated land to individuals who needed land.151
Land is inherited patrilineally, passed from father to sons, either at the time the sons marry or when the
father dies. Women do not inherit land, but rather have use rights to land through their husband, father, or another
male relative. It is the nuclear, rather than the extended family, that is at the center of land holding and inheritance
rules, just as it is the nuclear family that constitutes the unit of production.
In addition to fields, a wealthy individual may hold rights to pasture and forest land, land which is not under
intensive cultivation. Although individually held, access to such land is generally shared with neighbors and
relatives. Neighbors’ cows may be allowed to graze on pasture (or fallow) land, and neighbors may also be
permitted to go into wooded areas to collect dead wood for firewood (although such permission does not include
collecting fruit from or cutting live trees). Not all individuals hold forest and pasture land, and allowing others
rights to one’s land is both a means of alleviating the unequal distribution of land and an expression of the
unequal wealth (and status) in the countryside.
Community-based tenure, when described from the perspective of the farmer, appears to operate (and to
have operated) relatively simply in Burundi. However, various factors have complicated the system, as well as
our understanding of it. Pre-colonial Burundi was an hierarchical society, and its government a monarchy.
Twentieth-century descriptions of the traditional system of government and land tenure have introduced
anachronisms which have now become enshrined as reality. It has been widely written that under the customary
land tenure system all land was considered to belong to the mwami, king, of Burundi. The mwami was not the all-
powerful ruler the Germans and Belgians believed. Certain lands, those belonging to him personally, were at the
mwami’s disposal, to assign or lend as he wished, but neither in actuality nor in theory did he or his delegates
exercise broad allocation authority over his subjects or their land. Nevertheless, there is widespread acceptance of
this idea today, and however false, its general currency has important implications for both the Republic of
Burundi and the peasantry.
In the colonial era Burundi remained a country of smallholder agricultural producers, and almost no land
was appropriated for European agriculture or industry. Apart from those changes introduced into the theoretical
base of the land tenure system (as described above), there were few alterations in land tenure practices. With rare
exceptions ( such as urban areas, church mission lands, and minor agricultural and mining concessions), land
holdings remained unregistered and continued to be held under the same tenure as in the past.
Community-based tenure systems also had rules that regulated access to trees and tree products. These rules
differentiated between the person who had control and access rights to land and the same types of rights to the
trees on the land. In the past, the person who planted the tree kept primary rights, controlling who could harvest
fruit from the tree and cut the tree, even if he no longer had rights to the land on which the tree was planted. With
the change in the land tenure codes in the recent past, there is debate as to whether the differentiation between
rights to trees and land still holds.
The resolution of land tenure conflicts under the community-based systems also takes place. Conflicts are
first taken to a local council of sages for resolution. If they are not resolved at this level, they are taken to an
official, administrative level and/or the courts, and a resolution is handed down.
State laws recognize rights claimed under community-based tenure systems as a legitimate basis for
registering land. However, with the passage of the 1986 land code, all land, even that claimed under community-
based systems, should be registered with the state. To this extent, the state is currently attempting to replace all
community-based tenure systems with a central, national, tenure system as outlined in the 1986 law. However,
the state does not have the resources to carry this out, and education of the population, and even of the
government functionaries, regarding official, national, land tenure laws has not taken place. In many places,
administrators at the commune level look to community-based rules when regulating land tenure disputes rather
than to the national law, and few in the rural population have registered their land with government officials.152
There is evidence that
 land is bought and sold in Burundi, not only in titled areas but in areas under
indigenous tenure systems. In some places of high population density, buying land is one of the few mechanisms
by which a new farmer can gain access to enough land to support himself and his family. However, overall,
indications are that less than 7% of rural farm land is accessed by buying it
5. There does not seem to be any
difference as to whether the seller has registered the land or has control of it under community-based land tenure
rules.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Through the 1980s Burundi was one of the few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that produced enough food to
feed its population. It achieved this success by clearing new land for new fields, introducing new farming
techniques (such as intercropping, relay cropping, and double cropping), and changing the crops grown in its
fields as its population increased
6. As the possibility of clearing new land for agricultural production decreases, it
is questionable whether the practice of shifting from cereal and legume crops to tubers will be enough to keep up
with the pace of population growth. If not, the food security of Burundi will suffer.
Land tenure security does not appear to have been a limiting factor when it comes to increasing agricultural
returns. The literature indicates that Barundi have high levels of land tenure security. However, investments are
limited because there is little access to credit throughout the country, and even if credit was available, indications
are that most Barundi “own” too little land for bankers to consider it adequate security against loans.
Access to land markets also does not appear to be a constraint on agriculture. There are land markets
working in Burundi. The limitation is that resources for buying land are limited and not many enter into the
market, because of the primarily subsistence nature of agriculture in the country.
The main limiting factor on agricultural production is the high amount of land fragmentation in the
countryside. This fragmentation is a byproduct of high population growth rates, and an inheritance system that
encourages the splitting up of agricultural land among all the male offspring of a land owner.
There is only a very limited literature on land tenure and natural resource management in Burundi. Still, it is
possible to say that in spite of the security conferred by the existing land tenure systems and laws encourage the
fallowing of agricultural land in order to recover its fertility, there are still natural resource management and
conservation problems in Burundi. These problems are tied to the limited surface area of the country, the high
deforestation rates, and the growing population. All of these together have put undue pressure on the land and
force farmers to limit fallow periods, or altogether do away with them, in order to produce adequate food for their
families. These same pressures are noted as the cause for a high deforestation, increasing land degradation, and
destruction of rare flora and fauna found within the country.
Until the 1985 Forest Code, there were no laws strictly devoted to forestry issues. Instead, different laws
covered different aspects of forestry (such as interdictions to woodcutting, specific rules regarding burning, and
the like). One of the notable aspects of the 1985 code is that for the first time the national government explicitly
looks to protect the remaining primary forests of the country and also encourages a scheme for the exploitation of
the tree plantations planted in Burundi since colonial times. Finally, while the code does distinguish between state
forests, forests controlled by the “communes” and public forests, it is not clear, from the sources available, how
                                                  
5 More land may be bought in urban areas. Land is also accessed by renting and the same study showed that
about 1/5 of households surveyed have access to some of their fields by renting them.
6As population increases, grains and legumes are replaced with tuber crops. This is done as tubers can feed
more people from the same field area. However, as grains and legumes are replaced with tubers, the nutritional
value of the harvest is decreased.153
the forestry code interacts with community-based rules relating to the control of and access to forests and trees,
nor how the forestry code corresponds to the land tenure code.
At the national level, the Ministry of Land Development, Tourism, and Environment, created in 1988, is in
charge of overseeing and enforcing both the appropriate land codes and forestry codes. Its mandate is to
administer programs relating to rural works, water and forestry, land tenure, and rural cadastre throughout the
country. At the local level the commune administrator
7 enforces the land codes and forestry codes, and acts as
judge when conflicts relating to land and forest issues are brought to his level.
Both Land Tenure Reform and Forestry Codes have taken the form of top-down edicts in Burundi. This
limits the participation of the local population in decision making and runs counter to the idea of democratization.
In order to foster democratization in Burundi, the government should look to the local institutions and the rules
made under these to better understand how local participation in decision making works in the countryside. One
way of doing this would be to attempt to adapt these institutions and rules into the national land tenure system. By
adapting community-based tenure systems into the larger national system, local participation in decision making
would be encouraged, and the process of democratization in the country could be fostered.
As already discussed, under community-based systems women have little direct access to land, and the
inheritance structure is such that only male children inherit land. In 1980 the Family Code gave women the right
to process legal documents, own property (including land), practice a profession, engage in industrial undertaking
and gain access to credit. There are also indications that this change in legal status is slowly affecting women’s
access to land, as at least one study indicates that some women may be inheriting land from their father where no
male heir is present.
Present policy position and reform directions
Burundi’s present policy is one of recognizing that community-based tenure systems confer rights to land, but
officially encouraging all to register their land. Theoretically, this will result in the total replacement of the
community-based tenure systems. Another aspect of this is that the creation of villages is being encouraged (to
decrease the instances of farmers living in their fields). However, few resources have been devoted to the land
registration campaign and little education of the population (and government officials) regarding the land tenure
code has been carried out.
With regard to the noted problem of land fragmentation, little has been done to attempt to address the
population growth rate of the country.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
There are two areas where policy dialogue is needed. The first is over the government’s insistence of
implementing a replacement strategy towards land tenure reform. Given that land tenure security is not a problem
in rural Burundi it is debatable whether the aggressive implementation of the 1986 land tenure code will have any
effect other than to decrease land tenure security. Given that few people understand the law and it is difficult to
register land given the laws complexities, there is the potential for people who currently believe their rights to land
are secure under community-based tenure systems, to start to question that security if an aggressive campaign to
implement the 1986 code is undertaken.
                                                  
7 Burundi is divided into 15 provinces, each of which is divided into communes (114 in all). Communes are
further divided into a total of 2,464 collines, which are the smallest administrative unit. Communes and collines
both fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.154
The second area where a policy dialogue may be needed is in the area of land fragmentation. This dialogue
would have to revolve around the dual areas of population growth and reform of the inheritance structure. The
population dialogue should center on verification through research of the economic consequences of
fragmentation, and the development of strategies for bringing population growth rates under control. There is a
need to review inheritance law to ascertain whether there are ways to minimize fragmentation of land at
inheritance. There are different mechanisms that could be introduced into the community-based tenure systems
that could help alleviate this problem; one possible approach would be rotational use of inherited land by the
inheritors
8. Progress in these areas must, however, await the alleviation of the conflict within the country.
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Agricultural production in the Comoros has been stagnant due to a political situation which alternates between
peace and extreme violence. A small number of landowners have title to the most productive land which they use
for export crops. The majority of the peasant farmers hold very small untitled and unregistered parcels. The
government seeks to achieve food security by diversifying the export crops, but self-sufficiency is unrealistic since
arable land is limited and the islands have one of the highest population densities in the world. No tenure reform
policy is currently being discussed.
National land policy and legal framework
Three islands, Grande Comore (Mjazidja), Mohéli (Mwali), and Anjouan (Nzwani), constitute the Federal
Islamic Republic of the Comoros. The republic also claims the French-administered island Mayotte (Maori), but
this island is not included in the nation’s 2,170 square km of land surface. One third of the land is arable, while an
additional 7% is meadow or pasture, and 16% is forest or woodland. Approximately 80% of the 549,338 people
live in rural areas, while an additional 100,000 Comorians live abroad.
The Comoros Islands have played an historic role in the region due to their strategic geographic location in
the Mozambique Channel between Madagascar and mainland Africa. Today, although agriculture employs 80%
of the work force, Comorians are able to produce only about 10% of their staple rice needs, and overall local
agricultural production does not provide half of local subsistence. The economy is dominated by export crops.
The Comoros lead the world in the production of ylang-ylang (a flower used in perfume) and are the second-
largest producers of vanilla. The present tenure situation in the Comoros islands is the result of hundreds of years
of foreign influences. The islands were populated through waves of immigration from East Africa, with the
addition of Muslim Arabs in the twelfth-to-fifteen centuries. The Muslims created sultanates and established
themselves as the local elites. Each island, however, has a unique settlement history, with Anjouan being the most
dominated by the land-holding Muslims, and Mohéli being the most affected by French colonial planters.
  In the nineteenth century, France assumed control first over Mayotte Island, and then extended protectorate
status to the other three islands by 1886. In 1912, France declared the Comoros a colony and established four
categories of land: 1) company concessions, which were the consolidated land holdings purchased from the local
French planter class and which accounted for approximately 35% of the archipelago’s total land surface; 2) state
land, which included most of the forests and mountainous areas; 3) the private estates of the Comorian
aristocracy, who were the descendants of the previous sultanate rulers; and 4) collectively held village reserves.
There were no provisions for peasant small land holdings.
With the majority of the arable lands controlled by the colonial companies and the Comorian aristocracy, the
Comorian peasants began demanding land from the colonial government as early as 1927. To maintain peace,
France forced Bambao, the largest land company, to surrender some land claims to Comorian peasants occupying
company-held land.
The French promoted a series of land reforms in the 1950s and 1960s. Villages were awarded legal
ownership to the land they occupied, and more company land was transferred to peasants. The best arable land,
however, was retained by Bambao. Although some additional land was made available to villages on a collective
basis, villages were not assured of long-term access. Tenure security was weak as policy changes shifted land
from the control of one village to another.156
In 1975, the Comoros declared unilateral independence from France, though Mayotte refused to secede and
today remains under French domain. Bambao at that time sold the majority of its company land to private foreign
and local elite landowners. A series of coups d’état in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have stalled the agrarian
reforms that were to accompany the establishment of the new nation. The 1975 five-year plan, for example, was
not published until February 1978. The scope of this plan included land reform and food self-sufficiency, but the
only enacted policy was the distribution of some small plots of idle company land to landless peasants. The new
regime that assumed power later in 1978 wrote a new constitution which included the right to, and protection of,
private property. The vestiges of the French colonial law continue to provide the texts for land ownership and
registry.
Today there are four basic categories of land in the Comoros: untitled land; titled land; State Domain; and
village reserves. Approximately 80% of the population holds small parcels (.8–1.5 hectares) without title. Most of
these parcels are held and managed through one of the island’s customary tenure systems, although the local qadi
(Muslim judge) may grant a “deed” to the land. Such deeds, which have been issued for about one quarter of
these small parcels, codify inheritance rights, but they do not secure individual ownership in the eyes of the state.
Large landholdings (635–5,000 hectares) constitute the second land category. These parcels are held by
either former French colonists (on Mohéli) or Comorian elites (on Anjouan). Large landholders possess land titles
from the colonial period that are respected by the present government.
Most non-arable land, forests, and some of the land from the colonial companies are held as State Domain.
The state claims control over this land through rights that were outlined by the colonial legal system. For the non-
arable land, the population respects the State’s exclusive management and use rights, but peasant farmer
invasions are common in the forests. Regarding the former colonial company land, the status of the State Domain
is also in question because the majority of these State-held parcels are occupied by squatter peasant farmers.
Village reserves constitute the fourth land category. The status of these reserves is varied and uncertain. In
older villages, particularly on Grande Comore, this land is held collectively by the village and cultivated by
extended families for only short-cycle crops. Such village reserves are held under customary law without a title.
For villages lacking traditional reserves, like most villages on Anjouan, the State has purchased land—often the
former colonial company land—and placed it at the villages’ disposal. How these newly created village reserves
are managed is unclear.
The government’s current policy direction regarding land is based upon the 1983-84 Economic and Social
Development Plan. This document held that progress in agricultural and the modernization of traditional
cultivation techniques could not be achieved until land users had more secure tenure rights. Although the
Comoros could be more agriculturally productive, the land could not be used optimally until more of the small
landholders are assured of their future use rights. Aside from promoting crop diversification, however, the
Comoros has not advanced this policy with supporting legislation. In the 1980s and 1990s, agricultural reform
frequently has been stalled by coups and changing governments.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Local tenure regimes in the Comoros vary by island as each island has a unique settlement and colonization
history. Nonetheless, customary land-holding and inheritance structures on each of the islands are loosely based
on Islamic law, overlaid on an island-specific system.
Grande Comore has been the least effected by Arab and colonial policies and land acquisitions. On this
island, for example, some land (manyahuli) is still inherited through one’s mother. Women decide which parcels
to bequeath to their daughters and sisters, as well as the size of each parcel. Women may not, however, sell this
land without the permission of her family, and then only if money is needed for a family cause (for example,
funeral or marriage). In practice, men manage manyahuli land because, according to the local interpretation of157
Islamic law, husbands own their wives and therefore their wives’ land. The land called manyahuli also exists on
Mohéli, but here it is “indivisible land”, owned jointly by the extended family.
On Anjouan, land is inherited through one’s father. The local tenure system on Anjouan has been
characterized as “feudal” because a few noble families of Arab descent historically controlled both the land and
the labor force. Brought from East Africa, agricultural laborers were established in hamlets surrounding the
nobles’ villages. Neither the present-day vestiges of these hamlets, nor the villages created by the colonial
companies, have village territories delimited by natural boundaries. The lack of such boundaries has proved
problematic as conflicts over land escalate with increasing population pressure. With about twenty families
owning 40 % of the arable land, social and economic inequality is more pronounced on Anjouan than on the other
islands.
The State formally recognizes only the land titles granted by the French to the colonial companies, and the
titles acquired by the few large Comorian landowners. The State seems willing to recognize the customary system
of community-based landholding in the village reserves, but no mechanism has been established to assign this
land permanently to particular villages. Local qadis claim the authority to grant land “deeds”, but the State does
not yet recognize these deeds as legally binding. Although the State maintains a policy of promoting the
development of private property, such deeds do not secure land holding to this extent. The status of women’s
inheritance rights, especially those that are unique to manyahuli land, is not currently a matter of national debate.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
With a high population growth rate and little local industry, the national economy is heavily dependent on
agriculture, particularly export crops. As almost all arable land is already in use, and as population pressures
mount, land fragmentation is increasingly a problem. Land holders have parcels either too small to be productive,
or too far apart to be worked effectively. Cultivators face greater competition for land to be used for both export
and staple crops. To address these problems, the government has proposed two solutions: 1) a vast birth control
program; and 2) more rational and intensive natural resource exploitation. The second initiative is directed at land
use and management, but it suggests no changes to land holding practices or legislation.
Food self-sufficiency has been a goal of almost every regime since independence. With the introduction of
commercial crops during the colonial era, many rice fields disappeared, especially on Mohéli. In 1988,
recognizing that with such a high population growth rate this goal was unrealistic, the government instead
announced a policy of food security. Food security means diversifying export products to insure the revenues
necessary to import food. Ideally, both staple and export crops will be more intensely cultivated, each on the land
most suited for that crop. Future food security initiatives ideally would promote both sustainable intensified
cultivation, which requires increased tenure security, and the coordination of small farmers whose individual
holdings are too small to make export crops profitable. Proposed food security measures do not seek to
redistribute the property of the few large land holders, nor do they promise to solidify the rights of the small land
holders.
Environmental problems common to all of the islands are not being addressed, largely because farmers use
rights are not secure. Comorian soils are mostly laterite, lack humus, and require careful attention if they are to
remain fertile. Grande Comore in particular has very little topsoil. Severe soil degradation and erosion results
from crop cultivation on slopes without adequate terracing, yet land users are unwilling to improve the land
without the guarantee that they will be able to return to the land in future years. With increasing population
pressure, land fragmentation is also a problem. Due to recent immigration from the other overpopulated islands,
especially Anjouan, land squatters are a recent phenomenon on Mohéli. This immigration, however, has also
spawned the development of land markets on Mohéli as some land owners have sold their parcels to recent158
arrivals. On Grande Comore, peasant farmers have begun cultivating more intensively land in the village reserves,
but without tenure security, they tend to do so without adequate soil-protection measures.
With very limited pasture on the islands, herding is insignificant. Most animals are for use in ceremonies
only, while the majority of the meat consumed on the islands is imported. Those few goats and cattle that are
reared on the island are corralled or staked.
Although the islands were once covered by primary evergreen rain forests, today little of these forests
survives. On Anjouan, the only extensive forest is on the slopes of Mount N’Tingui, which is too steep for
cultivation. Some forest still remains on Grande Comore on the slopes of Karthala volcano. This forest, however,
is being cut for timber, and since the underlying soil is fragile, the forest does not regrow. Mohéli, with the lowest
population density, is the most heavily wooded. Farmers there often strip the forest undergrowth to plant bananas,
leaving the canopy intact. While the State owns almost all forests, it recognizes villagers’ use rights to the forests.
These use rights are not clearly defined, however, and encroachment into the forests is a serious problem. On
Anjouan, the forest of Moya is nearly 100% occupied and broken up into parcels. On Grande Comore, the forest
of Grille is 95% occupied. Both reforestation and anti-erosion measures are being considered by the government,
but no specific actions have been proposed. There is no mention of possible forest co-management policies that
might include a peasant-State dialogue.
The Comoros’ role in the regional fishing industry has diminished over the past century, and today the
islands are a net importer of fish. The pollution of coastal waters threatens the few remaining fishermen.
Two possible avenues for increasing villager participation in tenure policy and natural resources
management have been identified in the literature. Both suggest adapting an existing village structure to promote
a more participatory and decentralized national tenure policy. The village reserves, for example, are local-level
land management units that could be incorporated into a national system, and could be invested with state-
sanctioned authority to distribute the land under their domain. Throughout the islands, and on Grande Comore
especially, there is also a system of social categories (hirimu) based upon whether or not one has sponsored or
participated in “the grand wedding.” This complex of marriage ceremonies and obligations confirms one’s local
economic, political, religious, and social status. As an existing village structure that can influence the inheritance
of manyahuli land, the hirimu could be the basis for a village land management “community.” No policy
developments, however, seem to be directed toward incorporating either the village reserves or the hirimu social
groupings into decentralization programs.
The manyahuli land presents an unique situation with regards to women’s tenure security. Presently, up to
one-quarter of all peasant-cultivated land is manyahuli land. While only about 20% of this land is registered,
women are reasonably certain of their future access to it. Yet while women have usufruct rights to manyahuli
land, men hold the management rights, deciding which crops to plant where and what portions of the land will be
available to the women. In particular, men maintain the right to manage and harvest cash crops from this land,
while women are left to plant staple crops. In areas were manyahuli land is scare, such as on Anjouan, women’s
guaranteed access to land is very limited. Women’s tenure security is also threatened by high divorce and
abandonment rate in the Comoros. Although a woman who remarries retains her manyahuli land and, therefore,
her access rights, the management rights to this land pass to her second husband. Such a change often brings
disastrous results for soil sustainability because crop rotations, fertilization regimes, and anti-erosion practices are
altered without regard to sustainability.
Present policy position and reform directions
The State currently recognizes that tenure reform is needed and that any such reform must accommodate the
tenure realities peculiar to each island. Different soil and water conditions, different customary tenure systems,
and different population pressures render each island unique. Beyond this recognition, however, little actual159
policy debate has been initiated. Although tenure conflicts have become more frequent and acute since
independence, the government has seen this as a largely demographic problem to be solved by limiting the
population growth and increasing agricultural productivity through improved farming techniques. Reforms
addressing land access, distribution, registration, or long-term management rights are not being discussed,
perhaps due to the frequent political instability.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
There are several opportunities for tenure reform initiatives in the Comoros. Any initiative should begin with a
nationwide study of the tenure systems currently operating on the different islands. Several issues must be
clarified before new policies can be proposed: 1) How have the colonial mechanisms for registering land been
incorporated into Comorian national legislation?; 2) What is the status of the deeds granted by local qadis? How
much tenure security do the people holding these deeds have? Can women acquire these deeds? Are the deeds an
avenue for establishing a nation-wide system of land registration with a decentralized arbitration structure?; 3)
How do the different customary systems interact with the national law? Can any aspects of these systems be
formally recognized under the present legislation?; 4) What is the legal status of the village reserves? Can the
villagers be assured of long-term access to this land? How does the village actually manage this land, and how
secure are individual farmers’ tenure security?; 5) How are people migrating within the archipelago acquiring
access to land, and how secure are their holdings?; 6) Outline clearly the rights of small landholders who are
squatting on the former colonial company land that is currently claimed as State Domain.
As a related programming initiative, the government may consider promoting the development of forestry
co-management since farmers already occupy most State forestland.
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With little arable land and almost no agricultural tradition, Djibouti has not extensively developed national
legislation regarding land tenure or natural resource management. Traditional tenure systems presently regulate
the distribution and use of grazing land throughout the countryside, while land titles are honored in Djibouti city.
The need for a codified system may escalate as pastoral nomads settle permanently in peri-urban areas, placing
greater strains upon the pastures and water sources. At present, however, no tenure reform is under consideration.
National land policy and legal framework
Most of Djibouti’s 421,320 people live in Djibouti city and other coastal towns. Approximately 9% of the 22,000
square kilometers are meadows and pastures, while the majority of the country is unable to support even sparse
vegetation. None of the dry desert territory is naturally arable land, although a few small gardens are today
irrigated.
Situated on the Horn of Africa where the Gulf of Aden meets the Red Sea, Djibouti is strategically located
for both commercial and military reasons. Accordingly, the Djibouti economy is based upon service activities
associated with the port at Djibouti city. Easily accessible to the world’s busiest shipping lanes and to the Arabian
oil fields, this port serves as the sea terminus for the Ethiopian railroad to Addis Ababa, as well as an
international transshipment and refueling center. Local industry is limited to dairy production and mineral-water
bottling, and with an unemployment rate of approximately 30%, the country is heavily dependent upon foreign
assistance. Having virtually no arable land, hot and arid Djibouti must import the majority of its food. Djibouti’s
main exports are live cattle, sheep, and goats, as well as tanned hides. Many pastoralists have lost their herds,
however, as Djibouti was severely affected by the droughts of 1983/84 and 1987/88. Salt, in almost inexhaustible
supply, is Djibouti’s only other exploitable resource.
Three-quarters of the population live in Djibouti city and the few other urban and peri-urban areas. The
remaining quarter of the population continues to pursue the traditional transhumant pastoralist lifestyle that
predominated in pre-colonial Djibouti. Both the Afar and Issa people are herders of camels, goats, and sheep. The
Afar, in the northern region of the country, are part of a larger Afar group located mostly in Ethiopia, while the
Issa, who live mostly in the south, are related to the Somalis of neighboring Somalia. In addition, approximately
25,000 Somali refugees currently reside in Djibouti. Many of these people have been in Djibouti since British
Somaliland merged with the Republic of Somalia in 1960.
The former French Territory of the Afars and Issas became a French colony in 1896, but France at first
devoted little attention to developing a system of local administration. In 1924–1925, the French passed two land
laws dividing the colony into public and private domains. Public land was defined as “vacant and ownerless.”
Private land fell into the categories of greater and less than 5,000 square meters. The larger parcels were sold at
public actions and titles were obtained. The smaller parcels, however, were assigned to landholders through
temporary grants from the governor. These grants could be transformed into permanent titles if the holder met the
requirements as outlined in the cahiers de charges. For small urban plots, for example, the landholder had to
erect a building within 2–3 years, while land destined for cultivation had to be planted within 5–6 years.
According to the 1956 Loi-cadre, the Territory of Afars and Issas replaced France as the holder of the
public domain, and a territorial assembly replaced the governor as the grantor of permanent titles. Neither the
policies of 1924–1925, nor the law of 1956, however, were ever seriously applied because they both conflicted161
with the realities of a nomadic lifestyle. A formal land tenure system was only ever established in Djibouti city
and Ambouli. The majority of the Djibouti interior remained untitled.
When Djibouti gained its independence on 27 June 1977, it retained the basis of the French civil law system.
Since approximately 94% of the population is Muslim, local legal practices also incorporate Islamic law.
Although a multiparty constitution was approved on 4 September 1992, the country continues to be ruled by the
People’s Progress Assembly (RPP) which holds all 65 seats in the national legislature. President Hassan Gouled
Aptidon, who has been in power since independence, was last reelected on 7 May 1993. With 75% of the
population living in urban areas, rural tenure issues are not at the forefront of the political agenda. Improving
agricultural output is a concern of the government, but realistically they do not expect ever to be self-sufficient.
The literature does not discuss current land tenure policies. Plots in Djibouti city seem to be titled, as are the
irrigated garden plots used for vegetable production in the smaller urban areas in the coastal plain nearby. The
rest of the country is probably unsurveyed and untitled. Land is held, used, and managed by extended family units
within a structure of Afar and Issa sultanates whereby customary rules govern access to pasture land and water
points. There is no mention that the Somali refugees contribute to land or resource-based tensions, perhaps
because these refugees are mostly in Djibouti city.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Indigenous tenure systems in Djibouti involve the rights to pasture land and water points. The Afar and the Issa
maintain similar customary tenure practices, both investing regional tenure control in tribal groups. Local tribal
units are subdivisions of the sultanates that have historically spanned Djibouti’s borders with Ethiopia and
Somalia. A portion of the land traditionally used for transhumant herding is assigned to each family within a
tribe. This land remains within a family, and the use rights are inherited by sons of successive generations. If a
family has no male heir, the tribal chief may choose to reallocate the land to other families.
Among the Afar, tribes are divided into noble and vassal groups. Noble tribes will cede to related vassal
tribes the use rights of pasture and water points in exchange for their support and services in the event of warfare.
Unrelated vassal tribes must borrow pasture land in exchange for a tribute payment.
The tribes of the Issa are less hierarchical than the Afar, and a larger portion of traditional Issa territory lies
outside of Djibouti’s contemporary borders. The head of an Issa family unit will decide when and where next to
move the herds, taking into account the current state of familial and/or friendly relations with other Issa families
whose lands he might traverse.
Since the Djibouti government consists of both Afar and Issa people, and since there are few crops to be
threatened by the pastoralists’ herds, there is no national tenure legislation that favors agriculturalists’ rights over
pastoralists’ rights. Unlike most African countries where pastoralists are disadvantaged by tenure codes that do
not recognize grazing as a productive use of the land, Djibouti upholds (or, with an absence of other legislation, it
at least does not contradict) the traditional tenure rights and management practices of pastoralists.
There is little pressure or concern to codify pastoralist grazing rights, or to title their tribal and family-based
landholdings, because the customary mechanisms of conflict resolution regarding pasture lands and water points
continue to function. Furthermore, due to the droughts of the 1980s and the draw of urban-based amenities and
services, there is an increasing trend towards sedentarization.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
At the time of independence in 1977, increasing the country’s agricultural capacity was a central concern of the
new government. The Ministry of Agriculture operates experimental irrigated perimeters with two objectives: 1)
to introduce agriculture to those pastoralists who lost their herds during the droughts; and 2) to provide extension162
training to those vegetable farmers already engaged in agriculture. The Ministry also experiments with new crop
species such as Jojoba (Simmondsia Chinensis) which may be suitable to Djibouti’s arid climate. There is no
specific accompanying legislation to encourage growth in the agricultural sector.
Djibouti’s agricultural potential is severely limited due to several factors. Insufficient and erratic rainfall
restricts food production to fruit and vegetable cultivation in irrigated plots and around wells. There are no
permanent surface watercourses in the country, and only a few lakes. These lakes, like much of the underground
water, have high mineral content, and much of the geo-thermic subsurface water is unsuitable for agriculture.
Occasional excessive rainfall causes flooding in low-lying areas and along the coast, but attempts to create
reservoirs using water-retaining dams have failed. Furthermore, since soil salinization is a problem, any irrigation
efforts must be monitored for sustainability.
Traditional agriculture consists of date plantations and small vegetable garden plots around springs and
wells. The majority of present-day cultivation occurs in the peri-urban centers along the coastal plain near
Djibouti city. Producing vegetables for sale in the city, private gardens are irrigated from drilled wells. These
gardens are run either by citizens of Djibouti city as a secondary activity, or by settled pastoralists who work the
gardens while other segments of their extended families tend herds of goats and sheep in the pasture land nearby.
Agricultural productivity is so radically constrained by the country’s physical circumstances that security of
tenure as a constraint to investment has received little attention.
Independent families, in accordance with tribal authorities and traditions, continue to manage the majority of
the grazing lands. Where water resources are scarce, regulation by intertribal agreements define customary rights.
Outside of these traditional management practices, however, sedentary herders now also independently manage
portions of grazing lands adjacent to urban areas, especially Djibouti city. Conflicts are emerging between the
transhumant and sedentary herders over some of the peri-urban pastures because the transhumant herders
generally migrate to this coastal plains region near Djibouti city during the dry season. From the transhumant
herders’ perspective, the sedentary herders are limiting their access to water sources and are overgrazing these
pastures, causing irreversible degradation as the desertification process is accelerated without even the sparsest
ground cover. Such conflicts are currently infrequent, but this situation could intensify as more herders establish
permanent residences near the city.
With very little vegetation and even fewer trees, Djibouti has no national forestry service. The only extensive
masses of vegetation exist on the steep slopes Mt. Mabla and Mt. Gouda, the two main peaks in the country. The
forest of Day on Mt. Gouda, in which grow dew-fed juniper, ficus, and jujube tress, is managed by the
commandant of Tadjoura cercle.
Fishing rights along Djibouti’s coast are currently unregulated since fishing is not a traditional activity for
either the Afars or the Issas. While a more extensive fishing sector could be developed, the limited fishing
practices already exceed local demand, and the waters are not productive enough to develop a commercial
industry.
The literature points to no striking connection between democratization, decentralization and land policy.
Political participation in the 1993 presidential elections was limited almost exclusively to Djibouti city,
decentralization seems far off. Despite the 1992 ruling to re-instate a multi-party system, at present the People’s
Progress Assembly (RPP) holds all 65 seats in the national legislature.
Gender issues are acute even by regional standards. The country’s clerics follow a local interpretation of
Islamic tradition that differs from Islamic inheritance practices elsewhere in the Muslim world, women do not
inherit land or land access. Men own the animal herds as well as the land. Women may possess a only few
animals from her dowry.163
Present policy position and reforms discussed
In the available literature, there is no discussion of tenure legislation debates or reforms in Djibouti. Likewise,
there are no pending changes in national natural resource management policies. The government is more focused
on possible agricultural projects which may attract foreign investment. The limited references do not speak of
how future projects would distribute newly productive land, perhaps because such land would encompass small
garden plots only. Large-scale agriculture is not foreseen. Legislation detailing more explicit conflict resolution
mechanisms would be appropriate as the number of sedentarized herders increases, but such legislation is not
being discussed.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
With little potential for growth in the agricultural sector, policy dialogue is limited. Nonetheless, a future initiative
could target peri-urban areas to be titled: 1) to prevent land disputes for non-migratory pasture and water rights;
and 2) to decelerate land degradation, due to over grazing, by establishing rotational grazing grounds.
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The biggest challenge currently facing the Government of Eritrea is the enormous task of reconstruction and
development of the war-torn and drought-ravaged economy. In an effort to create a uniform system of land tenure
throughout the country, a Land Proclamation was enacted in 1994, which declared all land to be the property of
the Eritrean Government. This decree abolished customary land tenure and substituted a state-designed system of
community-based tenure. The system is egalitarian and radically improves the terms of access to land by a
number of previously disadvantaged groups, especially women and pastoralist populations in the lowlands. It
aims to decrease the acute competition and confict over land, and to preserve the local participation in land
management which existed under custom. It provides individuals with lifetime rights of use, but it also places
more discretion over land in the hands of government land administrators than is warranted, given the experiences
of other countries. It remains to be seen whether the new system will provide landholders with adequate security
of tenure.
National policy and legal framework
Eritrea consists of a triangle of 420,000 square kilometers of land bound by Ethiopia on the south, by Sudan on
the west and the north, and on the east by the Red Sea. As of 1993 the population was estimated at 3,782,543.
The economy of Eritrea is based on subsistence agriculture, with more than 80% of the population engaged in
crop farming and animal production, although only 3% of the land is arable. Eritrea lies in the Sahelian rainfall
zone of Africa; consequently, agriculture is and has been vulnerable to frequent years of drought, especially in the
last twenty or so years.
With the colonization of Eritrea by Italy in 1890, the first laws regarding land tenure were put into place.
Land was expropriated by the colonial administration, and, despite strong opposition from Eritreans, land
expropriation continued under the British Administration after World War II. In the Eritrean lowlands, the
colonial government legislated in 1909 that the low-lying plains--land located below 800 meters altitude (over
50% of the country) were declared as state lands. This applied to some other parts of the country as well,
including land along river courses and other fertile areas. The state-owned lands remained as such throughout the
Italian, British and Ethiopian.
In 1994, the year after Eritrean independence, the Eritrean Land Proclamation (Gazette of Eritrean Laws,
Vol.4, No.6) declared all land to be the property of the Eritrean Government. [At this writing, no official English
translation exists, and here reliance is placed on less unofficial renderings of its import.) Any claim to land,
therefore, now has to be legally ascertained with permission of the government, which reserves the right to
determine the proper usage and management of the land. Every Eritrean citizen is entitled to land usufruct with
regard to agricultural and/or residential land, and people can not maintain a usufruct right to land in more than
one area. This right is equally applicable to anyone regardless of gender, belief and/or ethnicity. To obtain land
for residential and/or agricultural use, an Eritrean citizen must apply to the regional office of the Land
Administrative Body. A plot of land distributed by usufruct right can not be sold or given as a gift to others, but
can be leased to another resident with the approval of the local Land Administrative Body. The village now has
no collective claim to its former farming area, though it still controls its own grazing areas, woodlands, and water
rights, subject to government review or intervention if the need arises.165
Excess land is the government’s property. There is to be a standard measurement for equal land distribution
for agricultural use depending on the particularity of the region. Distributed land is to be registered in the user’s
name, and the user has the right to use the land as long as s/he lives. Land is not inherited, nor may it be sold. On
the death of a holder, his heirs have priority for the parcel and may apply to the community to receive it. Once
awarded to them, it is for them to work out how they will divide it among themselves.
If the user does not use agricultural land within two years of distribution, however, it will be expropriated by
the government. Similarly, if a villager moves, the land allocated to him/her will be given back to the government.
These laws do not apply to those who have been authorized and licensed by the government to use land for
modern agriculture, industry, tourism or other forms of capital investment.
The Land Proclamation declares all the rules and systems of land tenure given by colonizers and/or
liberation movements—as well as existing village boundaries—to be null and void. In regions where the
proclamation is not yet implemented, the existing civil law and traditional tenure system will continue to function
as a transitional system.
The problem of land and the lack of uniformity in the tenure system has been identified by the government of
Eritrea as one of the main problems facing it. In particular, the existence of community-based tenure systems in
the highlands and government ownership in the lowlands present difficulties for creation of a uniform system of
landownership throughout the country and, consequently, in effecting developmental policies. The Government
has stopped the allocation of land for commercial farming in pastoralist areas. Some pastoralist groups have
asked for and received areas of land for commercial farming.
There is also the problem of urban development. The towns and cities of Eritrea are facing an acute housing
shortage as a result of refugees returning home after the war, areas being designated for government offices,
industrial and services development, and so forth. Thus, the demand for large amounts of urban land has been
very high. To meet this demand, land is being taken from outlying villagers, which are urgently trying to protect
their identity as original land owners.
The process of developing an effective, efficient, and inexpensive method of registering both rural and urban
land is also a major problem. There are no proper systems of measurement and registration, either of deeds or
titles of lands. No land records exist apart from the tax registers, which contain no reliable detail on land with
regard to location, and are generally fragmented, incomplete and inconsistent. The position and boundaries of any
particular parcel of village land can be located only after an inquiry has been made to determine what land is
under individual title and what falls under the ownership of the whole village. Procedures for dealing with land
issues are cumbersome; disputes have historically been numerous and lengthy, and the cost in terms of time and
money is considerable.
Security of tenure is in principle protected under the new laws. Government is committed to the provision of
non-monetary compensation where land is taken, for instance through provision of alternative land or shares of
ownership in the enterprise for which it is taken. Such compensation can be inadequate in a peasant society, and
only time will tell whether local communities will accept the fairness of this approach.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Four systems of tenure have dominated Eritrean society. Community-based or village ownership—diessa—is the
most prevalent system of land tenure in the highlands. Under diessa, every member of the village community has
the same usufruct rights to the land. To ensure a degree of fairness, diessa land is divided into different categories
according to its fertility and, in theory, land of each quality is distributed among village members periodically
(generally every five to eight years). Redistributions have been infrequent in recent decades, in part due to the
war. Pastureland is left open for use by the community. Diessa land is never sold or inherited. 166
Under family ownership—risti—only the members of the extended family have usufruct rights to the land.
Individual members are given land which their offspring have the right to inherit. This system falls short of
private ownership because the right to dispose of risti land is the prerogative of the family unit and not of the
individual user. Although women as well as men can inherit risti land, in practice only men are involved with
decision-making procedures. For example, risti land could not be sold without the consent of all the male
members of the family.
Italian colonial land policy favored diessa, replacing risti with it in the provinces of Akelle-Guzai and
Hamassien. The Derg’s land reforms abolished risti in the one province in which it still predominated, Serae. The
Eritean govenment is thus implementing its reforms on a fairly uniform diessa base.
The third type of tenure—”domeniale” (that appropriated by the Italian Administration between 1890 and
1941 and retained as state land by subsequent governments)—refers to the large tracts of fertile land that were
confiscated from the Eritrean people by colonial regimes. These lands are not subject to sale, and are leased
mainly to agricultural capitalists and rich farmers. Finally, tribal ownership was prevalent in the lowland areas
where nomadism prevails; here, too, one historically found more pronounced feudal relationships. Although the
land was theoretically owned by the entire tribe, an aristocratic class of dominant families imposed heavy dues on
some pastoral peoples.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Eritrean agriculture has traditionally been characterized by very low productivity, at only a subsistence level.
With the onslaught of war and drought, the agricultural sector’s established mechanisms of production and
distribution in addition to almost all of the country’s infrastructure have been destroyed. The chronic problems of
poverty, hunger and unemployment among the rural population, however, will need to be addressed to ensure
access to land for those who do not have capital with which to invest beyond a level of subsistence food
production. The recent tenure reform reflects government’s desire to give priority to the achievement and
maintenance of an adequate and reliable agricultural food supply for local consumption.
It is less clear whether the new tenure system will provide the security of tenure necessary for investment in
agriculture. This will depend to a large extent on how land administration officials exercise their considerable
authority under the law. In the short run, the zeal which informed the struggle for independence will probably
avoid possible abuses, but as that zeal wanes, as it must over time, more rigorous protection for property rights
may be needed. In addition, it is not clear whether the tenure system will provide adequate scope for more
efficient farmers to get access to a larger share of land, which is important if productivity is to be increased.
There has been a long history of extensive deforestation in the highlands, and trees are widely recognized as
a scarce and valuable resource. Although members are allowed to cut trees for their own construction needs, they
are prohibited from cutting trees for the purposes of selling wood and charcoal in urban areas, and are expected to
use only dry wood for their fuel needs. Many villages, particularly those in high density areas, attempt to reduce
overgrazing by preventing cattle—with the exception of milk-cows and plow-oxen—from grazing in village lands
during certain months of the year. In addition, villagers fallow some land in order to restore its vegetation and
fertility. Terracing and grass stripping along parcel boundaries are also practiced—especially in the highlands—o
prevent soil erosion. Enforcement of these traditional conservation measures varies, but in most cases it has been
loosely organized and patrolled. All members are responsible for stopping violators if they happen to see them.
The worsening economic hardships in the countryside as a result of the war, however, as well as the growing
demand for charcoal and wood in urban areas as a result of population growth, have led many people to cut trees
without planting replacements and/or paying compensation to the village. Along with the new system of tenure set
forth in the Land Proclamation, therefore, the government needs to put forth a plan to manage natural resources,167
especially since rainfall is so irregular and scarce, erosion is prevalent and much of the land’s vegetative cover
has been destroyed.
In peasant-dominated economies, successful and sustained development is not likely to occur without the
transformation of the subsistence sector. Moreover, a genuine democratization of the country requires that the
peasantry’s not only have access to resources, but also the power to influence management. The fact that the
country’s Land Proclamation declares the government the ultimate authority in all land issues seems to undermine
this very notion.
The need for democracy with regard to resource control is a pressing issue in Eritrea at the present time. The
hardships the country has faced during colonialism and Ethiopian oppression have served to fuel land disputes, a
problem under the customary tenure systems. It will be necessary to overcome not only traditional social and
economic structures that are exploitative and negligent of the peasantry, but a traditional bureaucratic paternalism
which may be given new life by a “vanguard” mentality. 
Women were not well treated under the various forms of traditional land tenure. In the diessa tenure system,
land was owned only by men; women had access to land ownership only insofar as they are wives. They had no
right to participate in the redistribution of diessa land. Women were in theory entitled to equal shares on risti
land, and women did in fact own risti, though a minority of women and in small amounts. Women have been able
to receive an equal share of land under the land reforms carried out by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, and
the Land Proclamation explicitly states that every Eritrean citizen is entitled to land usufruct with regard to
agricultural and/or residential land, regardless of gender. Each household thus receives at least two pieces of
farmland, one for the husband and one for the wife. In case of the dissolution of the marriage, each takes their
land with them out of the marriage.
This is the single most impressive reform of land tenure for gender equality in Africa in our time. The reform
was at the insistance of the EPLF. A third of combattants in the liberation army had been women, and the party
considered the issue of gender equality non-negotiatiable in its discussion of tenure policy with local communities,
where there was substantial opposition to the change. The great popular confidence in the TPLF in the wake of
acheivement of independence made it possible for this reform to go forward.
Present policy position and reform directions
It is easy to understand the Eritrean government’s concern to unify existing systems of land tenure, due to the
chaos during the past 30 years or more. But it appears to have acheived that uniformity by increasing state
controls over land and lessening the strong traditional community rights in the highlands. Even within the
highlands, the new land laws affect risti and diessa land holders differently. The law has important levelling
mplications in risti areas. Large risti owners face a loss of land because risti rights to land in different areas
simultaneously will no longer be recognized. They will now be allocated land in only a single community, and the
possibility of expanding land access by descent claims elsewhere will be foreclosed.
Interregional disparities due to different land resource endowments will continue to pose a challenge. These
problems are probably better addressed by focusing non-agricultural development in areas disadvantaged in terms
of land resources, rather than attempting to redistribute the land resource. In the short term, policy makers need to
find more effective approaches to manage conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists stemming from the
encroachment of crop production into traditional grazing.
In spite of all its positive features, there is a concern that the reform places too much confidence in the
integrity of land administrators, and too little emphasis on strong, defensible property rights for producers. The
reform is so recent that it seems likely that the next several years will see no major changes, but rather an
accumulation of experience under the new system and fine tuning of its provisions. There will be time to judge
whether the concerns expressed here are justified.168
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Government has embarked upon an ambitious project for construction of a unform ternure system for the entire
country. The system is still developing, and it may prove capable of producing tenure security necessary to small
and medium-scale commercial farming. Perhaps the most important needs are to ensure adequate monitoring of
implementation of the system and its impacts, and rigorous investigation of any reported abuses. There is a need
to ensure that productivity concerns receive a priority comparable with that given to equity concerns. It is
important that broad access to land be preserved, but it is equally important that more efficient producers be able
to expand their holdings.
The new land law grants government discretion in managing land which possesses the potential for serious
abuses. That potential is fortunately not likely to be realized in the near future because government’s cadres are
drawn largely from the disciplined and idealistic participants in the struggle for independence, but it bears
watching in the future.
Given the intense pressure on land in Eritrea’s highlands, it is important to stress that the problem of the
shortage of arable land cannot be solved by tenure change. Only the development of land productivity through
extension and investment, plus the gradual outflow of labor into alternative employment, can overcome the
problem of shortage of arable land.
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The Derg after the 1974 Revolution achieved genuine land reform by replacing extensive landlord holdings and
share tenancy in southern Ethiopia with a pattern of smallholder agriculture in which land access was managed
by local peasant associations. Soon, however, the government undermined autonomous peasant association
control of land, and since the fall of the Derg, many conflicting land claims are surfacing. The Transitional
Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was faced with creating a system of tenure that meets diverse demands of
displaced and forcibly resettled populations and rural people tired of land redistributions. The 1995 Constitution
of the Federal Democratic Republic declares all land state owned, and government statements envisage a system
of leaseholds from the ethnically based state governments. It seems likely that the different states will develop
coherent land policies at very different rates, and that there is a potential for constructive experimentation with
tenure options in the different states. There is, however, also an unfortunate potential for patterns similar to those
under the Derg to emerge, in which de facto one-party governments at state level come to control the peasant
associations and use control over access to land to enforce political conformity.
National policy and legal framework
Ethiopia is one of the largest countries in the horn of Africa, constituting 1.2 million square kilometers. As of
1984, the human population was estimated at 42.2 million. A population projection based on the 1984 census
showed a population of 59.9 by 1995 with an annual growth rate of 3%. The lowlands, which cover some 61% of
the national land area, are home to only 12% of the human population who are largely engaged in extensive
livestock herding and opportunistic cultivation. Most of Ethiopia’s inhabitants are cultivators living on the high,
broken, central plateau that rises between 6,000–15,000 feet above sea level.
The smallholder agricultural sector comprises 90% of the population and occupy about 95% of the available
arable and pasture land. Far from being homogeneous, Ethiopians exhibit great diversity of language, ethnicity,
mode of livelihood, social organization and religion; these differences are greatly reflected in land tenure,
especially between the peoples of the north and the south.
The land tenure system in southern Ethiopia before the 1974 Revolution was perhaps the most intricate and
hierarchical of any country in Africa, being the product of the interaction of local tenure arrangements with both
the central imperial regime. Much of the land was held in large estates by members of the nobility, and farmed by
tenants who were often the original inhabitants of the area. There were also concerns about community-based
tenure systems in northern Ethiopia and the tax-farming tenures which existed on top of them. By the 1960s it had
become clear that the existing land tenure systems were the single greatest obstacle to agricultural development.
The new military government (the Derg) which seized power in 1974, gave priority to the need for land
reform. On 5 March 1975, all rural lands were nationalized, placed under state ownership and referred to as the
collective property of the Ethiopian people. The land reform aimed to free the masses of the rural population from
oppression and exploitation by the landed classes and to promote economic development. Social justice, equality
and development were to be attained through the “public ownership” of land.
The reform was sought to bring about equity in holding size among rural farmers. Implementation of the
land reform began with the formation of Peasant Associations (PAs). Land distribution committees in every PA
allocated land to each household on the basis of criteria agreed upon by the community. In most PAs, land
redistribution was based on family size and availability of land. The reform provided usufructuary rights to rural170
land to all farmers/willing persons, with a maximum of 10 hectares per household, though usually much less than
10 hectares was received. Groups previously discriminated against in land areas, such as Muslims in the
highlands, received access to land. Households were eligible to get land in their residential areas only. When the
association’s pool of unallocated land was exhausted, new claimants were assigned land alienated from peasants
considered to have more than their fair share, or from grazing or marginal land. The sale, lease, transfer,
exchange and inheritance of land to other persons was prohibited. In addition, the use of hired labor was
prohibited, except by widowed, old or sick persons, or dependent children.
Although the Derg initially implemented a land-to-the-tiller reform, it moved on to promote collectivization,
villagization, forced resettlement, compulsory grain procurement, and control of grain marketing and pricing.
Producer cooperatives (PCs) were created in some areas, primarily in southern Ethiopia, and were seen by
government as models for eventual generalization. They were expected to become the chief source of food grain
by the mid-1990s. Membership was voluntary, but the best land in each community as well as valuable natural
resources were reserved for PCs, and those who did not join could be relocated to marginal land.  As a result, PCs
were extremely unpopular among the surrounding peasantry.
State farms were also created. Often these were on existing state land, but local communities often had
historic claims to this land.. State-managed land was in four sub-sectors: State Farms; State Coffee and Tea
Farms; Wildlife Conservation Areas and State Forest Conservation Areas. Some displacement did take place; one
estimate is that 90,683 local farmers covering a total area of about 176,708 hectares were displaced. Since the
new government came to power, many of the dislocated farmers have been returning to their original land,
claiming their original holdings on the state farms. There are reports of extensive encroachment by local farmers
of state-owned land throughout the country.
The reform accomplished laudable equity objectives, and in the peasant associations provided the country
for the first time with a nationally uniform system of local government. Collectivization and state farm
production, while quite limited in scope (less than 10% of farmland), were costly and inefficient. The beneficiaries
of the reform did not receive secure titles, but were subjected to repeated redistribution of land to accommodate
new claimants, which had the net effect of diminishing individual possessions. Repeated redistribution also gave
reduced tenure security. The extractive programs of the Derg, including compulsory acquisition of quotas of their
production at below-market prices, impoverished peasant households and extended and deepened rural poverty.
Furthermore, the implementation of most rural reform programs was highly authoritarian and top-down, with
very little room for local participation or feedback. This top-down approach along with the coercion and control
of the rural population/production eventually undermined the government’s agrarian programs.
From the outset, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia leaned toward state ownership of land involving
rights of usufruct for households, arguing that land is “collective property” and should remain under state control.
The international community has urged private ownership of land and a freer land market. The Ministry of
Agriculture’s 1992 paper on agricultural policy proposed that land remain owned by the government, subject to
the following admonitions: (1) in the smallholder sector, redistributions should be suspended, holdings inherited or
leased, hired labor can be used, and farmers are to have full freedom of disposition of their production; (2) future
resettlement is to be halted, given the ethnic tensions created by earlier forced resettlement; and (3) commercial
farms are to be established by private individuals and companies, with the land provided by government on
concession in such a way as not to affect the land rights of local people. The 1995 Constitution in Article 40
protects rights of private property and allows it taking by the state only with compensation, but while such
property includes buildings and other improvements to land, it does not include land itself. All urban and rural
land and all other natural resources are declared to be owned only by the state. Farmers and pastoralists are
declared to have a right to free use of land, Land may not be sold or otherwise transferred, though houses and
other improvements may be sold. Government may lease land to private investors, without prejudice to the171
people’s rights to land. The Constitution makes the federal ethnically-based regions responsible for the
administration of land, and revenue legislation makes the regional governments the beneficiaries of the land tax.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure systems
Prior to the 1974 Revolution and subsequent land reform, community-based systems of tenure referred to as rist,
were widespread in northern Ethiopia. The most common system, the rist system, conferred rights according to
inheritance from “first settlers.” Rist land could not be sold or mortgaged but could be leased and inherited by
children. Descent from these ancestors could be traced in both the male and female lines (ambilineal descent),
giving men and women extensive potential rist claims, only a small portion of which could usually be realized.
Powerful and influential individuals could significantly expand their landholdings by successful assertion of
claims and litigation to realize previously dormant claims to land.
The size of most holdings ranged from a fraction of a hectare to 4 or 5 hectares and could include parcels in
more than one community. It has been argued that security in access to land was guaranteed in rist systems of
tenure, although land fragmentation and diminution of holding sizes were prevalent features of the system.
Fragmentation of holdings exists when a household has several different parcels of land in scattered throughout a
region. This was often the case under rist tenure systems, because households realized several land claims at
once—each of which was based on a different line of descent in the ambilineal descent system.
Some researchers have suggested that reformers may have placed too much emphasis on the claim that land
fragmentation under the rist system resulted in inefficient land-use. Such claims are founded on the belief that
small and odd shaped parcels make plowing difficult, time spent traveling between plots is wasted, and that
scattered plots prevents the introduction of technology. Purposeful or planned fragmentation, however, is an
adaptive measure which provides protection against risk, uncertainty, and poverty. Ethiopian peasants prefer
having dispersed plots because they are able to exploit different micro-ecologies, grow a wider variety of crops,
and reduce the risk of complete crop failure.
In the southern core areas, by contrast, a majority of farming households worked as sharecropping tenants
of a landlord class of northern elites. Access to the use of land owned by landlords was secured as long as the
tenant agreed to pay the required rent and other services as required by the landlord. However, tenure insecurity
was high and eviction easy, since most lease agreements were verbal and the landlord had the right to terminate
the lease at any time. Evictions became common in the last decades of the imperial regime, when mechanization
of farming on the large holdings increased. Overall, this area was characterized by a very unequal distribution of
land and great inequalities of status and security. The need for reform of these tenure arrangements became a
major force behind the 1974 Revolution.
In the more peripheral areas of the empire, tribal groups and pastoralists continued to use land and pasture
under more or less indigenous arrangements except where disturbed by government or private development
initiatives.
As the new state government establish the rudiments of land administration, it appears that the system of
peasant associations may prevail and provide an element of continuity between the old and new systems. There
are few indications of any inclination to return to customary tenure forms in the areas affected by the land reform,
and it can be said that indigenous tenure systems have been largely replaced by new community-based tenure
systems. Those community-based tenure systems, to the extent that they are relatively informal and the
community is in effective control, may in a relatively short time be internalized in a fashion normally associated
with customary tenure systems.172
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Smallholder agriculture is of overwhelming significance for the food security and welfare of Ethiopia’s people,
the growth of its economy and the quality of its environment. About 80% of the nation’s households depend
entirely or primarily on peasant agriculture or pastoral activities for their livelihood. These households occupy
about 95% of the available pasture and arable land. Agriculture accounts for about 45% of the GDP and 85% of
foreign exchange earnings. Because of poor transportation, a lack of economic diversification, and the scarcity of
off-farm employment, access to arable land and/or pasture remains a primary determinant of income and food
security for a majority of Ethiopia’s rural households.
There is an ongoing debate over whether in the post-Dergue era smallholders have adequate security of land
tenure. The Transitional Government initially suspended land redistributions by the PAs, and farmers have
enjoyed a “honeymoon” during which price controls have been remove and government has more or less pursued
a hands-off policy with regard to land. But there are indications, including clear statements by some regional
governments such as that of Oromia, that land redistributions will be reinstituted in the near future, at least in
some areas, to deal with growing numbers of young and landless households and to remedy injustices under the
previous government.
If Ethiopian farmers come to believe that their access to particular parcels of land is insecure, this will
discourage investments in multi-year soil improvement and conservation measures. In addition to tenure
insecurity, low and unreliable farm-gate prices, the high cost of inputs, and risk of crop failure preclude
investment as well. There is evidence of increasing sharecropping, cash rental contracts, illegal sale and other
arrangements to secure land—practices which seek to adjust landholdings to household labor and capital
endowments. Several of the regions are beginning to experiment with concessions of extensive areas of former
state farm land to commercial producers. There is still a tendency in government to associate higher productivity
with “modern”, large-scale agriculture, and to ignore the potential in smallholder agriculture for more efficient
and profitable farming.
The 1975 reform often left rules concerning grazing land untouched. In some communities there is common
pasture from which nonmembers are excluded. Such land is usually managed as a commons, and use of the
resource is regulated by members of the community. In some communities, restrictions are put on the number of
livestock that one can send in, but in others there are no such limits, and as a result, overgrazing is the norm in
such areas. Grazing lands have also been reduced in the last decade due to the need for additional farmland. Such
resources are always under pressure from neighboring farmers who try to push the boundaries of their fields into
the pasture. In the 1980s, community forestry and hill closures for reforestation also reduced pastureland.
In the forest sector, the Derg nationalized all indigenous forests. Policy strongly favored state and collective
forestry and discouraged individual tree planting on household land. State forestry included all large-scale
plantations over 80 hectares which were off-limits to all peasants. Community forestry on the other hand referred
to all trees planted on common land and was aimed at meeting the needs of the communities. In theory,
community forests belonged to the communities on whose land the trees were grown and the peasants were
entitled to harvest the plantations for their use. In practice, however, the tenure issue was never satisfactorily
resolved, and peasants were not confident that the trees on their community lands belonged to them. In addition,
community forests were often reclassified as belonging to the state or handed over to cooperatives. Due to state
policy and tenure insecurity, peasants were often unwilling to plant trees on their household farm plots. Today,
however, with suspension of the redistributions, individual tree planting has become very popular in many parts
of the country. Trees are planted as fencing or windbreaks, in between plots, or on land around the house which is
not used for crops or vegetables.
The 1975 land reform was administered at the grassroots level by the PAs, which were chiefly responsible
for land distribution. The PAs at the outset were fairly democratic in nature; each had an executive committee173
elected by the adult members of the general assembly. Besides the creation of PAs, reform legislation empowered
peasants to create their own judicial tribunals and militia organizations. These institutions were to be used as
channels of participation and communication between the state and the rural population. But the PA officials
gradually became resented implementers of central government’s extractive policies, including military
conscription. The principle of local governance still remains strong in many of these communities, with the PAs
being reorganized after the fall of the Derg. These represent an important potential for grassroots democracy.
The 1974 land reform left issues of women’s tenure in land largely unresolved. Single women with
households (widows and divorcees) were usually given land as PA members. Households received land according
to formulas that counted household members, including wives, but for practical purposes vested the land in the
male head of household. Some reports indicate that in case of divorce women could claim a share of their
husband’s land, proportional to the number of children who stayed with them. Conflicts arose in Muslim regions
when husbands tried to claim land by registering each of their wives as members in PAs.
The reform worsened women’s rights in some ways. Women who had controlled land as rist, freehold, or
through other prerevolutionary tenures, lost it. Those who did not own any land before the revolution benefited
only as members of households. Although it has been widely accepted that Ethiopian women are an important
force in agriculture and the rural economy, very little attention has been paid to the issue of women’s rights of
access to resources. Female-headed households are the most disadvantaged group in the rural areas, and there are
large numbers of such households due to the war. Today, female membership in PAs may be as high as 20–25%.
In the most recent land distribution in Tigray and some areas in Wello and Amhara, wives were allocated
their own holdings alongside those of their husbands, but it is not clear whether this trend will become more
generalized in the future.
Present policy position and reforms directions
Ethiopia is currently wrestling with a complex set of issues growing out of one of the world’s most successful (in
distributional terms) land reforms. The new government has shown a reluctance to abandon the 20 year-old
policy that nationalized the rural lands previously held by smallholders, commercial farmers and feudal landlords.
Pending establishment of effective state land administrations, landholders are experiencing a freedom from
official interference in the short term, but long-term uncertainty as to the status of their rights to land. Because of
the divergent interests in each community, the issue of future land redistribution will be a difficult one for the state
governments. There are many competing claimants: previous occupants who lost land during the redistributions
of the Derg period, those who benefited from land reform (former tenants, poor peasants, and the landless), those
who were displaced by the war, and the burgeoning younger generation.
The Oromia State Government has stated that it is considering a major, if selective, reallocation of land in
the region. This may be expected in other regions, as they seek to deal with new households and past injustices.
There is in fact considerable dissatisfaction in many communities with the current pattern of distribution of land,
because of political inequities under the previous regime and because a new generation of the holders’ children
(defined as “landless” in Ethiopia) are seeking allocations independent of their parents, whose land they are
currently farming. A reallocation would challenge Oromia officials with applying the constitutional guarantee of
equal right for women, but it is not yet clear whether they would consider separate allocations to husbands and
wives as in the land redistributions in Tigray after the Derg was driven out. Reallocation may provide new state
governments with an opportunity to build new political constituencies, but they will find that land reallocation can
easily breed dissatisfaction, not gratitude. Depending on how such reallocations are handled, the negative impact
of such reallocations on security of tenure may be long-lasting.
Since Ethiopia is embarking on the road toward a market economy, there is some feeling among the
country’s professional and technical experts in favor of private ownership, and external experts have recommend174
this, especially given the prevalence of ownership in much of the country prior to the 1974 revolution. In view of
the peasantry’s experience under the Derg, any form of tenure that allows the state to retain a measure of power
over peasant sources of livelihood will be resented. State ownership of land creates temptations, as a system of
administrative allocation of the valuable land resource provides fertile ground for corruption of the land
administrators. Experience in other countries in Africa and elsewhere has indicated that state ownership of land
can result in dispossession of peasants in favor of political and urban elites, or simply in favor of other peasants
who support the government of the day. This is a real danger given the de facto one-party government in most of
the regional governments.
But many in the present government argue that a land market under freehold tenure would concentrate rural
land the hands of a few, and could possibly create political tension in areas of different ethnic groups. They
believe that tenure security can be guaranteed through long-term leasehold agreements. That freehold is
associated with land concentration is unsurprising given the extensive land concentration in southern Ethiopia
prior to the 1974 Revolution, though that concentration was in fact created through state grants of conquered
territory rather than market forces.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The distribution of land established in the land reforms since 1974 has great potential for agricultural growth if
the governments build upon it effectively. An adequate appreciation of the potential of smallholder agriculture
must be promoted, especially since it will be at least another generation before any significant part of the rural
population can be absorbed by the industrial and commercial agricultural sectors. Rural land is the only
subsistence asset for the farming population, and landholders need enhanced security of tenure.
While it is clear that the initiative in land tenure policy has shifted from the central to the state governments,
there is a need to have an institution at national level which is responsible for tracking developments in this critical
area. Central government, as guarantor of constitutional rights, still has clear responsibilities in this arena. There
is also an urgent need for training in land administration at both national and regional levels.
The immediate future of land tenure in Ethiopia promises to be varied and confusing. It seems unlikely that
there will be major adjustments at national level, and over the next few years the new state governments will find
their feet in land administration and make their first forays into planning and land reallocation. It is particularly
important that these processes be monitored and understood, and the learning shared among the regions.
Presently, there is a lack of information from the field, and it is important that studies be undertaken to ascertain:
(1) Are there are evolving market or other redistributional mechanisms acceptable to governments which can
reduce insecurity of tenure by avoiding periodic reallocation of land?
(2) How is the transition affecting women’s access to land in different regions?
(3) Where, how, and to what extent are ethnicity and/or religious factors affecting access to land and security of
tenure in this new period of ethnically-based regions?
(4) What exactly is the present role of the peasant association (PA) in regulating access to land, water,  pasture
and trees?
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As one of the first countries in Africa to undergo a comprehensive land tenure reform, Kenya is the best studied
example of a large-scale planned conversion from indigenous land tenure to private ownership on the western
model. The lessons learned have raised questions about several assumptions broadly held about tenure and
development, such as whether privatization necessarily leads to better access to credit or enhances tenure security,
particularly for women. Most recently, violent ethnic conflict rooted in acquisitions of land through the land
market which have enhanced land access by some ethnic groups as the expense of others. Unable to turn back the
clock, what remains to be seen is whether Kenya can develop more imaginative tenure strategies for the arid
regions to which registration has not yet been extended, and policies which will moderate unanticipated results of
the tenure conversions in the rainfed farming areas of Kenya.
National policy and legal framework
The 580,367 square kilometers of Kenya accommodate a population of 27,343,000 (1994), which is subject to
one of the highest growth rates in the world, estimated between 3.9 and 4.1%. While the vast majority of its
citizens are farmers, only about 20% of its land is suitable for cultivation. Kenya thus has an extremely dense
agricultural population of 4.5 per arable hectare.
Kenya’s rural population is a mixture of farmers, agropastoralists, and pastoralists. Farmers are
concentrated in the fertile Rift Valley, Central Province areas, and coastal plains of Kenya, and include the
Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya tribes among others Agropastoralists, who raise livestock in combination with
cultivating crops, occupy more marginal areas while nomadic pastoralists populate the arid and semi-arid regions
of the north and northwest as well as parts of the lower Rift Valley and Central Province.
Prior to and during much of the colonial period, land tenure in Kenya was governed at the community level.
Most of Kenya’s ethnic groups have patrilineal systems with land passed down from males to their sons. In more
land abundant days, land was passed from the father to his youngest son while older sons acquired unoccupied
lands. Land allocation decisions were the domain of clan or lineage elders. Once land was conferred on an
individual, it became inheritable and remained within his family indefinitely. Land sales were not sanctioned as
land was identified with the community and equated with one’s subsistence and the social security of one’s
children.
White settlers, who arrived during the early part of the century, were provided with large tracts of Kenya’s
best lands under Crown grants, in freehold. Meanwhile, indigenous populations were moved onto reserves of
poorer lands to be operated under customary tenure and were subject to several statutory restrictions, including
prohibition from cultivating cash crops. The poor economic conditions of the crowded reserves coupled with the
stripping of their land and political rights were key catalysts of the Mau Mau rebellion of 1953. In response to the
crisis, the British devised a plan to remove the former restrictions on African farmers and launch a campaign to
register their land under individual titles. This strategy of creating politically stable “yeoman farmers” was
outlined in the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 and was subsequently incorporated into law. Initially opposed by
African nationalists, they embraced the program after independence. It continues to be the cornerstone of Kenya
land policy today, making Kenya unique in the scope of its conversion to freehold.176
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
The land tenure reform was initiated with several objectives and expected benefits. The overriding interests at
conception were increasing Kenya’s agriculture production while securing colonial political interests through the
creation of an elite class of African farmer whose interests would uphold privatization and market economies. It
was purported that the conversion to individualized property would foster the emergence of land markets whereby
more efficient farmers would accumulate large tracts of land from less efficient farmers and cultivate the land
more productively. Those made landless would serve as a labor supply, both in the rural and urban sectors.
Several other arguments for stimulating agricultural performance were put forth and included:
¤ replacing customary systems and individualizing land would offer increased tenure security to farmers by
removing communities’ stake in land;
¤ provision of titles would allow farmers to utilize them as security for agricultural loans thereby fostering
investment in improvements, such as fertilizer and mechanized inputs;
¤ reducing land fragmentation and subdivision through land consolidation at the time of titling and establishing
local land control boards to monitor land transfers so as to prevent these practices. The rationale was to
ensure that parcels remained an economically viable size and farmers did not incur efficiency costs associated
with allocating farm labor and capital to fragmented plots;
¤ mitigating the incidence of land disputes over boundaries through adjudication and documentation of legal
holdings; and
¤ inducing investment in export crops, such as coffee and tea. and progress toward a more market oriented
economy.
However, these objectives met with limited success and in many cases, severe repercussions ensued from the
implementation of the registration process, which involved adjudication by committees of elders, demarcation of
boundaries and title registration. The downside effects of the reform were not realized in isolation, however, but
were also caused by high population pressures, growing land scarcity, and expanding commercialization of
agriculture.
With respect to the tenure security objective, colonists misinterpreted customary systems and did not
appreciate their individualized nature. Rather, they mistakenly assumed that title possession would allow farmers
to have greater confidence in their land holdings. The risk control function of community tenure systems was also
overlooked whereby members can make more economic use of the community’s land, knowing others are
available to help them meet their needs in case of shortfall.
Access to credit, marketed as a primary benefit of the reform, was largely unrealized by smallholders due to
both supply and demand constraints. Many farmers feared using their titles to obtain credit would result in losing
their land if they found themselves unable to repay. Smallholders’ limited access to markets also lessens their
demand for credit. Government programs subsidizing inputs and capital target large farms which are also more
likely to be focal points for infrastructure improvements, giving them better access to markets. On the lender side,
the smaller loans needed by poor farmers are not attractive to banks given their high transaction costs and
perceived higher risk. Financial institutions have further experienced difficulty in foreclosing on unpaid loans,
overwhelmed by community pressure to protect the holdings of its members.
Fragmentation and subdivision of parcels persisted. This was largely due to the tightly held values instilled
by customary tenure systems and in spite of the role of land control boards, which evolved into a rubber stamp
for most land transactions. Under increasing land scarcity, families are compelled to distribute land equally
among their sons, knowing other rural income earning opportunities are virtually non-existent. Although widely
believed by government policymakers to involve high efficiency costs, the traditional process of cultivating177
scattered parcels of land is often rooted in the economic rationality of minimizing the spread of crop diseases
while taking advantage of various soil types and microclimates suited to different crops.
For some, the fear of not getting permission to transfer title on subdivided or fragmented lands has led to
noncompliance with the registry requirement. However, the cost of registering one’s land is by far the overriding
factor behind the breakdown of the registry system which now stands grossly out of date for many areas. For the
smallholder, the expense of registration fees, bribes and travel to the district capital is prohibitive (estimated to
match the cost of several weeks wages for an agricultural laborer) and particularly not justified when weighed
against the limited benefits of title possession for the smallholder.
Small farmers subject to land disputes frequently suffer land losses either because they cannot afford
litigation or they must sell other land to finance litigation. During the adjudication process, small farmers
frequently lost out to wealthier individuals since they did not have the financial means to lobby for their interests.
Ethnic group preference also played into this equation. As a result, land rights held under customary tenure were
altered with registration. The incidence of disputes decreased immediately following the reform, but soon rose to
exceed pre-reform level and now includes disputes over ownership in addition to boundaries.
As land scarcity grew and land took on value as a commodity, many with the means to do so began
accumulating land. Land buying companies formed, selling parcels of land to members. Many individuals
invested for speculative purposes with no intention of farming their purchase. Unlike for smallholders, titles
procure greater access to credit for the more financially secure.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
The emergence of land markets as a result of registration has been less than anticipated. Among many ethnic
groups, such as the Luo living in the Lake Victoria Basin, customary rules continue to govern much of the way
land is administered and land sales are discouraged or restricted. Where populations are particularly dense, the
small size of landholdings discourage many farmers from relinquishing their means of subsistence in the face of
limited income alternatives. To the extent that they do occur, landlessness tends to be the result. In less dense
areas, land sales have shifted land between ethnic groups and aroused resentment toward tribes able to benefit
from the market, namely the Kikuyu. The incidence of landlessness continues to rise as small farmers are
compelled by their poverty to sell land to meet immediate cash needs, resorting to either agricultural labor or
urban migration to earn an income.
Pastoralists engaged in livestock rearing occupy much of the 80% of Kenya’s remaining land, which is arid
and semi-arid and largely unsuitable for cultivation. Populations are sparse in the north and northwest regions of
Kenya although the drylands east and south of Nairobi, home to the nomadic Masai, are subject to growing
population pressures from farmers moving into the region. Many have obtained land through membership in
“land companies,” joining together to purchase land, then subdividing it. In the drier regions, herders tend to be
nomadic while semi-arid regions make it agropastoralist practices possible. Despite their migratory patterns,
pastoral kinship groups tend to establish community rights over particular grazing lands as commons and
resources such as water. Although members may not hold exclusionary rights, the common interests of the group
motivate resource conservation.
The wave of land tenure reform in Kenya included pastoralists, it having been argued that the grazing
activities of pastoralists contributed to land degradation and desertification of the drylands. Failure to understand
the true nature of community rights over land, and mistaking them for open access, led to “tragedy of the
commons” notions that rampant exploitation of land would take place in lieu of private interests in its
sustainability. Thus measures were undertaken to assign pastoralists to group lands and award them group titles
with the belief that they would be used as collateral to obtain loans. By restricting their movement, it was argued
that more intensive and ecologically sound pasture management practices could be imparted to the pastoralists.178
Contrary to their stated intentions, group ranches intensified land degradation and crippled productivity through
undermining the very nature of pastoralism. No longer able to rotate their herds seasonally to more
accommodating land, overgrazing worsened and subsequent droughts caused massive herd losses.
Among the Masai, who occupy territory in the Central Province, many lost land as settlement schemes were
corrupted by government officials registering dedicated lands in their own names as well as their families and
friends. This enabled them to use the titles to obtain loans they had no intention of repaying. Numerous disputes
in the Masai community over land assignments and outsider appropriations have led to hostilities within the
community and resentment toward the government.
Perhaps the most acute tenure problem currently faced by the Kenyan government concerns the conflicts
which have emerged between the Masai in the lower Rift Valley and their Kikuyu neighbors. The post
independence departure of white settlers gave rise to resettlement schemes in some of Kenya’s most fertile
agricultural land, in particular the Rift Valley area west of Nairobi. Much of this land was allotted to and
purchased by the more affluent Kikuyu as large cooperative and commercial farms. Mounting land pressures,
however, prompted many Kikuyu to seek land in neighboring regions, including those occupied by the
agropastoral Kalenjin to the north and nomadic Masai to the south. In the case of the latter, Kikuyu entered into
agreements with the Masai to purchase or rent their land. Initially, relative land availability in the area allowed
Masai to move their livestock to the arid areas during the rainy season while moving their herds to graze on
Kikuyu post harvest cropland in the dry season. With growing competition for land resources, however, Kikuyu
have attempted to restrict Masai access to their land. In turn, Masai accuse Kikuyu of tricking them into
accepting unfavorable terms in exchange for their land. The result has been sporadic, yet escalating violence
aimed at driving out the Kikuyu. Government has been reluctant to interfere for fear of alienating key officials of
Masai origin and intensifying the conflict.
The government’s role in Kenya’s recent history of ethnic conflict raise serious questions concerning the
country’s level of political freedom. The Kenya African National Unity (KANU) party led by President Daniel
arap Moi came under stern international criticism for its manipulative tactics designed to undermine multiparty
elections in December 1992.
The clashes which took place between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu tribes occupying the lower Rift Valley
are widely believed to have been instigated by the Kalenjin dominated government. Historically, tensions have
brewed between the two groups stemming from the acquisition of Kalenjin land by the wealthier Kikuyu.
Nevertheless, relations between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin remained stable. With the introduction of multiparty
politics in 1991 and the division of parties along tribal lines, opportunity opened up for the ruling party of
President Moi to secure its power through aggravating the tensions to the level tribal war. Part of the objective
was to weaken the opposition party voter base in his home province in preparation for the December 1992
election. This is widely believed to have been achieved by government recruitment of individuals to pose as
Kalenjin and raid Kikuyu land, driving them out of the Valley. The guise thus stimulated real ethnic conflict as
estimates of 2,500 were killed while upwards of 200,000, mainly Kikuyu, were displaced from their homes. Moi
used the episode to blame the emergence of the multiparty system for the conflict and managed to win the
December 1992 elections by a narrow margin. Realization of the actual cause of the conflict has calmed tensions
and allowed Kikuyus to return to their land although resentment continues to fester and the future of their
relations is uncertain.
Land issues are undoubtedly a sensitive topic, given their roots in political corruption and tribal favoritism.
Policy debate on land tenure will likely be highly constrained, especially when one considers the numerous
officials who have benefited from national government authority over land administration.
The impact of tenure reform on women in Kenya cannot be overstated. While certainly not equitably treated
under customary tenure systems, women could be assured of use rights to land through their husbands or179
mothers-in-law upon marriage. Women’s interests and contributions to the community were factored into its
tenure rules and land allocation decisions. The process of land registration, however, effectively eclipsed the
recognition of women’s rights to land by excluding them from the adjudication process and conferring title to the
male head of household. 
The result has been substantially weaker tenure security for women. Many cases have documented the
incidence of men selling or mortgaging land against their wives’ wishes, often without even consulting them. Land
use decisions are also governed by men to the extent that women’s food crops are marginalized and forced to be
cultivated more intensively on poor soils. Women’s lack of tenure security furthermore embodies serious
implications for Kenya’s agriculture production and economic development objectives as the continued urban
migration of males leaves women to manage farms over which they have no rights.
Food security is integrally linked to women’s tenure security, and these have waned considerably under
privatization. Women’s agricultural labor is the primary contributor to meeting family subsistence needs. The
trend toward cash crop production and the demand for women’s labor has compromised the time she may devote
to tending food crops. With less land available, women are forced to employ more intense and ecologically
unsound cultivation. They must also resort to the market to supplement their subsistence needs where women’s
lack of income and fluctuating cereal prices constrain their capacity to sufficiently provide for family nutrition
needs. Among the female labor dominated coffee societies of the Murang District, women protested their lack of
control over their earnings by withdrawing their labor and crippling production. In response, the coffee societies
encouraged the opening of joint husband and wife checking accounts. Given women’s dominant role in
agricultural production, Kenya’s economic future and food security depends on recognizing women’s
contributions and providing them opportunities to enhance their roles.
The incidence of drought and continued ethnic clashes pose repeated threats to food security as well. During
the 1992 crisis, the expulsion of Kikuyu from their lands caused both food and commercial agriculture production
to drop significantly, resulting in shortages.
Present policy position and reforms
The success or failure of Kenya’s land tenure reform is hotly contested, though most studies tend to conclude it
has failed to meet expectations. The current situation is characterized by inaccurate land registries, widening land
distribution gaps, gender discrimination, shrinking food production, landlessness accompanied by swelling urban
populations, and threats to pastoral communities. In the case of the Masai and Kikuyu, land competition has
escalated to violent proportions. While it is unlikely that the reform can bear full responsibility for these problems
in the face of increasing population and cash crop production trends, the policy may have exacerbated by
disrupting systems which had provided important safety nets. While the clock cannot be turned back, a
reevaluation of the strategies is critical to avert further economic disparity and social unrest among Kenyans and
to avoid an uncritical transfer of the Kenyan reform model to other countries in Africa.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
At the risk of further bloodshed and displacement, it is imperative to focus attention the growing ethnic conflicts
over land. In the case of the Masai and Kikuyu, face to face negotiation need to take place among their respective
leaders. Innovative dispute settlement approaches need to be brought into play. Reciprocal agreements could
possibly be worked out to once again permit Masai seasonal access to croplands for grazing their livestock.
The role of women as key agents of economic development at the micro level implies a need to enhance their
control over the resources they manage and have an interest in, land and income from agriculture production.
Requiring that land be titled jointly in both the husband’s and wife’s may be one way to encourage this evolution.
Land sale and mortgages should also require both spouses’ in person consent and signature.180
Greater registration compliance could be achieved by making it more affordable through the establishment
of more decentralized registration facilities governed by local authorities and fee structures based on the amount
of land being registered.
Risk constitutes an underlying reason for much of the lack of small farm productivity. The reliance on
agriculture to meet their survival needs requires them to sacrifice high production strategies in order to curtail risk
of crop loss. A better appreciation of the rationale behind such practices is essential to designing effective means
to increase production without simultaneously undermining social security.
The creation of low-cost village credit schemes may offer an alternative to classic mortgage secured lending
which have failed to reach rural smallholders. These need not be sponsored by the government. Where
communities are cohesive, such schemes can be organized at that level supported by member savings.  It is
possible to design separate schemes for women to ensure their credit priorities are addressed.
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by Stephen Leisz
Executive summary
There are short-term and long-term critical issues relating to land tenure in Rwanda. The short-term critical issue
concerns the resettlement of refugees from two different periods. The Government of Rwanda needs to determine
which group of refugees will be provided with control of disputed land, those who reclaim land after up to 35
years in exile, or those who were displaced from land during the recent fighting and change of government.
Long-term critical issues relate to land fragmentation and the conservation of the country’s natural resource
base. Both of these issues are the product of a high population growth rate, high population density, and an
inheritance system that divides a man’s fields amongst his sons. There are few alternatives to agriculture as a
livelihood in Rwanda, and, over the years, the country’s governments have been committed to a policy of
equitable access to land for agricultural purposes. This policy was given legal standing in 1976, and recent
proposed agricultural reforms still support this position. However, this policy may also be contributing to
increasing land fragmentation and increasing degradation of the country’s natural resource base.
National policy and legal framework
Rwanda is a country of approximately 26,338 square kilometers. It is one of the most densely populated countries
in the world, with an estimated 300 people per square kilometer in 1994. In 1934, the first year that a census was
reported, there were 1,595,000 people in the country. This grew to a reported 7.16 million in the last official
census in 1991. The annual population increase, based on calculations from 1980 to 1991, is 3%. If the
population continues to increase at the present rate, it is estimated that there will be nearly 30 million people in the
country by 2050.
Ninety-five percent of the population lives in the rural areas of the country and earns its living from farming.
Given that virtually all arable land is already under cultivation, it is forecast that there will be increasing problems
with land availability in the future, increasing pressure to clear remaining forests for agricultural use, and
increasing problems of land degradation. In 1991 the average farm size, nationally, was 1.2 hectares. However, in
some regions the average size was less than 0.6 hectare, and as farming practices encourage one farmer to
simultaneously use fields in different areas of a community’s territory, field sizes are often 0.15 hectare.
There are three basic types of land tenure in Rwanda:
(1) community-based tenure systems, which recognize peoples’ rights to land according to land tenure systems
that are enforced by local communities;
(2) rights to land that are supported through written law and are dependent upon the registration of the land with
the state; and
(3) State lands.
This collection of interlinking tenure systems comes out of a history of land tenure reforms dating back to colonial
times. After independence the Rwandan Constitution of 1962 recognized these tenure reforms as binding. The
constitution underlined the belief that (1) lands occupied by original inhabitants, that is, as recognized by a
community-based tenure system, were to remain in that person’s possession; (2) all unoccupied lands belonged to
the state; (3) all sales or gifts of land had to be approved by the Territorial Governor; and (4) land belonging to
persons, or institutions such as churches, who were not original inhabitants had to be registered with the state.
These were the guiding principles of the state’s tenure laws until 1976.182
In 1976 the only post-independence legislation concerning land tenure was passed. This legislation had the
following four main provisions:
(1) all lands not appropriated according to written law belong to the State;
(2) lands subject to community-based laws (also referred to as customary law), or rights of occupation granted
legally, cannot be sold without the prior permission of the Minister for Agriculture, Herding, and Forests, and
after the Communal Council has given an opinion on the transaction;
(3) the Minister can only grant such permission if (a) the seller has at least 2 hectares of land remaining, and (b)
the buyer does not possess more than 2 hectares of land; and
(4) contraventions of the previous provisions are punishable by a fine of 500 to 2000 francs and the loss of
customary rights or rights of occupation of the land.
The 1976 law further solidified the government’s position that the state legally protects possession of land
claimed through community-based tenure rules. Thus, the types of land “ownership” officially recognized are: (1)
lands claimed under community-based tenure systems (approximately 90% of the land in the country); (2) lands
claimed through registration with the state (mostly land found in urban areas, and land granted to churches,
missions, and some NGOs); (3) State land such as national parks, roadways, and riverways; and (4) paysannats.
Paysannats are areas of land that were settled according to a colonial and, later, independent government
plan. Originally paysannats were located in uninhabited or sparsely inhabited areas and were set up to provide
land to farmers who, because of traditional patron-client situations, or other circumstances, did not have adequate
land for farming.
9 People who gained land under the paysannat system had to agree to farm the land in a certain
manner, and utilize the extension services that are made available to them. The paysannat system guarantees men
and women equal access to land. Women heads of household who have land under the paysannats make up the
majority of women who “own” land in the country. There are also paysannat-like areas of recently drained
swamps (marais), formerly used as pasture but now under cultivation for potatoes, in which local officials
allocate land to users, usually local residents.
Under both the Constitution of 1962 and the Land Law of 1976, all sales or gifts of land must be approved
by the Minister of Agriculture, Herding, and Forests, who is also responsible for land. Paysannat settlement is
administered by the same ministry. The Registrar of Land Titles is responsible for the registration of land titles in
urban and rural areas.
Land markets, both those encouraged by state laws and those present under the different community-based
tenure systems, are officially regulated by the state. According to these laws sellers of land must have more than 2
hectares of land at their disposal, and buyers must possess less than 2 hectares. However, there are many young
farmers who only have access to a minimal amount of land through the traditional methods of inheritance or land
gifts, and there are few landholders who possess more than 2 hectares of land. This situation lends itself to
strategies for getting around the state’s laws regulating land sales. Ways that these laws are avoided include,
gaining the tacit understanding of the local communal council that a sale by an owner of less than 2 hectares is
acceptable, not reporting sales or gifts, and informal renting of fields. With the use of these strategies land
markets are very active in much of Rwanda.
                                                  
9 Adequate land for farming was determined as being between 1.5–2.0 hectares. For the paysannat schemes plots
were divided so that each farmer had 2.0 hectares at his or her disposal for agricultural purposes. This determination also
influences the government’s policies on land sales noted in the 1976 law. It should be noted that marais areas (drained
swamps formerly used for pasture) have also been settled for farming purposes under the paysannat program.183
Land that is not occupied or currently claimed is under the jurisdiction of the state. In cases where this land
is forested, management falls to the Ministry of Agriculture, Herding and Forests. National Parkland is under the
ORTPN (Organization de Récréation, Tourisme, et Parc Nationale). In these areas there are limits as to the
cutting of trees and harvesting of forest goods. Given the population pressures and the lack of arable land within
the country it is difficult for government officials to adequately protect forested areas, and it is becoming
increasingly difficult to adequately protect the national parks.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
A great deal has been written on the division of Rwandan society between Tutsi and Hutu and on the cleavage
and consequences of this division. To simplify the problem for the purpose of this brief survey, let it merely be
pointed out that in the pre-colonial period the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage was not absolute nor as central in the society
as it became in the colonial period. Chiefs were more likely, but not necessarily, to be Tutsi than Hutu, and clients
and subjects were more often Hutu than Tutsi. Although pastoralists were usually Tutsi and agriculturalists
Hutu, the categories were not exclusive and it was possible for a person to “move” between being a Tutsi or Hutu
depending upon the community where he lived. Furthermore, it appears that the terms Hutu and Tutsi were not
widely used to define individuals’ status and memberships during the pre-colonial period as they were later to
become.
The settlement pattern in Rwanda, as in neighboring Burundi, is one of dispersed households rather than
small villages. These households are scattered on the hills, with the fields belonging to each household (rugo)
normally found on the same hill. Although the household is generally comprised of a nuclear family and the
farming unit is this small family group, the land itself is considered belonging to the lineage, descendants of the
man who first claimed and cleared it.
Under the traditional system of land tenure, both for Tutsi and Hutu, land was (and is) inheritable, passed
from father to sons. Only when a man died without male heirs would the land revert to the wider lineage, and the
chief of the lineage, usually the eldest male, would then reallocate the fields and other lands within the lineage. As
long as land was plentiful the system of land tenure and inheritance posed few problems. Indeed, outsiders might
be absorbed into the lineage with grants of land or taken on as clients. On most hills the settlement pattern was
mixed, with agriculturalists and pastoralists coexisting and exchanging products. Land was not set aside for
exclusive use as crop land or pasture. A section of pasture might be lent out for cultivation or fallow land given
over for grazing for a period of time.
A second pattern of land tenure and relations was superimposed on this one as the central Rwandan
kingdom expanded in the nineteenth century. Whereas in earlier years there were a number of chiefdoms and
small kingdoms that from time to time came under the control of the central Rwandan kingdom, at this time the
mwami (king) sought to establish a more permanent authority over these areas through the appointment of his
own men as chiefs.
Under the colonial rule of first the Germans (1897–1916) and then the Belgians, the process of
centralization was consolidated and extended. Governing under a colonial system of indirect rule, the
administrative chiefs became the agents of the colonial regime, and their powers to allocate land and muster
corvée labor (forced labor for the government) were even greater than before. Whereas earlier the limits to their
powers were the amount of force they could employ and the need for at least a modicum of local acquiescence,
now it was the central, European authorities that sanctioned their rule. Furthermore, the new chiefs were
established in the northern areas of the country where centralized rule had not been imposed. The effect was to
further diminish the authority of the lineage chiefs and to give greater impetus to the establishment of hierarchical
ties between patron and client: a powerful and influential patron might intercede on his client’s behalf and perhaps184
act to temper the authority of the chief. Land tenure, as other economic and social relations, became increasingly
individualized, and the collectivity of the lineage exercised less and less authority.
The colonial system, with its reliance on the authority of chiefs and its perception that Tutsis were the
appropriate group to exercise power set in place a system that opposed Hutus and Tutsi. The result by the end of
the 1950s was a society polarized between ruler and ruled. The result of this was the revolution of 1959, in which
the Tutsi chiefs were overthrown, and the subsequent events that led to the massacre of many Tutsi and to the
exodus of thousands who survived.
Besides being recognized by state law, little change has taken place within the different community-based
tenure systems found in Rwanda’s country side. Over 90% of the land is still under these systems and they are
similar to the general historical case outlined above. Rights to land are recognized as being obtained by either
clearing, inheriting or buying the land. Little clearing of land goes on today, though there are a few areas where
immigration is taking place and people are claiming rights to land through clearing. Inheritance of rights is more
common and is still from father to sons. All sons are given equal shares of the fields, thus leading to
fragmentation of fields. Land is bought as outlined in the previous section on land markets.
Access to land through renting does take place under the community-based tenure systems, though it is rare.
Some sources suggest that in recent years renting is becoming a more common phenomenon as sons who have
inherited little land attempt to rent land in order to increase their access to agricultural fields.
In general the community-based land tenure systems and the state land tenure system are compatible. State
law recognizes the legitimacy of land rights under community-based systems. Even under the draft agricultural
reform laws proposed in 1991 (and as far as can be determined, not acted on) there is no call for the replacement
of community-based tenure systems. It appears that the spirit of the states laws recognizing and enforcing land
rights granted under community-based systems will be carried into the future.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
In general it should be noted that the largest constraint on development in Rwanda is the uncertain tenure situation
of people displaced due to the war and the recent change in government. While the preceding sections outline the
general land tenure situation in Rwanda up to the events of 1994, it is not clear how the situation has changed
since then.
The current land tenure systems tacitly encourage land fragmentation. Even though the state laws officially
encourage holdings of no less than 2 hectares, the reality is that, through the inheritance laws and customs, land is
fragmented as it is divided among sons, and even field sizes have become increasingly small as individual fields
are divided between inheritors. Land tenure security does not appear to be a problem for most Rwandan farmers
as the different systems guaranteeing rights and access to land are accepted and enforced, but fragmentation acts
as a check on the adoption of agricultural innovations and investment. Innovation is limited because farmers do
not have excess land on which to try, for them, unproved methods. Monetary investment is limited as farmers’
land holdings are to small for banks to accept them as collateral for loans and lend to farmers.
In general the security conferred by existing land tenure systems is not a factor in the conservation of the
natural resource base. Rather, (1) the need to use fields year in and year out, (2) the pressure for increased access
to new land sources and other pressures engendered from a population that is growing beyond the natural
resource base’s carrying capacity, and (3) the recent renewal of civil war and the subsequent change in
government seem to be the biggest constraints on the sustainable management of the natural resource base. The
civil war has its base in the competition for resources and undermines the tenure system.
Of the above-noted constraints, the civil war that has ravaged Rwanda since independence is the gravest
problem. In the past, the search for enemy soldiers, and the desire to limit cover, has resulted in the destruction of185
whole forest areas. Also, land mines, and other booby-traps, left behind by soldiers from both sides present a
danger to animals and people in and around Rwanda’s national parks.
The fact that the state land tenure laws recognize the legitimacy of community-based land tenure systems
already encourages a certain level of local participation in the resolution of land tenure issues. This is the case
because it is much easier for local people to participate in local decision-making processes than it is for them to
influence edicts from a centralized government. As with all cases of democratization, though, there is a need for
checks and balances so that local tenure issues that impact on national concerns can be resolved at the proper
level of government.
While land tenure systems encourage a certain level of tenure security, the war has undermined legality and
threatens to create tenure security problems in Rwanda. This and other issues related to the land limit both
economic growth and food security. The most pressing of these other issues is the displacement of almost 2
million people since the war began.
  Other long-term problems influencing both economic growth and food security are the twin issues of land
fragmentation and overpopulation. In recent years only one prefecture of the country has achieved food security,
and this prefecture did this by providing a higher than average hectarage per farm ratio than the remainder of the
country through the destruction of its forests. As there is now little land left to clear for agricultural purposes, the
food security situation will only get worse.
The Rwandan Constitution of 1978 guarantees equality under law to both sexes. However, under customary
law women have no right to inherit land or land rights from either her father or her husband. If her husband dies
and she has children, the woman has land rights through her children. If she has no children, she must return to
her father’s household in order to have access to the land. Under customary law, women do not have the right to
buy land.
The only access that women, in general, and female heads of households, in specific, have to land is through
settlement on government-sponsored paysannats. These schemes offer women the same rights to men regarding
access to and use of land.
Present policy position and reforms
The government of Rwanda has a clear policy to encourage the equitable distribution of land to its citizens for
agricultural purposes. At the same time, through regulating land markets, it is attempting to combat land
fragmentation of its arable land. With regard to conservation, the government is attempting to conserve what
remaining forest lands are left and also encourage reforestation in order to fight land degradation.
At this point the government has not clarified its policy towards the most pressing, short-term, tenure issue it
faces, the resettlement of the different waves of refugees, from 1960 to the present, who are currently making
their way back into the country, or who shortly will be.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
There is a need to support policies that decrease rates of land fragmentation in the country, that lead to land
tenure security, and that can decrease potential conflicts between the returning refugees. Given Rwanda’s limited
resource base and conflictual relationships between some of the Hutu and Tutsi, the best policy positions may not
be immediately evident.
Regarding land tenure security, the best policy is to continue to support government positions that lend
themselves to the conciliatory relationship between state land tenure laws and community-based tenure systems’
rules.186
In the case of land fragmentation, there is the need to support government efforts to control population
growth and decrease the fragmentational effect of inheritance traditions. Policy decisions may have to be made as
to which is more desirable, equitable access and control of agricultural land, or the ability of individuals to
accumulate adequate amounts of land so that they can produce large enough harvests to guarantee food security.
On the question of the resettlement of two different groups of refugees, from two different time periods,
government policies must urgently clarify who will be resettled, if compensation will be paid to those who lose
land, and, if so, who will be compensated. It will be a delicate matter whether the newly disposed should be
compensated in favor of those who lost land decades ago, or whether those who lost land decades ago should be
compensated in favor of those who recently lost land. With this issue there are other factors that may play into the
equation, such as the questions of war crimes and whether or not the recently displaced will return.
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by Jyoti Subramanian
Executive summary
The conflict over access to productive resources in Somalia is rooted in the historical process of land occupation
and expropriation by the Somali state and its governing elites, as well as in large-scale demographic shifts, such
as resettlement of refugees from the northwest in 1974, and changing market conditions. It can also be traced to
the power relations in Somali society (typically expressed in terms of balances of power among clans), which
have had and continue to have the ability to acquire and allocate the means of subsistence. The struggle for land
was intensified with the passage of the Agricultural Land Law of 1975, which transferred control over all Somali
land to the state. Despite the laws, community-based tenure systems continue to regulate access to land in all
parts of the country. With the collapse of the Somali state, there appears to be a broad reversion to customary
practices for allocation and control of land, but little reliable information is available. Any future reconstruction
of national land policy will need to build upon customary, community-based tenure to a far greater extent than in
the past.
National policy and legal framework
Somalia occupies a land area of 637,540 square kilometers and as of 1993, has a population of roughly
8,050,000. (There are widely divergent recent population estimates, including estimates as low as 5.4 million as
of 1995; the basis for these estimates is not clear, and the pre-collapse figures will be used here.) It is largely hot
and dry throughout the year, with sparse rainfall except at higher elevations. Only 13% of Somalia’s land is
arable, of which only 8% has been cultivated. Livestock production is the primary economic activity in the
country, comprising approximately 50% of the gross domestic products and more than 80% of the export
revenue. About 55% of the national population participates in nomadic pastoralism and 80% is engaged in
livestock raising of some kind.
The first efforts to regulate tenure were made by Italian colonizers at the turn of the century, but the impact
of those laws was largely limited to the taking of land for urban development and for white settlement in the river
valleys. The Agricultural Land Law of 1975 was the first land tenure legislation after independence. The law
officially transferred control of all Somali land from traditional authorities to the Government of Somalia
Democratic Republic (GSDR). Individuals desiring access to land were forced to register their holdings within 6
months of the passage of the law. According to the law, landholders are permitted to register limited amounts of
land as state leaseholds or concessions, with usufructuary rights for up to fifty years, with the possibility of
renewal. One concession can be obtained per individual/family, for up to 30 hectares of irrigated land, 60 hectares
of rain-fed land and 100 hectares of banana plantations. The government can revoke a concession that exceeds
size restrictions, is used for non-agricultural purposes, is not used productively, is unnecessarily fragmented, is
transferred, or is not farmed for two successive years. There are no transactions allowed under statutory law.
Cooperatives and state farms received preferential access to land in the registration process, particularly in terms
of leasehold size, number, and duration of lease. Registration was most active in the Shabelle and Jubba river
valleys, where irrigation is possible.
The land law does not recognize the customary rules and procedures of the indigenous institutions that still
govern access to land, and weak legal enforcement resulted in disparities between statutory tenure and actual land
use and allocation. Many farmers bought, sold and rented land, and ownership above allowed ceilings was
common, as were multiple parcel holdings. Individuals circumvented restrictions against multiple parcel holdings
by registering leases in the name of sons, daughters, and wives.188
The conflict between statutory and community-based tenure intensified the struggle for resources in
Somalia. These struggles are grounded in multiple contexts; the main areas of contestation are local (community
membership), regional (rural-urban linkages and pastoral-agricultural interactions), and state or national
(government policy, legal and administrative structures). Intersecting all three arenas are the politics of ethnicity
and class.
Competition over productive resources occurred on many fronts in Somalia’s recent history, but it was
unquestionably in the settled farming districts of the south that the struggle was most intense and most disruptive
to ordinary life. Where land becomes scarce, communities seek to exclude outsider land claims. But now there
was strong government interest in local resources that previously had been relatively unimportant to them. The
privileged access of those at the center of power to the institutional mechanisms through which land could be
registered gave them a tremendous advantage in laying claim to valuable resources.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Within community-based tenure systems, access to, rights to, and/or control over land is most often dependent
upon one’s social identity. Land can be acquired by individual clearing, inheritance, request from the village
council, by purchase or by gift. Transactions are not entirely matters between the parties, and may require
approval by community elders, especially if the transferee is an outsider. Landholdings have many of the
characteristics of private property, and as a result, tenure security—provided by communal recognition of land
ownership--has been high.
Systems of community-based tenure in Somalia have been created in response to an unpredictable
environment. Nomadic pastoralism is one such example, where survival is increased by subsisting on more than
one type of land under different climatic conditions. Community-based tenure varies with land quality; oftentimes
land suitable only for grazing is overseen by the clan as a whole, while land which produces regularly is
controlled by individuals to whom use-rights have been allocated. Land left in bush (uncultivated) by a farmer
cannot be claimed by anyone else unless it is clear that the farmer intends to abandon the parcel. The right to bush
land is a critical aspect of community-based land tenure, because such land is crucial in terms of population
growth, inheritance, and the need to offset potential soil fertility losses on cultivated land.
The land law sought to transform these complex systems of land tenure and use rights that had been worked
out over many generations. As a result, there were many adverse consequences for both nomadic pastoralists and
farmers. The cost in money and time of registration and the lack of familiarity with government bureaucracy
served as major barriers. Titles were unproportionately issued to outsiders/town-dwellers, while state and
cooperative farms resulted in the displacement of small farmers as well as pastoralists. Community elders never
accepted the statutory system of land allocation and there was often active opposition to anyone with a
documentary title. Since uncultivated land risked appropriation by the government as well as outsiders,
unregistered farmers were forced to clear their bush land although they might not actually have plans for
cultivating it. As a result, deforestation became widespread.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Formal title is assumed to provide farmers with tenure security, thereby encouraging the transfer of land into the
hands of the most efficient farmers and increasing agricultural investment. In actuality, however, a sense of tenure
security was prevalent only among wealthier individuals owning superior parcels of land—a very small
percentage of the total population in Somalia—and it appears as though the amount of agricultural investment in
land by smallholders under the formal titling system was low. The smallholders who felt that title improved their
sense of security were primarily farmers in irrigated areas, and it was against incursions by government and its
nominees that they sought security. The granting of titles to outsiders undermined security of tenure of most of the
smallholders in the irrigated schemes.189
Whatever the original intentions of the Land Law of 1975, the insecurity that resulted from its
implementation poses perhaps the greatest challenge yet to the future of smallholder agriculture in Somalia. By
eradicating the legitimacy of customary land tenure and making state leasehold title the only legal means of
claiming land rights, the law tipped the balance of tenure claims in favor of those with privileged access to the
mechanisms of registration.
Studies indicate that the farmers with the least secure landholdings tended to be located in areas with access
to water and large potential production response to irrigation. Despite the appearance of high tenure insecurity,
few independent farmers registered their land due to a lack of financial resources and bureaucratic know-how. As
a result, their land was vulnerable to land grabbing by outsiders and local elites because of its higher value and
insecure status. It has been suggested that this land grabbing has come to a halt with the collapse of political
authority.
Research in the lower Jubba Valley in the 1980s showed that many Somali farmers were eager to engage in
market transactions. There was a market orientation among Gedo smallholders anxious to adopt irrigation
technology for onion production in the valley, among pastoralists of the Afmadow region, and on the part of
Somali women attempting to recover from drought and guerrilla warfare in northern Kenya. Somali farmers and
herders have not only been interested in, and dependent upon, occasional production for the market but have
frequently struggled against state policies to maintain access to profitable outlets for their production.
The use of land for grazing plays a crucial role in the lives of people and the economy in Somalia, since
roughly 55% of the Somali population is pastoralist. The key land policy issue for Somalia’s future development
is how to manage that pastureland.
Another issue which deserves attention is the serious rate of deforestation over extensive areas due to a
heavy demand for fuelwood and charcoal, grazing requirements for livestock, and land requirements for
settlements and agriculture. Due to the lack of policies regarding afforestation and/or forest conservation, there
has been significant erosion of the overall forestry resource base in Somalia.
Under the statutory tenure system the rights of individual farmers and pastoralists were diminished. By
appropriating all land to the state, the GSDR managed to consolidate governmental power over individual
interests. Settlements and cooperatives were established and were able to acquire large areas of prime land at the
expense of individual users. Pastoralism was discouraged in the process, since dry season grazing was utilized for
irrigated agriculture. Somali farmers and pastoralists in some areas also lost control over their land to the
government-created village council, which replaced the community leaders once responsible for presiding over
village affairs, but has now vanished. Clan conflicts over natural resources are the single most serious obstacle to
democratization and establishment of stable governance.
Although women are not prohibited from inheriting, purchasing and otherwise acquiring land independent of
their husbands under the community-based tenure system, most women (97.2% in the Bay Region of Southern
Somalia) do not hold title to their own land since they are guaranteed access rights to the land of their husbands or
brothers. This is an important aspect of community-based tenure, as it provides women who would not otherwise
have access to land with a means to support themselves. The legal system of tenure jeopardized the rights of
women by allowing only one concession holder per household, since titles were almost always issued in the
husband’s name.
Studies done in the Lower Shebelle also show that although women comprise about 20% of household
heads, they were the least likely group to register their lands due to cultural factors that restrict their involvement
in government programs. The tendency was for women to register their parcels in the names of brothers or sons.190
Present policy position and reforms discussed
The state leasehold system undermined the tenure security previously provided by the community-based tenure
system, and failed to provide an appropriate alternative to that customary system. Long-standing community-
based systems of land ownership and the indigenous institutions that still govern access to land and pasture were
officially completely ignored, as were the practices and needs of pastoralists.
Titling is assumed to improve access to credit and agricultural investment, but credit access is more often a
function of farm size than of registration status. Consequently, there was a significant neglect of smallholders,
since cooperatives, state farms, parastatals and corporate agricultural enterprises were favored over private
individual farmers in terms of holding size. As a result, formal tenure as implemented in Somalia displaced small
farmers and pastoralists and reduced the possibility of sustainable economic growth in the region.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
While land tenure policy cannot be addressed until there is effective government in Somalia, it is possible to
imagine certain possible policy directions. At the moment, we are seeing the de facto restoration of “traditional”
resource management systems, where long-time residents automatically have the ultimate say in how land is
allocated. Policymakers over the last decade were firmly committed to the notion that the resources of the riverine
and interriver regions are part of the national patrimony, and there is little question that these agricultural and
pastoral districts will be critical for feeding the nation in the future. At the same time, there is a desperate need for
rural farmers and herders to feel secure in their possession of land and their access to resources. The neglect of
important rural interests and poor management of the scarce agricultural land were among the key factors leading
to the collapse of national government. It is important that planners tap the knowledge and expertise of rural
people in developing new strategies.
Under community-based tenure systems, land use determines land tenure, and more effort should be
concentrated on understanding indigenous ways of dealing with changes in land use and the traditional social
institutions which continue to dictate access to natural resources. Accordingly, policies which take environmental,
social and cultural conditions into account should be formulated. Such policies should be flexible enough to
reflect changing conditions the same way community-based tenure systems do. In addition, the roles that clans
traditionally played in land management need to be taken into account, in light of their importance and
reemergence.
Alternatives to individualized titling should also be explored, such as registering land at the village level and
allowing community-based tenure systems to continue to govern resource access and control. Under such a
system, multiple parcel holdings and land sales could be allowed, some parcels of land could be retained in bush
(uncultivated), women could retain access rights to land and equity could be maintained. Such a method of
registration would also reduce costs, as village lands are already clearly demarcated in some areas. The fact that
many people in irrigated areas want titles to their land, however, will need to be addressed as well.
If the formal registration system is to be resurrected, some important revisions will need to be made. It’s
purpose should be to confirm traditional right-holders in their control of the land. The registration process should
be more efficient, less expensive and decentralized so that smallholders are able to partake of it; the district level
is the most appropriate in which to conduct registration procedures. In addition, smallholders should be granted
exclusive rights of occupancy for an unlimited term, and restrictions on the number of parcels held should be
reduced. There will need to be consideration of whether leasehold tenure should be used for land formally titled,
or whether full private ownership or other options should be considered.191
References
Besteman, Catherine, and Lee Cassanelli, eds. 1996. The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the
War. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Besteman, Catherine. 1989. “Land Tenure in the Middle Jubba: Customary Tenure and the Effect of Land Registration.”
Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin.
Roth, Michael. 1989. “Somalia Land Policies and Tenure Impacts: The Case of the Lower Shabelle.” Madison: Land
Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin.
Roth, Michael, Jon Unruh, and Richard Barrows. 1994. “Land Registration, Tenure and Security, Credit Use, and
Investment in the Shebelle Region of Somalia.” In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, edited by John W.
Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla, pp. 199–230. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt.SUDAN COUNTRY PROFILE
by John W. Bruce
Executive summary
Patterns of land law and administration under the Islamic regime do not appear, in practice, to differ significantly
from those of earlier regimes. While private ownership is well established in the riparian Northern Sudan, in the
rest of the country existing policy and law use government ownership of land to provide access to resources to
Northern elites on conditions which are highly profitable but not environmentally sustainable. There is every
reason for concern over the long-term ecological impact of developing patterns of land use, as well as the
immediate destruction of indigenous land tenure systems and the marginalization of traditional populations of
farmers and pastoralists. Conflict over land has become endemic, and while some measures appear to have been
taken for dealing with these problems, the information necessary to evaluate them is not available. The most
extreme case of conflict presented by the civil war in the Southern Sudan, in reaction to attempts to impose
Islamic law.
National policy and legal framework
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with a land area of 237.1 million hectares, of which only 1.3 million
are arable, and a population of 27.4 million. Large areas of the country are arid, used primarily by pastoralists.
Much of the country’s commercial agricultural production is concentrated in irrigated schemes and mechanized
rain-fed farming schemes.
Legislation in 1970 limited private ownership to limited area, mostly along the northern Nile, where
ownership had earlier been registered. All other land is state owned. In project areas both in irrigated and rainfed
mechanized farming, government has utilized a leasehold system. Outside project areas, rights continue to be
governed by customary rules. The basic patterns were set during the colonial period.
The Anglo-Egyptian administration enacted a Land Settlement Ordinance in 1905, with a stipulation that
“waste, forest, and unoccupied land shall be deemed to be the property of the government until the contrary is
proved.” This was superseded by the 1925 Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance, which provided to the
same effect. Land in most major urban areas in Sudan was registered in freehold, the result of sales of public land
to private buyers as the cities have expanded. In limited irrigated areas land was systematically surveyed and
registered in private ownership to traditional holders by the government. In these areas there is an active land
market. But in most of the country, there was no systematic effort to identify which lands belonged to
government. In practice, the state usually refrained from interference with rights of occupiers, whether group or
individual, in unregistered land, managing the country indirectly through traditional Native Authorities.
In 1970, the Nimeiry regime enacted the Unregistered Land Act, which declared that all unregistered land of
any kind whatsoever, occupied or unoccupied, belonged to the State and was deemed to be registered in the name
of the State. Ownership could no longer be acquired by long use. The original intention appears to have been to
establish direct state administration of all unregistered land. In 1971 the Local Government Act abolished the
Native Authorities, traditional rulers through whom the colonial regime had ruled the country. The local
government institutions intended to replace them were however never effective, and land outside major
development projects has continued to be administered by traditional authorities. Land rights have been
considered use rights, with disputes over such use rights being decided in customary or Islamic law courts in the
various parts of the country. The primary importance of the 1970 legislation was to provide a clearer legal basis
for use of leaseholds from the state as the tenure for farmers in development projects, and to facilitate acquisition
of land for such projects.193
A 1984 Civil Transactions Act, enacted by the new Islamic regime, repealed the Unregistered Land Act,
while reaffirming government ownership of all land not previously registered as privately owned. The 1984 Act
did not alter the status of urban or irrigated freeholds, but repealed a scheme of urban rent restriction dating back
to the 1950s. That scheme was of limited effectiveness, but with its repeal landlords introduced major rent
increases, especially for poor and lower-middle-class housing. The Act also introduced a variety of Islamic law
concepts, including the fundamental notion that the act of clearing and cultivation of previously unused or
abandoned land confers rights of usufruct. It is not clear that this has very much altered the situation on the
ground. Perhaps more important is a 1988 Act which restored the role of the Native Authorities, but information
on their operations is scanty.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Customary tenure controls access to most agricultural land in the country. In the areas of western and eastern
Sudan where shifting cultivation predominates, the village is the typical landholding community. Within the
boundaries of village lands, each member of the village acquires tenure rights for the duration of cultivation by
clearing land that is unoccupied. In areas where there is stability of cultivation, landholdings may be inherited
according to Islamic law or customary law, depending upon the depth of penetration of Islamic legal values. If a
villager leaves the village, the land he occupies is allotted to someone else. In parts of sparsely populated
Kordofan and Darfur regions, land in excess of the village needs may be allotted by the sheikh (chief) to
strangers. Because land is relatively abundant, the size of each plot is a function of kifayat yet (that is, not more
than your hand can work).
The whole of the Southern Region is composed of land under customary tenure, as are the large areas
occupied by nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples in the Eastern, Darfur, Kordofan, and Central Regions. The
Nilotic peoples of the Southern Region, the Beja in the Red Sea Hills, the Kababish of Kordofan, and the
Baggara of Southern Darfur have almost unrestricted enjoyment of a large territory known in Arabic as dar. For
nomadic and other pastoralist groups, pasture is managed as commons, with recognized boundaries not only
between tribes, but also between sections and subsections. Recent commentators note the continuing resilience of
customary tenure systems, even as they are place under growing pressure by expansion of the state leasehold
system for mechanized farming.
Customary tenure has however been gradually but steadily replaced by tenure rights derived from national
law. Private individual ownership of land (melk) is a fundamental concept of Islamic law, and has long been
practiced in urban areas and other more thoroughly Islamicized areas of northern and central Sudan. In earlier
centuries, sultanates granted land by written charter, and irrigated land along the Nile was governed by Islamic
law. After the suppression of the Mahdist rebellion at the turn of the century, the British began to register both
urban and agricultural land along the Nile in an operation which provided the prototype for land registration
efforts in British colonies elsewhere in Africa. Registration was systematic, with a field operation to adjudicate
the title to each piece of land in a “settlement” area (referring to settling of titles). The agricultural land registered
was a minuscule part of Sudan’s land area, but agriculturally extremely important: the irrigated land along the
Nile between old Halfa and Kosti, and some rain-fed agricultural areas in the Gezira and in the Nuba Hills. The
total area is about 6 million feddans (1 feddan is equal to 1.038 acres) out of a total of a little less than 40 million
feddans judged suitable for cultivation.
This registered land was excluded from the Unregistered Land Act, 1970, which made the State the
registered owner of all unregistered land. The Civil Transactions Act of 1984 established that the basic property
regime for this land is Islamic law, which had previously affected only inheritance of this land. The system has
been plagued, as in many other African countries, by failures to register transfers and inheritances.
Leasehold is the tenure on which government makes available land in development projects. This is the case
both in the irrigated schemes and in the mechanized farming schemes in rain-fed agricultural areas. Rents are194
nominal, and the most important function of the lease is to set out the complex relationship between the farmer
and the scheme. The period of leaseholds ranges from one year under Gezira Scheme tenancies (though they are
almost invariably renewed) to 25 to 40 years in rain-fed mechanized farming schemes such as those around
Gedaref and Habila. This last sector is clearly the most important tenure sector in terms of commercial
production. 
The Minister of Agriculture, Food, and Natural Resources has overall authority over the system of state
agricultural land leaseholds. The system is administered by the public agricultural boards or corporations. For
instance, the Mechanized Agriculture Public Corporation administers and allocates leases and subleases and also
approves dealings with leaseholds of lands under mechanized agriculture. The same is true of the Gezira Scheme
where the Gezira Board not only allocates leases but also determines what is to be produced, and how to produce
and market it. As for privately owned land, whether rural or urban, the keeping of records of titles and
registration of transactions is the responsibility of the Registrar of Lands. The Office of the Registrar is part of
the Judiciary, and there are local Land Registries in riparian provinces and towns with significant registered land.
The Minister of Construction and Public Works has overall authority over urban land, town planning and zoning.
The municipalities allocate urban lands and collect rates, levies, and registration fees on behalf of the Ministry.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
There is only very fragmentary information available on these issues in the Sudan since the Islamic government
assumed power. In some areas, for instance, the relationship between customary tenure and agricultural
production, the information had always been very scanty.
In the agricultural sector, there appears to have been a progressive worsening of problems identified as
serious even in the 1970s. In the privately-owned, registered land areas, progressive subdivision of holdings under
Islamic rules of inheritance is widely assumed to have a negative impact on production, though there are no
studies to document this. Following major floods in 1985, regional land committees and sub-committees down to
local level were convened to consider these issues. They recommended that no parcel smaller than .42 ha be
registered. Islamic and statutory rules give pre-emptive rights to relatives and neighbors in case of sales, and the
scheme of transfer charges has been reworked so that transfers to strangers are taxed at a higher rate than those to
relatives and neighbors. There is no indication that problems of unregistered transactions have been resolved, and
indeed attempts to control transactions, even in a good cause, tend to result in these being made “off the register.”
There are expressions of concern over the poor training of registry staff and disorganization in the registry
system.
On the recent irrigated schemes, leasehold tenure prevails. Conditionalities in leases extend a long history of
over-control of farmer production decisions by scheme management. These controls appear to be at least partly
responsible for declining yields of cotton, the export crop whose foreign exchange earnings provided the
justification for the major irrigated schemes. Farmers’ ability to expand into more profitable crops has been
constrained by threat of loss of their holdings.
But the most serious problems seem to be arising from the rapid expansion of both irrigated agriculture and
mechanized dryland farming of cereals. The expansion of irrigated agriculture has been critical for many rural
populations because it has interfered with their patterns of water use. The expansion of mechanized cereal
farming by urban financial interests has affected larger areas, expanding rapidly into the Central and Western
Sudan from its initial areas in the East, and placing increasing pressure on traditional land users, both farmers
and pastoralists. The last fifteen years have seen prolonged drought in Sudan, and this has exacerbated the
conflicts emerging from these expulsions of traditional users, rendering their marginalization more severe.
Severe environmental problems have arisen from this pressure. Serious land degradation under mechanized
cereal farming in eastern Sudan was noted fifteen years ago, but government has continued to expand the system,195
which is highly profitable for urban investors if they are not required to make the investments in the land which
would be required to make the system sustainable. While leases from government include conditions about
sustainable use, government controls are minimal. Mechanized cultivators often expand cultivation beyond their
leases and just move on to other land when the land on their lease is exhausted after a half dozen years. The result
is a situation which has been characterized as “shifting mechanized cultivation.” This pattern was established
under the Nimeiry regime, but has been expanding steadily under the present Islamic government.
In conditions of drought and increasing pressure on land by the expansion of commercial agriculture under
the government’s leasehold system, the situation of pastoralists has become critical. Commentators suggest that
the point may have been reached where pastoralist systems of land use may not be sustainable. Historically, tribal
territories (dars) of pastoralists in the western Sudan have been adjusted to take account of changing rainfall. The
annual conferences of tribal authorities in western Sudan held by the colonial officials to negotiate land uses for
that year are a model for land management in these arid areas. Tribal territories or dars are well understood, but
so is the principle that flexibility is required to accommodate great variances in rainfall from year to year.
Principles of comity apply: the group asked to cede access to a part of its territory and water resources in one
year will need to ask the same from another group in a later year. New pressures on land have made land conflict
endemic, and these conferences have recently been revitalized (perhaps in connection with the re-establishment of
the Native Administrations), but there is little information available on the process of re-establishment or its
consequences.
Forestry efforts in the southern Sudan, the locus of Sudan’s only tropical forests, have been profoundly
disrupted by the Civil War. In the north, gum arabic gardens play a key role in local economies. There is an
elaborate customary law with regard to gum arabic-producing acacia trees, but this differs from one ethnic group
to another. As pressure on resources increase, competition for these trees is intensifying. Gum arabic prices are
high, and proposals for greater government regulation of this resource may presage its appropriation by urban-
based elites.
The situation regarding basic human rights in the Sudan is so serious, both as a result of national policies
and the war in the South, that it is perhaps futile to speculate on the more subtle linkages between property rights
and democracy in the country. What is clear is that if the conflict in the South is ever resolved, it will leave behind
it an appalling confusion of land rights similar to those being confronted today in Mozambique and Rwanda.
Gender impacts of tenure arrangements have received relatively little attention in Sudan in recent years.
While Islamic law recognizes daughters as heirs, albeit to smaller shares than male heirs, in practice, women
rarely inherit land, and tend to be allocated personal property, leaving land for their male siblings. This reconciles
Islamic law with customary matrilineal inheritance patterns of most Sudanese peoples. Some observers have
however noted the growing role of women in agricultural production, and have expressed concern that their lack
of land rights undermines their incentives to invest their labor in agricultural production.
Present policies and reform directions
Despite the centrality of the concept of private ownership to Islamic thought on land rights, it is now clear that the
government intends to retain ownership of land in its own hands. Northern elites continue to support private
ownership in the irrigated land in the north, but have used claims to government ownership to land outside the
Nile Valley to legitimize vast land-grabs from rural people by urban elites. The value placed by Islam on the
bringing of land into cultivation as a basis for land right has provided an underpinning for the extensive
appropriations of land for mechanized farming by urban elites. Making land available for little or no price has
encouraged an expansion of cultivation beyond what is ecologically sound. In the Southern Sudan the current
rebellion is a reaction to attempts to impose Islamic law, and there the battle between Islamic and customary
values is at its starkest.196
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
It is increasingly apparent that land tenure policies pursued since the early 1970s have produced unsatisfactory
results. It is less clear that the needed reformulation of land tenure policy will be forthcoming. In these
circumstances project planners will need to give particular attention to tenure issues. This will be especially true
where major private investments in land are expected, and where significant increases in the value of land are
anticipated as a result of project activities. The first requires secure tenure, while the second raises dangers of
beneficiary displacement by more powerful interests if intended beneficiaries do not have secure tenure. Tenure
arrangements for project participants should to the extent possible be explicitly prescribed in project agreements
with government, pending establishment of a more stable land policy and land law environment for project
activities.
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by John W. Bruce and Mark Marquardt
Executive summary
Uganda has emerged from a period of considerable confusion in land policy. Uganda at independence had
relatively extensive areas of land under registered freehold and mailo (a local variant of freehold), but these were
nationalized and converted to long-term conditional leases by the 1975 Land Reform Decree enacted under Idi
Amin. The same legislation weakened the position of customary landholders. In fact, the Decree was never
seriously implemented and this left land tenure in Uganda in a state of considerable confusion for twenty years. In
1995 a Constituent Assembly produced a new Constitution which reestablished private property in land, and
mandates replacement of the 1975 law with a new land law within two years.
National land policy and legal framework
Uganda enjoys an excellent land resource base by Africa standards, and while there are areas of intense
population pressure on land (the densities the extreme southwest of the country are comparable with those in
Rwanda, just across the border), the country has 20 million hectares of land, of which 6.77 million are arable, and
a population of 20.6 million of which 16.2 million depend directly on agriculture.
The 1900 Buganda Agreement between the British and the Buganda Kingdom has profoundly influenced the
development of tenure patterns. An area of 1,000 square miles was divided into mile-square blocks (mailo) and
allocated to the king and nobles in support of their offices (official mailo), and 8,000 square miles allocated to
chiefs and other notables (personal mailo). An area of 9,000 square miles became Crown Land, under the
administration of the British Crown. Similar patterns were followed in some other kingdoms, such as Toro, in
which 255 square miles were titled as freehold and 122 square miles as official estates, and Ankole, where 50
square miles were titled as freehold. In succeeding years, many of these large holdings were broken up or
substantially reduced in size by sales.
Many smallholders became de facto tenants on these large allocations, and tensions grew between them and
their new landlords. By 1928 the colonial authorities enacted the busulu and envujo laws which provided these
tenants with broad security of tenure and fixed rents which inflation rendered increasingly nominal. Critiques of
the system suggested that this regulation locked in place two parties (landlord and tenant) who both lacked
adequate incentives to invest in agricultural development, but in fact the area became Uganda’s premier coffee-
producing region.
Small amounts of freehold land were created by pilot projects in Uganda in the 1960s, in the wake of the
freehold recommendations of the 1953 East Africa Royal Commission on Land Tenure. But the pilots met
substantial public opposition, and the program never took off as it did in Kenya, where the civil war footing
exempted the colonial government from politics as normal. These pilots were very different from the earlier tenure
conversions, and involved systematic, compulsory registration by smallholders of their customary holdings, with
6,400 plots involved in the Kigezi pilot (now Rukungiri), 1,560 in the Ankole pilot (now Mbarara), and 120 plots
in Bugisu (now Kibale).
In 1975 Idi Amin’s Land Reform Decree nationalized all freehold and mailo and converted them to 99-year
leases from the state, conditional on development. There had for many years been calls by socialist elements for
Uganda to move away from the path toward freehold, and the change may have been inspired in part by the 1974
land nationalization in Ethiopia. But it was also motivated by a desire of the Amin government to use
development conditions to take land and reallocate it, potentially to army officers and members of the ethnic
groups which formed Amin’s power base. The Decree also allowed the relative easy eviction of tenants. In
practice, existing titles and forms remained as they had been on the records, though new allocations of land were198
given as leases. Some tenants were evicted, but the requirement of the law that they receive compensation for
permanent improvements such as their coffee plantations limited this.
By 1987, shortly after the present government assumed power, a land use task force urged review of the
1975 decree as a policy priority. Studies carried out in between 1987 and 1989 found that in at least one of the
smallholder freehold pilots, there had been only very modest improvements attributable to titling. Perhaps more
important, the studies found an informal land market almost as active in customary tenure areas of central
Uganda as in the registered lands. Events were outpacing legal reform. The Agricultural Policy Committee
(APC), an interministerial forum, created a Technical Committee on Land Reform to explore policy options. The
technical committee conducted a series of public consultations on tenure reform throughout the country, and in
the end recommended the repeal of the 1975 decree, restoration of rights of private property in land, and enhanced
protection for the rights of customary holders.
The committee drafted a new land law, but this process was overtaken by the Constituent Assembly, while
elevated the re-establishment of private property to a constitutional concern. The new constitution provides that
land belongs to the people of Uganda, who hold it under freehold, mailo, leasehold and customary tenures. The
constitution mandates new legislation to resolve the relationship between the owner and occupier of the land (that
is, the mailo owners/tenant relationship), and this seems likely to be accomplished in the context of a new general
law on land.
This drafting process is now in the hands of the Ministry of Housing and Lands, which presumably will
begin with the draft law prepared by the technical committee of the APC in 1993. The Ministry is in this
connection seeking donor funding for rehabilitation of the existing land registry system, which has fallen into
serious disrepair.
In a parallel development, the official mailo and official estate of freehold are being restored by government
to traditional authorities from which they were appropriated by the Amin government. In the case of the former
Buganda kingdom, the restoration of official mailo to the Kabaka (king) involves the transfer of thousands of
hectares of high-value land in Kampala.
Adaptation and replacement of customary land tenure
Like most other African countries, Uganda exhibits a very considerable range of customary tenure systems.
These range from the strongly individualistic tenure pattern in baKiga area of southwestern Uganda, to the
notably hierarchical systems of the central Ugandan kingdoms to the highly communal systems of the north.
There exist on land which is Public Land, but were historically recognized by the state, and this recognition and
protection have been restored under the 1995 Constitution.
The pilot land registration schemes from the 1960s provide an example of replacement in the smallholder
sector, but it is difficult to argue from them that freehold title and its registration will dramatically improve the
situation of smallholders. Studies have suggested that tenure individualization and registration in advance of the
development of other markets and infrastructure is unlikely to have much impact. Indeed, no one in Uganda today
seems to be thinking in terms of the systematic, compulsory tenure replacement involved in those pilots.
Rehabilitation of land registries in areas where registration already existed is likely to take a decade or more, and
it seems that formal tenure will be available to customary holders in other areas only on a demand-driven basis, in
response to applications from smallholders and on at least partial payment by them of the costs of survey and
other field activities required to register the land.
This is the basis upon which leasehold titles are now available, and the experience with that process is
informative. Registry offices are ill-equipped, and almost all measures must go to Kampala or Entebbe for
approval. Few staff perform the duties associated with their office without some additional reimbursement from
the applicant. Files tend to stop in mid-process unless facilitated or followed up rigorously. Costs of registration199
are in fact substantial, geometrically more than the very modest fees officially chargeable. At present, most
applications for registration reflect an intention to move the land out of agriculture by the building of a house or
business.
In fact, the process involves two steps, the first of which reflects the adaptation of customary systems in the
face of new opportunities. Long exposed to sales of freehold and mailo lands, sales have grown more and more
common in the customary tenure systems. An investor planning to build on land under customary tenure in a peri-
urban area, for instance, will first break it out of the customary system by a purchase from the customary holder,
on terms recognized by the traditional authorities, then will apply for registration of his new right.
To make formal titles more available to smallholders, the registry system would need to be radically
decentralized, which would require considerable investments in the local registry offices and their staffs. These
registry office are considered the financial responsibility of district government, not the national Ministry, and it is
not clear whether these investments will receive priority in the district competition for funds. Development of
NGO-led community requests for titling could also significantly reduce costs.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
The new Constitution provides a very promising framework for creating a new atmosphere of tenure security, but
this will depend to a large extent on the terms of the new land law and the quality of implementation. There is a
danger, for instance, that protections for tenants will not be promptly reinstalled when ownership is restored,
inviting broad tenant evictions. There have been proposals that tenants receive freeholds for their holdings when
the Government reprivatizes the land, but there appears to be considerable opposition to this among property
owners in former Buganda.
Outside the agricultural sector, in natural resources management, property rights have not received the same
level of attention. National parks and forest reserves suffered decades of encroachment and poaching during the
civil wars. Efforts to reestablish controls have tended to be draconian, emphasizing the expulsion by force of
squatters, even in cases where government had previously build schools and clinics for them in the areas of new
settlement. Such expulsions have taken place from the game corridor between Kibale National Forest and Queen
Elizabeth National Park. A more sophisticated approaches might have allowed for a continued but carefully
controlled presence by farmers, but this was rejected by government. Similarly, while there is discussion of buffer
zone strategies along the verges of parks and reserves, little implementation has so far occurred. Common
property management of natural resources is not well-understood, and largely confused with loose management of
natural resources under customary tenure.
The new Constitution includes a major decentralization of public land administration, placing all untitled
land in the hands of district governments. This will include large areas of unreserved but valuable natural
resources, such as ungazetted forests and wetlands. Legislation will be needed to elaborate a system of district
land administration, and the staff and other capabilities at district level must be upgraded substantially to meet
this challenge. Little thought has been given to these arrangements, and the decentralization could pose serious
temptations for district officials if a legal regime is not in place to provide direction and criteria.
Gender dimensions of tenure have received considerable attention in studies in recent years. The patterns of
inheritance which tend to exclude women from direct control of land in the customary tenure sector are also
operating with regard to freehold, mailo, and leasehold land, and so far there is little sign of their having had an
impact on the perceptions of policymakers. At precisely the moment at which these issues can be addressed
because of the flux in land policy and law, they tend to be seen as tangential to the “big” policy decisions such a
forms of property.
The non-party democracy under the present government seems to have provided an atmosphere conducive to
tackling tough questions of land policy. Perhaps the most worrying trend at the moment is the reassertion of200
ethnic interests in land, initially though struggles for restoration of properties of traditional authorities deprived of
them by previous governments. This trend could potentially interfere with the development of nationally
integrative forces such as land markets, as groups with better land endowments seek to reserve them for their own
members.
The Constitution is only the beginning of necessary legislative reform, and priority projects are a new land
law, a new law to govern the land registry system, a new law on district ownership and management of natural
resources on public lands, and legal frameworks for buffer zone and common property natural resource
management. Much will depend on how the government agencies concerned rise to the occasion. To date,
government appears to be acting expeditiously. In September 1996, following a workshop on the implications of
the new constitutional provisions on land at Makerere Institute for Social Research, a drafting committee
convened in intensive sessions which produced a draft land law and forwarded it to the Ministry of Lands and
Housing.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The present policy position is clearly promising, but could fall dramatically short of its potential if government is
unable to move forward to enact the necessary laws and establish the necessary implementation machinery. There
is a danger that donors, because the Ugandan government has largely embarked on these policy reforms on its
own initiative, will not appreciate the need to support these important transitions. Privatization of land tenure and
the creation of land markets might be thought merely to require a withdrawal of government interference, but in
fact requires the creation and support of those public institutions such as land registries which provide the
infrastructure for markets. Similarly, there is a need to provide a more adequate legal framework for management
of natural resources, then move forward to develop locally appropriate models for implementation of these
measures. There is an urgent need to rebuild the capabilities of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Physical
Planning, and integrity in land administration in a ministry with a reputation for corrupt practices.
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Executive summary
Southern Africa was a region of extensive white settlement. Some countries are just now embarking on the reform
process, while others are well into the implementation of reforms or seeking to restabilize their rural economies
after reforms. In some post-reform situations, the collapse of the ideology which spurred the reforms has led to
normative confusion and massive land-grabbing. The region exhibits a broad range of land/population ratios, and
this makes it difficult to generalize about tenure needs. But there is no region in Africa that has seen more creative
thinking about tenure. To the extent that adequate progress has not been made, it is not so much because
promising models are not available, but because of elites pursuing self-interest.
Policy and legal framework
Southern Africa was the last part of Africa to come to independence, and the region in which white settlement
was most extensive. Redistributive land reform came hard on the heels of independence. In Tanzania,
Mozambique, and Angola, where most land had been in the name of the state under the colonial concession
regime, the new governments retained state ownership and opted for socialist reform models, seeking to replace
household farming with village collectives or state farms. Tanzania undertook a massive program of resettlement
and experimented with communal production in its villages. The state farm experience in Mozambique is the
most extensive in Africa. In Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Namibia, land reform has meant the subdivision and
reassignment of what were either freehold or long-term leasehold white farms into smaller holdings for
resettlement by Africans, usually retained in state ownership and allocated to the new holders on permits or
leaseholds. In Malawi land reform was postponed under Banda and has only recently come onto the national
agenda.
All these countries have had a strongly dualistic tenure structure, with cash crop production in the colonial
period dominated by settler agriculture. The indigenous or “communal” tenure sector was for the most part
ignored, or treated as a land reserve from which land was carved for white settlers as needed. It is striking that in
these countries this pattern has not changed significantly since independence. In Zimbabwe the displacement of
communal area holders has stopped, but in Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Namibia, and Malawi it
has continued. Even in those states once most committed to a radical egalitarianism, Mozambique and Angola,
the governments are now presiding over massive land-grabs from rural people as elites move to take advantage of
normative confusion created by the abandonment of socialist policies.
There have been a number of attempts to “modernize” indigenous tenure. That implemented in Botswana
beginning in 1968 deserves serious attention, as do the 1992 proposals in Tanzania and the subsequent debate.
Egalitarian redistributive land reform will continue to be an important theme in the region for some decades,
with a reform still under way in Zimbabwe, and reforms starting in South Africa and Malawi. Beliefs in the
superior productivity of large-scale operations is crumbling under new evidence that it was due largely to colonial
subsidies to scale and impositions of disabilities upon African smallholders. But there has been a major shift
away from socialist tenure formulae for reform beneficiaries. South Africa, while allowing community options on
tenure, seems to have opted for freehold ownership nested within a market economy, and this is what is being203
promoted by government for reform beneficiaries, whether as individuals or private landholding groups. Malawi
seems likely to move in the same direction.
The very different land resource endowments of the countries in the region suggest that there may be a
continuing diversity in land policies. The basic land/population data for the countries of the region are set out in
table 3.1. The fundamental tenure policies of the countries are arrayed in table 3.2.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
This region presents some of the more thoroughly disrupted indigenous tenure systems in Africa. Swaziland
presents a traditional hierarchy firmly in control of national politics, relegating formal government structures to a
secondary role and preserving perhaps the most indigenous land tenure system in Africa. But it is an exception.
Indigenous tenure systems in South Africa have been badly mauled by a century of intervention with both rules
and institutions, to the extent that many observers question whether they can be resuscitated. The ANC came to
power declared for the abolition of traditional authorities and decidedly negative concerning “customary” tenure
systems, which had been part of the Nationalist Party’s fiction of the homelands’ cultural and political autonomy.
It is increasingly seems, however, that government will not move too forcefully to remove these structures where
they have a genuinely popular base. Even among party cadres, blacks are increasingly voicing a hesitation to
eliminate a key element in black culture, however distorted by the colonial policies.
This change reflects similar trends in Zimbabwe and Zambia, where governments which at independence
rejected traditional authorities as having been co-opted by the colonial system are now seeking to define fuller
roles for them, with a land tenure commission in Zimbabwe actually recommending the return of local land
administration in the communal areas to traditional authorities. At the moment, there is a fascinating debate over
the authenticity of customary tenure in Southern Africa. It is argued that its content was dramatically distorted by
colonial policies and courts, emphasizing its “communal” elements and overstating the powers to traditional
authorities. This left African farmers vulnerable to the taking of their family lands by the colonial state, which
paid some token to the chiefly “owner”. This can serve as a base for an argument for restoration of traditional
communitarian values on a more democratic basis. Or it can be argued that the downplaying of the existence of
inheritable lineage tenure rights in the colonial period must now be redressed through allowing the development of
individual tenure.
This discourse over the “real” content of tradition is mobilized in current political debates over the future. In
light of the evidence from other parts of Africa about the constant evolution of indigenous tenure systems in
changing circumstances, there is an appreciation that it is futile to look for the “original” form of traditional land
tenure. But at the same time there is a temptation among some elements to see popular attachment to tradition as
the product of a “false consciousness” and not entitled to the same respect in a democratic system as other
genuinely held popular sentiments. In fact the interest in traditional authorities in this region may involve less a
persistence of traditional values than a growing disillusionment by rural people with centralized government in the
post-independence period, and an attempt to find in traditional authorities a counterbalance for the political
dominance of urban-based national elites and their ideologies.
There is considerable interest in this region in new institutional structures for community-based tenure
systems. The Land Board system in Botswana is perhaps the most successful attempt by the state to recognize the
decentralized authority of tribal communities over land, and to a significant extent customary tenure rules, while
at the same time easing traditional land administration authorities out of control. In South Africa, the Communal
Land Tenure Associations Act of 1995 develops an alternative to tradition based on the community land trust
model, initially for land reform beneficiaries but in the hope that it may serve as a new legal template for
communal lands communities as well. The model seeks to address the gender inequities of many indigenous
tenure systems. Tanzania appears to be moving toward a new land law which would empower local communities
in land management, reducing the role of the state.204
TABLE 3.1 Land and population, 1993


















Angola 124.7 3.5 29.0 51.9 40.3 10.3 7.0 2.0
Botswana 56.7 0.4 25.6 26.5 3.4 1.4 0.9 2.0
Lesotho 3.0 0.3 2.0 0.0 0.7 1.9 1.5 4.7
Malawi 9.4 1.7 1.8 3.7 2.2 10.5 7.6 4.5
Mozambique 78.4 3.2 44.0 14.0 17.2 15.1 12.2 3.8
Namibia 82.3 0.7 38.0 18.0 25.7 1.5 0.5 0.7
Swaziland 1.7 0.2 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.5 2.7
South Africa 122.1 13.2 81.4 8.2 19.3 39.7 5.7 0.4
Tanzania 88.4 3.5 35.0 33.5 16.4 28.0 21.7 6.2
Zambia 74.3 5.3 30.0 28.7 10.4 8.9 6.0 1.1
Zimbabwe 38.7 2.9 4.9 8.8 22.2 10.7 7.2 2.5
Note: All breakdowns of land area are based on FAO estimates.205
TABLE 3.2 National land tenure patterns
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Tenure constraints and opportunities
The prospect of regionalization of economic forces in this region following the independence of South Africa
throws two facts into sharp relief. First, the vagaries of colonial history have resulted in dramatically different
land availability in the different countries of the region. A few countries, Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia in
particular, enjoy very ample land/population ratios. They desperately need investment. On the other hand, in
countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, competition for land is fierce. Second, agrarian
structures in all these countries have been formed largely by non-market forces: land-grabbing on a racial basis
and egalitarian land reforms. The relative efficiency of different holding sizes is largely untested by exposure to a
land market in a free market economy, and this is as true of South Africa as of Mozambique.
There are already signs that the national compartments and regional imbalances created in the colonial
period are feeling the pressure of a new economic environment, and this extends to land. South African capital
and commercial farmers are reaching out for agricultural opportunities on cheaper land in the countries to the
north, especially in Angola and Mozambique. And as subsidies to scale are removed gradually throughout the
region, the experience of countries such as Zimbabwe suggest that at, least for some basic food crops
smallholders will display an efficiency which will force large commercial operations in the direction of export
crops for which they have a comparative advantages in market access.
Within national economies, the growing economic liberalization is producing more active land markets, legal
and illegal. In Mozambique, a return toward political stability has stimulated land values. In Zambia, where there
is a relative plenty of arable land, some holders of long-term leases from the government are partitioning the land
and selling it to others. In Malawi and Zimbabwe, land markets are growing even where state land ownership or
specific restrictions on sales make them illegal. For better or for worse, almost everyone (including officials) is
acting as if he believes that, whatever land’s current legal status, its market value will be increasingly recognized
by law, as private ownership or in some other fashion. Because of the presence of freehold tenure in several
countries in the region, Southern Africa seems likely to be the first region in Africa to see the emergence of a
regional land market. Needless to say, this is a prospect viewed with optimism by some commentators, who see
its potential for investment, and with fear by others, who are alarmed at the thought of foreign land ownership in
their countries, with its echoes of the colonial experience.
In the national polities of the region, there is a clear understanding that current tenure arrangements, both
those generated by land reforms and those indigenous, leave a good deal to be desired in terms of providing
incentives for investment. There seems a reasonable prospect of confronting this need in the “reformed tenure”
sector, but there is still a fascination with large-scale commercial farming in spite of the successes of small-
farmers once the playing field is leveled, as in Zimbabwe. This may delay the putting in place of adequate tenure
arrangements for small farmers in the “communal” sectors. This is in spite of interesting models for reform
having been piloted for twenty years in Botswana, and important institutional approaches to communal tenure
currently being generated in South Africa. The lack of action in this area may have less to do with inadequate
understanding of needs by policy-makers than it does with the self-interest of government and commercial elites in
cheap land acquisition as land is shifted from communal to statutory land tenure.
Land for pasture is a major issue in a number of countries in the region. In Tanzania, large-scale
mechanized cereal production and expansion of the farm frontier generally have placed pastoralist land use in
some areas of the country under intense pressure. Both Botswana and Namibia, the countries which have the
largest cattle herds in the region, have opted for large ranches under long-term private tenure, though not
necessarily ownership. Botswana’s 99-year leases of huge ranches to large stockholders have provided a
controversial model for range privatization. In Namibia, where white-held ranches have been in freehold, a “ranch
reform” process will scale down and redistribute some of those units in coming years, and there are concerns
about the appropriate scale for such operations on Namibia’s rather poor land resource base. These two countries207
have been much less successful in developing land tenure and management systems for their communal grazing
areas. Indeed, none of the countries in the region has adequately addressed the issue of communal grazing, which
even in Botswana and Namibia is still significant. Pastoralists in these areas are under much the same pressures
as elsewhere in Africa, with the viability of traditional patterns of land use endangered by the shifting of land and
key point resources into private hands. The situation of pastoralists in the region has worsened since
independence.
The region also has some of the most important wildlife resources in Africa, and in this area it has been in
the forefront in creative planning in the past decades. In Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe, the state traditionally took a commanding role in the protection of these resources. Led by Zimbabwe
with its CAMPFIRE program, however, the states in the region are increasingly examining options for
community-based wildlife management, involving the flow of revenues from big game hunting to local
communities. Zimbabwe remains the test case for such policies, and while there have been some difficulties in
ensuring that benefits accrue to local communities rather than local government, those promoting the program
have been persistently reforming the model and it is increasingly clear that it does have promise. The model has
benefited from, and has been controversial because it has been piloted in situations where big game hunting
generated very substantial revenues, but it is increasingly being experimented with in other sectors such as
community forestry and should not be evaluated exclusively in terms of wildlife. While prospects for wildlife
conservation are quite positive in the region as a whole, with Botswana and Kenya actively developing programs
similar to CAMPFIRE, in Mozambique and Angola the civil wars have done what appears to be vast damage to
wildlife resources, the extent of which has yet to be adequately assessed.
The other tenure-related environmental issue bedeviling the countries in the region is the question of
relationship between communal tenure on one hand and on the other, erosion and other forms of land degradation.
Lesotho and Swaziland, both countries where customary land tenure practices are still strong, are experiencing
extensive erosion and this is attributed by some commentators to inadequacies in tenure provided to households
there. The land degradation in the communal areas of Zimbabwe and South Africa are also sometimes cited in
this connection. There is however no empirical basis for these assertions, and it is likely that the problem has
more to do with the poor and/or mountainous nature of the natural resources rather than the tenure arrangements.
Tenure issues have had important connections to the democratization process in the region. In South Africa,
Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, fundamental political transitions in the recent past to majority rule have been
driven to a significant extent by resentments over land concentration. Their politics will for many years be in part
a politics of land. In the countries of the region generally, minority groups have found it difficult to obtain
recognition of their land rights by central governments. This is true of the San in Botswana and Namibia, and
fundamental human rights issues are involved. Overall, the region can be said to bifurcated into countries like
South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe where land tenure is debated as an important political issue,
with government engaging the problem successfully or unsuccessfully, and countries such as Mozambique,
Lesotho and Swaziland, where governments seek to avoid the issue.
Women in Southern Africa deal with a broad range of tenure systems, though they are not well treated under
any of them. Namibia and South Africa appear to be the only countries in the region where the government is
actively promoting gender equity with regard to land ownership. A common trend exists in Zimbabwe, Lesotho,
and Botswana, where women’s rights to land have been neglected and in some cases worsened since
independence. There has been an absence of government policy in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Swaziland and
Malawi with regard to women’s land rights. Despite customary and statutory restrictions, women in Lesotho and
Swaziland are gaining access to land through informal markets and inter-family arrangements other than
inheritance. In general, women in the region have been subjected to major disabilities in land ownership both at
customary and statutory law, including permanent minority status under some statutory systems. Tanzania stands208
out for its political commitment on this issue. It has enacted important legislation reforming customary rules of
inheritance to include women as heirs, though the new rules appear to have had little impact in rural areas.
South Africa will be the bellwether on this issue. Its new constitution in Section 8(2) of the Bill for Rights
provides that “no person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly” on the ground of gender or
sex. This opens the possibility of women gaining independent access to land, unmediated by their relationships to
male kin, and creates an interesting tension with recognition in the same constitution of customary law as a
legitimate component of the South African legal order. Women are networked (largely through the Women and
Law in Southern Africa Research Trust, based in Harare) far better in this region than in others in Africa, and the
South African experience are it seeks to balance the two constitutional provisions will be shared widely and
quickly. It is clear from the experience of other African countries which enacted fundamental legal reforms
decades ago, such as Tanzania, that legal reform will be only a first, necessary step in the process of improving
access and security of tenure in land for the region’s women.
Future of land and resource tenure in Southern Africa
The region is rich in terms of experience with both land policies and their implementation. The most sophisticated
discourse over land tenure futures in Africa has in recent years taken place within this part of Africa.
A great deal will hinge upon the role which South Africa comes to play in the region. It is potentially a major
force for the development of market-friendly law and institutions in the neighboring countries. Southern Africa
has seen important innovation in tenure for reform beneficiaries, and for traditional or quasi-traditional
communities. The same is true of tenure arrangements for wildlife and other wildlife conservation strategies.
Also of particular importance are the debates over a new land law for Tanzania. The 1992 report of the
Presidential Commission on Land Matters in Tanzania describes an unusually well-conceived and well-executed
process of studies and public consultation in development of policy proposals. It is exceptional in its frankness.
While a draft of a new land law exists, and it would represent an improvement on the current legal regime for
land, it would be premature to assume that it will be enacted in its current form. But the 1992 report is a very
thoughtful examination of how a community-based tenure system might be implemented.
Finally, Botswana’s Tribal Land Boards are a remarkably successful experience with decentralization of
land administration and democratization of the process at the local level.
This does not mean that those innovations are receiving the necessary attention in other countries of the
region. Mozambique and Angola are pursuing land tenure policies which encourage massive land grabbing, and
this will almost certainly provoke a reaction against liberalization. The most problematic land policy domain
remains the future of the “communal” tenure areas, which benefit from institutional and tenure reforms, which
can make smallholders productive; be treated as a “social security reserve,” a safety net isolated from market
forces; or be gradually diminished as urban and other politically dominant elites acquire them, placing customary
systems under growing pressure and endangering their viability. Regional workshops and conferences on land




Angola has experienced a variety of different land tenure systems. The community-based systems of the
nineteenth century were abruptly uprooted with the influx of European settlers. Small-scale farming gave way to
large plantations which were operated by the settlers. In 1975, the land was nationalized, and the plantations were
transformed into state-run collective farms. Finally, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed sporadic attempts at
dismantling the state farms and returning the land to individual farmers. Such policies, however, lacked adequate
government support as the civil war continued. Presently, Angola is again at an important crossroads where land
tenure policies could become important public issues. Despite such possibilities, it is doubtful whether Angola
will be able to address the numerous land tenure issues due to a lack of political stability, and perhaps more
importantly, a lack of information on existing land tenure systems and their salience in the countryside.
National policy and legal framework
Although population estimates are difficult to gather due to the on-going civil war in Angola, it is estimated that
there are presently 10.9 million people living in Angola. Sixty percent of the people live in rural sites while the
remainder live in urban areas. Even though 75% of the population depend on the land for commercial or
subsistence use, and that there is an estimated 5 million to 8 million hectares of arable land, only 3% of this land
is currently being cultivated. In addition, there are approximately 800,000 residents who have been displaced
because of the civil war. This combination of land pressure caused by the lack of quality land, and the return of
many displaced people to their original parcels of land, makes the issue of land highly volatile in Angola.
During the colonial period, the Portuguese government encouraged the settlement of Europeans in Angola.
Numerous land programs had the effect of displacing and “resettling” many Africans from the more productive
land to smaller and less arable parcels of land. Specifically, in 196l, the Portuguese government passed the
Overseas Property Decree, which in theory protected the land rights of both the settlers and the indigenous people.
Under this law, it was established that the Europeans would be given to title to such land if the property were
developed for twenty years. Although formal registration requirements were set forth, there is little evidence that
many Europeans were granted legal freehold interests due to the inefficient government bureaucracy. Thus, most
Europeans held their large plantations as de facto freehold, rather than as de jure freehold. Such resettlement
programs, especially those in the Central Highlands area, caused the disruption of the community-based land
systems, and the colonial government did little to help the Africans resolve the numerous issues of cultivation
rights that immediately emerged. The law did not recognize the community-based tenure systems, nor did it grant
the indigenous people ownership rights in the land they were occupying.
The tracts of land that were given to the Europeans served as large plantations. Even though the Europeans
were given the best land to cultivate, the land was underutilized, and the exports that the colonial government
hoped to witness never materialized to the extent that the government had promised. At independence in 1975, the
new government of Angola abolished private property and established state farms and agricultural cooperatives
on the land that was abandoned by the Europeans.
These newly created state enterprises were called agrupamentos de unidades de producão (AUPs). In
addition, the new government replaced the “bush traders” with its own rural shops. These shops were supposed to
provide rural peasants with consumer goods and agricultural inputs, but because of a lack of efficient managers210
and technicians, this bureaucratic apparatus failed, and precipitated the dramatic decline in peasant-produced
crops. The AUPs proved to be a complete failure, and Angola quickly lost its status as a net exporter of
agricultural products.
In 1985, the MPLA government began to dismantle the state farms and to establish an agricultural strategy
that supported peasant producers. In particular, the government established estacios de desenvolvimento agricola
(EDAs) to service small farmers. The EDAs are supposed to serve three distinct functions: 1) to provide technical
assistance to small farmers; 2) to distribute inputs and other goods in rural areas where private wholesale and
retail networks are inefficient; 3) to guarantee rural credit.
Before the resumption of the war in October 1992, there were signs that the government planned to establish
private land ownership. In a project that was supported financially by Spain in 1991, the Ministry of Agriculture
allotted ten agricultural plots to 24 war refugee families originally from the Huambo and Bie provinces. Even
though the farmers of this land were prohibited from selling or leasing this land, the government claimed that its
long-term goal was to grant the farmers freehold interests. This project was suspended in 1992 due to the
resumption of the war. Also, in 1991, the government established a specialized agricultural bank entitled Caixa
Agro-Pecuaria e Pescas.
The Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of land tenure policies. While the government has made sporadic
attempts at changing the state farm system, any policies that sought to formally privatize the land have been
suspended. In addition, the government has not stated what the legal status of community-based tenure systems
will be.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
The colonial government, as well as the government after independence, paid little attention to African systems of
land tenure. Thus, we know very little about such land tenure systems. Although our information is limited, there
is evidence that at least two broad types of land tenure systems exist in Angola: the tenure systems in the Central
Highlands, and the tenure systems of the agropastoralists in southern Angola.
The Central Highlands are mostly occupied by the Ovimbundu people. Landholding in this area of the
country was originally community-based. The land was held by the village chief who allocated parcels to clan
leaders. The clan leaders would then distribute the land to individual family members of the clan. Family
members would occupy the land as long as it was productive—generally about six years. When the land became
less productive, it would be returned to fallow, and the clan leader would allocate a different parcel to the family.
Because the land formally belonged to the tribe (and symbolically belonging to the chief), it could not be sold or
inherited by the family occupying it.
During the nineteenth century, this land tenure system began to change as the Ovimbundu experienced new
land pressures. As clan leaders began to move, the power of the village chief declined. Over time, land use
became more permanent, and in many cases, land became heritable following the principles of matrilineal
succession. In addition, family members began to sell and lease land. Thus, in the Central Highlands, there is
evidence that the community-based land tenure systems have gradually adapted to a system of strong individual
interests in the land. As noted above, however, there is a lack of information from the Portuguese colonial
government, or the independence government on these issues. More research must be done in order to determine
whether the trend toward private ownership that existed in the nineteenth century continued over the years.
Unlike the peoples of the Central Highlands, the Dimba and Khumbi of the south are both agriculturalists
and pastoralists. While they are principally animal herders, there is evidence that they have relatively permanent
settlement sites—which many families occupy up to fifty years. The men are responsible for herding the animals
while the women and children are responsible for tilling the land. This original tenure system has been affected by
two recent events. First, much of the land that was used for herding was allocated to Portuguese settlers in the211
1950s and 1960s. And second, this part of the country has been inflicted by fighting over the last 25 years. Again,
while there is information concerning original tenure systems, there needs to be more research done in order to
document any changes that have taken place over the last three decades.
The government has been silent as to its policy concerning community-based tenure systems. In 1975, all
land was nationalized, and community-based interests were not formally recognized. Over the last decade, the
government sought to return parcels of land from the state to the families, but there is no indication that the
government considers issues of community-based tenure to warrant policy pronouncements.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Due to the war, and the 1989/90 drought, food production continues to decline. Prior to 1975, Angola was a net
exporter of food products, specifically with respect to coffee. Presently, Angola is a net importer of food stuffs,
and has been the recipient of over 92,000 tons of food aid since 1988. In addition, the prospects for an increase in
food production are not only linked to the ending of the civil war. Dispersed throughout Angola, there are
approximately 10 million land mines of which there are maps for only 2 million. Most of these mines were buried
on footpaths leading to rivers where women and children sought to obtain water for their small agricultural plots.
In order to increase food security, and its export capacity, the government must make a concerted effort to locate
and dismantle these mines. This situation has put a strain on tenure security. The ultimate location and
destruction of these mines will cause much damage to the land. Such a possibility has undoubtedly affected how
individuals make tenure and agricultural decisions.
The five principal grain crops in Angola are maize, sorghum, millet, rice and wheat. In 1990, the total
production of these crops fell to 246,000 tons, less than a quarter of the output in 1973. There is evidence that the
crop production in 1991, the year of the Bicesse peace accords, began to improve. With the resumption of the
civil war in 1992, however, the food production again began to decline. The war has also had the affect of making
security of tenure highly suspect. Individuals are unable to adequately plan for the future because they do not
know how the civil war will end and what policies will be implemented.
Over the last five years, there have been sporadic attempts at establishing rural agricultural services and
investment incentives for farmers. These efforts, however, have been suspended due to the continuation of the
war. Due to the lack of research in Angola, there is a substantial lack of information concerning both formal and
informal land markets that currently exist.
There is no current information regarding parks, reserves, commons areas, or community forestry programs.
There is every reason to believe their management is in great disarray as a result of the war.
The democratization process in Angola has at times showed signs of promise, but has ultimately only ended
in failure. Unfortunately, because of the ephemeral reality of peace in Angola, the atmosphere is not particularly
positive for land tenure reform issues. While there is no doubt that Angola’s economy is based on its ability to
produce enough agricultural to feed her residents and to export, it is difficult for the government to implement
long-term policies due to the ephemeral reality of peace. As noted above, after the signing of the 1991 Bicesse
Peace Accords, the government did address land tenure issues, but all such policies were suspended once the
fighting resumed in 1992. As recently as December 1995, the MPLA government and UNITA have been
negotiating in order to fully implement the principles of the Lusaka Protocol.
There is a lack of research in Angola concerning gender issues. While women do perform much of the
agricultural labor, their tenure rights are not known. In addition, even though there are two mass organizations
[Organization of Angola Women (OMA) and Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement
(JMPLA)] of which an estimated 1.3 million women are members, there is no evidence that the government is
pursuing any specific policies concerning gender issues.212
Present policy positions and reforms discussed
The Angolan government has not been able to implement long-term land tenure policies due to the civil war.
There are signs, however, that it is committed to a land tenure system that is based more on private ownership,
and less on state ownership. The dismantling of the AUPs in the 1980s, and the establishment of the EDAs show
that the government is aware that the state farm system is inefficient and unproductive.
Unfortunately, however, the government has done little with respect to recognizing or dealing with the issue
of community-based land tenure systems. Examples from other African countries show that a desire to replace
one tenure system with another requires not only the existence of efficient bureaucratic institutions, but also a
long-term policy that acknowledges the cultural aspect of change. Until the government addresses the issue of
community-based tenure systems, it is unlikely that the EDAs, the agricultural bank, investments from foreign
donors, or the creation of rural credit markets will be sufficient to adequately solve all the tenure issues.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The difficulty of discussing land tenure issues in Angola is that we know very little about the actual land tenure
systems on the ground or the impact that the government’s policy change in the 1980s had on small farmers. Both
because of the lack of interest the colonial government had in community-based land tenure systems, and the
ongoing civil war, there is much we do not know about Angola’s land tenure system. There is an urgent need to
gather more information relating to the existing tenure systems. Until such research is completed, it is difficult to




Botswana distinguishes itself from other African countries in its open recognition of customary tenure and
provision of a legal basis for it. The Tribal Land Act, enacted following independence, and its subsequent
amendments have nevertheless altered the framework, and perhaps much of the philosophy, underlying
Botswana’s customary tenure system. The role of chiefs in making land allocation decisions has been phased out
and replaced with a decentralized system of Tribal Land Boards, which are linked to the national Ministry of
Local Government, Land and Housing. Still, much of the security and easy access principles embodied in
customary tenure systems has been preserved. By employing an adaptation rather than replacement strategy, the
government has been more attentive to the evolving needs of its citizens and has avoided large-scale normative
confusion which often accompanies radical conversions of land tenure systems. At the same time, it has
eliminated distinctions between citizens from different tribes and subtribes and provided all Botswana citizens a
right to land where they live.
National policy and legal framework
Less than 1% of Botswana’s land is classified as arable; about 45% is permanent pasture. Agricultural
population per hectare of arable land is 2.03; 75% of Botswana’s population resides in rural areas where
livestock is the primary source of subsistence and income. The majority of livestock raised is cattle, which endure
Botswana’s drought conditions better than crops, partly because they are a mobile asset.
Land in Botswana is divided into three categories: tribal (71%), state (23%), and freehold (6%). With the
exception of reserve areas and some commercial holdings classified as state land or freehold, land in the rural
areas is designated as tribal land. The law permits two types of land tenure on tribal land, customary and
leasehold. Until recently, one could also legally acquire freehold with the consent of the Minister of Local
Government, Land and Housing, but this proviso has not been utilized to any extent since independence and was
recently repealed.
Enacted in 1968 and implemented in 1970, the Tribal Land Act and its amendments pertain to the land
tenure systems in the tribal lands which are recognized under Botswana law. The main body of the legislation
provides for the creation of local land boards to administer land allocations in the tribal land areas, the rules
underlying its administration, and the rights held by various groups of landholders. Land became vested in the
boards, which were given the power to make customary grants and common law leases to tribesmen within their
jurisdiction. Prior to the law, tribal chiefs were responsible for making customary land allocations to their
members and thus the law made a sharp departure from tradition.
Land boards are divided into both main and subordinate categories, with the former residing in the district
capital and the latter in more remote areas. Boards are overseen by the Ministry of Local Government, Land and
Housing, which appoints several ex-officio members to each land board. When the law was originally
implemented, it named the local chief as an ex-officio member of the board. The chief further appointed a full
member to the board. Two District Council members were elected to the board and the minister appointed the
remainder. Later, communities could elect land board members and chiefs and their appointees and District
Council members were removed from land boards all together, such that today boards are made up of only214
elected officials and ministerial appointees. Main land boards have 12 members while subordinate boards have
10.
Customary grants allocate land for residential, cultivation, and livestock grazing purposes. In the case of
grazing, communal rights are granted to groups of community members rather than individual rights to
individuals. Originally, such grants were restricted to members of the subtribe of the district given that almost all
the districts correspond to the traditional territories of the Tswana subtribes, typically referred to as “tribes” in
Botswana. This restriction to “tribesmen” was amended in 1993 so that any Botswana citizen could have equal
access to any tribal land. Common law leases are provided for commercial, industrial, commercial livestock
production, or commercial agricultural purposes. In 1985, in response to recommendations in a government
White Paper, this was expanded to include residential leases which persons had the option to obtain in lieu of
customary grants. The objective of this measure was to facilitate access to formal credit through enabling
individuals to mortgage such property. Residential leases involve a one-time, small rental charge (P30.00) to
ensure their accessibility to low-income citizens.
In the case of common law leases, the law allows land acquisition by noncitizens, but favors Batswana. This
is reflected in requirements for ministerial approval for noncitizens to acquire land, plus higher rental charges and
shorter duration on lease agreements. In the case of residential leases, for instance, citizens are awarded 99-year
leases while noncitizens receive 50-year leases. All other leases uphold 50-year terms which are renewable for an
additional 50 years for both citizens and noncitizens, with the exception of commercial agriculture, which carries
a 15-year, renewable term.
The rights provided by customary grants closely resemble those of the customary tenure system. The
allocations are made by the land boards free of charge and accompanied by a Certificate of Customary Land
Grant, which, unlike leaseholds, does not have to be registered. Rights held by the recipient are permanent (the
land never reverts to the state), exclusionary, and inheritable, provided that the grant is not revoked. The
conditions under which a customary grant may be canceled include: failure to utilize the land on the terms
specified by the land board, failure to develop the land according to the specified purposes within five years,
guarantees to insure equitable land distribution by the land board, and compulsory acquisition by the government
for public purposes.
Although the latter two provisions have potential for abuse, their use is in fact rare, perhaps because the
compensation requirement discourages it. If the state acquires land from holders, it is obligated by law to
compensate them for improvements made, crops planted, resettlement cost, and the subjective value of the rights
lost to the land.
Land transfers made on tribal land require land board approval, regardless of whether the land is held under
customary grant or common law lease, unless the transaction is exempted from such consent. Exemptions include
inheritances, mortgages made by a citizen or sales made in execution to a citizen, and transfers of land which has
been developed according to the terms specified in the grant or lease. However, one is still required to inform the
land board of a transfer for record-keeping purposes. Prior to 1993, all transactions required board and/or
ministerial approval, except for inheritances or mortgages of common law leases.
Land disputes are often brought to land boards. The fact that they have undertaken a judicial role has
prompted debate over whether this administrative body should carry out such functions or whether district
tribunals should be created for these purposes. All decisions made by subordinate land boards may be appealed to
main land boards after which appeals are made to the Minister. The final authority rests with a court of law.
A small, but significant, portion of land remains under freehold tenure. Most of these holdings are estate
farms carried over from the colonial period and are owned by families of European descent. The greatest
concentration of these farms is in the highly fertile Ghanzi region and Tati Concessions. Prior to the repeal of the215
acquisition of freehold tenure, freehold allocations were strictly frowned upon and post-independence freehold
purchases were made solely by the state.
The Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) of 1975 emerged as a result of livestock populations having risen
dramatically during the early 1970s, heightening competition for resources in communal grazing areas and
resulting in overstocking and rangeland degradation. The TGLP sought to address these problems and bolster
livestock production through providing more exclusive rights to large cattle owners while protecting the
communal interests of small-scale herders. Commercial regions were zoned where these large-scale individual
cattle owners and syndicates could obtain 50-year renewable leases on rangelands averaging 6,400 acres in area.
It was believed that the ability to mortgage such leases, unlike customary grants for grazing, would improve cattle
owners’ access to formal financing. Implementation of the TGLP proved to be problematic, however. Several of
the areas zoned for commercial ranching proved to be occupied by hunter-gatherer populations as well as other
borehole owners, so that allocations in these areas had to be scrapped. Many TGLP leaseholders continued to
herd their animals in communal grazing areas, keeping their ranches as reserves. Thus, the expected benefits to
communal grazers of removing commercial ranchers from the open range did not materialize. In the end, the
TGLP was implemented in only six districts, and by 1991, 300 commercial ranching leases had been granted,
most of them to already established borehole owners. Despite government anticipation of the TGLP leading to
increased investments, demand for large-scale credit, enhanced livestock production, and adoption of rangeland
preservation techniques, significant improvements have not been forthcoming.
Allocations of state land are governed under the State Lands Act and apply principally to urban areas and
some commercial farms. Leases are issued by the Department of Surveys and Land and require ministerial
approval. Unlike leases obtained on tribal lands, those issued on state land do not require permission for transfer.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Prior to the introduction of the Tribal Land Act, land allocations were made by chiefs to ward (extended family)
headmen, who in turn divided land among their members. Rights were held on an individual basis for residential
and agricultural land while communal rights were maintained over grazing lands. Rights were inherited
patrilineally for the most part and provided the holder with permanent, undisturbed occupation of the land. The
aim of the TLA was to uphold these principles while reassigning the administrative body over land rights so as to
streamline procedures and provide greater efficiency and equitable distribution. Although amendments to the law
have removed the chiefs from the picture, the land boards have continued to rely heavily on ward headmen for
information and assistance in implementation.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Gaborone has undergone rapid expansion since independence, resulting in mounting land values. The pressure on
urban areas and the severe shortages of housing there have sky-rocketed land values and prices, causing residents
to seek land in peri-urban areas where free allocations of customary grants keep land values low. In several of
these areas, rampant land sales have taken place, most without land boards’ approval. There is evidence of
corruption and influence peddling in peri-urban land allocation.
The government has endeavored to adapt the land legislation to suit changing needs and circumstances of
rural populations while ensuring that land is accessible to all Batswana. In doing so, it has had to make tradeoffs
in the pursuit of its dual objectives of equity and food security versus growth. Against the recommendations of
some earlier land tenure commissions to replace the TLA with freehold tenure, government policy has upheld
customary tenure systems which it believes offer greater access and security for the majority of its citizens.
Meanwhile, its introduction of common law leases, expansion of mortgaging rights, and extension of exclusive
rights to cattle owners under the TGLP are indicative of its growth objectives. Conflicts between these goals
emerge when the provision of exclusive rights to commercial ranchers reduces small-scale herders’ access to216
grazing land and dispossesses hunter-gatherers, threatening their food security. Likewise, free allocations of
customary grants keep land values low so that it is difficult to use land as collateral even when one has the right to
do so. It may be that the recognition and acceptance of these conflicts have allowed Botswana to remain
committed to a balanced development strategy.
Cattle-raising is the dominant activity of rural populations while beef is a primary export commodity and
foreign exchange earner. Thus, the impact of land policy on grazing rights and livestock production bears
importance to all in Botswana.
Prior to the TGLP, the growing intensification of competition for borehole access transformed the roles of
syndicates, elite groups of cattle owners born out of high-ranking members of tribal lineages. Traditionally
charged with the role of managing access to communal grazing resources, these bodies gradually adopted more
rigid criteria such that only syndicate members and their immediate families were granted access to boreholes and
the surrounding grazing areas. Nonmembers, typically poorer small-scale herders, could have access only as
hirers, who paid fees for watering and grazing their livestock. The expansion of residential and cultivation areas
further diminished available grazing land such that competition increased and smaller herders became relegated to
more marginal lands. Although the intent of the TGLP was to relieve much of this pressure by assigning
syndicates land in commercial grazing zones, the lack of unoccupied land resulted in granting exclusive rights
(leases) to syndicates on existing land, where they were encouraged to fence the perimeter of their property to
prevent others’ cattle from intruding. The policy further stated that hirers would be given rights to the boreholes
and lands they used. The threat of nonmembers acquiring rights prompted syndicates to exclude hirers from their
land. Thus efforts to ensure greater equity took an about face.
Water is a source of widespread dispute among livestock owners. As livestock populations increase, so does
competition for access to boreholes, particularly since in most cases they must be placed at a 5-mile distance from
one another to work effectively. Whereas land is fairly abundant in Botswana, much land cannot accommodate
boreholes since the groundwater supply is negligible, difficult to access, or salty. As land and borehole rights
become increasingly privatized, smaller herders and hunter-gatherer groups have less access to resources from the
land, including natural sources of water that border these properties. Fencing has also inhibited the mobility of
wildlife and their access to resources, threatening animals’ survival.
Present policy position and reforms
Probably more than any country in Africa, Botswana has in place a functional, well-thought-through system of
land administration. It has invested heavily in creating a serious land administration capability. We may expect to
see fine tuning, but no major policy reversals.
Botswana has successfully upheld a decentralized system of land tenure administration; it has imposed a
significant degree of state control over these matters. This is demonstrated by the number of decisions requiring
ministerial approval, particularly concerning land transfers. Although many of these restrictions have been
removed, the state has also replaced the representation of chiefs and other local community leaders on land boards
with appointees of the minister. It is unclear whether such changes in board membership coincide with the
opinions of rural populations being affected by them. Replacing some of the ex-officio members with elected
members would better ensure local representation, and this issue of representation on the land boards continues to
be discussed within and outside the Ministry of Local Government, Land and Housing.
Although the Tribal Land Act does not bar women from obtaining land, other legislation effectively
precludes them from doing so. Namely the Marriage Act, the Married Persons Act, and the Deeds Registry Act
do not permit women to register land in their own names if they are married. In doing so, they are denied access to
credit from formal sources which require registered documents as collateral. Without the means to develop the
land and comply with the five-year development requirement, women face the risk of losing their land. Women217
also encounter discrimination by land boards. If married, they are sometimes questioned as to whether they
recognize the man as the head of household, and if so, why they should then have land in their names. Similarly, if
a woman is unmarried and the board feels she is eligible for marriage, she may be denied land on the grounds that
she will have access to her husband’s land once married.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The decentralized structure of Botswana’s land tenure system and the responsive nature of the government in
addressing evolving tenure needs make Botswana among the more successful examples of how to structure land
tenure policies which are compatible with development objectives. Although the dual objectives of equity and
growth frequently compete so that no policy may address either completely, there is room for further adaptation
to remove additional constraints.
Climatic uncertainty and risk of drought make flexibility, mobility, and community interdependence key
factors in the survival and productivity of livestock. It may be prudent for land boards to negotiate and make
customary grants which embody overlapping rights to land and water resources. Caution should be undertaken in
granting exclusive rights to individuals on land used by other groups to avoid marginalizing such populations and
exacerbating income inequalities .
The rights of hunter-gatherer populations like the Basarwa and the San have never been defined within
Botswana’s land tenure policy. For this reason, they are often not recognized as having rights to land, leaving
them vulnerable to dispossession. Long the victims of policies which favor Botswana’s pastoral tribes, hunter-
gatherer groups are gradually gaining momentum and making themselves heard in the policy arena.
The lack of improvements undertaken on commercial ranches allocated under the TGLP may in fact stem
from nontenurial constraints. Insufficient access to improved technology and extension may be key contributors to
their lackluster performance. If mechanized technology is introduced, spare parts may be difficult or impossible to
obtain, resulting in failure to adopt such improvements. Likewise, the problem of insufficient marketability of
rural land and continued lack of formal finance available to rural populations may be more effectively addressed
by nontenurial strategies which seek to revise banking norms.
For all their merit, Botswana’s equity objectives have more aptly aspired to equity among males. Women’s
tenure rights need to be addressed in land legislation if they are to gain recognition. Gender discrimination by land
boards should be made illegal. Efforts to include at least one female representative on land boards might aid in
enforcing the measure and promote better treatment of female applicants. Training for land boards could also be
instrumental in promoting gender equity.
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With the passage of the 1979 Land Act, the Government of Lesotho attempted to enhance security of tenure of
landholders, with the ultimate aim of increasing agricultural production. Under this act, the customary system of
tenure is modified, though the integrity of the system is protected by the government. Whereas in the past, chiefs
had the power to reallocate land upon the death of a holder or to accommodate new households, now reallocation
is to be done only in cases of abuse or nonuse of land. Implementation of the act has not been widespread,
however, due to lack of effective communication on behalf of the government regarding advantages of the act.
There is also a lack of incentive on behalf of farmers to comply with the law due to difficulties in securing good
land for leasing.
National policy and legal framework
About two-thirds of Lesotho is mountainous and only 13% of its area is arable. As of 1991, the country’s
population was estimated to be 1.9 million and growing at an annual rate of 2.6%. About 85% of this population
is rural and resides mostly in the “lowlands,” a narrow crescent of land lying along the western perimeter of the
country. The Basotho peoples are traditionally agro-pastoralists. Under the impact of a rapidly growing
population, overgrazing, severe soil erosion, and expanding residential areas, the quantity of arable land has been
steadily decreasing. By the 1970s, population pressure on land had become very intense, and the average holding
size per household was estimated at 1.4 hectares with an estimated 20% (approximately 70,000) of rural
households being landless.
The relatively uniform customary tenure system which permeated the nation was criticized for two primary
reasons. First, farmers’ uncertainty about their long-term tenure rights discouraged investment in land. Second,
progressive farmers willing and able to employ land and other factors at higher levels of productivity than
subsistence were unable to do so because of the general prohibition against sales. The government’s response was
the Land Act of 1979. This piece of legislation accounted for some of the more obvious criticisms of the
customary system while preserving its basic tenets, particularly the right of all Basotho to free allocations of
agricultural land in their village of residence. The main provisions of the Land Act are as follows:
1) Land remains the property of the nation and is held in trust by the king.
2) The entitlement of all adult married males to a “customary” allocation of land for residential and agricultural
purposes.
3) The recognition of inheritance rights and the establishment of procedures for them. (Inheritance has become
a key mechanism for passing land from one generation to the next; surviving widows and then the oldest
adult son inherit.)
4) The strengthening of individual rights against chiefs, who are prohibited from revoking or subdividing land
for reallocation.
5) The creation of a new agricultural leasehold tenure. (The law gives customary holders the option of
converting their allocations to a lease-right, which they can mortgage and even sell, subject to approval by
the Ministry of Interior.)
6) The creation of land committees empowered to allocate land and chaired by chiefs.219
The Land Act provides for the selective introduction of the agricultural lease which was felt to meet the
needs of farmers seeking to invest substantially in their holdings. The lease allows the holder exclusive use of a
specified piece of land for a period of not less than 10 years. The lease may be sublet, made the subject of a will,
and can be used as collateral for a bank loan. The knowledge that the lease cannot be appropriated by any
authority until the specified period has expired—provided the conditions are adhered to—is assumed to allow the
leaseholder to make property investment plans which would ultimately lead to increased productivity. There was
no general or automatic conversion of tenure to lease. Instead, it was left to holders of allocations with a felt need
for the new tenure to apply for the conversion of their allocations to leases. An important exception to this was the
provision in the Land Act for the general conversion to lease tenure in Selected Agricultural Areas (SAAs)-areas
where government has decided it is necessary to pursue intensively the introduction of modern farming
techniques. Because a lease is transferable under the Act, the possibility is also created for the beginnings of a
market in agricultural land.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Moshoehsoe, the founder of the Basotho nation and its first paramount chief, formalized Lesotho’s customary
tenure system. He established the principle that all land belonged to the nation, to be held in trust by the chief
(today the king). He delegated land allocation rights to a hierarchy of area and village chiefs. Accordingly, a
household head was entitled to allocation of three “lands,” for maize, sorghum, and wheat, respectively.
Land was not inheritable, but reverted to the chief for reallocation on the death of the allottee. In fact, land
was often passed to a son or sons of the allottee while the allottee still lived, with the chief’s consent. Most land
remained, therefore, in the family via a male lineage. A widow was entitled to retain two of her husband’s lands
until her own death.
Occasionally, land was reallocated between families. As a family diminished in size, due to either deaths or
sons’ moving away, the number of parcels to which a man had rights would be reduced, and these fields would be
reallocated to a family that was growing in size. In theory, subsistence needs determined the amount of land to
which a man had access. Sales of land were unknown, but there were gifts and occasional loans of land.
The Land Act modifies these terms of allocation by no longer allowing chiefs to reallocate land from existing
holdings to the creation of new holdings. Regulations have been established which allow the Land Committee to
revoke an allocation for abuse of the holding, overgrazing, refusal or inability to fight soil erosion, and lack of
cultivation of arable land for over three years.
There are three distinguishing features of the Land Act as it applies to agricultural land. First, it encodes in
law features of customary practice that authorities had not always applied consistently. Second, it creates a new
tenure in the form of agricultural leases. This provision appears to meet demands for a more negotiable land title,
but in reality has not been that effective since conversion to a lease requires the initiative of the landholder, and
entrepreneurial farmers have had trouble in securing good land. In addition, the transfer process is enveloped in
multilayered administration, and as a result, the Land Act has done very little to increase the marketability of
land. Finally, the Land Act dilutes the allocation rights of village chiefs. However, since it has not pressed the
adoption of the Land Committee model in rural areas and has not been clear in defining the real nature of the
relationship between it and the chiefs, implementation of the Act has not been widespread. In fact, the impact of
the Act in rural areas is almost negligible (only 3 leaseholds had been created by 1988), and customary tenure
arrangements still govern most of the rural areas in the country. There is more of a tendency for the Land Act to
be implemented in urban areas.
Either the government has not been effective in communicating the advantages of the law or rural farmers
have not perceived that any advantages would be forthcoming if they complied with the law. A 1984 Land Act220
Policy Seminar resulted in the drafting of a set of regulations for implementation of the Act in rural areas which
are currently under discussion.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
For most landed households, the principal source of income consists of remittances from men working in the
South African mines. Long-term opportunities in South Africa and other urban centers in Lesotho, however, are
sufficiently insecure and serve as disincentives for rural Basotho to cut their ties to the land. Although agriculture
as a source of income has declined in importance where the head or other adult household members are working
off-farm and sending home remittances, land continues to have value as a form of capital that can be used to
produce a modest crop. Moreover, people retain customary interests in land, expecting that it will provide an
important source of income in an uncertain future. Under these circumstances, agricultural land is both
underutilized and in short supply in relation to demand.
The economic system within which most Basotho operate does not provide long-term assurance of access to
nonfarm employment, of pensions on retirement, or of other forms of economic security that might incline holders
to surrender their land to others who would be able to farm it more productively. Lacking other farming assets
such as implements, labor, and cash, they will often use land as their contribution to sharecropping arrangements.
In broad economic terms, land in Lesotho is seen less as a source of primary subsistence than as a source of
supplementary income for households that cannot secure more conventional types of income outside of
agriculture.
Many studies argue that land held under customary tenure is insecure because rights are not individualized,
and because control over land is largely in the hands of the chief and the community. In addition, although the
customary tenure system provides ready access to security in subsistence opportunities, it does so at the expense
of tenure security in a specific piece of land. In particular, the possibility of land reallocation from existing
holdings for new families reduced security of tenure. Given the debate on land shortages, fragmentation. security
and declining production under the customary system of tenure, the government of Lesotho passed the Land Act
of 1979 as a means of increasing investment on existing holdings, changing land allocation procedures, and
increasing security.
The Land Act has not produced the production impacts intended, however, because other production
constraints faced by farmers simply outweigh security issues. Farmers are not as likely to adopt resource
management practices, for example, if costs outweigh perceived advantages, no matter how secure a holding
appears. In response to such constraints, including shortages of land and farming assets such as draft power,
labor, and cash, sharecropping has become a commonplace farming strategy in Lesotho. Sharecropping
arrangements have been a common feature of agriculture in Lesotho for many decades. Terms consist of the
landholding party contributing land, and the party sharing-in contributing other necessary assets such as draft
power and cash. Some of the reasons given by chiefs for the increase in sharecropping include less land for
allocation to newly established households, more widows and female-headed households with too little cash to
farm on their own, declining livestock ownership and fewer available oxen for plowing, increasing farming costs,
and population growth.
Although most commercial farmers recognize the social security role of the customary tenure system and
tend not to perceive customary allocations as inadequate or as disincentives to investment, some are dissatisfied
with sharecropping procedures since they are annual commitments generally associated with subsistence field
crops. These farmers are looking for greater control over operations and profits than offered by this model. Some
of them have tried to follow the procedure for transfer of lease rights as set out in the Land Act of 1979, but
without much success. Prospective sellers are intimidated by the procedure for converting their customary right to221
a leasehold, while prospective buyers have found the process expensive and time consuming. Consequently, the
commercial farming sector in Lesotho is still relatively small.
The Land Act is focused upon arable land and does not deal with grazing and range management, because
grazing rights are communal and are not allocated to individuals. Mountain pastures fall outside the jurisdiction
of any Land Committee, being utilized by herders from many communities. The principal chief for the area
concerned has control over the mountain pastures under the Grazing Regulations of 1980, and issues grazing
permits for these areas. Emphasis has been placed on the development of grazing associations to achieve many of
the economies possible under large-scale holdings. Two functions the associations can perform are: (1) providing
a framework for assigning grazing rights to specific areas based on membership in the association, and (2)
providing an institutional forum for agreeing upon local range regulations and controls.
Soil erosion has been documented as a problem on land governed by community-based systems of tenure.
Since farmers do not have formal title under this system, it is assumed that more secure tenure would promote
better soil conservation as well as the adoption of resource management practices.
The king and chieftainship of Lesotho never supported the Land Act, principally because of its provisions
that committees allocate land. The new process of allocation under the Act, however, appears democratic in
nature, since chiefs chair the land allocation committees, and all adult married males are still entitled to a
“customary” allocation of land for residential and agricultural purposes as they are under the customary system
of tenure. The fact that women can gain access to land only through their husbands, however, needs to be
addressed in a critique of the Land Act.
Under customary tenure systems, women acquire land rights indirectly through their husbands. In the event
of divorce or separation, a woman loses her rights to her husband’s fields and is expected to reincorporate herself
into her parents’ production unit. Sometimes unmarried, divorced, or separated women are loaned pieces of land
for food production by their brothers or fathers. These arrangements are intended only as temporary measures,
usually until the woman gets married or remarried. An elderly, unmarried woman may be granted a small field in
her own right at the discretion of a chief or village headman to enable her to produce her own food. A widow
retains lifetime rights to her deceased husband’s fields, provided she continues to reside in his village and does not
remarry. Thus, the male heir has to share the land with the widow as long as she lives. Ultimately, women’s
access to arable land remains through the male as husband, father, or brother. The Land Act enforces provisions
similar to the customary tenure system, in the sense that it allows women to gain access to land only through their
husbands. The Act still protects a widow’s lifetime rights to her husband’s fields as well.
Some women without their own arable land have been able to gain access to other people’s land indirectly
through sharecropping. The fact that one is able to provide one or more factors of production in sharecropping
allows women, regardless of marital status, to gain indirect access to arable land and its products. In addition,
informal land markets have allowed some women with cash and other resources to gain access to arable land
independent of men.
Present policy position and reforms
Despite high levels of landlessness and pressures for reform from donor agencies and commercial farmers, the
Government of Lesotho has protected the integrity of the customary land tenure system. This is largely due to
continuing support at both the elite and the popular level. The reason the customary system is so valued is
because it is sufficiently responsive to current needs, as demonstrated by the spontaneous emergence of renting
and leasing land. In addition, the system has the right to free land as one of its central components. The fact that
land is in increasingly short supply serves only to galvanize support for the basic tenets of the system. Some
critics believe, however, that the customary system allows tenure security to prevail with unrestrained
reallocations of land by chiefs.222
Some of the main criticisms of the Land Act are: (1) it does not attempt to deal with the issue of
control/access/use of communal pastures; (2) the extensive powers given to the government in the SAA context
have potential for land-grabbing by elites; and (3) by enveloping the leasing process in multilayered
administration, the law contributes very little to the increased marketability of land.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The government has not been effective in communicating the new law to rural residents since it provides so many
benefits. By increasing tenure security, allowing for inheritance, encouraging investment and the possibility of a
land market (especially for commercial farmers), forbidding reallocation of land, and striving to reduce
landlessness, the Land Act has the potential to make a significant impact on the lives of the Basotho people. To
facilitate implementation procedures, the excessively demanding survey standards and multilayered
administration of the Act need to be revised. If, upon widespread implementation, the Act does not appear to be
improving the tenure security of rural people, the system of sharecropping that is predominant in most parts of the
country should be evaluated in terms of its effectiveness in making use of available land and other resources. This
is especially important in light of the fact that women are able to gain access to arable land under the system.
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Madagascar has gone through a number of land and natural resource tenure reforms, yet, in much of the country,
its community-based tenure systems are still strong. In general, land and natural resource tenure security is high.
However, it is low where people do not understand the state laws and have lost confidence in the community-
based systems, or where the community-based systems and state laws overlap and people variously respect one of
the other sets of rules. Where tenure security is high there is an opportunity to encourage agricultural innovations
and investment, and the conservation of the natural resource base. At the same time, there are other forces,
including lack of access to capital for investment, poor agricultural extension services, and high population
growth rates, which work against these opportunities. These should be addressed so that Madagascar can take
advantage of the relatively high levels of tenure security found in its rural countryside.
National policy and legal framework
Madagascar is the fourth largest island in the world and has an area of 587,000 square kilometers. Population has
grown from an estimated 3.5 million people in 1900 to 6.7 million in 1970, 8.7 million in 1980, and around 13
million today. In 1992, the average annual population growth rate was 2.8%, one of the highest in the world. The
population is unevenly distributed throughout the island, with 75% living in rural areas. The central highlands is
the most densely populated area; the eastern rainforest area is also noted as having high population density; and
the western, drier, part of the country has the lowest population densities. Approximately 46% of the population
is under 15 years of age. Out of the total labor force, 80% are engaged in predominantly small-scale agricultural
production.
Land is valued in Madagascar for more than agricultural purposes. Families and communities have strong
ties to their land due to certain beliefs relating to the place of ancestors in the society. Different practices among
the ethnic groups of the island manifest this belief. In some cases, the umbilical cord of a baby born away from
the family’s traditional geographic area must be carried back to the ancestral land and buried, and in other areas a
person must be buried in an ancestral grave in order to be truly at rest. These strong connections to the land are
reflected in the customs, rules, and laws that relate to land in Madagascar.
Madagascar also has a complex mixture of a state-sanctioned freehold tenure system and community-based
tenure systems. There are both national laws and community-based rules that regulate the access and use rights
that people have to land, trees/forests, and water.
Individual ownership of land under the law precedes the colonial era in Madagascar. In 1881, the Merina
royal council set forth the idea in a Code of 305 Articles. The Code also established the concept that all land
comes from the state. The Code was considered law for those areas of the island under Merina hegemony. Areas
where this was not the case included the far northern part of the island, where the Antakarana were predominant
and the southwestern part of the island, where Merina rule was not firmly established.
In 1896, the French colonial regime introduced the notion of land alienation and privatization with the goal
of encouraging European settlement. In 1897, the Torrens system of land registration was adopted and it was
required that all land sales be registered in order to be legal. Settler freehold was most common along the eastern
coastal region, where large plantations were established. The 1896 law also stated that individual claims to land224
could be based on “traditional” claims to land and that these claims could be used as evidence to establish
individual ownership and receive land titles.
A 1911 decree abrogated the use of traditional criteria for claiming land in areas where slash-and-burn
agriculture predominated. This decree followed in the tradition of the 1881 Merina Code and enlarged the powers
of the state over land. The decree of 1926 further enlarged the state’s claim to land and stated that (1) traditional
testimonies could no longer be used as proof of rights to ancestral land, and (2) in the future all land would be
recognized as state land, except for titled land. The decree of 1956 reversed the decree of 1926 and reestablished
the right of using traditional testimony as proof of “ownership” of ancestral lands.
Under state land laws, women and men are recognized as having equal rights to land and natural resources.
However, in practice when land is titled, it is titled under the name of the male head of household.
As with land, the Merina kingdom had laws that regulated tree and forest use. These laws were promulgated
in response to the perceived threat of deforestation and placed limits on the cutting of trees and clearing of areas
for slash-and-burn agriculture. As with the land laws, these laws were mainly enforced in the central highland
area of the island.
In 1913, the French passed the first colonial forestry codes. These codes were based on the French National
Forest law of 1854. It held that all forests belonged to the state and that all trees were state property. These laws
outlawed the practice of slash-and-burn agriculture. In 1927, the first laws creating protected areas
10 were passed.
This law was passed at the behest of French botanists who noted the uniqueness of Madagascar’s environment.
These laws were added to and changed slightly over the years up to independence. Under the colonial system the
Department of Water and Forests (Département des Eaux et Forêts, or DEF) was responsible for both enforcing
the forestry code and regulating access to the protected areas on the island.
After independence, the DEF continued in this capacity. The forestry codes were changed to accommodate
new political realities. Rules regarding slash-and-burn agriculture were either changed or not enforced as
stringently and the enforcement of laws relating to cutting trees was relaxed. Forestry laws and the enforcement of
these laws have changed with different political regimes that have emerged in Madagascar, but today, the forestry
code still states that all forests, except those on titled land, are state property, and most trees are also considered
property of the state.
Protected area legislation has also changed over time. Currently there are 37 protected areas in Madagascar.
Of these, only classified forests and hunting reserves are controlled by DEF; the rest are under the authority of the
Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protèges (ANGAP), which was created in 1989 as part of the
implementation of the Environmental Action Plan. ANGAP is authorized with patrolling and running the national
parks, strict nature reserves and special reserves. The Ministry of the Environment was recently created and given
the power of overseeing all environmental laws and Madagascar’s protected areas.
Water plays a large role in the agricultural systems of Madagascar. National water laws are administered by
DEF. These laws state that all water sources and water courses belong to the state. Consequently, when there are
disputes over access to water, the local Water and Forests agent has the primary responsibility for resolving the
conflict.
Land markets are officially encouraged through the state laws that regulate land titling. In cases where state
land laws are vigorously enforced, land markets are also present. However, even in these cases, traditional views
of land influence arrangements between buyers and sellers (see below).
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Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Madagascar’s community-based tenure systems recognize that different people have different rights to land and
natural resources. Consequently, academics and others have used the categories of primary, secondary, and
tertiary holders of rights to land to describe these differences. Primary holders are those individuals who have
cleared, inherited, or bought rights to land or natural resources. They have rights to designate how the land will be
managed, to sell the land or resource, and to say who can use or who will inherit the land. Secondary holders,
who are usually sons of primary holders, but can also be daughters and wives in some situations, are in line to
become the primary holder of the land or resource. They have certain rights to the land, such as deciding what can
be planted on the land, and they often have a say as to whether the land or resource will be used during the
coming season or whether it will be rented or loaned. They do not have the right to designate definitively who will
have future use rights to the land and they can not sell the land. Tertiary holders have few long-term rights to the
land. They either rent, sharecrop, or borrow the land, or the use/access rights to the resource, for a limited period
of time. They can determine what will be planted on the land for the duration of that period, but have no long-
term decision-making rights to the land. The same three designations differentiate holders of rights to water
resources and trees under the community-based tenure systems.
In most situations women are secondary holders or tertiary holders of rights to land. Women hold these
secondary rights because in most cases they have access to land through a male relative, such as a husband,
father, or brother. This is the case since they usually leave their community to live on their husband’s land or in
their husband’s household. This is the case even in community-based tenure systems where women inherit land
from either their mother or their father. In these cases, when they leave the community at marriage, the tenure
system dictates that they entrust the land to one of their brothers or to another male relative. In these cases, if a
woman divorces, is widowed, or for some other reason returns to the community, she can reclaim the land that
she entrusted to her male relative. In cases such as these, she could be considered a primary holder.
Community-based tenure systems regulate forests as community goods. The communities have rules and
regulations that limit access to the forest and limit use rights to the forest goods. Communities recognize the value
of their forests, and if a forest resource is becoming scarce, they place a variety of boycotts on the collection of
the resource. Communities also designate seasons during which different forest resources can be collected. In
most places the use of forests as common pastureland is also recognized.
Madagascar’s community-based tenure systems include informal land markets. Each community has a
complex set of rules that dictate who can sell land, who can buy land, and under what conditions land can be sold.
In most cases people are unwilling to sell land unless they are in very dire need of money for food or to pay the
costs of a funeral. When this is the case, most community rules orient the seller so that land stays within the
community. The seller first tries to sell land to an immediate family member; if this is not possible, an attempt is
made to find an extended family member who can buy the land. If this is not possible, someone else in the
community is sought who can buy the land. Finally, if there is no one from within the community who can buy
the land, an outside buyer is solicited. When an outside buyer buys land, it is usually under the minimal condition
that he (or she in certain cases) agrees to recognize community rules. In more extreme cases the outside buyer
needs to become “blood brothers” with a person or family in the community, or in some other way a recognized
member of the community.
Land markets within community-based tenure systems are usually strongest and most developed in areas
where there are already land shortages.
Community-based tenure systems are located within clearly defined geographical areas; accordingly, the
communities know where their rules are in force. These boundaries generally were defined sometime in the past.
As communities expand and come up against each other, the boundaries are refined and become more definitive.
The same can be said about the rules of access under the systems. In general, when an area is first settled, most of226
the land is loosely claimed or considered a common good. As populations grow, or people settle definitively in an
area, boundaries between areas for pasture and agriculture are defined, and boundaries between peoples’ fields
are defined. As the population grows, these boundaries become fixed and better defined. Also, rules regarding
who has access to and who can use the land and resources become more precisely defined. Specific examples of
how these have changed follow in the next sections.
Irrigated farming systems rely on both land and water resources and are found through much of
Madagascar. For the most part community-based tenure systems associated with these farming systems follow
the generalized outline above. However, there are regional and ethnic differences. Some of the regional differences
have to do with the population growth patterns and rates in the area. If there is scarcity of arable land, primary
holders are less likely to loan out land, though renting and sharecropping may still be found. Secondary holders
may also have less security regarding their future ascendancy to land. In some places, inheritance may take on a
rotational form, where each secondary holder inherits the right to use land only on a rotational basis.
11 Another
variation is that women may have fewer rights to land as arable land availability decreases. In some ethnic groups
this has resulted in women’s not having inheritance rights to land or losing access to inherited land if they leave
the community to reside with their husband. Another aspect of population pressure on land tenure systems
associated with irrigated farming systems is the process of land fragmentation. As population increases,
landholdings become smaller and fragmented. This situation is prevalent in parts of the highlands.
Water resources are also regulated depending upon the irrigation situation. In some communities, as
population pressure increases, access to water sources takes on an increasingly private tone, with each individual
having a canal from the water source to their field. This can result in two, three, or more canals running side by
side to adjacent fields. In other communities canals are communal, access is regulated by the community, and
there are rules as to their creation, upkeep, and use.
Trees in these systems are recognized as being controlled by the individual who planted them. They are also
used to mark boundaries between irrigated fields.
In areas where the farming system is dominated by slash-and-burn agriculture (tavy) the community-based
tenure systems follow the general outline with minor variations. In these areas primary holders are those who
have cleared or inherited land (women are included in this and are able to both clear and inherit land), secondary
holders are usually sons and daughters of the primary holders and expect to inherit land, and tertiary holders are
usually those who have access to land through land loans. In these areas, there is little or no sharecropping and
little or no selling of agricultural land. There is, however, selling of bottomland, where irrigated rice is grown, and
of areas where tree crops (such as tea and coffee) are grown.
In these areas most forests are considered community goods. However, in some areas, when land is cleared,
the part of the forest that touches the farmer’s field is considered private forest and the farmer has control over its
use. This private forest acts as a firebreak between adjoining fields so that a fire started in one field for the
purpose of clearing the land does not spread into other fields.
In these systems, primary holders of trees are those who plant and tend the trees. These holders are the only
people who can cut down the tree. Secondary holders are family members and they can pick fruit from the trees.
Water is considered a community good in most slash-and-burn agricultural areas. There is little or no
infrastructure for irrigation purposes. There are also few rules attached to water access in these areas.
The western part of Madagascar is predominantly dry savanna and its agricultural systems are structured
around extensive cattle raising. In these areas the community-based tenure systems recognize pastureland as a
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community good. There are few rules that regulate its use. Some researchers suggest that the main ethnic group,
the Savaka, who mainly raise cattle, will abandon an area rather than enforce their primary tenure rights when
immigrants arrive. In these areas, one of the previously explained community-based tenure systems is found when
there is land used for sedentary farming.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Throughout Madagascar three different types of land and natural resource tenure situations are found. These
situations reflect the power of state law and community-based rules regarding land and other natural resources in
the different parts of the country. The three situations are: (1) areas where the state land and natural resource
tenure laws are in force and respected by inhabitants of an area; (2) areas where community-based tenure
systems’ rules regarding land and natural resources are in force and respected by the inhabitants; and (3) areas
where the different laws and rules overlap, and where some inhabitants look to the state’s laws regarding land and
natural resources to guide how they have access and others look to community-based rules to regulate how they
have access to the land and natural resources of the same area.
Given the three different situations, there are also different levels of land and natural resource tenure security
experienced by people throughout the country. Tenure security is highest where people understand and respect the
tenure system in place. For areas where the state tenure system is enforced, this means that people understand
what the laws are and believe that the laws are well and fairly enforced. For areas where the community-based
tenure systems are enforced, this means that people understand how the system works and believe that the system
protects their rights to land and the natural resources. Conversely, tenure security is lowest where people do not
have confidence in the land and natural resource tenure system(s), do not understand them, or are not sure which
tenure system they should follow.
In Madagascar, the third situation results in low tenure security. In areas where this happens, state laws
contradict community-based rules and regulations. Other instances that lead to tenure insecurity are situations
where state laws are enforced to the benefit of outside immigrants or loggers and communities where people no
longer have confidence in the community-based systems. All three of these result in people’s believing that their
rights of access to and control of their land and natural resource base may be in danger.
Madagascar’s land and natural resource tenure situation has an effect on its capacity for economic growth
and food security. Madagascar is an agriculturally based society and as such security of tenure influences both
the crops that are grown and the number of fields planted. In most of Madagascar tenure security is high and
other factors, such as access to agricultural extension and capital, are the biggest constraints on increased food
production and increased economic growth fueled by export crops. In those areas where there is tenure insecurity,
there are fields that are contested and crops that are not grown. Also, in areas where the tenure system encourages
field fragmentation, such as in the Central Highlands, fewer crops are grown. All of these factors have
contributed to lower security in Madagascar. Over the last 20 years Madagascar has gone from being a rice-
exporting country to a rice-importing country.
In most parts of the country the biggest constraint on agricultural innovation is the lack of resources
available to the farmer and the lack of adequate agricultural extension services. In most of the country, better
extension services and increasing farmer access to resources would increase the acceptance of agricultural
innovations. Only in those areas where tenure insecurity is a noted problem does land tenure enter into the
equation of farmer acceptance of agricultural innovations.
Where tenure security is high certain types of investments take place. These investments are in the form of
time, such as the community’s policing its community goods and farmers’ repairing irrigation infrastructure, the
creation of new infrastructure in the fields, and the planting of perennial crops. Direct investment in the form of
money, for buying new agricultural equipment, fertilizer, and pesticides, takes place, but in limited instances. As228
in the case of innovation, tenure security is not seen to be the limiting factor. Rather, there are few banks which
will loan money to small farmers, and few banks located in rural areas of Madagascar.
Informal land markets are present in Madagascar. These markets take the form outlined in the previous
sections. Formal markets are found in urban areas and rural areas, but are highly influenced by cultural aspects
of Malagasy society that dictate who will sell land to whom. In general, land is such a valued commodity, for
cultural reasons, that individuals will not freely sell land, no matter the parcel or field size.
The general theory linking land and natural resource tenure security to conservation objectives is that if
people feel secure in their rights of access to and control of land and natural resources they have traditionally
used, they will use these resources in a wise manner, with a long-term perspective. In Madagascar there is
evidence that this is the case. In places where land and natural resource tenure security is high, there is anecdotal
evidence that community forests are conserved and that communities undertake some conservation practices.
Where tenure security is low (especially in areas where there is confusion between state and community-based
tenure systems) there are reports of poor natural resource management practices. Finally, it should be noted that
other factors than tenure security influence conservation practices. Even when land and natural resource tenure
security is high, if there is high population growth or if there is market-driven demand for the expansion of export
crops, an expansion that forces the cultivation of food crops from prime to marginal agricultural areas or creates
demand for the expansion of agricultural fields in general, then conservation may lose out to these other demands.
In the past tenure reform has taken the form of top-down edicts from colonial or central governments with
little local-level, democratic participation. As Madagascar moves toward a more decentralized system of
government and also moves to recognize the legitimacy of community-based tenure systems (see below), there is a
real possibility that democratic participation in governmental processes will be encouraged. Community-based
tenure systems tend to reply to local pressures and local needs. Thus, they can be viewed as encouraging local
participation and certain forms of democratic decision-making. However, as with most democratic institutions, a
set of checks and balances should be in place. Therefore, it is necessary that as the legitimacy of community-
based tenure systems is recognized, there should also be certain checks on rules that may have an impact on areas
of national concern. These areas need to be decided upon by the people of Madagascar in order for true
democracy to take root.
Women’s access to land is highly influenced by the land and natural resource tenure system that operates
where they live. Of the community-based systems found throughout the island, some, such as those found in
certain slash-and-burn agricultural areas, promote and protect women’s rights to land and natural resources,
while others, such as those found in some areas where irrigated agriculture is practiced, limit women’s rights to
control these resources (see discussion above). The state laws that regulate control of and access to land and
natural resources officially protect women’s rights. However, research has shown that the implementation of
these laws often favors men’s access and actually acts to limit women’s. In areas where land titling has recently
taken place, only the male head of household’s name was listed on the title, and women’s names were not
recorded, even in cases where the woman had inherited the land.
Present policy position and reforms
Land and natural resource tenure reform has had a long history in Madagascar, and the state has attempted to use
reform to influence Malagasy agricultural practices, forest use practices, and most recently conservation
practices. The latest instance of tenure reform was mandated in the Environmental Action Plan (EAP) written in
1989. The EAP mandated that land titling would be carried out throughout Madagascar and that community-
based tenure systems would be replaced in a systematic manner, starting in areas closest to national parks and
special reserves. This mandate was based on the premise that land tenure insecurity was one of the major causes
of encroachment on Madagascar’s protected areas. In September 1994, at a Land and Natural Resource Tenure229
and Governance workshop, the Government of Madagascar accepted the recommendations from a number of
sources that the land titling program should be put on hold and other ways of guaranteeing land and natural
resource tenure security should be investigated. The major recommendation that came out of the workshop was
that differences between the state land and natural resource tenure laws and community-based tenure systems
should be reconciled, so that when the two systems overlap they do not contradict each other and, in the process,
create situations of tenure insecurity. This recommendation seeks to bring the community-based tenure systems
and state’s laws and regulations into closer harmony and encourage long-term tenure security in the rural areas of
Madagascar.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
The major need is for government and the donor community to recognize the resilience of community-based
tenure systems in Madagascar and the necessity of harmonizing the state laws with these tenure systems.
Replacement strategies have been tried in Madagascar since before colonial times, yet evidence suggests that in
most rural areas community-based land and natural resource tenure systems are still looked to as the major
provider of tenure security. Thus, the donor community should support the government’s new initiative to revise
state laws so that they support aspects of community-based tenure systems that are desirable, such as
conservation mechanisms and women’s rights to land.
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The most striking characteristic of Malawi’s land tenure system is its dualism. Large estates, hundreds and
thousands of hectares in area, are held under either freehold or leasehold. Between 1970 and 1990, estate holdings
grew more than tenfold from approximately 79,000 hectares to 843,000 hectares. By 1994, around 30,000
estates occupied over 1 million hectares. Historically, the sector has contrasted sharply with the smallholder
sector which operates primarily under customary tenure rules. Here, the average farm size is around 1.1 hectares
per household, with over one-third cultivating below the .7 hectare estimated area necessary to meet household
subsistence requirements. Despite the government’s purported commitment to improving the welfare of the
smallholder, Malawi land policy has effectively precluded development of smallholder agriculture through
measures which favor the estate sector while subjecting poorer farmers to increasing uncertainty and insecurity. It
is only recently that meaningful changes in land policy have taken place which target smallholder interests.
National policy and legal framework
Land pressures vary significantly. In 1993, the agricultural population per arable hectare measured 4.5, the most
dense region being the South where fertile lands attracted many European settlers prior to and during British
colonialism. By contrast, the North, characterized by poor soils, hilly terrain and low rainfall, still has a
comparatively abundant supply of land. The Central region has been host to the greatest expansion of the estate
sector in more recent decades, attracting labor from the barren areas of the North and the labor-saturated South.
Agriculture overshadows all other sectors in Malawi. It engages around 72% of the labor force and accounts for
about 35% of GDP. Its two largest cities, Blantyre and Lilongwe, have not yet experienced the severe mounting
population pressure typical of many other African cities, in spite of overcrowding in rural areas. However, the
growing number of landless poor is gradually turning this around. Overall, settlement patterns and land
availability have proved key determinants of land tenure systems and population concentrations in Malawi’s
Northern, Central and Southern regions.
A brief sketch of Malawi’s colonial background and land legislation history is useful in gaining a richer
perspective of the complexities involved.
European settlers began to arrive in Malawi in substantial numbers around the early 1800s. These
entrepreneurial farmers routinely took over large tracts of land, known as estates, which often overlapped with
villages and indigenous land holdings. Such estates were regarded as freehold property of the settler. In the South,
where this practice was most prevalent, the native farmers were commandeered as laborers as the price for their
continued occupation of the land under a system known as “thangata.” When the British colonial administration
assumed control of Malawi in 1891, it officially discouraged this practice and eventually outlawed it in 1928,
requiring estate holders to charge monetary rent to the occupiers rather than forced labor. Nevertheless, the lack
of enforcement permitted the practice to continue for several years. The Central region estates employed mainly
migrant labor (who farmed their own customary holdings elsewhere) in exchange for small wages, a factor which
began to lure indigenous workers from the South into the Central region.
By 1904, allocation of estates in the Crownland (the South) was changed from freehold to leasehold, and
land which was not held in freehold became vested in the government. In addition, the prospective lessee was
obliged to obtain the signature of the relevant chief in order to have his lease approved. This measure provoked231
disputes as headmen undertook transactions which were not in the interest of the community members, running
counter to the belief that the land belonged to the community. This practice continues to be the norm for obtaining
leaseholds today.
The colonial period was replete with competing views concerning the promotion of EuroPean estate holder
interests versus protecting those of African farmers. Common themes included accusations that customary
farming and land tenure practices were inefficient, unproductive, and contributed to land and soil degradation.
Such beliefs were carried through independence and shared by Malawi’s president, H. Kamuzu Banda, who
proclaimed customary tenure systems were a hindrance to the country’s economic growth. Nevertheless, the Trust
Land Order, which first broke out the country’s land tenure forms into Crown (public) land, Reserved land
(mainly estates), and Native Trust, protected customary lands from alienation. In 1948, the government
undertook to purchase and reallocate idle estate lands to African farmers in recognition of widening economic
disparities.
However, resettlement schemes, both before and after independence, were largely failures. Allocations of
consolidated plots prevented farmers from dividing their crops among different microclimates and employing
risk-adverse strategies while imposed project rules limiting fallow periods hurt agricultural production and
incomes. Other problems included lack of project staff, extension and farmer involvement in the planning stages.
With independence in 1965, several new laws were enacted which exemplified the new government’s
sentiment that the key to agriculture development lay in private forms of tenure. Under the Land Act of 1965, all
Public land and Customary land (formerly Trust land) became vested in the Head of State and could be allotted to
estates via leasehold. Outdated (1902) English land law was applied to private property tenure. Four other laws
followed, including the Registered Land Act, the Wills and Inheritance Act, the Customary Land (Development)
Act, and the Local Land Boards Act. The first of these, decreed in 1965, provided for the registration of customary
land under private title in designated areas. The measure was only implemented in the Lilongwe area under the
Lilongwe Land Development Program (LLDP) and subsequently floundered. In conjunction with this, the Local
Land Boards Act provided for the establishment of administrative bodies in each district to oversee customary
land transactions, with all land sales subject to their approval. The Wills and Inheritance Act Permitted an
individual to bequeath long-term investments made on customary land. The Customary Lands (Development) Act
of 1967 gave the government the right to acquire customary land for conversion from public land or leasehold
estate without obligation to consult traditional authorities, although this remained the practice.
The Special Crops Act stipulated that only estate farmers, who acquire the relevant quota licenses, are
entitled to grow certain primary export crops, such as burley and flue-cured tobacco, tea and sugar. Within the
past few years, though, government schemes have been initiated to permit limited growth of burley tobacco by
smallholders. In one case, a project designed to permanently settle smallholder families on land designated for
burley tobacco cultivation has deteriorated as a result of many participants abandoning their new allocations.
Even though the project produced 50% higher output per hectare than estate farms and generated larger gross
revenues per hectare, the farmers themselves earned much lower incomes than their estate counterparts since they
had to sell their produce through the Agriculture Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) rather
than via private auction where prices were up to six times higher. More recently, the government has liberalized
burley tobacco cultivation and marketing, extending it to those farming under customary systems. Plans are to
eventually eliminate all restrictions.
Another burley tobacco growing scheme was launched as a five year pilot project involving individual male
farmers. Labelled the Malawi Young Pioneers, it was later coopted as a political organization by Banda’s ruling
party. It sprang up as an offshoot of the Master Farmers Program, which was initiated to mold a class of
entrepreneurial “yeoman” farmers to lead the country’s agricultural revolution. Based on a similar rationale as the
Swynnerton Plan, the program has instead been blamed for forging class division among Malawians.232
By contrast, the Smallholder Tea Authority (STA) scheme has been relatively successful as a result of a
considerable level of credit, marketing and technical support. STA farmers receive attractive prices for their tea,
notably higher than the lesser quality estate grown tea. The program has attained nearly full self-sufficiency,
excluding staff salaries.
The most recent legislation has been the Control of Land (Agricultural Leases) Order (1990), which
responded to the land shortage crisis faced by smallholders by terminating issuance of estate leases, except to
those persons who have previously held land under customary tenure.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
The majority of Malawi’s ethnic groups have matrilineal and uxorilocal origins. Under matrilineal inheritance,
land is inherited by males from their mother’s brother. Uxorilocal applies to post-marital residence, such that the
male goes to live in his new wife’s village and is allocated land use rights to fields belonging to her family. In the
case of polygamous societies, the husband must cultivate and tend fields on the matrilineage land of each of his
wives. Men generally acquire their own land only through inheritance. Women, although they exercise little
authority over land allocation, have more secure rights than under patrilineal and virilocal systems; in the event of
divorce, they do not run the risk of losing their land. Matrilineal and uxorilocal residence are practiced by
Malawi’s dominant ethnic group, the Chewa of the Central region as well as the Yao and Man’anja of south
central Malawi.
Patrilineal societies reside chiefly in the North, perhaps the most prominent being the Ngoni. As mobile
warriors originating from Swaziland, they succeeded in conquering several tribes, some of whom they engaged as
serfs, including the Abafo and the Tumbuka. Over time, many of Malawi’s ethnic groups have modified
inheritance and residence patterns to reflect changing circumstances. Some of the Tumbuka adopted the
patrilineal inheritance practices of the Ngoni while the Sena of the Lower Shire Valley have merged both
matrilineal and patrilineal customs. Expanding land pressure has induced men to pass land on to their sons in the
interest of safeguarding their children’s future. Furthermore, European values and rules governing private tenure
have influenced customary practices causing matrilineal systems to take on more patrilineal attributes.
Malawi is riddled with attempts at replacing indigenous tenure. Although it still accounts for around 70% of
total land area, customary lands are increasingly encroached upon by the estate sector, leaving smallholders to
cultivate smaller and more marginal lands. During colonialism, indigenous land tenure and agricultural practices
were often described as ecologically ruinous and contributing to loss of soil fertility and erosion. Under the guise
of conservation efforts, native farmers were induced to change from mound to row agriculture and decrease or
eliminate fallow periods, plus they were prohibited from practicing slash and burn techniques. Claims of native
land degradation were greatly exaggerated. Rather, techniques employed by European farmers, such as intensive
cultivation, deep plowing and hillside cropping were far more harmful to the environment than customary
practices. Indeed, estate farmers conducted slash and burn methods much more rigorously than smallholders, yet
did not suffer reprisals.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Malawi stands as one of the poorest countries in Africa, with an average per capita income of $176 per annum.
When one considers the wide gap in income distribution wrought by its dualistic class structure, the depth of
poverty and malnourishment are severe. The shrinking and marginalization of lands held under community-based
tenure has direct implications for households’ ability to meet their food security needs. Since independence,
Malawi has set a goal of food self-sufficiency and has indeed made impressive strides in reaching that goal.
However, access to food has always remained highly skewed. During the 1980s period of economic decline,
Malawi, faced with dwindling export prices and rising import prices, was no longer able to meet its food233
requirements. In a study conducted in the Kasungu and Ngabu districts in 1990, 85% of the smallholder farmers
surveyed had depleted their food reserves by the pre-harvest month of February.
The demand for agricultural wage labor, in the form of tenancy and migrant labor, has grown as farmers
find themselves unable to provide for their subsistence needs. Already meager wages have thus been driven
further downward, exacerbating income disparities. The effect has been degenerative for seasonal workers who
then have to plant their crops later in the season, undermining their productivity.
Most households own livestock in Malawi though not on a large scale. Livestock are raised for domestic
consumption only. Women primarily hold small ruminants whereas men own larger livestock, mainly cattle.
Under customary tenure systems, livestock graze during the off-season on commons and post-harvest crop areas.
In general, smallholders tend to cultivate food crops and a limited number of export crops, including maize,
rice, beans, cassava, potatoes, groundnuts, sorghum, fire-cured tobacco and cotton. Maize, which occupies 73%
of total crop area, is considered the primary staple. Tobacco is Malawi’s largest estate-grown crop. The vast
majority of burley and flue-cured tobacco are produced by estates along with other export crops like sugar, tea,
coffee, and macadamia nuts. Although most of these precluded the participation of smallholders under the
provisions of the Special Crops Act, since 1990, a limited number of districts have been allowed to deregulate
smallholder production and marketing of burley tobacco. Full liberalization is envisaged during the coming years.
As demonstrated by several of the smallholder schemes described above, however, estates have proven
overall to be less efficient producers of export crops than their small scale counterparts. estates, rather, are
characterized by a high incidence of absentee landownership, poor management and tenant farming. Quality of
production is generally poor, in particular because tenant, compensated poorly and at the landholder’s whim, have
little or no incentive to improve output. 1990 estimates revealed that less than 28% of estate lands were utilized.
Although lands held under customary tenure have been shown to be lagging in productivity behind the estate
sector, several contributing factors are apparent, including regulations mandating smallholders to sell to
ADMARC at depressed producer prices, special restrictions on customary land use, insufficient crop area to meet
subsistence needs forcing smallholders to undertake agricultural wage labor, and lack of access to credit, markets
and other inputs.
Land markets have arisen in Malawi primarily as a result of European settlement patterns and the
perpetuation of estate farms for commercial agriculture. The restriction of lucrative export crops to estate
operations has made it attractive for those with the means to do so to apply for estate leaseholds. Conversion to
leasehold has another impetus, which stems from the uncertainty created by the numerous and ambiguous laws
governing land policy. As estate sector expansion and mounting population pressures contribute to escalating land
shortages, tenure security weakens. Under such a scenario, it would be unlikely to observe an increase in farmer
investment or agricultural production among those operating under threatened community-based tenure systems.
Recognition of these widening disparities has recently come about, giving rise to the Control of Lands
(Agricultural Leases) Order (1990), which has halted further conversion of customary lands to estate leaseholds,
with the exception of individuals who previously engaged in customary tenure. The proviso has ostensibly served
as a loophole, such that applications received since the law was put into effect have well exceeded previous levels.
Nevertheless, the average area of estates has substantially decreased over the years from a mean of 250 hectares
in 1979 to an average of 14 hectares between 1989 and 1994. The evidence points to the overwhelming number of
smallholders transforming their customary parcels to estate leaseholds.
The tenure security of women is particularly fragile. As more customary lands are converted to estates
directed toward commercial crop production, women’s role as food producers is marginalized. Leaseholds are
furthermore registered in the man’s name such that women have no claim to the land nor its production, leaving
her social security vested largely in her husband. If she descends from a patrilineal community, she has lost her234
use rights. If her origins are matrilineal, she loses not only use rights but also the strong claims she held to land in
her own community.
Since the 1920s, when conservation flourished as an issue and indigenous tenure systems were blamed for
provoking environmental hazards, natural resource management has been a matter of concern among
policymakers. Although the conservation debate may have used a moral imperative to disguise a less noble intent,
natural resource degradation has become a serious concern in more recent years.
Deforestation is undertaken in grave proportions. About 75% of the total fuelwood consumed every year is
by estate farms which is mainly used in the production of flue-cured tobacco. The bulk of what is consumed
comes chiefly from indigenous and community forests rather than the estates themselves. Once the local supply is
depleted, the estateholders purchase the wood from commercial cutters who also extract their supply from
customary lands. In 1983, it was estimated that one-fourth of available fuelwood had been cut. The government
has responded with measures which include creating national forest reserves, imposing leasehold covenants which
stipulate the lessee devote 10% of his land to woodlot, and requiring commercial cutters to obtain permits.
Although significant strides have been made toward afforestation, having 21% of Malawi’s total land area under
reserve conflicts with customary tenure values, as can be seen by the high incidence of villager encroachment.
Moreover, lack of clarity concerning authority roles between the Forestry Department and other government
departments invites opportunities for controversy. As for the woodlot requirement for estates and the permit
requirement for woodcutters, they are rarely enforced.
Community forestry initiatives may offer some solution to continued depletion of forested areas. By vesting
rights to forested areas in communities, their incentives are geared toward the forests’ regeneration. As it stands,
state control of forest reserves is inadequate at best. Villagers in need of fuelwood illegally remove it from the
reserves while unpermitted commercial cutters wreak extensive destruction. Localized control should provide
significantly more potent enforcement of cutting regulations than the Forestry Department which lacks the
resources and staffing to effectively protect the reserves.
Following a referendum in 1993 instituting multi-party democracy, presidential elections were held in
Malawi in May 1994. The result was the transfer from a thirty-year one-party state to a new constitution
supported by a multi-party parliament. The new administration is led by former opposition leader Bakili Muluzi
who vows a commitment to a more participative government, human rights and free primary education. The
political environment has undergone a substantial transformation, which includes a highly vocal press, adamant
against any insurgence of the political corruption and intimidation which had been so deeply rooted in Banda’s
regime.
Democratization is taking place for the first time in Malawi. In this climate, of political overhaul, it would
seem to be a particularly opportune time to initiate land policy dialogue. As historical pioneers garnered by heavy
international support, the new administrator’s leaders are likely to be quite open to policy reforms which will
inspire the favor of their constituencies.
Women in Malawi are the prime cultivators of food crops while men devote most of their time to export
crops. When one considers that maize is the primary smallholder crop cultivated and that three quarters of the
total cropland is maize, it is clear that women undertake most of the agricultural work. Men are involved chiefly
in the clearing of the land and soil preparation whereas women do the bulk of planting, weeding, and harvesting.
At 28%, Malawi has one of the highest female headed household to total household ratios in Africa,
consisting of unmarried, separated, divorced and widowed women. To the extent that food security issues affect
all small scale producers, they are particularly critical for women. Whereas estimates are that in a typical
household, Malawian women work one half to seven hours longer than their male counterparts, they undertake an
enormous burden when left to shoulder it alone. In general, female headed households lie at the bottom of the
poverty scale, cultivate the smallest plots (as small as .2 hectare), and face the greatest constraints in accessing235
credit and markets. Government loan schemes have demonstrated little success in reaching women since
beneficiaries must belong to community farmer clubs which tend to exclude women based on their meager assets
and perceived high risk for credit. Women who seek seasonal wage labor to cover their subsistence requirements
are typically assigned to low skill tasks as the bottom of the pay scale.
The combination of export-led development strategies along with the expansion of individualized tenure and
estate agriculture have instilled a system of greater paternal values. Land shortages have undermined uxorilocal
practices while it has induced a preference for patrilineal practices of bequeathing land to one’s own son rather
than one’s nephew. These factors have succeeded in partially supplanting matrilineal and uxorilocal practices
with implications for women’s tenure security and social position.
Present policy position and reforms
The impact of the 1965 and 1967 land laws has been largely negative for the smallholder operating under
customary tenure systems. While the Registered Land Act was only applied in the Lilongwe area and failed to
take root, the prevailing customary tenure system’s social security function is being eroded. Whereas tenure
insecurity had been a rarity among customary landholders before, it is fast becoming a credible threat with the
encroachment of the estate sector fueled by an enabling government. The average size of customary holdings was
1.1 hectares in 1987 while many have less the .7 hectare to cultivate. Applications for leaseholds rose sharply
starting in the late 1980s, in part as a measure to protect one’s land. Another impetus for acquiring leaseholds has
been the restrictions imposed by the Special Crops Act such that smallholders under customary tenure were
virtually barred from cultivating certain lucrative export crops, such as tea and burley tobacco, even though
special schemes have demonstrated small scale farms to be at least as productive as estate operations. Even crops
which smallholders were permitted to market had to be sold to ADMARC, often at prices well below the
exchange value obtained by estate farmers. With new legislation gradually allowing smallholders full rights to
cultivate and market burley tobacco, one would expect a rise in productivity among those farming under
customary tenure and an extension of the measure to all crops.
Small-scale farmers who cannot afford to apply for leaseholds (due to requisite fees and the investment
criteria) and whose landholdings are insufficient to meet subsistence needs often find themselves having to work
as tenants or migrant laborers on estate farms. The poor quality and mediocre production levels of estate tobacco
farms attest to the lack of economic incentives present in tenant-landowner systems to foster agricultural
investment and improved yields. Also apparent in this trend are the implications for worsening economic polarity.
More recently, government policy has placed greater emphasis on the promotion of smallholder agriculture.
In addition to export crop liberalization, several schemes directed at small scale farmers have been initiated, some
relatively successful while others are virtual failures. Key factors of success appear to be the provision of ample
and appropriate inputs and extension, payment of competitive prices for agricultural produce, and integration of
participatory decision-making and project maintenance. The Rural Development projects set aside for smallholder
burley tobacco farming hold promise that production and marketing of the crop will soon be permitted to all
smallholders.
Failure to place a limit on the hectarage of estates has enabled the establishment of large estates, some
occupying over 1000 hectares. Most farmers do not ever approach full utilization of their lands, leaving the
majority idle. It is little wonder that smallholders, when given access to the needed inputs, have proven more
efficient producers of commercial crops than estates. Economies of scale in this context appear to be mythical.
Implementation of the Control of Land (Agricultural Leases) Order (1990), banning the acquisition of leaseholds
in all but certain areas, has been ineffective in controlling the number of leases granted due to an exemption
applying to farmers under customary tenure. The measure is frequently exploited as a loophole. Nonetheless, the
mean size of holdings being leased has decreased considerably, averaging only 14 hectares in recent years.236
Lack of enforcement of lease covenants merely fuels the inefficiencies and inequities. Groundrents are set
uniformly at rates far below market value. In most cases, however, they are not even paid since the authorities do
not follow up on arrears cases.
The fact that land is vested in the State, which has the authority to appropriate it at will without the approval
of traditional authorities, places customary land holders in a precarious position. Although the state has not been
known to appropriate occupied customary lands, land converted to public and estate land translates to less
commons land and land to accommodate future generations. The allocation of increasingly smaller and marginal
customary holdings has implications for smallholder agricultural productivity and food security. The natural
tendency of the government may be to lay blame on the structure of customary tenure itself whereas it might be
better attributed to the emergence and promotion of the estate sector and the consequent creation of land
shortages, both of which are reinforced by dualistic land policy and legislation.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Many of the problem afflicting the implementation of sustainable development strategies in Malawi are rooted in
the inequitable land policy and preferential treatment afforded the estate sector. The key to equitable growth,
therefore, lies partly in the reversal of such policies. The government has taken important first steps toward this
objective through relaxation of the long held restrictions on burley tobacco cultivation and sales.
All restrictions on crop production under the Special Crops Act need to be eliminated if smallholders
farming under customary tenure systems are to be given and opportunity to make rational choices about which
crops to cultivate. Their modest holdings often are not sufficient to meet their food security needs. If prices of
export crops are high, it will generate additional cash to better meet food security needs and reduce the need for
agricultural wage income.
The administration of uniform pricing policies for all agricultural commodities would also serve this end.
Whereas originally ADMARC invested much of the proceeds from smallholder produce spreads in the estate
sector, in recent years this has been eliminated and they are offering prices more in parity with sale prices. The
sector still remains in need of further liberalization, though, which would bolster producer’s income and
production incentives.
Even with the opportunity to grow more profitable crops, the smallholder sector will not flourish if it
continually must endure shrinking land holdings. It makes little sense that small farmers must continuously
cultivate minute plots in order to eke out a meager subsistence while vast tracts of estate prime estate land remain
idle. Instead, when the initial 29-year leaseholds come up for renewal, the government might opt not to renew
unused lands and instead convert them to customary lands. Furthermore, estate lands which have already been
returned to the government might be transferred from public lands to customary holdings. Other measures to
discourage consolidation and unproductive practices may be to increase rental rates for holdings in excess of a
certain moderate hectarage for leaseholds and apply a similar tax structure for estates held in freehold. This of
course would necessitate vast improvement in the enforcement of ground rent collection, which is abysmal at
present.
If factors contributing to tenure security are removed, such as estate sector encroachment and restrictions on
land use, measures such as the Control of Lands Order may not be necessary. The law’s principal effect has been
to provoke panic and perceptions of land scarcity.
Inducing improved agricultural investment and productivity among farmers of customary lands will require
the rebuilding of tenure security. The newly democratic government might take the opportunity to entrust the land
once again to local communities and revest the land in customary authorities. Such a move should likely be
decided in consultation with local communities since in some cases community relationships with village headmen237
and paramount chiefs have been ruptured. In any case, decentralization, whether to traditional headmen or locally
selected authorities, holds greater promise for more equitable and efficient land allocation.
Addressing women’s needs entails devising means of linking them with improved access to credit and
extension. Training for government extension and credit agents should stress the importance of reaching women
and sensitize them on women’s different needs and how to include women where it may be politically difficult.
Programs may want to set goals for incorporating women as well as integrate more female field staff. Extension
services also may need to gain a better appreciation of women’s roles in order to offer them more agriculture
extension, including that for cash-crop cultivation.
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In 1995, the Government of Mozambique began to seriously address needed changes in national land policy,
gradually moving toward a position which appears to recognize the need for encouraging land markets,
decentralizing authority within state institutions, and integrating customary institutions and practices into the
statutory land regime. The government has expressed its intention to construct a new land policy which improves
tenure security, reinforces the move towards market-based policies, and is commensurate with extant state
capacity and de facto practices concerning land in rural areas. Such revisions will be critical for a country
attempting to rebuild state institutions, refurbish the new democratic regime’s political legitimacy, and reconstruct
a shattered economy following nearly two decades of devastating conflict and failed socialist policies. The
specific policy reforms which would advance these broader objectives, however, remain unspecified. Indeed, the
precise parameters of a revised national land policy continue to be debated nationally. Some within the
government continue to resist privatization of land rights. In addition, the government continues to debate the
extent to which administrative and taxing authority should be devolved to district officials as well as the number
and identity of districts which would enjoy such authority.
National policy and legal framework
Although no reliable census has been conducted in Mozambique since 1980, the government estimates the
country’s population to be approximately 16.5 million and that it is growing at a rate of 2.6%. According to
World Bank estimates calculated in 1992, 70% of Mozambique’s population resided in rural areas. Due to the
return of many refugees and displaced peoples to their areas of origin following the October 1992 cease-fire, the
percentage of rural dwellers has likely increased.
Mozambique, constituting approximately 80 million hectares of land, is often perceived to enjoy relatively
low population densities which would presumably diminish competition over land. In reality, however, the
Ministry of Agriculture estimates that only 18 million hectares of land are suitable for agricultural production. In
addition, while there are indeed relative land surpluses in many parts of the country, fierce competition exists over
land which is especially fertile and/or located near transport infrastructure, market channels, agricultural
extension facilities, or where agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation equipment is situated. These areas
include land along the Beira Corridor, in the Limpopo and Zambezi river valleys, agricultural land in Maputo
province, land near or around the former state farms, and agricultural lands near urban areas. Land near the
borders with Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, and Swaziland are also in high demand. In addition, coastal areas
and land within or near former game reserves are subject to growing competition as Mozambican and foreign
capital begin to establish tourist complexes as political stability returns to these regions.
A critical problem in the climate of growing competition over land is that Mozambican land laws and
policies remain incommensurate with existing state capacities and incompatible with the government’s stated goal
of establishing an economic environment grounded in liberal economic principles. Upon independence from
Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, the government of Samora Machel promulgated policies premised on a rigid
form of socialism that viewed free markets, international capital, and decentralized control over political and
economic resources as incompatible with the ruling Frelimo party’s broader project of constructing an
economically advanced and nationally integrated society devoid of social or class-based inequities. In the239
agricultural sector, these aims were to be achieved through a trio of programs--large smallholder cooperatives,
villagization schemes, and in particular, the establishment of a large state farm sector.
In terms of land policy, the fundamental principles and regulatory norms governing rights in land are
enunciated in three legislative instruments—the Constitution, the 1979 Land Law, and the 1987 Land Law
Regulations. According to these instruments, ownership of land vests in the state while the state also controls all
aspects of land use and enjoyment. The state exercises primary dominant rights while its citizens or other groups
can only obtain limited, secondary use and occupancy rights (direito de uso e aproveitamento). The state
exercises paramount rights over land and retains authority to revoke individual use rights as well as grant land use
rights to development projects or selected Mozambican and expatriate enterprises. While individuals can transact
improvements on their land, land and rights in land cannot be sold, encumbered, mortgaged, or in any way
alienated. Formal land markets are therefore not permitted within this structure.
Statutory land administration in Mozambique remains highly centralized and ambiguous regarding
customary rights and land claims. In practice, larger farmers exploit the formal legal system, while smallholders
rely on customary systems of land tenure. In an important modification of the 1976 Constitution, a 1990
constitutional provision concerning ownership and control of land presumably supports customary rights and
claims by specifying that the state would recognize rights acquired through occupancy. In practice, however, the
provision provides little protection for the majority of rural dwellers who rotate their crops. For example, by
leaving some of their land fallow, they are not formally “occupying” it; the land is therefore “available” for other
parties to occupy. In addition, the provision does not establish any legal mechanisms for resolving land disputes
involving conflicts between customary and statutory jurisdictions. As a result, because the property is not usually
registered, smallholders lose out when disputes arise with state or larger commercial enterprises. Smallholder
claims, rooted in customary forms of evidence, receive almost no weight.
Larger commercial farmers enjoy relatively greater tenure security than smallholders but the formal
administrative system has nevertheless been unable to construct a transparent and reliable tenure regime for even
these larger interests. According to the Land Law and the Land Regulations, any party acquiring land for
commercial agricultural purposes must register the holding through the formal tenure system and pay
commensurate taxes. The registration process involves officials at the community level as well as at district,
provincial, and central levels of DINAGECA (Direcção Nacional de Geografia e Cadastro). DINAGECA works
under the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture. If DINAGECA officials grant a favorable report on its
proposed usage, a usage permit would theoretically be granted or denied within four months. In reality, however,
the government has not had the capacity to administer the formal land tenure system as presently constituted. This
derives from a scarcity of qualified personnel, insufficient resources, and the extraordinary constraints imposed
by Mozambique’s civil conflict and consequent insecurity and shifting populations. As a result, the formal
process of land acquisition and registration has been time consuming, confusing, and laden with corruption.
For over a decade, the ruling Frelimo party has at least implicitly acknowledged the dissonance between
these realities and the government’s statutory laws and extant institutional capacities. At its Fourth Party
Congress in 1984, Frelimo conceded that all of its state farms were operating at a loss and that they were
absorbing a disproportionate share of resources from programs aimed at smallholders. However, a vigorous
debate raged within the government over whether these failures stemmed primarily from flawed policy design or
from Renamo military activities which by then had spread to all the provinces. It was not until 1989, two years
after the formal adoption of an IMF and World Bank approved macroeconomic structural adjustment program,
that the Frelimo-led government officially recognized the need to completely restructure the state agricultural
sector and privatize, lease, or close parastatal farms. The process by which this was done, however, was
haphazard, nontransparent, and riddled with corruption (Myers and West 1993).240
Despite the shift from state-led agricultural development schemes and the adoption of market-friendly
macroeconomic policies, the government has not coupled these with simultaneous reforms in national land policy.
This has produced negative consequences. First, formal land policy does not reflect realities in most rural
communities where it is customary institutions rather than state officials that administer land and other resources.
Second, the lack of consistency and transparency in the land laws, weak state capacity, and state officials’
significant discretionary authority over land and their lack of formal accountability to societal groups have
contributed to enormous corruption and land grabbing, even on land which had not been part of the state farm
sector. In the period between 1992 and 1994, for example, at least 20 million hectares of land has been
“acquired” as concessions by private (nonsmallholder) farmers or commercial interests, many of whom are
themselves government officials. Third, land is more valuable as a consequence of improved security conditions
in rural areas and a macroeconomic context in which agricultural producers receive higher prices for their
commodities. As a result, competition over land has increased. Due to the highly centralized system of control
over resources, the lack of clear procedural guidelines, government officials’ malfeasance, and the maintenance of
land tenure laws and policies originally designed for purposes of advancing socialist aims, confusing and conflict-
ridden scenarios marked by competitive and overlapping land claims have proliferated. This has often had
deleterious consequences for the tenure security of smallholders whose claims for tenure rights within customary
structures remain unrecognized by statutory law and whose interests are often compromised on behalf of the
interests of more powerful foreign investors, former colonial landholders, and selected government officials. Yet it
should be pointed out that even the more powerful groups are themselves handicapped in the long term as they are
also subject to unclear, non-transparent land policies and administrative mechanisms, giving rise to tenure
insecurity.
Several steps aimed at reforming national land policy have been taken, though no substantive reforms have
yet been implemented. In 1994, the Mozambican parliament approved a Municipalities Law designed to
decentralize administrative authority in a broad array of arenas, including land. At present, however, the law does
not clearly specify the discretionary authority of local officials on critical issues such as taxing authority, thereby
leaving the central government with de facto control. In addition, in December 1996, the Mozambican parliament
approved legislation authorizing elections in selected municipalities in 1997. The identity of the municipalities
(selected cities and districts) where such elections would take place remained unspecified. In 1996, the
government published a proposed draft of a new Land Code, which was widely debated at a National Land
Conference in Maputo in June of that year. The proposed Land Code still vests control of land in the state. It
does, however, move toward mechanisms which can better secure smallholder tenure security. These include: the
legitimacy of customary dispute resolution for disputes between smallholders and the admission of oral testimony
as evidence in dispute resolution procedures between small and large landholders. It remains uncertain when a
final draft of the Land Code will go to parliament for approval.
In May 1992, with the assistance of the Land Tenure Center, the government formed the Ad Hoc Land
Commission within the Ministry of Agriculture for purposes of evaluating and reformulating the country’s land
policy. But up until 1996, it has had neither substantive power nor meaningful domain within a government
which appeared reticent to meaningfully address land tenure reforms. Since May 1995, however, a newly
established Land Commission has emerged as an important player in drafting a new land policy designed to more
effectively incorporate customary forms of tenure into the statutory land regime while decentralizing formal
authority over land to district-level state institutions and local customary authorities. Its recently drafted Land
Policy Statement, while still vesting landownership in the state, nevertheless recognizes the need for phased
movement towards formal land markets and permitting the alienation of property, if appropriate changes in the
1990 Constitution are made.241
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
There is a rich diversity of indigenous tenure practices across Mozambique whose subtle differences belie clear
cut categorization. In broad and admittedly simplified terms, however, one key difference in tenure regimes is
rooted in the distinction between the societies organized according to patrilineal kinship principles south of the
Zambezi River and those according to matrilineal principles to its north. Muslim beliefs on the coastal areas in the
northern half of the country have also influenced indigenous land tenure practices. In addition, the trade in slaves
and ivory and the Portuguese prazero system during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries blended Portuguese and
African tenure in a unique amalgam that continues to affect indigenous land tenure practices in the Zambezi
valley (Negrão 1994).
From the country’s independence in 1975 until the early 1990s, the Frelimo government viewed the
customary institutions which managed indigenous tenure practices as archaic remnants of a pre-modern and
exploitative colonial past. It therefore attempted to replace them with more “modern” state institutions and
regulatory practices. In reality, due to insufficient state capacities and war-imposed constraints, the state has
permitted indigenous tenure systems to operate in many rural communities. Yet the rights conferred by these
institutions have always remained insecure and were frequently usurped if state officials perceived that doing so
promoted the interests of villagization schemes (aldeamentos), state farms, or state-organized collectives. Indeed,
some analysts, as well as many individuals within the Frelimo party itself, now argue that official hostility to
customary institutions and practices (including community-based tenure systems) and the attempts to replace
them alienated many rural communities from the Frelimo government (Geffray 1991).
Since 1992, and especially since the October 1994 elections, the Mozambican government has adopted a
more conciliatory stance towards customary institutions. Rather than seeking to eliminate and thereupon replace
them with “modern” state institutions, Frelimo has expressed a desire to better accommodate these institutions
and clarify how they can be incorporated into a revised statutory land policy. Official Frelimo rhetoric no longer
bashes all chiefs (regulos) for being little more than Portuguese lackeys. Nor does it characterize indigenous
tenure practices as archaic and “obscurantist.” Indeed, in the October 1994 election campaign, both Frelimo and
Renamo candidates drew upon political imagery associated with more “traditional” practices and beliefs. More
substantively, two of the articles of the 1994 Municipalities Law deal with the “involvement of traditional
authorities,” encouraging new local governments to coordinate their work with them in a broad range of areas
including collection of taxes and the allocation of land. The law does not give traditional leaders the power to
enforce their demands and decisions, however. More recently, the Ministry of Agriculture’s new land policy
statement (política de terra), which has been approved by the Council of Ministers, emphasizes the need for
granting legitimacy to customary forms of evidence vis-à-vis rights to and control over property. How these aims
will be translated into actual law is still under review, however, though the Land Commission did incorporate
these objectives in its 1996 draft Land Code.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Due to cruel colonial legacies, periodic droughts, the country’s devastating conflict, and flawed policy choices,
post-independence Mozambique has been an economic basket case unable to meet its population’s basic food
requirements. Its estimated USD $80 per capita is one of the world’s lowest. According to a government paper
presented in March 1995 at the World Bank Consultative Group on Mozambique in Paris, 60–70 % of rural
households fall below the poverty line. In terms of nutrition, average daily caloric intake is only 77% of
requirements. Since 1987 the government has been implementing a structural adjustment package designed to
increase agricultural production through improved price incentives and deregulating the exchange of consumer
commodities. Growth in the agricultural sector has, however, been slow due to unstable political conditions in
rural areas up to 1992. The destruction of transport infrastructure and market channels, the near total breakdown242
of state agricultural extension capacities, and continuing tenure insecurity which discourages productive
investment have also combined to impede vibrant growth.
Security of tenure in Mozambique remains weak for all groups. Since the October 1992 cease-fire,
government agencies at varying levels have been haphazardly distributing land rights to national and foreign
capital, government officials, former soldiers, and returning refugees and displaced individuals. The process has
been riddled by corruption. And even when officials have acted with integrity, state institutions have been poorly
equipped to administer what is already a contradictory set of policies and procedures regarding land. As a result,
activity surrounding the acquisition of land remains primarily speculative and focused on land grabbing rather
than productive, long-term investment which might also be environmentally sustainable. Smallholders have been
particularly vulnerable in this process and have also been hesitant to invest in capital improvements or undertake
more ecologically sound practices on land from which they may be soon thereafter expelled.
Despite the fact that national land policy continues to proscribe formal land markets, informal land markets
have emerged in selected areas of the country. These include the Green Zones of Maputo, land along the Beira
corridor, and a variety of peri-urban areas near larger provincial and some district capitals. Although land cannot
be legally sold or otherwise alienated, landholders and local government officials have relied upon a legal loophole
which suggests that investments or improvements on land can be negotiated to exchange or otherwise alienate
land. Transactions which are at core forms of illegal land alienation are therefore simply characterized by
government officials as exchanges transacted on the basis of “improvements” in the land (Roth, Boucher,
Francisco 1995). It is clear that in these peri-urban areas land is treated as a commodity which can be bought,
sold, or retained.
A critical problem, however, is that these transactions take place in an environment marked by a lack of
transparency and formal accountability as well as uncertainty regarding long-term tenure rights. This gives rise to
corruption and tenure insecurity. It also distorts the price which is actually “paid” for a piece of land. Further,
smallholders who may lack information regarding how best to retain or transfer land or who lack sufficient
political or economic resources necessary for advancing their claims have been severely disadvantaged in the
process.
The conflict in Mozambique devastated what had been a well-developed system of parks and reserves
located in the interior as well as on the coast. Since the successful October 1994 elections, growing attention
within the donor community and the Mozambican government has been paid to the rehabilitation of these parks
and reserves. The World Bank in particular has been encouraging the creation of transfrontier areas that would
connect game reserves in South Africa and Zimbabwe with territory in Maputo, Gaza and Manica provinces. The
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in conjunction with the Department of Forestry and
Wildlife in the Ministry of Agriculture, have begun plans to initiate a CAMPFIRE-like program in Magoi district
in Tete province. Modeled after relatively successful pilot projects in Zimbabwe, the CAMPFIRE approach seeks
to encourage wildlife and natural resource conservation by permitting local communities to participate in
decisions on how best to protect these areas in ways commensurate with their own interests as well as to insure
that they benefit financially from the tourist revenues these parks generate. Discussions have begun between the
IUCN and the Ministry of Agriculture concerning how to replicate this elsewhere. In addition, the National
Directorate of Tourism is recommending that approximately 20 areas of the country be reserved as protection
zones for tourism.  Most of these plans are still being debated and yet to be formally accepted and implemented. It
is clear, however, that they will have profound implications for the land use rights of groups or individuals who
currently reside on targeted areas and that their interests should also be taken into account.
The October 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections marked a formal end to the United Nations-
monitored transition towards multi-party democracy as well as the formal cessation of the country’s sixteen year
civil conflict. Frelimo’s presidential candidate, Joaquim Chissano, won an outright majority although his Renamo243
opponent, Afonso Dhlakama, did better than expected, garnering 33.7% of the vote. In addition, while the
Frelimo party enjoys a slim majority, Renamo won 112 of the 250 parliamentary seats and won an outright
majority in five of the country’s ten provinces. Future elections are therefore likely to be highly competitive.
Significantly, however, land policy and proposed land reforms did not emerge as an issue during the
campaigns leading up to the 1994 elections. Indeed, current efforts to reform national land policy derive more
from donor pressures or government recognition of policy mistakes than as a response to political pressures from
rural populations or Renamo delegates to parliament. Vigorous debate within the parliament erupted in October
1995 over whether Afrikaners from South Africa should receive land concessions to farm in Mozambique. Yet
the debate has centered primarily on nationalist and racial themes rather than treating the issue as an opportunity
to investigate the process by which land concessions are granted or to meaningfully address the need for policy
reform which encourages long-term investment. That land policy issues have not been a focal point of political
debate undoubtedly derives from the fact that those groups who might benefit most from such reforms--
smallholders--remain politically unorganized and weak. It will therefore be critical that external donors protect
smallholder interests as the government reviews and revises its land policy.
Beyond electoral politics at the national level, the 1994 Municipalities Law, once clarified, could further
empower local communities, thereby deepening the democratization process. In particular, it could be a first step
in a process culminating in the granting of more local control and authority over land and other natural resources.
 The law proposes that municipal status and elections would be gradually extended to the country’s 128 rural and
23 urban district (Maputo city already enjoys this status) once they meet certain minimal criteria such as
sufficient qualified personnel and material resources. How many districts meet these criteria and therefore qualify
for local elections planned for 1997 is, however, subject to intense debate. Renamo, whose political support is
often strongest in those areas which lack minimum conditions, has opposed the gradualist approach and has
favored granting municipality status and power to all rural and urban districts.
Under both patrilineal and matrilineal customary tenure systems, women generally obtain rights through
men. The primary difference in the two systems relates to whether men receive land through their father’s kin or
through their mother’s. In most cases, a woman receives relatively secure land use rights although they are
dependent on a continuing relationship to the male who parceled land out to her. They are also, of course,
dependent on the male’s own tenure rights. Women generally do not own land and have little formal management
authority. In practice, however, women have tended to be the primary cultivators of land and actually make many
of the decisions regarding production activities within a given plot.
Decentralizing administrative authority and the movement towards official recognition of land markets will
likely produce mixed results. Since independence, the Frelimo party has championed and, with varying success,
implemented a fairly progressive agenda aimed at promoting gender equality. Moves toward strengthening
customary authority and local officials may reverse some of the protections Frelimo has attempted to extend to
women. On the other hand, by pursuing a less confrontational strategy towards customary structures, the
government may not evoke such a powerful backlash which has often resulted in a further diminution of women’s
rights and status within rural communities. For women located near peri-urban areas where competition over land
is more intense, the encouragement of formal land markets could prove beneficial. They could for the first time
have land formally registered in their names. On the other hand, it will be some time before government
institutions such as DINAGECA will have sufficient capacity to register lands and adjudicate conflicts between
title holders with conflicting claims. As a result, the tenure rights of the weakest members of communities—
women and smallholders in general—will likely remain insecure in the face of predatory activities of larger, more
powerful groups and individuals.244
Present policy position and reforms
Since 1994, the Mozambican government has demonstrated a willingness to meaningfully address needed
changes in national land policy and the mechanisms by which it will be administered. The government initiated a
three phase, eighteen month program to revise national land policy in 1995 as part of the ongoing FAO supported
Land Commission program within the Ministry of Agriculture. This has led to several important recommended
policy shifts. These include: (1) creating a context in which land markets can operate, at least in peri-urban areas;
(2) granting greater recognition to customary forms of land tenure; and (3) acknowledging the need for reforming
mechanisms for administering land and other natural resources as well as the means by which conflicts are
adjudicated.
While these represent welcome shifts in overall policy direction, their impact will clearly depend upon the
final language and institutional frameworks constructed as the government actually drafts new land laws and an
accompanying regulatory code. For example, as presently constituted, the proposed land policy still vests
ownership of land in the state, thereby denying individuals or groups the right to alienate property. Such a clause
is clearly in conflict with the new Land Policy Statement’s expressed aim of encouraging the emergence of formal
land markets. Some individuals drafting the new Land Policy Statement have recognized this fact. Indeed, some
within the government have indicated that the primary reason that the Land Policy Statement continues to vest
ownership rights in the state derives not from any deeply felt hostility to individual property rights but rather,
because the country’s constitution proscribes private property. National land policy is therefore premised on
amending constitutional provisions which vests land ownership with the state. It is uncertain whether the needed
constitutional modification will occur, however, as many within the state apparatus still believe that the state
should retain its control over land.
The other significant proposed change addresses the issue of decentralizing administrative and adjudicative
authority so that it will be more commensurate with state institutional capacity as well as to encourage more
participatory mechanisms and procedures which will be viewed as more legitimate. The general policy orientation
of the 1994 Municipalities Law is to be commended. At present, however, it remains vague on two key issues.
First, for meaningful decentralization to occur, the central government will need to go beyond decentralizing costs
and implementing authority. Local state institutions, to play a meaningful role, must have authority to raise
revenue and receive discretionary authority to go beyond tinkering with policies formulated in Maputo. Second,
the government will need to specify more clearly central-, provincial-, district-, and locality-level state institutions’
relationships and division of responsibilities with customary authorities. The Municipalities Law encourages
cooperation and “collaboration” with customary authorities but if they are to have meaningful power and input,
the government will need to draw up more concrete directives and institutional frameworks. Given that they de
facto administer much of the country’s land and that much of the rural population perceives them as the most
legitimate repositories of political power, clarifying and ensuring the role of customary authorities will be critical.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
As the Government of Mozambique proceeds in the process of revising its national land laws and administrative
and adjudicative practices, it should be encouraged to denationalize control over land and natural resources,
decentralize control to provincial and district level state institutions, and more formally integrate customary
dispute resolution procedures and customary laws and evidence into statutory land administration. More specific
recommendations include:
¤ As the government in Maputo revises its land policy, it should be encouraged to continue its dialogue with
other levels of government (provincial, district, locality), Eduardo Mondlane University, the private sector,
and other groups in civil society including commercial, agricultural, forestry, mining and tourist enterprises.245
Special attention should be paid to incorporating smallholder concerns in the policy formulation process. Such
a dialogue will likely lead a larger percentage of the population to view the tenure regime as legitimate.
¤ The government should be encouraged to begin a phased move towards denationalizing property rights and
permitting formal land markets in areas marked by relatively high land competition and capable state
institutions. At the same time, the government should focus on building capacity within institutions such as
DINAGECA. It should also streamline procedures for securing rights in property, especially the registration
process.
¤ The government should consider instituting a co-titling program for entire communities which would obviate
the need for communities to go through the time-consuming and confusing process of first forming a formal
association.
¤ The government should freeze the granting of land concessions until a new land policy has been formalized. In
addition, to discourage unproductive land speculation, it should consider a sizable land tax which penalizes
large unproductive holdings.
¤ The government should be encouraged to decentralize administrative authority over land. In particular, the
1994 Municipalities Law needs to be clarified, especially with regards to issues of taxation and spending
authority. In addition, even if the government decides to pursue a gradualist approach which sets minimal
conditions for achieving municipality status, the government should host local elections and begin devolving
power to the selected municipalities in 1997.
¤ The government should continue its efforts to integrate customary institutions and forms of evidence into the
statutory system. It should also consider creating a secondary-level court or tribunal which would allow
disputants to present either customary or statutory evidence to support their claims and thereby serve as a
bridge between community-based and statutory tenure systems.
¤ A national Bill of Rights should be considered which articulate the rights and obligations of each individual
and group. Particular attention should be focused on protecting the rights of historically disadvantaged
groups, especially women. The Bill of Rights should include the power to litigate against the state (at all
levels) or any other party (including traditional structures) that contravenes the rights expressed in the bill.
¤ The creation of municipality-level participatory land commissions should also be considered. These would: (1)
permit the variety of different customary tenure systems to be accommodated within the parameters of the
national code, (2) advance the democratization process in a more localized context, and (3) protect the rights
of groups and individuals—particularly women—as specified in a national Bill of Rights.
¤ Donors should also undertake effort to improve smallholders’ and customary authorities’ awareness of the
land law and measures they can take to secure land titles or otherwise protect their individual or community
interests. Beyond awareness-raising, donors should encourage the emergence of groups within civil society
(especially groups of smallholders) which can develop informational, material, and organizational resources
for purposes of protecting their groups’ perceived interests.
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Dispossession of the indigenous people of Namibia was a central feature of colonial rule. The ethnic groups
inhabiting the central Namibian plateau (principally the Herero, Nama, Damara, and San) were forcefully
expelled to make way for colonial settlers. At independence, some 45% of the total land area and 74% of the
potentially arable land was owned by white commercial farmers who comprised less than 2% of the total
population. With the advent of independence, expectations of redistribution were widespread. Although SWAPO
never proposed full-scale nationalization of land in its 1989 election manifesto, it did commit itself to transfer
some land from the few who held too much to the landless majority. Nearly four years after the departure of
South African colonial forces, however, the formulation of a program of land reform is proceeding very
cautiously and without widespread public debate on the issues.
National policy and legal framework
At 82.4 million hectares, Namibia’s total land area makes it one of the larger African countries. It is, however,
also the driest country in sub-Saharan Africa, with all except the northeast receiving a mean rainfall of less than
400 mm a year. Below the 400 mm level rain-fed cultivation is possible only on a small scale and at high risk of
crop failure. Stock farming with domesticated animals or wildlife, hunting, and gathering are the main forms of
land use. Namibia has a population of 1.4 million, the distribution of which is heavily weighted toward the
northern Communal Areas (CAs).
Rights to land have commonly been assigned to four categories: state land, used for nature conservation,
game parks, and military bases; town land, where standard concepts of state, municipal, and private ownership
apply within proclaimed boundaries under statute law; commercial farmland, which refers to all freehold
agricultural land; and communal land, which groups together all land reserved by the German and South African
colonial administrations for the exclusive use of indigenous Namibian communities.
About 44% of the country is freehold land which is sparsely settled. The status of freehold rural property is
regulated by the Namibian constitution and the statutory tenure system, which states that all natural resources
(including land) belong to the state if they are not otherwise lawfully owned. The overwhelmingly majority of
freehold agricultural land is in private ownership. These freehold farms, which are virtually all ranches focused
on extensive livestock production, are surveyed and have title deeds. While subdivision of farms is rare, multiple
ownership is commonplace and acts as a protective device against the risk of rain-fall failure. Rural freehold land
is regarded as a potentially major resource for land reform, and the new Agricultural Land Reform (ACLR) Bill
is likely to become the chief instrument of acquiring rural freehold land for just this purpose. The ACLR Bill
would vest in the state a general right to acquire agricultural land, which is defined to exclude proclaimed urban
areas, resettlement schemes, and all land already in state ownership. “Underutilized” land (agricultural land which
is not substantially being used for agricultural purposes) is also allowed to be taken over by the state. The state
has the power to buy land on a “willing buyer–willing seller” basis.
Another 43% of Namibia is communal land, most of which is unsurveyed and unfenced, lying mainly in the
north of the country. A fifth of communal land is not suitable for any kind of farming. The Namibian state
inherited ownership of land in all the CAs at independence. Although inherited colonial legislation provides the
president with wide powers to administer communal land, CAs continue to be allocated by traditional authorities248
under differing customary rules in the absence of any functioning state mechanism following the dismantling of
colonial regional institutions. Traditional pastoral and mixed farming systems dominate these areas, where at least
half of the indigenous population lives. Although there are local variations, unenclosed grazing land is generally
available to all as open access commonage. Most of the CAs in the south have been converted into de facto
freehold and leasehold areas.
The remaining 13% of Namibia is state land, which is too dry for farming; much of it is leased for diamond
mining or set aside as national park.
In June 1991, a Lands Conference was held in Windhoek to discuss the land question in Namibia. Beyond
the establishment of a number of guiding principles, however, the conference provided no mandate for future
action. The lack of urgency in addressing land issues in Namibia infers that land reform is not a top priority for
the SWAPO government at present. Some believe that the consultative process served to buy time for the
government to consolidate its rule.
Although none of the conclusions established at the conference have yet been implemented, they nonetheless
are understood to broadly have the support of the current government. A summary of some of the relevant
resolutions follows:
¤ As provided by the constitution, all Namibian citizens have the right to live wherever they choose within the
national territory. In seeking access to communal land, applicants should take account of the rights and
customs of the local communities living there. Priority should be given to the landless and those without
adequate land for subsistence.
¤ Full restitution of claims to ancestral land is impossible, given the complexities in redressing them.
¤ Disadvantaged communities and groups (such as the San) should receive special protection of their land
rights.
¤ No one may be forced to leave communal land, though large communal farmers with certain number of
livestock should be encouraged to acquire commercial land outside communal areas. In the future, farmland
used by large farmers in communal areas should be reduced to make space for small farmers.
¤ Commercial farmers should not have access to communal grazing land, and communal farmers who acquire
commercial farms should not be allowed to keep their rights to communal grazing land.
¤ Very large farms and ownership of several farms by one owner should not be permitted in the future, and
such land should be expropriated.
¤ CAs should be retained, developed, and expanded where necessary.
¤ Foreigners should not be allowed to own farmland, but should be able to use and develop it on a leasehold
basis.
¤ Land owned by absentees should be expropriated.
¤ The role of traditional leaders in allocating communal land should be recognized and should work in
coordination with regional and local government institutions in the area of land administration.
¤ Criteria used to determine which land should be appropriated for redistribution include absentee ownership,
the underutilization and undercapitalization of land, and the multiple ownership of farms. Some 7 million
hectares of land (roughly 10% of suitable farming land) have been identified under these criteria. The farms
identified, however, are scattered throughout the country, which limits options for extending existing CAs.
Although it was concluded that CAs should be retained, developed, and extended where necessary, and that
fencing of land by wealthy stock owners be halted, the Ministry of Agriculture is going ahead with credit schemes249
to help farmers subdivide communal land in an effort to reduce poor environmental management. In addition, the
transformation of traditional stock keepers into commercial farmers and the replacement of customary forms of
communal land tenure with individual title has become common. These actions are based on the assumption that
traditional techniques of pastoral and livestock management are environmentally destructive and that
improvements in production and land management can only be achieved on fenced private farms. They also have
to do with the fact that national elites are actively grabbing land via range enclosure in Ovamboland.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Four main modes of land use were established before colonialism: hunting and gathering, small stock pastoralism,
cattle pastoralism, and mixed farming. San hunter-gatherers, organized into small highly mobile communities,
were the original inhabitants of Namibia. They occupied most of the interior, including the Kalahari sandveld and
the inner Namib Desert. Each extended family group had exclusive use of an economic domain with gradually
shifting boundaries between groups.
The Ovambo people are also a group indigenous to Namibia. There were complex and overlapping rights to
land and other natural resources in Ovambo society. Land in each settlement cluster was formally vested in the
king or clan elders on behalf of the community and administered by a hierarchy of territorial headmen.
Households gained the lifetime use right to their arable fields and had the right to clear new land. Household
heads were usually men, who gained the lifetime use-right to the family homestead and fields. Women occupied a
subordinate position in Ovambo society but had substantial rights to property and land. They were entitled to
their own plots within household fields and had the right to control output for family consumption. Local
commons in pasturage and natural vegetation were common property which were loosely regulated on a
neighborhood basis. Wells and forest belts were open access resources under community supervision.
The disappearance of the colonial administration combined with the lack of any new structures authorized to
deal with land has led to the re-emergence of traditional leaders in allocating land in the CAs. The rights of
traditional leaders to allocate and administer communal land are generally held to fall under customary law. The
constitution gives explicit recognition to customary law so long as its content does not offend the constitution. The
content of customary law affecting land rights and administration can be expected to vary greatly between broad
zones and within small distances.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Production in the commercial farming sector dominates agriculture’s contribution to gross domestic product
(GDP) and to exports, which fluctuate in response to irregular rainfall and periodic drought. Although
agriculture’s contribution to GDP is small when set against mining, the agricultural sector as a whole is the
country’s dominant employer. It has been estimated that up to 70% of the country’s population may be directly or
indirectly dependent on agricultural production for their livelihood. Up to 90% of the population in the communal
areas are engaged mainly in subsistence production, while the commercial agricultural sector is the country’s
single largest provider of wage employment. With capital-intensive and low-productivity farming systems co-
existing in a resource-poor environment as in Namibia, sharply conflicting tenure perspectives are likely to
emerge. On the one hand, surpluses from high-cost high-output agriculture contribute to national food self-
sufficiency and exports. On the other, subsistence farming supplies the basic needs of far more people.
A sound land tenure system requires that rights in land be defined so that they may be defended and security
of tenure guaranteed. For this reason, it is important to note that the customary tenure systems of the northern
communal areas provide a form of social security for the people. The concept of usufruct as use only, and only
for a lifetime, has shifted toward more stable private “ownership.” Improvements in the form of fencing and
housing undermine the possibility of headmen to evict “owners” or to change their allocations in the case of
vacancy or nonuse. The prevalence of out-migrating labor further implies that it has not been customary to250
reallocate unoccupied plots. In sum, tenure security over arable land is increasing in subtle but significant ways.
The insecurity that does exist in communal areas is due primarily to the ambivalence of the state toward
making/implementing policy with regard to land (especially with regard to the enclosure of communal
pasturelands) and the de facto encouragement (acceptance) of land grabbing at the expense of the majority. There
is little documentation regarding the extent that land rentals or interhousehold or intrahousehold land transfers are
taking place, in what conceptual and tenurial framework chiefs and headmen are allocating pasture for enclosure,
or where headmen and elders are “changing the rules” to accommodate land shortages, if at all.
Colonial policy on wildlife management did more to encourage local communities to regard wildlife as a
commercial benefit to the white minority, as opposed to an economically valuable resource which they themselves
could make use of. As a result, wildlife populations declined in most CAs, due primarily to the pressure of
expanding settlement. Upon reviewing relevant legislation in the constitution, which commits the state to actively
promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting policies aimed at the utilization of living natural
resources on a sustainable basis, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism has initiated a program in support of
the sustainable utilization of wildlife resources. A major objective is effective wildlife conservation in the CAs
coupled with sustainable income generation for local communities. Community-based wildlife management
(CBWM) pilot programs are currently under way in the eastern Bushman CA and the eastern Caprivi CA. In
areas where CBWM has already been attempted, there have been marked improvements, such as the
nongovernmental organization (NGO)-run program in the Damara CA, which has been going for a decade. Local
communities have made gains in terms of concession fees from both trophy hunting and safari operators as well
as from meat supplied by controlled culling. Concession fees are channeled directly into community projects.
Since independence, traditional authorities no longer have the power or ability to effectively administer land
tenure and administration, and as a result, the growth of individual tenure in CAs has intensified rather than
relieved pressure on the remaining communal range. The risk of long-term degradation is heightened by
intensified pressure, since owners of fenced farms still graze their livestock on communal rangeland in order to
maximize their benefits and reduce risks. In addition, illegal fencing of land by wealthy stock owners (in
Ovamboland and Hereroland) has adversely impacted the poorer sections of these communities. Legal
enforcement machinery is lacking to prevent these illegal enclosures as well as other forms of encroachment in
communal areas.
Herd movement is one of the principal techniques employed by African livestock producers to exploit
environmental heterogeneity. The preservation of herd mobility requires the legal recognition of existing
customary tenure arrangements, especially those which provide for the seasonal use of a wide variety of
ecological resources. Environmental degradation frequently accompanies sedentarization due to an intensification
of activity and overgrazing in one area. Thus, formal programs of land-use planning should attempt to coordinate
movement and regulate access by different user groups, rather than restrict movement.
Sustainable range management is only possible by linking the cultural values and existing social
organization which enable pastoral mobility to be continuously negotiated and maintained with the imperatives of
livestock farming in a complex and highly variable environment. The recognition that it makes sense for
communal farmers to expand their resource entitlements rather than reduce their herd size during times of stress is
implicit to understanding why group ranches and grazing schemes have failed throughout dryland Africa. There is
a clearly identified need to formulate an appropriate legal and administrative framework to regulate land use and
tenure and to safeguard and define the rights of land users in communal areas.
Currently, the groups most vocal in their claims for restitution of land are those who were forcibly
dispossessed of their land during colonial rule. Unlike the Ovambo communities in the north that practice mixed
livestock and grain farming, farmers in the center and south of the country are predominantly pastoralists whose
immediate needs are for additional grazing. These ethnic groups are numerically small and comprise no more than251
6% of the national population. They also represent a political minority who have predominantly supported
Namibia’s opposition parties; SWAPO is governed primarily by the Ovambo, who have more of an immediate
interest in Ovamboland in the north. Falling outside of the mainstream of ruling party politics, it can be assumed
that these groups do not represent an important part of the SWAPO constituency, and that their claims are not a
matter of immediate concern. Since their survival depends on their access to the land which they have historically
occupied, these groups might require special protection, especially in light of the government’s priorities.
Furthermore, the needs of southern Namibians are not being met since the national leadership is heavily partaking
in land grabbing in Ovamboland via range enclosure.
In Namibia, as elsewhere in southern Africa, arguments about land reform tend to be about the
redistribution of formerly white-owned freehold ranches to blacks rather than to the landless. Not surprisingly, the
winners in newly independent Namibia are the black elite. Their position is reinforced by the belief that the only
environmentally sound way to manage the land is to subdivide it into ranches, since traditional open-range
pastoralism is seen to be environmentally destructive. This opinion is sustained by the conservative political
leadership.
NGOs play a strong role in communal areas by urging the government toward land reform, albeit with a
considerable amount of tension, as demonstrated by a 1995 NGO conference on the lack of progress in land
reform. The formulation of useful land tenure policy for the communal areas has, after all, not yet taken place,
and some are beginning to question the political will of the current government to do so. This is especially the
case since those who make policy are the same as those who are in favor of commercialization of the communal
lands and may be involved in illegal fencing.
Women form the majority of agricultural producers in the CAs, but suffer discrimination under both
customary and statutory law and have been historically marginalized. Arable land is allocated to individuals as
heads of household, and formal rights are usually vested in men rather than women, who gain access as wives.
Significant rights within the household do exist, however, for women to own crops and, in some cases, cropland.
In the last few decades, more women have been acquiring land in their own right. The 1991 Land Conference
resolved that women should have the right to own the land they cultivate and to inherit and bequeath land and
fixed property. All discriminatory laws and all discriminatory practices that disadvantage women should be
abolished or amended with immediate effect. In addition, women should be fairly represented on all future district
councils, land boards, or other bodies which deal with the allocation or use of land in CAs.
Present policy position and reforms
It appears that the terms of importance attached to issues of land reform by postcolonial leaders are: (1) factors
relating to perceived personal and tribal self-interest; (2) the need for racial justice and for restoring land to
Africans (arguments about land reform tend to be about the redistribution of formerly white-owned freehold
ranches to blacks rather than the landless); and (3) those factors relating to social equity. Environmental
arguments tend to be set aside or exploited in an opportunistic way.
Although two of the conclusions made at the Land Conference were that CAs should be retained, developed,
and extended where necessary and that fencing of land by wealthy stock owners should be halted, the Ministry of
Agriculture is going ahead with credit schemes to help farmers subdivide communal land in an effort to reduce
poor environmental management. In addition, the transformation of traditional stock keepers into commercial
farmers and the replacement of customary forms of communal land tenure with individual title have become
common. These actions are based on the assumption that traditional techniques of pastoral and livestock
management are environmentally destructive and that improvements in production and land management can be
achieved only on fenced private farms. The growth of individual tenure in the CAs, however, has intensified
rather than relieved pressure on the remaining communal range. The risk of long-term degradation is heightened252
by intensified pressure, since owners of fenced farms still graze their livestock on communal rangeland in order to
maximize their benefits and reduce risk. In addition, access is made more difficult for small farmers.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Reform efforts will proceed on two fronts. There will be some movement toward ranch reform, though it is not
clear how extensive this will be. The donor community should support this process and seek to contribute directly
to a more rigorous thinking-through of alternative approaches. It is not at all clear that subdivision of existing
ranches and distribution to reform beneficiaries is ecologically sound; merger of ranches to create still larger units
with cattle of reform beneficiaries grazed on a common property range owned and regulated by an association
might be a more prudent approach.
The second reform front concerns the communal areas. There is little reason to be optimistic that
government will effectively implement programs to stop the land grabbing there, whether a reform law is passed
or not. The most promising reform approach in these areas would involve the devolution of all authority with
respect to land to provincial and local authorities.
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SOUTH AFRICA COUNTRY PROFILE
by Eva Jensen
Executive summary
The Government of South Africa has begun to implement a major land reform program aimed at more equitably
distributing the currently highly skewed racial distribution of land. From 1913 to 1992, the majority black
population of South Africa was prohibited from owning land and excluded from participation in the land market.
The government says it intends to redistribute land and natural resources in a way that establishes security of
tenure for all South Africans, reduces poverty, and contributes to economic growth. The government’s demand-
driven and rights-based approach to tenure reform intends to build upon local initiatives, capacities, and relations.
However, the government will commit resources to the effort: land acquisition/settlement grants, planning grants,
state-owned land, and state-purchased land. It is not clear, however, whether the urban-based African National
Congress (ANC) will commit enough resources to land reform in the light of other pressing needs. Public policy
debates and program initiatives related to land reform will significantly impact the long-term development of not
only South Africa, but all of Southern Africa.
National policy and legal framework
According to the apartheid race classification system, about 76% of the population is African, 13% is White,
8.5% is Colored, and 2.5% is Asian.
12 On the basis of race, South Africa’s population of approximately 40
million people is unevenly distributed over approximately 114,051,900 hectares of land. Colonial land
dispossession and legislation, South Africa’s Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, and apartheid laws solidified white
control of 87% of South Africa’s land and created extreme inequities between the white and black population.
17.63 million Africans
live on this portion of land
13% of
land
87% of  land
22.37 million South Africans
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LAND AND POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
                                                  
12 The Population Registration Act of 1950 classified the population of South Africa according to four race-based
categories: “white,” “native” (or Bantu or African), “colored” (people of mixed race), and Indian (people of Asian decent).
In this paper, the term “black” is used to refer to all who are disenfranchised and not referred to as “white”; it includes all
the people officially classified as “native,” “colored,” or “Indian”. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the
different black population groups because of the differential impacts of apartheid, the terms “African,” “colored,” and
“Indian” will be used.254
Millions of black families were uprooted from their land and forced to live in overcrowded and resource-
poor bantustans, reserves, or townships, which acted as pools of cheap migrant labor for white-owned farms,
mines, and industries. Black people were stripped of their landholdings and rights. Successful black farmers were
forced to seek employment as farm laborers or move to bantustans or townships. There, black people were not
allowed to own land outright. They were issued residential and land use permits or leases to the land which
belonged to trustees, generally the state or the South African Development Trust (SADT). The majority
population became tenants on landholdings that were unable to sustain them. A small minority of black people
retained freehold rights to land that has subsequently become overcrowded as well because of the severe land
shortage and land hunger that exist in South Africa.
White property rights and claims consist largely of legally recognized title: title deeds, mineral rights, and
leases which were originally established by the Dutch and British colonial governments. These legal forms are
supported by laws, regulations, and institutions. In contrast, colonial and apartheid legislation prohibited black
people from owning or leasing land, even in the bantustan areas, where most black rights to land exist in forms
that are vulnerable and insecure. Blacks hold land in three basic categories: state-administered tenures, communal
tenure, and freehold tenure.
State-administered tenures were implemented in bantustans, reserves, and townships. In urban areas,
black-occupied land was owned by the state or white local authorities and occupation rights were granted by
Certificates of Occupation or lodgers’ permits. Land in the former bantustans was owned by the state, held in
trust by the government, and regulated by centrally determined rules. Through a variety of systems, control of
land was taken away from communities and granted to central administrative authorities: chief, headman and
council, agricultural officers, or government ministers. In African rural areas and in 23 colored reserves, land was
pegged and divided into residential, arable, and grazing areas. Residential and arable plots were allocated to
individual families; grazing land was to be shared. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Deeds of Grant and Rights of
Leasehold, both less than ownership, were introduced. Following the former government’s 1991 White Paper on
Land Reform, freehold title was made available to Africans by means of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights
Act 112 of 1991 and the Less Formal Townships Establishment Act 113 of 1991.
Communal tenure systems, community-controlled landholdings which are flexible and include a variety of
tenures, survive in some parts of the bantustans and tend to operate as informal systems. Within communal
tenure systems, community membership conveys landholding rights. In theory, and in practice in some places in
South Africa, the community retains the privilege to approve of any outsiders who want to obtain rights to land.
Communal tenure systems were transformed by the postcolonial construction of customary law which gave chiefs
the power to allocate land to individuals and families and failed to recognize the rights and power of the
community. In some areas, chiefs are moving to formalize greater control over land, treating land as their private
property. At the other extreme, some communal tenure systems have individualized property rights and allow for
individual buying and selling.
Freehold tenure for blacks has survived to a limited extent in South Africa. Under severe demographic and
social pressure, most privately owned black land carries tenancies, with tenants living under informal tenancy
leaseholds in densely populated informal settlements, particularly in peri-urban areas.
In white-owned rural areas, black families live on freehold land as labor tenants and farmworkers. Though
statistics are unreliable, it is estimated that there are approximately 3 to 6 million farmworkers, both permanent
(mostly men) and part-time (many of them women and children), employed by white commercial farmers. On a
minority of commercial farms, labor tenant communities have survived. They are estimated to be several
thousand and are located primarily in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga.
Historically, land administration was clear and record keeping was well documented in white areas, while
administration in the black areas was chaotic. In the townships, colored reserves, and bantustans different laws,255
administrative systems, and responsible authorities existed to administer land matters. The existing legislative
framework for land development is inappropriate, apartheid based, and duplicative. Over 12,000 pieces of land-
related legislation apply to the former reserves and SADT land. In many areas administration and record-keeping
systems have broken down.
Today, the national Department of Land Affairs (DLA) has been given responsibility for setting national
land policy and embodying it in legislation as well as establishing, implementing, and funding land programs. The
national government is also responsible for supporting the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights in its
efforts to restore land or otherwise compensate people who were dispossessed of their land rights under racially
discriminatory laws and practices.
Provincial governments have concurrent responsibilities with national government with regard to critical
areas that affect the sustainability of land reform, including development planning. Provincial steering committees
are being created to plan, implement, and support land reform. However, land administration functions remain
fragmented among disparate departments at national, regional, and local levels. There is a lack of clarity about
intergovernmental relations, accountability, and commitment to devolution of authority to local government. The
long-term aim of DLA is to establish a decentralized land administration system that is based at third-tier
government levels, operating on the basis of a one-stop land services office, conveniently accessible to local
people within district local government.
Extensive capacity-building in government is needed, but in the meantime, DLA is forging successful
partnerships with NGOs in support of land reform. The National Land Committee and its regional affiliates and
the Legal Resources Center have had a long history of land rights advocacy. While they themselves have limited
capacities, they have established a strong base of trust, knowledge, and experience through their support of
communities in resistance against forced removals. Some are already assisting in land restitution claims and
redistribution pilots.
The pre-eminent policy challenge is to reconcile the need for land reform with creating at atmosphere in
which property rights are respected. The 1996 Constitution of South Africa includes a property clause which
provides for the protection of property and expropriation only “for public purposes or in the public interest; and
subject to compensation, the amount, timing, and manner of payment, of which must be agreed, or decided or
approved by a court.” In addition, the constitution specifies “the public interest includes the nation’s commitment
to land reform” and indicates “[t]he State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.” The national
land reform program consists of three main thrusts:
u Restitution: The goal of the land restitution policy is to restore land and provide other restitutive remedies to
people dispossessed of their rights in land since 1913 under racially discriminatory laws and practices. The
Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994, specifies the procedures for implementation of the program. People must
submit their claims before 1 May 1998 to one of the four Land Claims Commissioner’s offices. The Land
Claims Commission and Court proposes to finalize all claims by 1 May 2000. A 10-year period is allowed for
the implementation of all court orders. As of March 1996, over 6,800 claims had been lodged, many of them
group claims representing multiple claimants.
u Redistribution: This reform is to proceed on a willing seller–willing buyer basis. The plan is to facilitate such
redistribution through the provision of government grants and services. Eligible households may apply for a
maximum R15,000 Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant in order to obtain land. Based upon voluntary
transactions between willing buyers and sellers, over the next 10-year period, the government claims rights in
land will be secured for a significant proportion of eligible citizens. A variety of tenure forms will be available,
including holding of land as individuals, as communal property associations, and as traditional communities.256
u Tenure reform: The intent of the tenure reform program is to extend security of tenure to all South Africans
under diverse forms of tenure. Government says it is committed to converting all permit-based and informal
systems of landholding into legally enforceable rights to land. The legal position would be brought into line
with practices and realities that exist on the ground. Pre-existing rights and interests, both formal and informal,
will be used as a basis for clarifying and formalizing land rights. Multiple and overlapping rights to specific
parcels of land will have to be identified and defined, a challenging task. Additional land under the land reform
will be required in order to accommodate the rights of all stakeholders.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Contemporary black “communal” tenures in South Africa were distorted by colonial and apartheid policies.
Chiefs administered unpopular colonial and apartheid policies and were in the process deeply compromised in
many communities. Colonial laws and governments imposed their ideas and models on African practices.
Indigenous tenure systems in some areas may involve processes of consultation which are democratic in spirit,
but in many cases characterized by undemocratic and arbitrary control by chiefs. In KwaZulu-Natal, traditional
authorities have become heavily politicized. Their opposition to the present central government has complicated
the development of national policy on indigenous tenure systems and authorities.
There are aspects of communal tenure that have been valued and retained by local communities. As
discussed above (existing tenures) these systems have endured, in spite of the legislative tenures imposed on
communities, because they have served the needs, values, and interests of people in various ways, when the
central legal system provided them no other options. One of the challenges of land reform is to find ways of
preserving the benefits of communal tenure while eliminating the abuses which have occurred under it.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Research conducted in the early 1990s found that 49% of the South African population is living in poverty, with
blacks and females disproportionately represented among the poor. Black South Africans living in rural areas
have been forced to diversify their income strategies in order to live. The three most frequently attempted
livelihood tactics are: claims against the incomes of migrant-labor household members (38% of all households),
employment in the informal or secondary economy (37%), and agricultural production (36%). Pension and social
welfare claims are the fourth most important survival strategy (20%). Agricultural production provides only 10%
of the income of rural African households (an average of R91/month); however, it is the third most popular
source of livelihood and is a particularly important source of income for women.
South Africa has achieved national food self-sufficiency. Field crop production exceeds consumption rates
by approximately 30%. Both field crops and horticultural products are exported. Livestock production, red
meats, and industrial milk production are close to self-sufficiency, but some products are imported. Food security,
however, has not been achieved. Hunger and malnutrition rates among the black population are high with 2
million people identified as malnourished. The skewed distribution of resources and income results in unbalanced
food consumption and low household food security levels for many black people. The solution to these problems
does not lie wholly in the agricultural sector, but in enhancing the already varied streams of income of rural
households.
Rural land-use planning in South Africa has been strongly polarized. One system was developed to serve the
needs of large-scale commercial farming. Approximately 77 million hectares of land are held by 50–55,000 white
farmers engaged in commercial farming and agribusiness. Of these, 30% are responsible for 80% of the country’s
agricultural output. This land-use system has stressed exclusive land uses, with the Subdivision of Agricultural
Land Act (Act 70, 1970) being the main instrument to implement zoning regulations and prevent land subdivision
(DLA 1996, p. 17). Generous subsidies to scale have resulted in high levels of productivity for large-scale
operations.257
The other rural land-use system, small-scale farming, was devised for the overcrowded reserves and
bantustans. Where it has survived, it has been forced to conform to bantustan policies and “betterment” planning.
In some areas this has led to distant arable lands being abandoned in favor of intensively cultivated gardens near
the homestead, often on plots too small to produce significant benefits. While the average size of white farms in
South Africa is over 1,000 hectares, the average black farm is 2 hectares. In many crowded areas grazing and
arable land has given way to residential needs. Black farmers have received little support from state agricultural
extension.
The agricultural sector contributed only 4.6% to the gross domestic product in 1994, but because of
extensive forward and backward linkages, agriculture has a significant impact on the economy. In spite of the fact
that employment rates have dropped, it still employs a large work force. Agriculture makes up approximately
35% of the income of the poorest black rural population.
The Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry is the lead ministry on most environmental issues and is
currently conducting a review of legislation and regulation on water rights Water Act, Act 54 of 1956) and
forestry.
Water is a scarce resource in South Africa. Historically, water rights were allocated in agricultural areas,
with the rights of farmers along rivers protected. With an increase in demands from the industrial sector and the
growth of cities and towns, the Water Act, 1956, was adopted to ensure equitable distribution of water between
the rural agricultural sector and the urban industrial sector. Water law has been written in the interests of
commercial agriculture and industry and little attention has been given to the customs and practices of the
majority population with regard to water rights.
Commercial forest plantations cover 1.2 million hectares, 1% of South Africa’s land surface, compared to
0.14% covered by indigenous forest. The expansion of commercial forestry has often involved forcible removal of
black residents from the land, and the rate of growth of the industry, at 4% a year, poses potential problems in
regard to its future land demands. Conflict may arise over plantations on South African Development Trust land.
There is a need to explore new participatory models of social forestry which provide direct benefits to local
communities. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry held a National Forestry Policy Conference in
March 1995 and has issued a policy discussion document which calls for a new Forest Act.
Turning to broader conservation efforts, land in state forests, national parks, provincial nature reserves, and
private farms exists alongside overcrowded rural areas of poverty and environmental degradation. In some cases,
people were dispossessed of land and/or forcibly removed in order to create nature reserves. Fences have denied
people access to water and other natural resources, sources of traditional medicine, and craft material. Parks have
experienced tense relations with neighboring communities, which question the importance of protected areas when
they experience great need for natural resources. In some areas, consideration is being given to establishing game
reserves as part of the rural livelihood strategies for beneficiaries of redistribution. Game farming has already
become a lucrative business for many white landholders.
Overstocking and environmental degradation of grazing commons in South Africa is a concern of many.
Indeed, rural pastoralists need and desire additional land for grazing. The declining availability of grazing land in
the bantustans, resulting from the need for residential sites, has contributed to high stocking rates which are often
criticized as overstocked and contributing to erosion and degradation of the land resource. Cousins’ review of
more recent research leads him to question the reliability and usefulness of standard stocking rates. Heavily
grazed communal land has demonstrated resiliency and a capacity to support larger herds than previously
accepted (Cousins 1994, pp. 20–22).
Land reform in South Africa is one of the outcomes of democratization and the first democratic elections
which were held in 1994. Today, the focus of democratization efforts is on local governing structures, with the
first elections under the new dispensation held in 1996. The lack of popular experience in local government is a258
legacy of apartheid, and management and administration training programs are needed. Lack of adequate
government services are a major constraint in land reform implementation.
Traditional leadership and authority in many areas is not recognized as legitimate or democratic. Many
chiefs and community councils are under pressure to cede their power and authority to new local government
structures. On the other hand, there are traditional leaders who are eager to retain their positions of authority and
leadership, and in some areas they have broad public support. They seek to retain their traditional role in
allocating land and the power that comes with that authority. Women are particularly disadvantaged by
traditional governing systems and the tenure systems administered by chiefs and community councils. Tensions
between the role and functions of traditional authorities and those of elected local governments are likely to persist
for some time. Where traditional authorities or other more democratically chosen local authorities abuse their
powers, people now have constitutionally established equity rights to which they can appeal.
Under communal tenure, land rights are usually granted to married men, who hold the land with their
families and operate their own production. Inheritance by male heirs is usually automatic, though land may be
given to married or widowed daughters. A widowed woman in most cases is allowed to stay on the homestead,
under the tutelage of a male relative of the husband. She continues to occupy her homestead only with the good
will of her husband’s family. Generally, unmarried people are denied access to land. The legal position of many
white women is also unsatisfactory. If married in community of property, the usual case, the wife is regarded as a
perpetual minor and incapable of dealing with her own land.
By the 1996 South African Constitution, SECTION 9(1) of The Bill of Rights: “Everyone is equal before the
law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.” The constitution prohibits unfair discrimination
“directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language, and birth.” The equity clause provides women the possibility of gaining independent access to land,
unmediated by their relationships to male kin. The critical challenge will be translating these abstract rights into
benefits for women.
In the design and implementation of land reform, issues related to gender and the status of women are
critical. The DLA in its Green Paper on South African Land Policy identifies women as a group whose needs
must be specifically addressed and calls for the removal of all legal restrictions on participation by women in land
reform.
Present policy position and reforms
There are several debates about the most effective means of redressing the injustices and inequities of apartheid-
based land distribution. They include issues related to the market-based approach to land reform, the necessity of
supporting communities in their expression of need, the level of financial and development support that land
reform beneficiaries should receive, the democratizing of local government, the role of traditional authorities, and
the viability of various group ownership schemes through which most people will receive land rights.
The market-based approach to land reform necessitates the provision of support to individuals and groups or
communities in their expression of need. The capacities of government and NGOs to facilitate local capacity
building, support people in their land rights claims, and conduct tenure research must be enhanced through
training and additional recruitment.
The market-based approach to land reform is critiqued because the majority population in South Africa does
not have the resources to participate freely in a land market. The government is responding to this reality by
providing a maximum R15,000 subsidy to all households with an average income less than R1,500 per month.
The intent of these grants, as well as settlement and district planning grants and facilitation services, is to make it259
possible for the poor to participate in the land market. Questions about the adequacy of the grants and the
sustainability of agrarian reform and rural economic development persist, given the poverty of the beneficiaries.
While the state may compulsorily acquire land for land reform, the formula appropriate for “just
compensation” is hotly debated. Private procedures for market valuation have an upward bias. Government is
suggesting that use value (the value that a property has for a specific user) in the case of residential land and
productive value (the present value of the income that can be earned) in the case of agricultural land be applied in
the pricing of public land for redistribution and housing programs (DLA 1996, p. 69).
Past agricultural policy has neglected and undermined small-scale farming. With the Department of Land
Affairs and Agriculture now the responsibility of a single minister, the opportunities to coordinate efforts in
support of the land reform should be enhanced. Both within and outside the reform sector, agricultural policies,
and particularly credit policies, must be modified to service small-scale farmers, including women. Research,
training, education, and extension programs appropriate to small-scale farming need to be established.
The Communal Property Associations Act of 1996, modeled on community land trusts, provides the
possibility for reform programs to deliver land to groups of purchasers, with title held communally but use rights
to at least some of the land held individually. The performance of these models must be monitored to ensure that
the landholding or governing body is supported by and representing the interests of all members. Group
ownership involves complex management responsibilities and government will need to support these efforts with
training. There is some confusion between models of group landowning and models of governance, even among
DLA staff.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
As the South African government continues to implement its land reform program, it should be supported by
international partners in its efforts to establish an equitable and nonracial distribution of land and natural
resources, decentralize land management to provincial and district levels, develop local capacities, and expand
socioeconomic growth. Specific recommendations to support this process include:
1. Affirm and support the demand-driven process of land reform by funding the expansion of local community-
organizing and -training capacities of NGOs which have been involved with black communities in land rights
and land reform efforts. Creating and supporting top-down and interventionist approaches will undermine local
capacity building, economic development, and the creation of social stability.
2. Fund land tenure research initiatives which are necessary to identify the rights that people have and the
resources required to ensure those rights.
3. Fund research and monitoring initiatives which will identify the benefits and needs of group landownership
schemes through which the majority population will receive land rights. It is necessary to identify and provide
the support and resources needed to sustain these community-based initiatives if they are to become viable
socioeconomic development options for the people of South Africa.
4. Support government policies and fund programs that will enable those historically excluded from agricultural
credit, extension, training, production, and markets in order to facilitate their entry into the market and
expansion of the smallholder agricultural sector. This will necessarily require shifting resources historically
allocated to highly capitalized commercial agriculture to other programs.
5. Support and fund other grassroots community development initiatives that will enable people to remain on their
land and develop viable rural communities, rather than turn to urban migration which often results in failed
job-seeking initiatives and exacerbates urban poverty and development problems.260
6. Support and fund the initiatives of rural women’s movements which advocate women’s rights and their full
participation in social, political, and economic development. Such initiatives will be required if the legal rights
which women have obtained are to be realized in their daily lives.
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The traditional land tenure system of Swaziland retains considerable vitality, in part because the traditional polity
as a whole has been changing only gradually. The dual system of land tenure governing the country—customary
tenure and freehold tenure—can be traced back to the 1900s. Since most freehold tenure is held by white South
Africans and foreigners in the form of private property, however, an antipathy toward individual tenure has
developed on the part of the Swazis. While the traditional land tenure system has been critiqued by some
observers, it has been concluded that for socioeconomic advancement, political stability and sustainable
development, both systems have to co-exist.
National policy and legal framework
Swaziland is a small country in Southern Africa, covering approximately 1,736,000 hectares. It is surrounded by
the Republic of South Africa for the most part, except for a small area in the north east where the country shares
a border with Mozambique. As of 1993, the total population was estimated at 809,000. There is a 3–30%
(191,000 hectares) range of arable land available across the different physiographic regions of the country, and
78% of Swazis are engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture. Of the total land area, grazing land accounts for
over 60%, cropland accounts for 11% and commercial forests (owned by large commercial companies which
export most of the wood products) account for 6%.
Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Swazi monarchy controlled all the land through chiefs. In
the early 1900s, however, the rulers of Swaziland granted numerous land concessions to foreign interests. As a
result of overlaps and conflicting claims concerning concessions, in 1907 the British assumed direct
administration of Swaziland as a protectorate, and in the following decade effected a tripartite partition of all the
land in the country. Land was divided into Swazi Nation Land (SNL)—governed by community-based tenure,
Individual Tenure Farms (ITF)—governed by private ownership, and Crown Land. Because Swaziland is a
kingdom, the term “Crown Land” is still used, although given the nonbureaucratic, traditional mode of its
administration, it is better characterized as SNL under direct control of the king. In the process of land division,
approximately 2/3 of Swaziland was lost to foreign concessionaires and private land owners. By repurchasing the
alienated land, however, the Swazi nation has been able to expand to about 56.7% of the total land area of the
country. The dual land tenure structure permeates the entire economic, political, and social system of the country.
ITF land covers an area of about 750,000 hectares, and comprises roughly 37% of the country. About 3/4
of the freehold title holdings are held in equal proportions between Swazis and expatriates (the majority of whom
are white South Africans) and the balance belongs to large companies. Very little individual tenure land is owned
by Swazis. Thus, ITF consists of commercial large-scale estates, medium-sized farms and urban areas.
Individuals/companies obtain land through the Deeds Registry Office. Owners of land titles can sell or use the
land as collateral in order to make investments. The Swazi state has the right to withdraw title in land required for
national development, but only after making appropriate compensation. Some ITF land has been returned to the
status of Swazi Nation Land, but most lands acquired through repurchase have been retained for state
development activities, such as parastatal operations and experimental farms.
Freehold tenure is regulated by Roman-Dutch law and administered by the Deeds Registry Office. Some
freehold land is in highly mechanized, totally market oriented modern agriculture, and is said to generate quite a262
substantial percentage of the country’s export earnings. Primarily large commercial activities are carried out on
individual tenure land, such as forest, fruit and sugar plantations. Land of lesser potential serves as seasonal
grazing for sheep. Sugar and timber are the principal commodities of ITF, and account for a sizable proportion of
total merchandise exports.
ITF is regarded as advantageous because of high productivity, high income returns, and good management
and utilization of modern agronomic techniques. Loans can be obtained by owners on the security of lands or
buildings. There is security of tenure, and so good farming and conservation practices are possible, as well as the
cultivation of long term crops, since can one can fence and thus obtain security from one’s neighbors.
Although individual tenure land has been held to be the best policy option for ensuring maximum production
and development, the system keeps most of the land in the hands of a few people. It has created landlessness and
economic insecurity for traditional families. As a result, many disputes have arisen between farmers and
squatters, because the latter believe they have the moral right to inhabit the land, having lived there for many
generations.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
The nation of Swaziland consists of a single ethnic group which practices community-based tenure on Swazi
Nation Land. At present, SNL constitutes 63 % of Swaziland. This land is held by the King (he does not own it)
in trust for the nation and is controlled through chiefs, who act as the main administrators of the land tenure
system. The land is in fact owned by the entire community and can be used by everyone, although it cannot be
individually owned, sold, or used as collateral. The chiefs allocate land to homestead heads—primarily males—in
their respective areas, who then distribute fields to wives, descendants, kin or even nonfamily members. Each
“house” (consisting of a wife and children) in the homestead is entitled to its own fields for cultivation. The
majority of SNL homesteads engage in subsistence cropping and livestock raising. Grazing is communal and the
location of grazing pastures is determined by the chief on the advice of district representatives.
All Swazi citizens can be allocated land by virtue of membership in a local community, although the manner
in which a Swazi is granted land is dependent upon his/her position in the household, determined chiefly by age,
sex, seniority and marital status. The size of the parcel of land allocated to individuals is supposed to be based on
need and ability, but it is not uncommon for a chief to allocate large expanses of land to himself and his close
associates. Since SNL cannot be bought, rights of ownership are derived more from political than economic
bases--traditionally, a person pledges loyalty to a chief in return for a plot of land.
Inheritance of SNL held under traditional tenure is governed by community-based law as well, and goes into
effect when a homestead head dies. Land rights are normatively passed down patrilineally through the male line.
The eldest son of the principal wife in a polygamous household or the only wife in a single household is the main
heir, while provisions are made for the younger sons.
The community-based land tenure system, though highly criticized on developmental grounds, is defended
by many Swazis as an indispensable element in the traditional polity, and continues as the dominant tenure form
for smallholder agriculture. As a member of the community, a Swazi is entitled by right to the nation’s resources
and productive land. Thus, a Swazi who has tended to his family and social obligations is always ensured of a
place of residence as well as a place where s/he is entitled to derive a living from both arable and pastoral land.
Swazis fear that individual land tenure would result in the emergence of a landless group, in addition to a loss of
power by the King and local chiefs.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Swazi Nation Land tenure arrangements have been criticized by “developers” on the grounds that they slow
agricultural commercialization. It is argued that only 10% of the households produce for the market and that263
agricultural production, which accounts for only 12% of GNP, cannot cope with the growing population. Factors
contributing to this lack of production are small and fragmented holdings, lack of tenure security, erosion due to
overgrazing, fallow land, and lack of modern innovations such as fencing and credit. In addition, the communal
tenure system has not been able to create enough employment opportunities since production is mainly during a
single season, leaving most people unemployed for the rest of the year.
The Government of Swaziland is aware of the crucial contribution freehold tenure makes both to export
growth and economic development. It is estimated that ITFs generate about 31% of the country’s GDP,
contribute to over 70% of the country’s export earnings and provide up to 75% of employment of Swazis. Given
their well established infrastructure, ITFs do not have marketing problems because they usually have written
contracts with processing companies, marketing firms and consumer institutions both within and outside the
country. The freehold tenure system allows for more employment opportunities than the community-based tenure
system, because the large sizes of enterprises allow for a variety of activities which can be carried out throughout
the year, such as marketing, machine operations, servicing and repair of machinery. Since agriculture on freehold
tenure is regarded as self-sustaining, government funding, marketing and production support policies have been
focusing on mobilizing local and foreign financing and expertise for purposes of increasing rural employment and
production on Swazi Nation Land.
Various critics of the community-based tenure system have argued that it is disadvantageous in the
following ways:
1) There is an inability for more productive farmers to obtain enough land to farm at the desired scale, since the
average size of a farm plot is less than 2 hectares.
2) The division of the original homestead among family members (from fathers to sons and from unplanned
allocations by chiefs and households to other families who live far from the holdings) results in a
fragmentation of land, lack of motivation to engage in soil/water conservation practices, reduction in the
efficiency of cultivation, low productivity and limited farm investments.
3) The fragmentation of holdings is also identified as inefficient because it is an obstacle to the introduction of
mechanization, though it clearly also has certain advantages in risk-spreading strategies.
4) Since individuals only have usufruct rights to the land, tenure insecurity is assumed to exist for members of
the community; albeit rare, there is the threat of eviction by political authorities (chiefs).
5) Farmers do not have the tenure security needed to obtain loans for agricultural investment.
6) Farmers’ independent management of their holdings is said to be limited by community uses, such as
communal grazing after harvest.
7) Significant amounts of land are said to be idle in the hands of rural residents who derive their livelihood from
alternative sources of employment in the modern sector.
8) There is a marked discrepancy between the major role which women play in agriculture and their inability to
own land in their own right.
These critiques have been repeated regularly but most have not been very well substantiated. Insofar as they
do exist, their extent and seriousness remain to be established.
Although individual tenure land has been held to be the best policy option for ensuring maximum production
and development, the system might not be the best option for residents of SNL. Although private ownership
would instill a sense of tenure security for homestead heads, many Swazis harbor antipathy toward the system of
individual tenure farms due to the bitter experiences they had in the early 1900s when two-thirds of their land was
sold to foreign concessionaires by the king. Although individuals on SNL might not have the tenure security264
necessary to invest in commercial agriculture, they do have tenure security in the sense that they are guaranteed
rights to the nation’s resources. As such, they can always obtain usufruct rights to a piece of land which they can
use for subsistence agriculture. The problem is to balance social security and productivity needs in a single tenure
system for the SNL.
Rangelands, forests, and water resources fall under community-based tenure systems and are open to all
members of the community. This system of tenure has been criticized on the basis of the “tragedy of the
commons,” particularly in terms of grazing practices. Studies have shown that grazing lands in recent years have
been subject to levels of overgrazing and extensive soil erosion in many areas of SNL. Evidence indicates that
households under present institutional arrangements are given incentives to accumulate as much livestock as they
can without due consideration of the impact on the environment. Since privately held animals are grazed on
publicly held land, there are no incentives for individuals to reduce herd size and to improve pasture. There is no
effective social control of use of land for grazing. This scenario is not a problem on ITF land.
Since the fragmented nature of farm holdings on SNL limits the level of investment an individual can make
on them, there has consequently been limited investment in soil conservation practices. Although the individual
tenure system is recognized for its use of good farming practices and adoption of soil conservation measures,
commercialization involves the use of farm inputs such as chemical fertilizers. Recent studies have indicated a
general increase in soil toxicity as a result of these practices.
Tenure arrangements also impact democratization objectives. Swaziland is not remotely a democratic
nation, and tenure is closely linked to the traditional system of authority. Although the communal tenure system is
equitable in the sense that every person is eligible to obtain usufructuary rights to a piece of land as long as s/he is
a legitimate member of the community, the system also provides the basis from which the government derives its
authority. Land is the basis of power in Swaziland, as demonstrated by the fact that the king controls land
through chiefs in a hierarchical manner. A king’s or chief’s position is largely derived from the fact that he has the
power to assign land to people. For example, transformations involved in the different tenurial systems, such as
the repurchasing of freehold tenure land into SNL, are under the control of the monarchy. If an individualized
tenure system is adopted by the Swazi nation, therefore, a mechanism needs to be designed which will ensure that
the majority of the land does not end up in the hands of only a few people, causing landlessness and insecurity to
the traditional family.
Tenure also has important gender dimensions. According to traditional Swazi law and custom, all land
attached to a homestead belongs to the head of that homestead—usually a male—although in some cases it might
be a grandmother or the most senior wife in a polygamous household. The power of land allocation is also vested
primarily in males and is allocated by them to their sons. A wife and her children are treated as constituting a
“house” within the homestead, a division especially relevant to the allocation and inheritance of land and livestock
as well as other property. Only men can assume primary roles as members of chief councils entrusted with
important decision making responsibilities regarding land. Women are only accounted for in the sense that they
can expect to receive land from their husbands and be represented by their husbands in dispute situations.
Access for women remains a problem. Although it is often found that women oversee much of the
production process, consumption patterns and the process of surplus disposal with regard to land, they can only
use land which has been acquired by a man. The normative pattern for women to gain access to land is by
marrying, or through male children. If a woman approaches the chief through a male relative and is unmarried
with children to support, she might be allocated some land as well. According to the system of community-based
tenure, each individual field belongs to the woman who tills it. She may defend her rights to that field against
anyone seeking to take it away, including other members of the homestead. She also has the right to the produce
of her fields, although some of that produce must be contributed to the common stores of the homestead.265
Many Swazi women have developed creative strategies for gaining access to land. These strategies fall into
three different categories: (1) strategies of control (women assume person control over land access processes by
either openly rejecting or minimizing the ideal standard of male control); (2) strategies of avoidance (women
avoid individuals and legal measures which might deny them access to land); and (3) strategies of deception
(women deceive decision-makers about personal circumstances, such as marital status, and deceive the legal
system about land rights). These strategies are used within the context of Swaziland’s customary legal system as
well as the modern legal system, with a varying degree of frequency and success.
Present policy position and reforms
Many arguments have been advanced in favor of land reform in Swaziland which encourage conversion from
community-based tenure to individualized tenure. Such arguments are founded on the belief that various
components of the community-based tenure system—such as a lack of tenure security, the inability of women to
own their own land and soil erosion/environmental degradation—are hindering national development.
The individualized tenure system fares more favorably in terms of productivity, income generation,
employment and the general contribution to GDP and external trade. Such a system would create private
individual ownership of land whereby rights are adjudicated, fragmented holdings are consolidated, land areas are
surveyed and owners determined and registered. Such a system, however, has the tendency to promote self-
centered objectives that may work against the needs of the majority of the people. It eliminates use rights of other
individuals, tends to keep most of the land in the hands of a few, creates landlessness and economic insecurity,
and requires a dramatic change in policy.
If such a system were adopted, it would be necessary to drastically alter the terms and conditions on which
land is held so that community controls over land are reduced. Furthermore, the family, the clan and the
community at large are significant components of the Swazi community-based tenure system which would be
threatened if the system were replaced. In sum, individualized tenure conditions under freehold tenure would
likely undermine social cohesion in the Swazi culture.
It is easier to enhance development if people are considered as cohesive communities rather than individuals
or individual families. Since community ideals are promoted under the community-based tenure system, this
would ideally be the basis of social development. Although this system of tenure does not score as highly on
economic indicators, it has very positive attributes of community welfare, social cohesion and group solidarity.
Both systems of tenure, therefore. have attributes--either social or economic--which are important to the
development of the Swazi nation as a whole. The decision to discard one tenure system in place of another,
therefore, is not likely to enhance development in its true sense. If genuine national and social development is to
emerge in Swaziland, there needs to be a compromise between the two existing tenure systems.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Clearly there is a need for improved land policy in Swaziland—one that will not only ensure equitable social
development, but will also guarantee increased productivity and production on both ITF land as well as SNL.
Any objective evaluation of the development process cannot overlook the fact, however, that the traditional
dispensation is still very strong in Swaziland, and it prohibits the selling and buying of land. Swazi society is very
much tied to the community-based tenure system. If changes are to be introduced, therefore, they should be
gradual so that the fundamental social framework is not dismantled. Reforms are needed in the repurchase areas,
perhaps more urgently than in the SNL. Efforts to redistribute land to the peasantry (such as the repurchasing
program) must not simply end up creating more inefficient “royal” parastatals which serve primarily to increase
the power of the monarchy.266
TANZANIA COUNTRY PROFILE
by John W. Bruce
Executive summary
Landholding in Tanzania was profoundly disrupted by vijiji (villagization) and ujamaa (communal farming)
reforms during the 1960s and 1970s. These programs were carried out without legal authority and have left a
heritage of normative confusion and tenure insecurity, reflected today in growing litigation to regain land lost
during the reforms. A decade of struggling to reformulate national land policy has produced innovative proposals,
but clear decisions on policy have been delayed by resistance to change in the large land administration
bureaucracy.
National land policy and legal framework
The population of Tanzania is 28.8 million, of which 22.2 million depend directly on agriculture. The land area of
the country is about 88.6 million hectares, of which only 3.5 million hectares are cultivable. About 5% of the land
area is cultivated under customary tenure, and 1% under commercial agriculture, while 40% is in rough grazing
and 25% gazetted as reserves or parks.
Under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, the government of newly independent Tanzania emphasized the
virtues of an egalitarian society characterized by mutual aid and cooperation. It intervened decisively to bring an
end to a developing market in land under customary tenure and to thwart growing peasant differentiation. Most
land in Tanzania was already owned by the state under colonial legislation, but a modest amount of freehold had
been created under the German colonial administration, primarily in the coastal areas. In 1963 the Freehold Titles
(Conversion and Government Leases) Act converted all freehold titles, totaling about 1 million acres, into 99-year
government leaseholds.
Between 1967 and 1973 government mounted a major effort to create ujamaa villages, settlements in which
communal agricultural production was to be initiated. Collective production was unpopular and bedeviled by the
same factors which undermine it elsewhere: inefficient management, free-rider problems arising from the
difficulty of rewarding labor contributions fairly, and the priority given by households to their own holdings.
By 1973 government was soft-pedaling collective farming, but pressed forward with the associated program
of compulsory villagization (Operation Vijiji), which aimed to make it easier to reach rural people with
educational, medical, and agricultural services. This program has in the end had a far greater long-term effect on
rural Tanzania than ujamaa. Eleven million households were relocated, often by force, and resentment over the
compulsion and loss of traditional lands was compounded by the fact that the promised services often never
materialized. In some areas the new concentrations of population meant concentrations of livestock which resulted
in serious environmental degradation in the surrounding areas, leading to draconian programs of livestock
clearing.
These programs are generally recognized among Tanzanians to have been ill-conceived and to have led to
major reductions in agricultural productivity. Today, the struggle is to disentangle producers from the confusion
and uncertainty which is their heritage. The reform program did not explicitly concern themselves with land
tenure. Indeed, they were largely extralegal, relying on government’s ownership of land and overriding customary
and other rights. This has led to growing litigation by those who wish to reassert customary rights ignored in the
reforms. To block those claims, government in 1992 attempted to legislate to nullify those prior customary rights267
in the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act. This attempt has been held unconstitutional by one
court, and the matter is still under litigation in multiple cases before the Tanzanian courts.
In the absence of legislation spelling out a new system of rural land tenure, the basic rights available to rural
Tanzanians remain the “right of occupancy” established under the Land Ordinance, 1923. The Ordinance
provides for “granted rights of occupancy,” written grants of land use rights by government to noncustomary
holders, which are rather like leases. The Ordinance also recognizes “deemed rights of occupancy” for peasant
land users. This is simply a general recognition of their rights under custom or implied by allocations under the
reform programs, without any documentary proof in the individual case. 
In 1983, an Agricultural Policy Paper adopted a policy of long-term (99 years) leaseholds to villages by
government, and from the villages to households (33 years). No legislation was deemed necessary to implement
this, again apparently on the theory that government could act solely on the basis of its ownership of the land,
whatever customary or other rights of use might have been recognized earlier. A program of village demarcation
and registration was initiated and by June 1991, out of some 8,471 registered villages, 1,836 (22%) had been
surveyed; some 1,303 (15%) village certificates prepared and only 183 (2%) of the certificates had been
registered. No individual certificates had been issued.
A 1992 Presidential Commission on Land Matters (“the Shivji Report”) suggested that the leasehold/sub-
leaseholds policy be dropped and replaced by a major decentralization which would confer greater discretion on
local communities to define tenure and manage land. That report was extremely critical of the Ministry of Lands,
Housing and Urban Development, recommending its replacement by a quasi-judicial institution, and the period
since 1992 has seen that Ministry struggle to retain its prerogatives and the centralized system of land
administration against the reform impetus.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenures
Customary tenure practices in pre-colonial Tanzania varied widely, the product of a complex interaction between
land, man, and crops whose purpose was to minimize the risk of famine. As a rule, clearing and cultivating land
established rights to it, rights that were then held collectively by descendants of the original land-clearer. Although
certain activities might be done communally, the farming unit was usually the individual household. Among most
groups inheritance was patrilineal, and land passed from a father to his sons. (The Zaramo, Luguru, Mwera, and
Makonde in the southeast of the country are exceptions and are matrilineal.) Land was relatively plentiful in most
areas of the country, and when holdings had become subdivided beyond an economical size or when productivity
had begun to fall, new lands could be cleared and brought under cultivation.
In a few areas of the country, notably Buhaya and Bugufi west of Lake Victoria, land tenure relations were
more hierarchical. Here powerful chiefs allocated large estates of land to officers who in turn allowed tenants to
work the land in exchange for services and tribute (that is, a portion of the crop). This system of landholding and
use, referred to as nyarubanja, survived in the colonial period despite the fact that the military caste it had served
no longer existed.
Under German and British colonial rule, customary land tenure systems survived with only slight alteration.
Large tracts of land were not alienated for European settlement, and as long as the supply of land was adequate,
customary practices continued to be followed. Although both colonial administrations declared unoccupied land
to be the property of the crown, customary practices were little affected. There were, however, innovations in
tenure systems introduced in areas where permanent crops were planted. Among the Chagga around Mount
Kilimanjaro, for example, the introduction of coffee meant that land with coffee bushes on it remained under
permanent cultivation. And because of the commercial value of the crop rights to coffee land became increasingly
individualized. In addition, in some areas new tenancy arrangements were introduced. Such arrangements were268
prevalent in areas around Lake Victoria where tenants had been used in the past and where there were now
migrant newcomers who wished to farm.
The evolutionary trends evident in the customary tenure systems in the years prior to independence were cut
short by the post-independence reform programs. But communities with substantial permanent improvements on
their land, such as the Chagga, tended not to be shifted in villagization and have retained traditions of strong clan
and household rights over land, and an informal land market is re-emerging.
In most villages there is today a village committee under the Local Government (District Authorities) Act
(No. 7 of 1982) which allocates land. These committees were until 1992 headed by law by the local party
chairman, and had little legal autonomy in land administration, though control from the center was often weak.
The chairman is now elected, but it remains an open question whether these committees can rebuild legitimacy. In
the absence of secure property rights, abuses by local officials still occur.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
Agricultural production in Tanzania is depressed, and insecurity of land tenure is one of the factors in this low
level of production. Tenure in the villages remains profoundly confused. There have been some false starts post-
ujamaa, largely on the legal or national policy level rather than on the ground. There have been some promising
pilot activities, as in a Dutch-funded project near Dodoma which maps and documents holdings, but no adequate
legal framework exists for these efforts.
Pastoralist land use is under increasing pressure from extensions of cultivation. These occur through natural
processes of increases in population and needs for land in farming communities, but they were intensified by the
reform policies in some areas, and in others by grants of land by government to commercial producers. Donor
projects have sometimes acerbated these problems, as in the case of the Canadian wheat production program. In
recent years, pastoralist populations assisted by NGOs have actively litigated to defend their land rights.
The impasse on privatization of rights to agricultural land has prevented policy discussions from moving on
to the development of adequate regimes for common property management of natural resources. There is an
adequate legal basis for management of common property pastures under the Range Development and
Management Act (1964), though the experiences with ranching associations has not been a positive one. There is
no adequate legal regime for protecting traditional migratory routes of pastoralists, and indeed these are under
intense pressure. There is a further important need for a legal regime for common property management of
woodland resources, as has been recognized in recent World Bank forestry project reports. There is currently an
intensive debate over whether resources such as miambo woodlands should be including within village territories
for development on a community forestry model or held by government for allocation to mechanized commercial
farming.
While national legislation on inheritance rights in Tanzania is relatively progressive, insisting on equal
treatment of male and female children, the situation in practice is that under both patrilineal and matrilineal
systems of inheritance, women in rural Tanzania generally have access to land only through their husbands.
Recent policy discussion have reiterated equality of treatment as the objective, but have also identified immediate
measures which may be strategically important: in government land allocations, single women should be eligible
to receive titles in their own right; land titles issued to households should be joint titles to husbands and wives; and
wills which leave lands to daughters should be honored.
The prospects for progress in the area of tenure reform are intimately connected with efforts to develop
multiparty democracy. The domination of village committees by the single party of the post-independence period
long posed a fundamental problem for reform strategies such as decentralization of land administration. These are
now being resolved. At the same time, secure land tenure is needed to provide rural people with the independence
to effectively challenge national policies on land rights and resource use which they oppose.269
Present policy position and reform directions
The next few years may well be critical for land policy. The Shivji Report is on the table, and numerous
workshops have reacted to the recommendations, generating counter-proposals. Government has before it well-
elaborated reform options. It remains to be seen if government will find the political will to follow through on
these reforms.
The case made in the Shivji Report for decentralization of tenure arrangements to local communities is
compelling and has considerable support in the donor community, but government will likely continue to assert
strong control over land outside traditional agriculture, as in the former freehold sector and in and around
municipalities. It remains profoundly reluctant to surrender state ownership of land, leery of land markets, and
still largely unconvinced of the efficiency of smallholder agriculture. Areas of unintensive use by local
communities seem destined to be the focus of intensive competition between local communities and government
as the latter seeks to allocate this land to commercial agriculture.
Implications for policy discussions and programming
Throughout most of the twentieth century Tanzanian farmers have been told what, where, and how to produce
and have generally chosen to cooperate only selectively—a not surprising fact given that most programs provided
little return to them.
A clear focus on the restoration of tenure security is essential. This appears attainable only through the
decentralization of authority to local communities proposed in the Shivji Report. That report would allow return
of households to land taken from them in the reforms which is not used and occupied, and calls for compensation
for all those whose land was taken outside the terms of legislation then in force; but it concludes that the new
patterns of residence and landholding created in the reforms must stand. The alternative of trying to restore post-
reform land use patterns is not feasible.
The strengthening of land management by democratic village institutions seems the best hope for re-
establishing an effective system of land tenure. While many villages may be content to work within customary
frameworks for years to come, there should be the option for villages with strong private rights in land to seeking
formal registration and titling of individual holdings. Existing rural development projects can make an important
contribution by piloting low cost systems for this purpose. Funders of rural projects could The report correctly
suggests that some limitations on opening villages to land markets may be needed, but perhaps overstates the
danger of landlessness. In urban and peri-urban areas there is a need for more elaborate land management
institutions.
There is also a fundamental need across the board for policy to allow the value of land to be recognized in
markets. Many of the problems with land in Tanzania have resulted from treating it as a free good, creating
extensive opportunities for rent seeking on the part of officials.
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Zambia has a land tenure system characterized by the co-existence of statutory leasehold tenure in state land and
customary tenure in reserves and trust land. This dualism means that land owners and tenants often must relate to
two separate sets of rights: one dictated by government through national law and one dictated by custom. In 1964,
the year of Zambia’s independence, all land was vested in the hands of the president. Subsequently, although
community-based tenure systems still operate, private freehold has been repressed if not prohibited, and land
legally has no value.
Zambia’s land management style has tended to emphasize administrative rather than market control. As a
consequence, the government has denied itself income from the country’s most valuable resource--land.
Currently, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government of Zambia, is calling for the
institutionalization of a new land code and land administration system, in an effort to overcome some of the
obstacles mentioned above. As of 1993, a number of reforms calling for both immediate and long-term action
were declared by the MMD at the National Conference on Legal Policy and Land Reform.
National policy and legal framework
Zambia is a country in southern Africa which comprises roughly 75 million hectares. Of these, approximately 16
million hectares are considered suitable for rough livestock grazing and 9 million hectares are considered to be
arable land with good potential for crop cultivation. Only 1.3 million hectares—14% of the nation’s arable
land—are currently under crop cultivation, however. The majority of arable land has not been cultivated because
of the fact that Zambia has one of the highest rates of urbanization in Africa. As of 1990, the population was
estimated at 7.8 million with about 42% of the total (3.3 million) residing in urban areas.
At independence in 1964, all Zambian land was vested in the hands of the president for and on behalf of the
Zambian people. At this time, Zambia inherited three categories of land: Crown land (now state land), native
reserves and native trust land (now trust land). State land constitutes 6.3% of the total land area of Zambia and is
governed according to the principles of English statutory law. Trust and reserve land constitute 57.7% and 36.0%
of the land area respectively, and are governed by varying systems of community-based tenure.
In 1975, a Land (Conversion of Title) Act was passed which enabled the president to convert all freehold
titles to statutory leaseholds of up to 100 years duration. Upon expiry, the lease can be extended for another 100
years or less as the president sees fit. The Act allows all unutilized tracts of farm land to be immediately taken
over by the state, and requires presidential consent before any dealing in land can conclude. In addition, the Act
abolished the sale of bare land in urban areas, municipalized all vacant land and undeveloped land in and around
major urban centers, and ordered all real estate agencies to close down.
Under this legislation, improvements are valued and sold when leaseholds change hands, but the land itself is
transferred without any compensation. Such policy adheres to the assumption that individuals should not reap
benefits from values in land which may be created by nature or by acts of the government, because such values
belong to society as a whole. The fact that land is not sold, however, does not mean that land has no value.
Legislation to tax or increase the rent on land in an active and functioning land market would raise the cost of
holding such land and thus diminish its value. Such a tax would also encourage more intensive use of the land or
its transfer to another owner who would use the land more intensively. Although the concept of land as a free271
good without value might create little problem in a purely subsistence economy, it is difficult to conceive of land
in this way in Zambia, where private entrepreneurs actively work to improve their leaseholds in a mixed
economy.
The Act also imposes high and rigorous standards of ground survey before one can obtain a title certificate.
The Land Survey Division of the Ministry of Land has a severely limited staff for meeting these standards and is
badly behind in survey work. Currently, the MOL estimates a backlog of roughly 30,000 applications in various
stages. To avoid long delays in the issuance of certificates, the Land Survey Division and the registry have for
many years adopted a policy of registering leases of up to 14 years if accompanied by an adequate sketch plan.
The 14-year lease title certificate confers the benefits and privileges normally enjoyed by the holder of a 99-year
lease title upon the lessee. Once a survey is eventually conducted, the 14-year lease is surrendered and a 99-year
lease is granted, covered by a final Certificate of Title. At present, there are between 70,000 and 100,000 titles
issued nationwide.
The Land Act did not abolish interests in reserves and trust land nor their governance by community-based
law. The administration of reserve land is governed by the Zambia Orders, which sets apart the land for the
exclusive use of the indigenous people. Although this land is governed by community-based tenure, the president
still retains the right to make grants or dispositions of land to Zambians and non-natives alike for up to 99 years.
In trust land areas, the president can grant a Right of Occupancy of up to 99 years to non-Zambians and demand
rent for the use of the land.
Currently, the MMD is calling for the institutionalization of a modern, coherent, simplified, and relevant
land code and land administration system. The 1993 National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform
specified a number of reforms. Specifically, the MMD called for immediate repeal of Act No. 15 of 1985, which
prohibited land from being granted, transferred, alienated, or leased to non-Zambians, and repeal of the section of
the 1975 Act that allows government, in fixing rents, to recognize the value of improvements only and not the
land itself.
Additionally, the MMD proposed to combine reserve and trust land categories into a single customary land
category, allow for uniform 99-year leaseholds on all state land and a variable duration on customary land, extend
an automatic renewal of 99-year leaseholds provided that lease conditions are met, identify unutilized land to be
made available to all investors, permit mortgaging and leasehold transfers of one year to take place without
presidential consent, formally recognize the role of chiefs and customary rights, recognize the universal principle
of equality for women and other disadvantaged groups, and repeal all undesirable land legislation.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Despite the application of English common law in Zambia, most Zambians still conduct their activities in
accordance with a system of community-based tenure. There is no single uniform set of customs prevailing across
the country, however; the term customary law encompasses a host of customs which are somewhat different for
each ethnic group.
There are three modes of acquiring land according to customary law: original acquisition, derivative
acquisition, and acquisition by inheritance. Land governed by community-based tenure is never sold. What is
sold, however, are improvements on land such as permanent structures (that is, buildings). The cornerstone of
customary land tenure is the communal ownership of land resources. People in most ethnic groups have relatively
equal access to resources and there is an equitable distribution of cropping land. Once a piece of land is acquired
by a family, it stays with that family for as long as they exist. Even if people leave their villages to get jobs in the
city, they retain ownership of the cropping land they used to cultivate. This ownership is perpetual. In the
individual’s absence, the field may he temporarily assigned to a relative who cultivates it on the understanding
that when the owner returns, the field will have to be surrendered.272
Ownership and the use of land is determined by the local community through their traditional leader in
whom this power is entrusted. The chief, as a center of political, traditional and cultural power, stands as a
symbol of the ultimate ownership. Traditionally, an individual wishing land would go to his or her native village
and ask the chief for an allocation. Ties between the urban population and the chiefs have however weakened
considerably with time in some areas. Children, whose parents and grandparents are one or more generations
removed from rural life, in some cases find that chiefs no longer recognize their traditional rights to land. The
consent of chiefs and district councils continues to be the basis for any approval of applications by outsiders for
both Reserve Land and Trust Land.
Chiefs also establish the rules of land use in communal woodlands and grazing areas. These use rights are
generally not regulated, and there are no formal limits on stocking rates or extraction from the forests. Likewise,
stocking rates on grazing lands are rarely monitored or controlled. Customary law does not have distinct
principles on the ownership of and access to trees. Generally, a landowner has rights to the trees and crops grown
on his land, and all trees on land without a landlord belong to all.
With regard to inheritance, when a man dies leaving children and a widow, his entire estate devolves on a
specific male heir in whom the property vests for his use and distribution to other relatives entitled to a share.
Sons who do not receive an inheritance but wish to farm in the village may seek land from the headman, but they
must first seek land from within the extended family. Women do not generally inherit land or receive land as
permanent gifts. In the case where sons are too young at the time of the father’s death, the woman may retain the
use of family gardens, but only until the sons reach maturity. There are exceptions in the case of unmarried,
divorced, or widowed women.
Studies indicate that the majority of farmers do not have documents or title to their land. In Southern
Province, 75% of respondents to a study had no form of documentation, and in Eastern province, as many as
94% did not hold written documentation to land. Only one Eastern Province farmer had obtained a formal title
deed. The remainder of the document holders held a letter from the chief.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
The current system of land legislation, based on antiquated English law, is badly in need of modernization.
Private landownership is effectively repressed if not prohibited by Zambia’s current legal framework, and land
cannot legally have value. Lack of private ownership and a land market is constraining the development of formal
credit and real estate markets. In addition, delays and costs in processing leasehold issuances and property
transfers are constraining land markets and inhibiting economic growth.
Zambia’s land management style has been that of a planned economy with direct administrative control,
rather than through managed markets and land use regulation as in market economies. It has involved state
ownership of land, administrative rather than market determination of land allocation, reliance upon development
conditions, restrictions on transactions, and undervaluing of land in the context of both transactions and taxation.
These policy decisions have impoverished Zambia’s public sector and undermined development in its private
sector.
At the present time, there are two primary sources of tenure insecurity in Zambia. First, there is the fact that
the leasehold system allows for large land allocations to outsiders. This can result in tenure insecurity for those
lacking title or the means to acquire it. Included is the risk of land speculation where people acquire land but
make no investment to develop it. Second, there is the possibility of maladministration in the customary sector by
some chiefs on reserve and trust lands, characterized by the allocation or selling of large tracts of land to
outsiders—most often wealthier claimants of influence—or by preventing the inheritance or transfer of land.
Aside from the potential deficiencies mentioned above, however, the community-based system of land tenure
does in fact play a significant role in providing security of tenure and access to the members of a community.273
Most farmers feel quite secure in their ability to cultivate crops on their land, and the high percentage of rights to
fence and plant trees conveys the notion that cultivation rights are long term in nature. In the communal area
surveyed in the Mazabuka district, 30.8% of the farmers felt they needed title deeds to secure their land rights. In
terms of security for credit access, the majority of farmers feel that title deeds are not necessary to obtain loans.
Even though all land belongs to the state according the 1975 Land Act, studies show that nearly 60% of
households on reserve and trust land in Eastern Province believe that the household head is the owner of the land,
while 31% attribute ownership to the chief or headman. The households who perceived themselves as owners of
their farmland tended to adopt more development measures, such as earthwork improvements and tree planting.
Most of these farmers used livestock or crops as collateral as opposed to land or land title.
Markets for land are poor for several reasons, but the major reason in areas studied is the relative abundance
of land. Households are able to find adequate land on which to satisfy their consumption needs and even to
produce a surplus for the market. It is public knowledge, however, that some of the people who were assigned
land in leasehold by the state are demarcating and selling undeveloped pieces of it. Although this practice is
illegal, the parties involved get around the law by entering into an agreement in which the buyer refrains from
seeking legal title or transfer to the land until after developing it. The law is also avoided by purporting to transfer
land to someone else as a gift or at nominal value.
The present forest code in Zambia discourages sustainable and regulated forest use by claiming that all
forest products belong to the state. On lands under traditional tenure, individuals or local communities cannot
legally restrict access, cut trees, or charge others a cutting fee, even if they have protected and managed a forest
area. Without an incentive to protect and manage forest areas, therefore, clandestine cutting to avoid government
fees has become the norm. In order to adequately manage or even protect the 7 million ha of gazetted forest estate
in Zambia, the Forest Department needs to engage the participation of individuals and local communities.
Community forestry will have significant potential in this respect. The integration of women in forest activities
needs to be given priority as well, since women are the primary gatherers of many of the forest products and by-
products and outnumber men in the rural communities.
The systems of community-based tenure in Zambia are equitable in the sense that each household within a
community has an equal share to the natural resources available. The system of statutory tenure governing state
land, on the other hand, is highly centralized in that control over all land is vested in the hands of the president.
The Act of 1970, which makes provisions for the compulsory acquisition of land and property is still in effect.
There is no appeal on such matters, since they lie in the discretion of the president. This act has been severely
abused in the past, and the government has been known to expropriate land without adequate levels of
compensation.
The current titling system, which is in theory open to traditional farmers in the rural areas, is by reasons of
expense and complexity really open only to the relatively wealthy, well-informed, and influential. It is exceptional
for traditional farmers to apply for or receive titles. The system as it is now working is not so much a system for
providing title as evidence of rights to land, as it is a mechanism for taking land away from communities which
customarily have had access to it.
If the land is actually allocated to those who will develop it, if reasonable compensation is provided to the
community which loses access to it, and if the community consents to the transaction, some transfers might be
appropriate. However, local people see the leasehold system as something which continues to reduce their supply
of land. The vast majority of traditional farmers do not understand the pros and cons of leasehold tenure and are
not in a position to evaluate its relevance to the development of their land.
Women have very limited access to land under both statutory and community-based tenure systems. Most
women have to get permission from the household head to use land and some are denied rights altogether. A study
done by Michael Roth showed that wives in Southern province appear to be completely excluded from fencing274
and tree planting decisions in about half of the households. Women in Eastern province, however, are allowed to
take part in some decisions; in about 11% of male-headed households interviewed, women were able to plant trees
without asking permission, and in two-thirds of all households women were allowed to plant following their
husband’s permission.
Where custom dictates that a married woman move in with the family of her husband, she cultivates the
same fields as her husband; the field belongs to the husband, however, and the wife merely has the right of
cultivation. It is now generally accepted, however, that if a married woman acquires land on her own initiative
independently of her husband, she has exclusive rights over ownership of that piece of land, notwithstanding the
dissolution of the marriage. According to the systems of inheritance under customary law, women do not inherit
land or receive gifts of land from their parents or mother’s brothers.
Although a procedure for obtaining title to land in areas under customary land tenure has been available
since 1985, most rural women are unlikely to take advantage of this opportunity since they are much less familiar
with bureaucratic procedures than men. Furthermore, traditional authorities demand that a married woman obtain
her husband’s consent in such a transaction.
Present policy position and reforms
The administration of land rights in state land are highly inefficient and often corrupt. The main cause for this
inefficiency is the requirement for cadastral survey of the property before title deeds are issued. Unless the farmer
is willing to pay very high survey fees to private surveyors, he has to wait a long time before a public surveyor is
available to attend to his needs. Consequently, the proportion of land under leasehold tenure has for a long time
remained under 10% .
Supporters of leasehold tenure argue that it is beneficial because it allows state intervention in the event that
a tenant fails to appropriately utilize a piece of land. Transfers enhance efficiency by relocating land from bad
farmers to good farmers, and help to facilitate the use of land as collateral. Opponents of leasehold tenure argue
that it does not convey the absolute ownership needed for tenure security. Instead, it is essentially a qualified right
to occupy land for a fixed term which may or may not be renewed. The tenant is therefore under the constant fear
of dispossession or state refusal to renew the lease. The degree of administrative discretion in land allocation,
coupled with the allocation of a valuable good at almost no cost, has led to widespread corruption in land
administration.
The community-based tenure system has by and large been more successful than leasehold tenure in meeting
the needs of the Zambian people. Customary systems seem to have weakened, however, for three reasons: (1)
rising land values, increased competition for land, and increased rent-seeking by chiefs; (2) little incentive to make
long-term improvements without clearly defined long-term land use rights; and (3) increased central government
control and reduced powers of local leaders.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
Despite the strengths and weaknesses of both tenure systems, they have become so entrenched that the
substitution of one for the other is neither feasible nor practical. Priority areas should be identified for limited
tenure “replacement.” Replacement is likely to be most effective in rather limited geographic areas where market
forces are well developed—for instance, in peri-urban situations. For other areas, there is a need for
tenure-change strategies which stress more evolutionary processes and may involve continued reliance for some
time on the relatively cost-effective customary institutions of land administration. One source of potential conflict
in this process could result from the fact that land rights in the customary tenure system are never registered
although their recognition is guaranteed.275
A land law that would serve different interests throughout Zambia is needed. This law should stress the need
for some forms of community title with regard to common property resources such as communal pastures, forests
and marginal lands, which constitute an important safety net for the rural poor. Special attention also needs to be
given to the needs of women.
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by Jyoti Subramanian
Executive summary
Zimbabwe’s agrarian question is one of the country’s most enduring colonial legacies fifteen years after
independence. For about ninety years the country was a settler colony in which the alienation of most of the fertile
land to European settlers and the adoption of discriminatory agricultural policies resulted in the oppression,
marginalization and impoverishment of indigenous producers. In an effort to redress these inequities, the
government of Zimbabwe enacted a series of land reform measures after independence in the late 1980s. In 1992,
the Land Acquisition Bill was passed, which enables the government to acquire 6.9 million hectares of land from
the large-scale commercial sector for purposes of resettlement. Proponents of land reform have aggressively
called for an expansion of the resettlement program to help redress the unequal distribution of land resources and
to rectify acute land scarcity in communal areas. Opponents of rapid and substantial land reform have asserted
the superior efficiency of the commercial farming sector and the adverse consequences that a substantially
expanded resettlement sector would have on agricultural output and the balance of trade. In 1993, the government
appointed a commission of land experts to assess the current tenure systems and make suggestions of alternative
systems. Its recommendations have not yet been acted upon.
National policy and legal framework
One of the smaller countries in southern Africa, Zimbabwe covers an area of 39,760,000 hectares; only 7% of
this area is arable (2,876,000 hectares). As of 1993, the total population was estimated to be 10,739,000, with
7,161,000 living in rural areas. Two main ethnic groups comprise the African population of Zimbabwe, the
Ndebele and the Shona; the former primarily occupy land in the western half of the country and the latter in the
eastern areas. Among both tribes, the traditional pattern of agriculture prior to white settlement was shifting
cultivation, a product of sparse vegetation and a relative abundance of land.
The current pattern of land distribution in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the 1890s, when an enforced
racial division of land was first implemented. This division was formalized under the 1930 Land Apportionment
Act, when approximately 50% of the country was given to the African population and 50% to the Europeans.
Although land was divided equally in terms of hectares, the fact that the European population has historically
been a very small percentage—less than 5 %—of the total population, illustrates a great disparity in the amount
of distributed land. This inequality is further compounded by the fact that the land allocated to white farmers by
the colonial government was of superior quality, while the black population was forced onto generally inferior
land in what became the “reserves.”
After independence in 1980, land categories in Zimbabwe have been redefined: the large-scale commercial
sector (LSCS) contains lands formerly held by Europeans; the small-scale commercial sector (SSCS) contains
lands formerly classified as Native Purchase Areas; the communal areas (CAs) contain lands formerly held by
Africans in the reserves; the resettlement areas are lands which have been acquired and redistributed to
smallholders under state-sponsored resettlement schemes since 1980; public lands contain former parks,
preserves, and unassigned lands.
Fifty-seven percent of Zimbabweans live in CAs and are often referred to as a “peasantry.” These areas
constitute 42% of Zimbabwe’s land area, and 85% of them are in the drier agroecological areas. Despite the
label, CAs are not composed of communal holdings. Their boundaries and farming systems are instead the
creation of a colonial regime which wanted to make room for white farmers. The farming system in these areas277
involves rain-fed and ox-plow cultivation focused heavily on maize production. Differences in landholding sizes
reflect differences in the ability of households to place land under cultivation with respect to household labor and
ownership of oxen.
Following independence, the resettlement program became the government’s main policy instrument to
redress inequities in land distribution. The Lancaster House Constitution, Zimbabwe’s 1981 independence
constitution, required that the government acquire land to redistribute on a willing buyer-willing seller basis.
Before the constitution expired in April 1990, this provision was often cited as the principal limitation of the
government’s program of land acquisition for resettlement, since it included a clause which protected European
landowners against confiscation of their lands.
The government was also able to obtain land through the Land Acquisition Act of 1985, which gave it the
right to “compulsory acquisition” for purposes such as settlement, agricultural use, land reorganization, forestry,
wildlife, or other natural resource utilization, or the relocation of persons dispossessed in consequence of the
utilization of land for the above purposes. The law enabled the president to acquire underutilized land and land
which had been declared derelict (abandoned by the owner). The government was required to provide adequate
compensation for both types of land. Through 1989, the provisions on underutilization had not yet been used to
acquire land, but a small amount of derelict land had been procured.
The Land Acquisition Bill of 1992 enabled the government to acquire 6.9 million hectares of land from the
LSCS. Of this amount, 5.0 million hectares was added to the resettlement sector, expanding its size from 3.3
million hectares to 8.3 million hectares, and 1.9 million hectares was added to the state farm sector, increasing its
size from 0.5 million hectares to 2.4 million hectares. Land allocations in the communal and small-scale
commercial sectors remained unchanged at 16.3 million hectares and 1.2 million hectares, respectively. The
government intends to first acquire underutilized land, and only later acquire more intensively utilized farms.
Thus far, most resettlement has taken place in the more barren regions of Zimbabwe in the form of a “model
A” scheme. Each model A settlement has about 500 families divided into roughly 15 nucleated villages of 25–50
families, with 3–4 schools and a clinic for each village. Land allocations within each scheme are based on the
different types of land use found in CAs: residential, arable and common. Each family is given a residential stand
of 2,500 square meters, an arable allocation of 5–6 hectares, and access to communal pasture sufficient to
support a herd for draft power. Land is occupied on the basis of a number of temporary permits. Grazing is
shared communally within village grazing areas, and the number of livestock units varies according to
agroecological zone. Specific settler criteria include: (a) no land or too little land, (b) unemployed, (c) poor, (d)
married or widowed with dependents, (e) aged 18–55 years and physically fit, (g) returned Zimbabwean refugee,
or (h) experienced and master farmer. The most difficult settler-selection issue facing government now is that of
displaced labor from the large-scale commercial farms which are being taken over for resettlement. There are also
concerns regarding whether the intensity of land use and productivity in the model A schemes can justify the
replacement of large-scale commercial farms.
The model B scheme is based on communal living and a cooperative mode of farming. Livestock may be
privately owned, but all other property, including land and equipment, are owned cooperatively. The model is
intended to enable those with limited resources to participate in viable agricultural activities. By 1989, less than
6% of the land area had been resettled using model B. In the model C scheme, a core estate provides production
and marketing services for settlers. As in model A, individuals are allocated parcels of arable land, and grazing
land is communally managed. By 1989, this model represented less than 1 % of the resettlement area. The model
D scheme attempts to integrate acquired grazing land into a land use plan for adjoining communities in the
communal areas. Although it has only been tried in one case, it comprises 12.4% of the total resettlement areas.
Despite its achievements, Zimbabwe’s land distribution still remains highly skewed. As of 1988, 4,660
farms still held 11.2 million hectares, while over 1 million African families in the communal sector lived on 16.4278
million hectares. Furthermore, farms in the large farm sector have land in the best rainfall zones, while the
majority of the rural population in CAs farm the most arid lands.
Freehold tenure governs the commercial sectors of Zimbabwe. All freehold land is registered; leases can be
obtained for ten years or more, or for the life of one of the parties. The easy transferability of freehold land has
made it attractive collateral for loans, and it has served as a form of security in the LSCS and SSCS sectors,
providing a great incentive for long-term investment in land.
Replacement and adaptation of indigenous tenure
Despite diversity in rainfall, soil quality and population density, CAs share a system of communal land tenure.
The community, represented by the chief, “owns” the land but allocates households’ heritable rights and permits
livestock grazing on an unallocated commons. The system of land allocation in CAs originated with the colonial
government, as it rearranged the population in an effort to accommodate European settlement. Thus, many
believe that communal tenure is largely a colonial construct, useful for indirect rule and the control of land
resources through chiefs.
With a redistribution of land came a redistribution of power. This is expressed by the passage of the
Communal Land Act of 1982, which vests ownership of communal land in the president. While the government
affirmed its support for customary law regarding access to and use of land, it removed the authority for its
allocation from customary institutions (such as local chiefs) and vested it in elected local government institutions
(district councils under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development). Land ownership
(title) continues to vest in the President, since the government sees itself as the executive authority of the people’s
interests. In fact, the provision that vests land allocation in elected institutions has been the only significant
departure from colonial practices relating to the allocation of land. The Act may be seen as another effort of the
state to gain control over communities.
Tenure constraints and opportunities
The arguments against agrarian reform have focused on its implications of the necessity of radical land
redistribution for economic growth. These implications are illustrated by the fact that the resettlement program
was conceived as a project for modernizing peasant production processes through strict state management and
regulation. The basic argument is that the equity gains that would ensue from reform would be nullified by losses
in efficiency and productivity, and that this would have adverse implications for employment, food security, and
export earnings. There has been huge productivity in food grains (maize, in particular) from the communal sector,
however. In addition, the historical circumstances which gave rise to the efficiency and productivity of large scale
capitalist farms (lavish state support and protection from competition), however, should not be ignored.
Moreover, the efficiency of these farms continues to be based on indirect subsidies of cheap labor, as evidenced
by the poor conditions of employment for farm workers and the high levels of malnutrition among their children.
A number of commentators do feel, however, that land redistribution will lead to an increase in incomes
which will lead to increased consumption and savings, and a subsequent increased demand for industrial goods,
which will in turn translate into increased industrial production. It is assumed that increased production, in turn,
will lead to an increased demand for labor and a reduction in unemployment.
The conventional critique of land tenure arrangements in CAs holds that the lack of individual security of
tenure derived from the communal control of landholdings weakens incentives to invest in agriculture. Similarly,
because land cannot be sold and thus not mortgaged under the customary tenure system, the system is seen as a
constraint on the ability of CA farmers to obtain credit for investment. There is evidence of success, however, in
CA production, in response to the lifting of other constraints. In the years following independence, CA farmers279
showed a remarkable ability to respond to new opportunities and were successful in growing maize and cotton.
This suggests that tenure has not been a binding restriction.
Land redistribution is predicated on the idea of modernizing peasant agriculture, which is founded on the
belief that peasants are traditional and subsistence-oriented. Hence, if left to themselves, it is assumed that they
would employ less productive methods of farming. Thus, the government has implemented strict administrative
regulations based on the permit system of tenure. The land tenure system in model A schemes is based on three
permits: a permit to reside, a permit to cultivate, and a permit to depasture stock. In each case, the use of the land
is strictly limited to the purpose for which the permit is granted, and the permit holder has no right to build upon,
cultivate, or depasture livestock on the grazing commons.
Tenure insecurity exists in these areas; according to the Land Tenure Commission, settlers are not prepared
to make long term investments on their land due to the fact that permanent improvements are prohibited,
compensation for them may be made only at the discretion of the Minister, and utilized land can be taken by the
government at any time. Although homestead entitlements are secure with respect to other households, insecurity
does arise when the state uses its ownership rights to regulate land use.
As a result of this insecurity, many resettled farmers have not surrendered their customary entitlements to
land in the CAs. In some cases, resettled farmers have ignored the conditions imposed on them by the permit
system altogether. Despite the fact that the land formally belongs to the state, some settlers have sold their rights
while others have sublet their plots. There is also evidence that a land-rental market is emerging in the CAs,
involving successful farmers who rent land occupied by households under-utilizing all or part of their land as a
result of capital and/or labor shortages. Payment is usually by way of cash, food, and plowing services.
Examples abound of the destruction of the economy, environment and community in Zimbabwe. Rural
community structures and self-sufficiency have been undermined by successive replacement of traditional
institutions, first by colonial structures and following independence, by post-colonial centrally dictated local
government structures. Land apportionment, the designation of marginal communal lands as labor reserves for
commercial farming areas, increasing population, land degradation, as well as national parks pressures have all
resulted in an environmental crisis in Zimbabwe’s communal lands.
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) program
is an attempt to implement, recreate, and support community based management of natural resources, including,
but not restricted to wildlife, in the marginal, pressured environment of the communal lands. CAMPFIRE was
initiated in the mid 1980s by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, to decentralize natural
resource management to the local level and to provide incentives for conservation by ensuring benefits,
proprietorship and decision-making power to the communities most affected by wildlife and other resources. It is
based on the premise that those who bear the costs of living with and managing resources should benefit from the
utilization of those resources. CAMPFIRE is seen as an alternative land use and livelihood strategy for marginal
lands unsuited to many forms of agriculture.
The implementation of CAMPFIRE can be considered as a five-stage process. The first stage is the
development of a supportive legislative and political environment. The second stage is to make district councils
aware of the potentials of wildlife and to wait for them to request the program. The third stage is to earn money
by identifying and marketing commercial opportunities, such as hunting wildlife products (elephants, ivory) or
tourism (safari operations). Money is returned directly to the councils. The fourth stage involves effectively using
the revenues gained to achieve the kinds of development desired by communities. The fifth stage is the
improvement of wildlife management and institutions, which is assumed to be an inherent by-product of the
empowerment of local communities. The government’s role in this process is one of monitoring program
sustainability, measured by three factors: harvesting of wildlife, returning revenues to producer communities, and
following guidelines which aim to ensure economically sound and democratic management.280
Some critics of the program feel that the government has not gone far enough to devolve responsibility
beyond the district level, which for many communities is too remote. Authority over and ownership of park
resources may need to be handed down to village level if CAMPFIRE’s aim of turning former poachers into
gamekeepers is to succeed.
While the land reform program is making important achievements in terms of equity, it has itself come under
criticism. The resettlement program does not include participation by, or representation of, the beneficiaries in the
planning and implementation process. Consequently, the conception of resettlement models and their
implementation have tended to be bureaucratic and statist. The permit system is authoritarian both in its form and
content, and is a good example of a law which confers unrestricted discretionary powers on an administration and
imposes obligations on citizens without conferring any rights. The Constitution does not grant permit holders the
right to question the fairness or reasonableness of administrative decisions (such as compulsory land acquisition)
through administrative review. This is clear evidence of the continuation of the colonial practice of fusing
sovereignty and proprietary title to land in the state.
There are important gender/tenure issues in the communal areas, the resettlement areas, and the freehold
sector. Although women farmers provide most of the labor for CA agriculture, male heads of household make the
basic farm-management decisions. Often, they will also claim control of any cash earnings from women’s work
on the farm or even off-farm. Land is distributed from chiefs and headmen to male lineage heads, who then
allocate this land within their subsistence units. Women are allocated land use rights as wives and daughters.
While women are entitled to acquire rights to land from their husbands upon marriage, not all wives actually have
plots. In a recent study, one-third of the married women in a sample did not have parcels. Often this was a
voluntary decision on the part of women, if they had an alternative source of cash. Women who had plots did not
expect to get them every year, since sometimes there was a rotation system among wives. Women have no rights
of inheritance under this system, and feel that control over the proceeds of the land is more important than gaining
formal rights to land.
In the resettlement areas, widows and unmarried women with dependents qualify to have land allocated to
them, while only widowed and divorced women are considered as household heads for purposes of resettlement.
With respect to married women, however, permits are issued in the name of the husband. In an area studied, 98%
of married permit holders were male while only 2% were women. Unmarried women constituted 11.6% of all
permit holders in the area. The rationale for issuing permits in the husband’s name is that he is the head of the
household, and that traditionally, only males had primary rights to arable land. This has served to reproduce and
perpetuate the patriarchal division of labor found in communal areas, since many polygynists prefer to marry
additional wives for labor as opposed to hiring workers. In the event of a divorce, the fact that permits are issued
in the name of the male spouse extinguishes women’s rights of access to land. This lack of access to land inhibits
women’s access to institutional credit, which is constrained because of the inability to produce collateral.
Collateral is obtained by the marketing of cash crops, which is traditionally done by men. Group lending may
have special importance for women who can form groups and obtain credit in this way.
From a production standpoint, women’s land rights are less important for the LSCS than for the SSCS. In
the LSCS, women do not act as field managers to any important extent, and very few women own freehold land.
A freeholder has been able to pass land to a daughter by will, though in cases of intestacy, customary rules
prohibit daughters from being heirs. The same holds true in situations of divorce and widowhood.
Present policy position and reforms
While private property rights and freehold tenure protect the sphere of private interests and activity of some
sections of society from the sovereign power of the state, the fusion of sovereignty and property facilitates state
intervention in the interests and activities of other sections of society. The marginal land that the majority of the281
peasantry occupy and use is subject to administrative and bureaucratic control by state functionaries in the name
of development, and the administrative authoritarianism of the state has exposed the peasantry to an abuse of
state power, racial and class domination and gender differentiation. The Zimbabwean government’s constrained
attempts to promote democratization and substantive equality through land redistribution have not fully
succeeded.
On 1 November 1993, the government appointed a commission of land experts to assess the current tenure
systems and make recommendations on alternative systems. The Commission recommended that communal
tenure be maintained and strengthened, both to improve tenure security as well as the legal and administrative
mechanisms necessary for long-term evolution of the system. The Commission also stated that traditional freehold
tenure for arable and residential areas is secure, and that this security should improve if the State relinquishes the
de jure ownership of communal land to village communities. Title to land in CAs is still vested in the President,
however, and while the use rights of the peasantry may be secure from other peasants, they are not secure from
the state as the owner of the land.
On land administration, the Commission recommends that members of the CAs be given rights over land
and all village resources. In addition, it is recommended that all CAs are surveyed using low cost techniques,
which would start with the adjudication and mapping of traditional villages so that they could receive a village
registration title. In the medium to long term the Commission recommends that villages or districts which have
fulfilled requirements for effective village level land administration should cease to be state land, and that all
communal land should ultimately be deemed “Traditional Village Land.” The significance of village registration
titles is unclear in this respect with regard to ownership, if land continues to vest in the state until villages have
met the requirements for effective village-level land administration.
The Land Tenure Commission has no coherent position on the issue of gender discrimination. For example,
it recommends that the legal rights for arable, residential and grazing areas must be held by the head of the family
in trust for the rest of the family. In addition, it urges heads of households not to dispose of or subdivide arable
land or residential land without the consent of the spouse and dependent children. If the Commission truly
intended to protect the rights of women, however, it should have recommended that Land Registration Certificates
be issued in the name of both spouses.
Implications for policy dialogue and programming
If the Government of Zimbabwe is sincere about wanting to democratize the social relations of both class and
production, it needs to seriously consider removing landownership from its sovereign authority. The community
should not, however, be romanticized as the repository of democratic and egalitarian agrarian practices. Unlike
the state, however, which is highly capable of repression, the community comprises local level social relations
which are amenable to democratic regulation and control. The government, therefore, needs to vest land in
communities themselves rather than in the state. Individual entitlements to land should be embedded and defined
within the community, which should allow for transfer and accumulation restraints, so as not to threaten the
stability of communal relations. Individual access to land should continue to be determined by community
membership. The role of the state should be to promote the establishment of local level institutional structures that
would foster democratic regulation and control on the one hand, and prevent the discrimination and oppression of
weaker members of the community on the other. In addition, state power should be used to enhance the rights of
those sections of society which have been marginalized within the political economy.
The government should build upon the principles laid out in the CAMPFIRE program, which are founded
on involving, organizing and empowering all members and sectors of local communities, and enabling them to
define and organize themselves on their own terms.282
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